be sure at the reentry, to come with a new strength, and that seven-fold to what he had before; and needs must the end of that man be worse than the beginning. She must therefore resolve to shun all likely occasions of falling again into the same snare, so far as the quality of her person and condition, and the common affairs of life will permit. And she had need also to use her best care and diligence (praying to God daily for grace to strengthen her thereunto) to withstand all wicked temptations of the flesh, that she be no more foiled thereby, neither entangled again in such sinful inconveniences as by God's Mercy she shall be now freed from.

17. If in these Directions I be thought to deal with too much rigour and strictness, it would be considered,

First, That it is much better to put the patient to a little more pain at the first, than, by skinning the wound over, to heal it deceitfully, and to suffer it to rankle inward; which will breed a great deal more grief at last.

Secondly, That since all men, through corrupt self-love and privy hypocrisy cleaving to our depraved nature, are partial towards themselves, and apt to deal more favourably with their own sins than they ought, it is therefore safest for them, in their own cases especially, to incline to severity rather than indulgence.

Thirdly, That there may be a mitigation used of the present Directions, according as the state of the patient, in the several variations thereof, shall require; but that, for the avoiding of partiality, not to be permitted to the sole liberty of the party herself, but rather to be done by the advice of a ghostly Physician, who, if he be a man of such wisdom and moderation as is meet, will I doubt not allow a greater indulgence, in case he see it expedient, than it could be safe for the party herself to take of her own head.

Fourthly, That in all this Discourse, I take not upon me to write edicts, but to give my advice: that is to say, not to prescribe to the judgment of others, if any shall see cause to dissent, but to deliver my own opinion (being requested thereunto by a Reverend Friend) with such a faithfulness and freedom as becometh me to do; and truly those parties whom it most concerneth ought not to blame me for it howsoever; inasmuch as there can be no cause to suspect that I

should be carried with any personal respects to be partial either for or against either of them: so God is my witness, whom I desire to serve, I had not any intimation at all given me, neither yet have so much as the least conjecture in the world, who either of them both might be.*

* Paley, in his Moral Philosophy, Book iii. Part i. Chap. 5. pronounces Sanderson's decision to be wrong. But, unless he had seen a different Copy of the Case, he mis

states it in several particulars, and wholly omits the fact that, at the time the Promise was made, the woman was married as well as the

man.

IN referring over your friend to me, you have pitched upon one of the unfittest persons in the world to be consulted in Cases of that nature, who am altogether a stranger to the public affairs of Christendom, and understand nothing at all of the mutual interests, relations, or transactions of foreign Princes or States. Yea, so little curious have I been to inform myself so much as where the stages lay of the chiefest actions of these latter times abroad, or what persons were engaged therein, that I have something pleased myself, perhaps too much, with my own ignorance in our home affairs, accounting it among the happinesses of my privacy and retiredness, in these unhappy times, that, amidst so much fury and bloodshed on every side, it was never my hap to be within the view of any battle or skirmish; nor did I ever see so much as a pistol discharged, or a sword drawn against any single person, since the beginning of the War. I could have wished therefore, since my Opinion herein is desired, that I had had the opportunity to have advised with some more knowing men, and of greater experience and judgment than myself in these matters; or at least that you had sent me, together with the two enclosed Letters, a transcript of your Answer (whose judgment I do with great reason very much value) unto the former of them; for there I assure myself, I should have met with such materials as would have served me for a good foundation to work upon. Yet to satisfy your desire, so far as in me lieth, and the rather for the Gentleman's sake your friend, (who, though unknown to me by face, or, till the receipt of your Letter, so much as by name, yet by his Letters appeareth to be a person of piety and ingenuity, and a great master both of reason and language,) I have endeavoured, with reservation of place for second thoughts, and submission to other judgments, to declare what

my present apprehensions are concerning the whole business. Wherein the resolution of such doubts as in point of Conscience may arise, or of the most and chiefest of them, will, as I conceive, very much depend upon the consideration and right application of these four things, viz.

I. The different sorts of men's Employments in general. II. The nature of the Soldier's Employments in particular. III. The end that men may propose to themselves in following the War; or what it is that chiefly induceth them thereto.

IV. The condition of the person so employed, or to be employed.

I. Considerations of men's Employments in general.

1. Men's Employments are of two sorts. The one of such as any man may, without blame from others or scruple within himself, follow, merely upon his own score, if he find himself in some measure able for it, and have a mind thereunto. He hath a power in himself, and that Jure proprio, by a primitive and original right, without any necessary derivation from others, to dispose of himself, his time and industry in that way. For the exercise of which power, there needeth no special or positive warrant from any other person; but it is presumed he is, as in relation to others, sufficiently warranted thereunto in this, in that he is not by any superior Authority, Divine or human, forbidden so to do; and upon this account it is that men betake themselves, upon their own choice and liking, to husbandry, merchandize, manual occupations, the study of the Law, &c.

2. But another sort of Employments there are, whereunto a man hath not a just right primitively, and of himself; neither may he lawfully exercise the same merely upon his own choice; but it is necessary that that power should be derived upon him from some such person or persons as have sufficient Authority to warrant him for so doing. Such is the Employment of a Judge, a Constable, an Arbitrator, &c, which are therefore said to be Juris delegati, because the right that any man hath to such Employments accrueth unto him by virtue of that Authority which he receiveth by delegation or deputation from some other that hath a right by command, election,

nomination, or otherwise, to empower him thereunto: whence are those usual forms, Quo jure? Quo warranto? Who made thee a Judge? By what Authority dost thou those things! Or, Who gave thee this Authority? A man may betake himself to the study, and so to the practice of the Laws, of his own accord; but he may not take upon him to be a Judge, without commission from his Sovereign. So he may follow husbandry and merchandry, upon his own choice; but he may not do the office of a Constable, unless he be chosen by the neighbours; or of an Arbitrator, unless chosen by the parties thereunto.

3. Now, although as well the one sort as the other, after a man hath addicted himself to the one, or is deputed to the other, may not unfitly be termed his particular Calling, and the latter perhaps with better propriety than the former, (for the word Calling properly importeth the action of some other person,) yet according to the common notion which, by custom of speech among us, we have of these terms, the General and the Particular Calling, the Employments of the former sort are usually taken to be the particular Calling of men, and those of the latter sort will be found, if well considered, to fall rather under the general Calling, as branches or parts thereof: inasmuch as the exercise of such Employments is a part of that moral duty which all men, according to their several respective relations, ought to perform to others, being by them empowered thereunto, upon the tie of obedience, contract, friendship, &c. But for distinction sake, as the Latins make a difference between Vitae institutum and munus, we may call those of the former sort a man's Profession, and those of the latter sort his Office. So a man is by profession a Lawyer, by office a Judge; by profession an Husbandman, by office a Constable.

4. To bring this Discourse home to the present business, we are next to inquire, to whether sort of the two the Employment of a Soldier doth more properly appertain: that is, whether we are to conceive of it as a profession which a man may at his own choice fix upon, as his particular vocation, or rather as an office of duty and service, which he is to undergo when by the command of his Prince he shall be thereto appointed, and so to come rather under the notion of a general