REPORT OF CASES DETERMINED ON THE CROWN SIDE ON THE Northern Circuit, COMMENCING WITH THE SUMMER CIRCUIT OF 1822, AND ENDING WITH THE WITH A TABLE OF CASES AND AN INDEX. BY SIR GREGORY A. LEWIN, "The knowledge which teaches the nature, extent, and degrees of every crime. "No rank, no elevation in life, and let me add, no conduct, how circumspect LONDON: PUBLISHED BY S. SWEET, CHANCERY LANE, LAW BOOKSELLER AND PUBLISHER. TO THE HONOURABLE SIR EDWARD HALL ALDERSON, KNT. ONE OF HIS MAJESTY'S JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS It I COULD not dedicate this Volume to any one more appropriately than to the person who introduced me to the Circuit where its materials have been collected. is nearly twelve years since, at the request of Lord WYNFORD, (then Mr. Justice BEST), you rendered me that good office; and I am not only happy in the present opportunity of recording your kindness on that occasion, but also of acknowledging the many friendly attentions. I have from time to time received at your hands; especially since you have occupied the high station to which you were so justly elevated. Let me then hope, that, whatever opinion may be entertained as to the manner in which my labors have been performed, you will accept the dedication of them as an offering of my regard, and allow me to subscribe myself, With respect and esteem, Your obliged and faithful servant, 1, Elm Court, Temple, Feb. 10th, 1834. G. A. LEWIN. PREFACE. "FORASMUCH as human laws are to be dispensed by fallible men, instead of an unerring and omnescient Judge, the safety as well as the liberty of the subject requires that discretion should be bound down by precise rules, both of acting, and of judging of actions. Hence, LAWGIVERS have been obliged to multiply directions and prohibitions without number; and this necessity hath drawn them into a prolixity, which encumbers the law as a science to those who study or administer it, and sometimes perplexes it as a rule of conduct, to those who have nothing to do with it, but obey it. "When controversies arise in the interpretation of written laws, they for the most part arise upon some contingency, which the composer of the law did not foresee or think of. In the adjudication of such cases, |