carriers own line does not, primâ facie, create a contract to carry such goods to their final destination.1]

sustained, in our dissent from it, by the Court of Errors in New York, and by the Supreme Courts of Vermont and Connecticut. Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157; Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Champlain Transportation Company, 18 Verm. 140, and 23 Verm. 209; Hood v. New York & New Haven Railroad, 22 Conn. 1. In these cases, the decision in Weed v. Saratoga & Schenectady Railroad, 19 Wend. 534, (which was cited by the present plaintiff's counsel,) was said to be distinguishable from such a case as this, and to be reconcilable with the rule, that each carrier is bound only to the end of his route, unless he makes a special contract that binds him further."]

1 [In Jenneson v. The Camden & Amboy Railroad Co. in the District Court of Philadelphia, Jan. 1856, Stroud, J., said: "The only question is whether this receipt contained an undertaking by the defendants to carry the chest beyond the terminus of their line, or rather, beyond the place named in the receipt, the 'office of the defendants, in New York.'

"The language of the receipt is plain and positive—which we promise to deliver at our office in New York, upon payment of freight therefor at the rate of 26 cents per 100 lbs.' For what purpose the memorandum, To be shipped for Camden, Ohio, from New York,' was made, we are not called upon to determine. We do determine that it did not enlarge the defendant's promise, as set forth in the body of the instrument; that it does not import an agreement by the defendants, that they would transport the chest to Camden, Ohio, and then deliver it to the plaintiff, which is the allegation in the declaration. It was admitted by the plaintiff's counsel that the chest was safely carried to New York, that it had been put in the way of transportation to its destination, by delivery to a proper railway transportation company for that purpose, but what became of it afterwards could not be ascertained.

"Questions very similar to that which has here arisen, have occurred several times in England, and in some of our sister States. Muschamp v. The Lancaster & Preston Junction Railway Company, 8 Mees. & Wels. 421, was the case of a parcel delivered at Lancaster, addressed to a place in Derbyshire, beyond the line of the Lancaster and Preston Railway. Baron Rolfe, before whom the cause was tried, told the Jury, that a carrier who takes into his care a parcel directed to a particular place, and does not by positive agreement limit his responsibility to a part only of the distance, undertakes primâ facie to carry the parcel to its destination, and that the rule was not varied by the fact that that place was beyond the limits within which the carrier professed to carry. This ruling was sanctioned by the Court in banc.

"In a subsequent case, Watson v. The Ambergate, Nottingham, & Boston Railway Company, 3 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 497, the decision in Muschamp v. The Lancaster, &c., was approved.

"In this country, the Courts have held, that when goods are delivered to a carrier, marked for a particular place, but unaccompanied by any other direc

§ 539. The like result will follow, if the goods are destined

tions for their transportation and delivery except such as might be inferred from the marks themselves, the carrier is only bound to transport and deliver them according to the established usage of the business in which he is engaged, whether that usage were known to the party from whom they were received or not. Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, (N. Y.) Rep. 157; Farmer's and Mechanics Bank v. Champlain Trans. Co. 18 Verm. R. 140, and 23 ib. 209.

"In Nutting v. Connecticut River Railroad Co. 1 Gray, 502, a receipt was given of this description: Northampton, Mass., received of E. Nutting, for transportation to New York, nine boxes planes, marked,' &c. Two of these boxes were lost between Springfield, Mass., and New Haven, Conn., being beyond the terminus of the defendant's road. No connection in business was shown to exist between the defendants and the proprietors of the connecting road, nor was pay taken for the transportation beyond Springfield, which was the terminus of the defendant's road.

"The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held, that the true construction of this contract was, that the goods should be safely carried to the terminus of the defendant's road, and there delivered to the carriers on the connecting road, to be forwarded to their proper destination. This decision was made upon a case stated. Muschamp v. Lancaster & Preston Junction Railway, 8 M. & W. 421, was cited on behalf of the plaintiff, but the Court disapproved of that decision, and held that, to bind a company under the circumstances of this case, the burden was upon the plaintiff to show a special contract By the company to carry the goods beyond the terminus of its own railway. There is another case which was cited on the argument before us, by the counsel of the defendant. In this it was decided by a divided Court, that, where a passenger paid the fare to a point several miles beyond the terminus of the defendant's railroad, receiving from the conductor of the cars a ticket in this form: New Haven and Northampton Company Conductor's Ticket - New Haven to Collinsville by stage from Farmington,' - that the company was not responsible for any injury sustained by the passenger on the stage road between Farmington and Collinsville. The case was tried twice. A new trial was granted after the first trial, on a ground corresponding with that taken in Nutting v. The Connecticut River Railroad Company, 1 Gray, 502; but, after the second trial, in which the verdict was, as it had been on the first, for the plaintiff, the Court, in setting aside the second verdict, rested its opinion on the ground that the conductor had no authority to bind the company to carry beyond the limits of its railway, because the company itself could not make any such binding contract. Hood v. N. Y. & N. H. Railroad Co. 22 Conn. R. 1, 502.

"The case before us does not require, in support of the conclusion to which we have come, the adoption of the rulings in any of the cases in our sister States, which have been referred to. The nonsuit on the trial was placed distinctly the principle that the evidence did not support the declaration; that the

upon

to B. only, if it is not, by the custom of the business, the car

allegata and probata did not agree. The declaration alleged that the goods were to be carried from Burlington, New Jersey, to Camden, Ohio; whereas the receipt was express, that they were to be delivered at the company's office at New York, and the charge of freight was to New York only, and not beyond." Am. Law Register, Feb. 1856, p. 234.

"To which the editors add: It is a question of much practical importance whether carriers by railroad, who have received merchandise to be taken according to its address to a point beyond the line of the road which receives it, and beyond the point to which their own means of conveyance extends, are liable as common carriers, for losses which occur beyond that point, or are to be considered as having contracted to carry to the end of their own line, and then employing other connecting lines at its termination as fresh agents to complete the carriage. It is quite clear, that a carrier may contract to transport beyond his own line, and may make connecting lines his agent, and thus become responsible to the owners of merchandise for its loss at any period or any place while it is in transit. Story on Bailm. § 538; Shelford on Railw. 486, 3d edit.; Am. edit. Judge Bennett's notes; Hodges on Railw. 614, 615, notes, 2d edit.; Smith's Mer. Law, 367, 3d edit., notes by Am. eds. ; Fowles v. The Great Western Railway Co. 7 Ex. 699; Weed v. The Sar. & Schen. Railroad, 19 Wend. 334; Muschamp v. The Lancaster, &c. 8 M. & W. 421; 2 Eng. Railway Cases, 444; Watson v. The Ambergate, &c. 3 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 497; Noyes v. The Rutland Railway Co., Am. Law Reg. Feb. 1856, 231; St. John v. Van Santvoord, 25 Wend. 660; 6 Hill, 155, S. C.; Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Champlain Trans. Co. 18 Verm. 140, and 23 Verm. 209; Erne v. New York & Erie Railroad, in New York Marine Court, before Phillips, J., MS.; Ackley v. Kellogg, 8 Cow. 223; Hood v. New York & New Haven Railroad Co. 22 Conn. 1, 14, 15, 508–512; Edwards on Bailm. 528; Scotthorn v. The South Staffordshire Railway Co. 8 Exch. 341; 18 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 553; Crouch v. The London & Northwestern Railway Co. 14 C. B. 255; S. C. 25 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 287; Wilcox v. Parmelee, 3 Sandf. R. 310.

"But the case most difficult of solution is, where the shipper delivers his merchandise addressed to a point beyond the route to whose custody it is delivered, and it is received without agreement of any kind, except that which the law creates by the mere delivery and receipt. This question was much discussed in the leading English case of Muschamp v. The Lancaster, &c., cited and commented on by Judge Stroud; Watson v. The Ambergate, Nottingham, & Boston Railway Co. was the case of certain models or plans of a machine to load colliers, sent by the plaintiff from Grantham to Cardiff to compete for a prize of one hundred guineas, and which arrived too late for the competition, by which the plaintiff lost his chance of success. When the package was delivered to the storing master at Grantham, he said he could take pay only to Nottingham, as he had no rates beyond, and he erased the words "paid to Bristol," and substituted "paid to Nottingham," without the knowledge of the plaintiff. The

rier's duty to deliver the goods to the consignees there, but

original direction was left on the package, which was detained at Bristol and did not arrive at Cardiff until the day after the award was made. In the opinions of the Court this contract is treated as a contract to carry from Grantham to Cardiff, and the rule laid down by Baron Rolfe held to apply.

"The Court of Exchequer, in Scotthorn v. The South Staffordshire Railway Co. 8 Exch. 341; 18 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 553, affirmed Muschamp v. The Lancaster, &c., and held that where a carrier received goods to carry from one station to another, he was liable for the loss during any part of the transit, though it may happen on the line of the railway belonging to another company. And in Crouch v. The London & Northwestern Railway Co. 14 C. B. 255; 25 Eng. Law and Eq. R. 287, the Court of Common Pleas after elaborate arguments, held, affirming the preceding decisions, that a common carrier, professing to carry to a place which is beyond the realm, was still subject to the common-law liability of a carrier for hire, and was bound to perform all the duties assumed and implied by that relation.

"The doctrine of the English Courts must be considered as settled, that carriers by railroad, who receive merchandise to be transported beyond the line of their own route without any special agreement, do not limit their liability to their own route only, but are held liable for losses which may occur beyond it, or perhaps, to speak more accurately, they are held liable upon the exact contract made, which is in general, a question of fact, and is to be determined by the finding of a Jury; and in the absence of any special agreement, the presumption which arises from bare proof of the delivery of the goods to the carrier, addressed to a place beyond the limits of the carrier's own route, is, that he undertakes the delivery at that place.

"But the rule to be deduced from the American decisions may be stated in the language of Judge Stroud, "that when goods are delivered to a carrier, marked for a particular place, but unaccompanied by any other directions for their transportation and delivery except such as might be inferred from the marks themselves, the carrier is only bound to transport and deliver them according to the established usages of the business." Van Santvoord v. St. John; Farmers' Bank v. Champ. Trans. Co.; Hood v. New York & New Haven Railroad; Nutting v. Conn. River Railroad.

"In the case of Hood v. The New York & New Haven Railroad Co., Ellsworth, J., dissented from the English doctrine, and held the following language: 'We are aware that in the cases cited from the English books, it seems to be held that if a railroad company receives at its depot goods marked to be forwarded beyond its own road, and even beyond any other railroad, this is primâ facie evidence of a contract to carry the goods to the place of destination. We will not say that in these English cases, since there was no evidence on the part of the defendants to disprove the primâ facie case, the defendants were not rightly subjected in damages for a loss beyond their road. Indeed, the Judges intimate that there may have been a partnership throughout the route.

simply to deposit them in his warehouse.'

But if it is his

"But if more than this is meant, and that a railroad company, by receiving freight at its depot, became responsible to carry it, as it were, by guaranty or insurance, to the place of destination, at any distance from the road, and that this is an inference which cannot be disproved by showing the facts, as in this case, we are not prepared to give it our assent. We think it an unnatural inference, and a contract not, of course to be drawn from the fact, that a chartered company of limited extent has taken goods to carry over its road.

"But if we are wrong in this, it does not follow that the doctrine of the English cases, as to freight, is to be applied to passengers; passengers take care of themselves. And even as to freight, were such a question before us, we believe the true doctrine to be this; where goods are delivered to a carrier, marked for a particular destination, without any directions as to their transportation and delivery, save such as may be inferred from the marks themselves, the carrier is only bound to transport according to the established usage of business in which he is engaged, whether the consignor know of the usage or not. The carrier becomes a mere forwarder of the goods to the end of his own portion of the route, and is then bound to use due diligence in seeking for and handing over the goods to the next carrier.'

"Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157, was the case of a box marked ‘J. Petre, Little Falls, Herkimer Co.;' it was delivered to the Swiftsure line, and the following receipt given: Rec'd from St. John, on board Ontario, one box merchandise, marked J. Petre,' &c. This was the contract. The usage to deliver to the next carrier was shown. And the construction of this contract was held to be, that the box had been delivered to the carrier with the intention that he should transport it in the usual and customary way, and that the usage of the business must be considered as one of the elements of the contract, and the shipper could not avail himself of his ignorance of this usage, it being his business to inform himself.

"In the Farmers' Bank v. The Champ. Trans. Co. 18 Verm. 140, Kellogg, J., commenting on Van Santvoord v. St. John, says 'the doctrine of that case is in substance this; that where goods are delivered to a carrier marked for a particular place, without any directions as to their transportation and delivery except such as may be inferred from the marks themselves, the carrier is only bound to transport and deliver them according to the established usage of the business in which he is engaged, whether the consignor knew of such usage or not. With the reasoning and authority of that case we are well satisfied. It is founded in good sense, and sustainable upon principle.'

"In Nutting v. Conn. River Railroad, Metcalf, J., cites and applies the ruling in Van Santvoord v. St. John, 6 Hill, 157, and takes occasion to dissent from

1 In re Webb, 8 Taunt. R. 443; S. C. 2 Moore, R. 500; 2 Kent, Comm. Lect. 40, p. 604, 605, 4th edit.; Cairns v. Robins, 8 Mees. & Welsb. 258; Ante, § 446 to 449, 453; Thomas v. Boston and Providence Railroad Co. 10 Metcalf, R. 472.