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Advice of Counsel at Law being taken, how the said A. B. may be most readily relieved, he is directed to petition the present Supreme Power to pardon the debt, because taken only in the King's name, when there is no debt due to him from R. C.

As to the Case proposed,

1. I am clearly of opinion, that the taking of Bonds in the King's name, to the mere behoof and for the advantage of private persons, when there was no such debt really due to the King, was a fraudulent and unjust act from the beginning; for though it were not actually forbidden, and so might perhaps be valid enough in foro externo, till the issuing out of the King's Proclamation in that behalf; yet was it in point of Conscience unlawful before, as being a crafty course: so refused by the King himself, and guilty of a double injustice: the one to the King, as an abuse to his Prerogative: the other to the subject, as tending to their oppression, as by the Proclamation is recited; and that therefore,

2. Neither might the Merchant, whiles he lived, nor ought his Executors, now he is dead, to make advantage of the King's name used in that Bond; nor might he then, nor may they now, by virtue of the King's Prerogative, or under the colour thereof, for the recovery of the said Debt, use any way to the prejudice or damage of the Obligee, or of any purchaser from him, other than such as he or they might have used, in case the Bond had been taken in the Obligee's own name, and not in the King's.

3. If any proceedings have been made already in pursuit of the Debt due upon the said Bond, upon no other ground or colour than the Prerogative aforesaid, whereby the said A. B. cometh to be endamaged or prejudiced more than otherwise he should have been, that the Executors ought to make him some considerable satisfaction for the same: although perhaps not to the full of what he hath suffered or would demand, yet in such a proportion, as to the judgment of indifferent persons, in a case wherein both parties, if they must do what is fitting and just, are sure to be losers, shall seem reasonable, in case the parties cannot accord it between themselves.

4. Whereof, although through the corrupt partiality that is in most, I may truly say, all men more or less, I do not apprehend any great likelihood, for neither part would, and yet both must be losers, yet I should advise that trial were made thereof in the first place, as the most kindly Christian way of growing to peace, if parties will be persuaded to meet about it, and can be made masters of their own passions when they are met; and surely matters might be easily brought to a handsome conclusion, if both parties, but especially the Executors, who seem to have the advantage in Law, would not stand too much upon whatsoever advantage they may seem to have, but, as in Conscience they ought, submit both that, and all other circumstances appertaining to the business, and indeed their whole mutual demands, to the final determination of that transcendent Law, which Christ hath established as the only Royal Standard, whereby to measure the equity of our actions in all our dealings towards others: viz. to do as we would be done unto; or, which cometh to one, not to do that to another, which if he should do to us, supposing his case was ours, we should think ourselves scarce justly and fairly dealt withal.

5. But lastly, in case no such accord can be made, either by agreement of parties, or mediation of friends, and that through the only default and stiffness of the Executors, A. B. having by all fair ways faithfully sought and endeavoured the same, I see not but the said A. B. may (but not to be done but as his last refuge) seek to relieve himself according to the advice of his Counsel, by making his addresses to such person. or personage, as for the time being shall be in actual possession of the Supreme Power, and so in a capacity to overrule the Law in a case of that nature, by forgiving that Debt whereunto the King was colourably and fraudulently entitled for private advantage, to the prejudice of a third person; but was not at all a debt owing to him from the Obligee.

*

B. P. 17 July, 1658.

* In the Cambridge Version, 'Personae isti aut Magnati.'

THE

CASE OF SCANDAL.*

IN judging of Cases of Scandal, we are not so much to look at the event, what that is or may be, as at the cause whence it cometh; for sometimes there is given just cause of Scandal, and yet no Scandal followeth, because it is not taken: sometimes Scandal is taken, and yet no just cause given; and sometimes there is both cause of Scandal given, and Scandal thereat taken. But no man is concerned in any Scandal that happeneth to another by occasion of any thing done by him, neither is chargeable with it, further than he is guilty of having given it. If then we give Scandal to others, and they take it not, the whole guilt† is ours, and they are faultless: if we give it, and they take it, we are to bear a share in the blame as well as they, and that a deeper share too. Vae homini! Wo to the man by whom the offence cometh, S. Matt. xviii. 7. But if they take offence when we give none, it is a thing we cannot help, therefore the whole blame must lie upon them: wherefore, if at any time any doubt shall arise in the Case of Scandal, how far forth the danger thereof may, or may not oblige us to the doing or not doing any thing proposed, the Resolution will come on much the easier, if we shall but rightly understand what it is to give Scandal, or how many ways a man may become guilty of scandalizing another by his example. The ways, as I conceive, are but these four.

2. The first is, when a man doth something before another man which is in itself evil, unlawful, and sinful. In which case, neither the intention of him that doth it, nor the event, as to him that seeth it done, is of any consideration; for it

*This can hardly be regarded as a distinct Case, the matter of it, with a few variations of no great importance, having already been given in the Case of the Liturgy, PP. 49-53 above.

'the whole guilt-they take it.' These words, inserted here from the Case of the Liturgy, are represented in the Cambridge Version of this Case.

mattereth not whether the doer had an intention to draw the other into sin thereby, or not: neither doth it matter whether the other were thereby induced to commit sin or not. The matter or substance of the action being evil, and done before others, is sufficient to render the doer guilty of having given Scandal, though he had neither any intention himself so to do, nor were any person actually scandalized thereby because whatsoever is in itself, and in its own nature evil, is also of itself, and in its own nature scandalous, and of evil example. Thus did Hophni and Phinehas, the sons of Eli, give Scandal by their wretched profaneness and greediness about the sacrifices of the Lord, and their vile and shameless abusing the women, 1 Sam. ii. 17, 22. And so did David also give great Scandal in the matter of Uriah, 2 Sam. xii. 14. Here the Rule is, Do nothing that is evil for fear of giving Scandal.*

3. The second way, when a man doth something before another with a direct intention and formal purpose of drawing him thereby to commit sin. In which case, neither the matter of the action nor the event is of any consideration; for it maketh no difference, as to the sin of giving Scandal, whether any man be effectually enticed thereby to commit sin, or not; neither doth it make any difference, whether the thing done were in itself unlawful or not, so as it had but an appearance of evil, and from thence an aptitude to draw another to do that, by imitation, which should be really and intrinsecally evil: the wicked intention alone, (whatsoever the effect should be, or what means soever should be used to promote it,) sufficeth to induce the guilt of giving Scandal upon the doer. This was Jeroboam's sin, in setting up the calves with a formal purpose and intention thereby, for his own secular and ambitious ends, to corrupt the purity of Religion, and to draw the people to an Idolatrous Worship; for which cause he is

*Mr. J. C. Robertson, in his Work entitled, 'How shall we conform to the Liturgy?' Additions to p. 29, 1. 9, second Ed., would prefer to omit the comma, placed in previous Editions, after the word 'evil,' understanding the Rule to mean, Let not fear of giving scandal persuade you to do evil. But is not its purport rather, Do no

thing that is evil, lest you should give scandal, lest you should put a stumblingblock in the way of your brother or brethren? Compare De Juramenti Obligatione, Praelect. ii. §. 9. Altera respectu aliorum, ob metum scilicet Scandali: ne quis alius infirmior, nostro exemplo adductus, quod nobis factum videt id sibi quoque licere putet,' &c.

so often stigmatized with it as with a note of infamy, to stick by him whilst the world lasteth: being scarce ever mentioned but with this addition, Jeroboam, the son of Nebat, that made Israel to sin. Here the Rule is, Do nothing, good or evil, with an intention to give Scandal.

4. The third way is, when a man doth something before another, which in itself is not evil, but indifferent, and so, according to the rule of Christian Liberty, lawful for him to do or not to do as he shall see cause, yea, and perhaps otherwise commodious and convenient for him to do, yet whereat he probably foreseeth the other will take Scandal, and be occasioned thereby to do evil. In such case, if the thing to be done be not in some degree, at least prudentially, necessary for him to do, but that he might, without great inconvenience and prejudice to himself and any third person, leave it undone, he is bound in charity and compassion to his brother's soul, for whom Christ died, and for the avoiding of Scandal, to abridge himself in the exercise of his Christian Liberty for that time, so far as rather to suffer some inconvenience himself by the not doing of it, than by doing of it to cause his brother to offend. The very case which is so often, and so largely, and so earnestly insisted upon by St. Paul: See Rom. xiv. 13-21; XV. I, 2. I Cor. viii. 9-13; ix. 12, 22; and x. 23-33. Here the Rule is, Do nothing that may be reasonably forborne, whereat it is like Scandal will be taken.

5. The last way is, when a man doth something before another, which is not only lawful, but, according to the exigencies of present circumstances, pro hic et nunc, very behoveful, and in some sort prudentially necessary for him to do; but foreseeth in the beholder a propension to make an ill use of it, and to take encouragement thereby to commit sin, if there be not withal a great care had to prevent, as much as is possible, the Scandal that might be taken thereat; for, Qui non prohibet peccare quum potest, jubet.* In such case the bare neglect of his brother, and not using his utmost endeavour to prevent the evil that might ensue, maketh him guilty.† * Seneca, Troad. 295. Qui non from Gratian, Dist. 86. vetat... Compare Sermon vi. ad Magistr. §. 26. Qui non vetat peccare cum posset, jubet is quoted by Prynne, Canterbury's Doom, as

† 'maketh him guilty.' In previous Editions, making him guilty, upon which' &c. See above, p.

52.

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