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other questions argued and authorities cited, but it is unnecessary to refer to them for the purposes of this report).

McCardie for the respondent.-[WRIGHT, J.The question is whether this particular statute does not show by the language of the Act itself an intention that the costs of all proceedings should be dealt with by the court of summary jurisdiction before which the matter comes. Sub-sect. (d) speaks of the "costs of the court."] The expression "costs of the court" merely refers to court fees. Sub-sect. (d) only applies to an order made in the wife's favour under sect. 4; and "order" in sect. 5 means an order made under sect. 4. There is not a word throughout the whole Act referring to an order of dismissal. Therefore, if an order of dismissal be made -as in this case-it must be an order made, not under sect. 4, but under the Summary Jurisdiction Act. [Wright, J.-By sect. 6 no order shall be made if the wife shall be proved to be guilty of adultery; that contemplates an order of dismissal.] There is no other section except sect. 5 which is applicable, and the wording of that section shows that it gives the justices discretion to insert conditions and provisions relating to the order. That section applies only as between the husband and wife, and, even assuming that that section would take away the right of the wife to maintain this action in the County Court, yet that does not affect the right of the solicitor for the wife to maintain this action. The solicitor's right is a common law right, and is apart from the wife's right. It is a higher and wider right and does not depend on the wife's right.

WRIGHT, J.-This case is one of importance and very great difficulty. I think that under this Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895 it was not intended by the Legislature that there should be various proceedings in other courts as to the costs. It was not intended that, after making it possible that an application for costs could be made to the court of summary jurisdiction, an action could be brought in another court as to those costs. I think that the fair meaning of the Act is, that it intends that all questions as to costs should be dealt with by the court of summary jurisdiction before which the matter comes, and it leaves that court perfectly free to make any order as to costs they think fit against either the husband or the wife. I think it might very well be argued that the provision in sect. 5 (d) did not prejudice the rights of the married woman's solicitor to take proceedings against the husband in another court to recover his costs. That depends on the construction of the Act. If the Act intended-as I think it did intend-that all questions of costs should be dealt with by the court of summary jurisdiction, then it seems to me that we ought to hold that that provision binds the solicitor of the wife, as well as the wife herself. There have been other points raised and argued which it is unnecessary to decide. We have not sufficient information before us, and in fact it is not necessary to deal with them, as upon the whole, we think we can deal with the matter upon the construction of the statute itself.

BRUCE, J.-I am of the same opinion. The Act of 1895 is an Act containing a summary procedure in cases of this kind for the benefit of

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married women, and to give them a protection which they otherwise could only have got by more expensive proceedings. It seems to me that the intention of the Act was to give the justices the right and power to deal with all the costs of these proceedings; and I think it is only fair to assume that the intention was that the costs should be dealt with exclusively by that court. I have therefore come to the conclusion that the action in this case will not lie; but when I come to look at the facts in the judge's note, there are not sufficient facts set out to enable us to form an opinion as to whether the wife was or was not justified in living apart from her husband, or as to whether there was reasonable and proper cause for commencing the proceedings. It is, however, unnecessary to decide these questions, I think that this appeal should be allowed.

Appeal allowed. Leave to appeal refused. Solicitors for the appellant, T. A. Dennison and Co., for Seymour Price and Adcock, Birmingham. Solicitors for the respondent, Tippetts and Son, for Edward Eaden, Birmingham.

Jan. 28 and Feb. 17.

(Before HAWKINS and KENNEDY, JJ.) MORRIS AND OTHERS (pets.) v. BEVES AND OTHERS (resps.). (a)

School Board-Triennial election of-Ballot papers -Voting by crosses placed opposite candidates' names-Principle of counting crosses-Ballot papers not bearing official mark-Ballot papers not cancelled-General order of Committee of Privy Council on Education, 1st Aug. 1895.

At a triennial School Board election held under the provisions of the General Order of the Committee of the Privy Council on Education, of the 1st Aug. 1895, several voters voted by placing one or more crosses opposite the name or names of one or more candidates, and in the counting of these votes upon the ballot papers a difficulty arose as to the numerical value to be given to each cross. There were also some ballot papers which did not bear the official mark, stamp, or perforation, and others, inclosed in an envelope marked "spoiled ballot papers," which bore no mark of cancellation.

Held, that, in counting the votes on the ballot papers, one cross ought under all circumstances to count as one vote, and no more; that the ballot papers which did not bear the official mark were properly rejected under sect. 2 of the Ballot Act 1872; and that the ballot papers which bore no mark of cancellation ought to have been rejected, as there was no evidence that they were ever in the ballot boxes at all.

CASE stated by Mr. Edwin C. Cooke, of the Election Petitions Office.

The case was stated for the opinion of the court by order of Hawkins, J., made on the 16th Nov. 1896, under sect. 93, sub-sect. 7 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, in the matter of an election petition touching the election of members of the School Board for the united school district of Brighton and Preston, held on the 1st Oct. 1896. At the above election there were eighteen candidates for fifteen seats, and the returning officer (a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

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declared the first fifteen candidates to be duly elected.

A petition was presented by the petitioners against the return of the last three successful candidates (the respondents Beves, Stevens, and Roth), alleging that mistakes had been made by the returning officer and his assistants in the counting of the ballot papers and the votes recorded thereon; and that, by reason of such errors and mistakes, the result of the poll was not accurately ascertained and declared; and that the majority of votes declared for the respondents was only an apparent majority, and that the three unsuccessful candidates (Bartlett, Dodson, and Houghton) and each of them had a majority of lawful and valid votes. The petition asked for a re-count of the votes, and that it might be declared that the respondents were not duly elected, and that the three unsuccessful candidates were duly elected and ought to have been returned.

By order of Hawkins, J., the case raised by the petition was to be stated as a special case to be settled by Mr. Cooke, and that all the counted, tendered, and rejected ballot papers should be examined before him at the election petitions office, and that the votes recorded thereon in favour of the three respondents and the three unsuccessful candidates should be re-counted, and that he should state the result of such examination and re-count in a special case, reserving for the consideration of the court such only of the ballot papers as might remain at the conclusion of the re-count in dispute between the parties.

Such examination and re-count took place accordingly before Mr. Cooke, who-so far as is now material-reported as follows:

There were seven ballot papers not bearing the official mark, stamp, or perforation. These papers contained fifty votes distributed among the parties to this petition. All these fifty votes Mr. Cooke disallowed in accordance with sect. 2 of the Ballot Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 33).

There were certain ballot papers upon which the voters had marked a cross or crosses; and in these cases a difficulty arose as to the numerical value to be attached to such cross or crosses.

For convenience these ballot papers may be classified as follows: (a) Five ballot papers marked with a single cross opposite the name of a single candidate; (b) two ballot papers marked with a single cross opposite the name of each of three candidates; (c) ten ballot papers marked with a single cross opposite the name of each of five candidates; (d) eighteen ballot papers marked with a single cross opposite the names of two, four, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten candidates (e) three ballot papers marked with more than one cross and for more than one candidate.

The returning officer counted the crosses above described as follows: In class (a) as fifteen votes for each cross; in class (b) as five votes for each cross; in class (c) as three votes for each cross; in class (d) as one vote for each cross; in class (e) as one vote for each cross.

In dealing with the above classes, Mr. Cooke acted upon the principle laid down by Lord Coleridge, C.J. in Phillips v. Goff 17 Q. B. Div., at p. 815), "that a voter must be taken to vote up to the full extent of his voting power."

If, and in so far as the value of these votes was a question of fact for him to decide, Mr. Cooke found upon the evidence before him that

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the voters intended to vote as follows: Class (a) fifteen votes for each cross; class (b) as five votes for each cross; class (c) as three votes for each

cross.

In classes (d) and (e), as the crosses did not by any form of multiplication give a product of fifteen, that is, the full voting power, he, therefore, rejected them on the ground of uncertainty.

If Mr. Cooke was right in counting or rejecting the crosses as above described, then the totals were to be amended accordingly; but if he was wrong, then the additions or deductions consequent on the judgment of the court must be made.

In addition to the above-mentioned ballot papers there were ten ballot papers (class (ƒ) in dispute between the parties, under the following circumstances:

It was proposed at the re-count to examine the contents of the packets which ought to have contained the unused and spoilt ballot papers; and which should have been sealed by each of the presiding officers at the twenty-two polling stations, and delivered to them by the returning officer (the mayor), and by that officer opened, verified, and resealed at the close of the poll.

No such packets were transmitted to Mr. Cooke by the town clerk; but he delivered, together with the other documents, a sealed envelope, which he had marked " spoiled ballot papers,' and which he stated (in a letter to Mr. Cooke) he had made up from the twenty-two above specified packets for the purpose of this re-count and special case.

This envelope contained certain ballot papers which had been cancelled, and also contained the said ten ballot papers (class (f), which bore no mark of cancellation. Of these ten Mr. Cooke rejected one, on the ground that the voter had marked an excess of votes. The remaining nine ballot papers appeared upon the face of them to be valid, and npon the evidence before him Mr. Cooke found as a fact that they were valid, and not spoilt ballot papers. Certain irregularities occurred at the said election; for instance, it appared that some ballot papers issued to voters, and presumably placed by them into the ballot boxes, were lost.

If Mr. Cooke was right in allowing the votes on these nine ballot papers, then the totals were to be amended accordingly; but if he was wrong, then the additions or deductions consequent on the judgment of the court were to be made.

Amongst the papers annexed to the case were the instructions to voters at the election, and parcels of ballot papers in dispute.

The questions for the opinion of the court were: (1) Whether the election of the respondents, or any of them, was void. (2) Whether the three unsuccessful candidates (Messrs. Bartlett, Dodson, and Houghton) or any of them was duly elected, and ought to have been so returned.

In the second schedule to the Elementary Education Act (36 & 37 Vict. c. 86) it is enacted respecting the election of members of a school

board that

(1.) The election of a school board shall be held at such time and in such manner and in accordance with such regulations as the Education Department may from time to time by order prescribe and revoke or alter any previous order, whether confirmed by or made in pursuance of this Act. Provided that any poll, so

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far as circumstances admit, be conducted in like manner in which the poll at a contested municipal election is directed by the Ballot Act 1872 to be conducted, and subject to any exceptions or modifications contained in any order of the Education Department made in pursuance of this Act, the Ballot Act 1872, shall apply in the case of the election of a school board in like manner as if the provisions thereof were herein enacted with the substitution of "school board election" for "municipal election."

An order made in pursuance of this schedule shall save as otherwise provided by such crder, apply to al, school boards.

On the 1st Aug. 1895 the Lords of the Committee of the Privy Council on Education, by virtue and in pursuance of the powers vested in them under the Elementary Education Acts 18701893, published a "general order regulating the triennial election of a school board in a borough," in which (inter alia) it was ordered

(16.) Subject to the provisions of this order, the poll shall be conducted in like manner as a poll at a contested municipal election is directed by the Ballot Act 1872 to be conducted, and, subject as aforesaid, the provisions of that Act shall apply to the election in like manner as if they were contained in this order, with the substitution of the term "school board election" for the term "municipal election." Provided that (a.) Every voter shall be entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of members of the school board to be elected, and may give all such votes to one candidate, or may distribute them among the candidates as he thinks fit. (b.) The voter may place against the name of any candidate for whom he votes the number of votes he gives to such candidate in lieu of a cross, and the form of directions for the guidance of the voter in voting contained in the Ballot Act 1872 shall be altered accordingly.

S. H. Day (Kenrick with him) for the petitioners. With regard to the mode of counting the crosses the principle is this, that where a voter goes to vote at a school board election, he must be taken to have intended to vote up to, and to have exhausted, his full voting power:

Phillips v. Goff, 17 Q. B. Div. 805, at p. 815. [HAWKINS, J.-I cannot see that there is any such presumption of law or fact that, if I have fifteen votes, I intend to give fifteen. There is certainly no such presumption of law. Each case and each vote must depend upon its own particular circumstances]. Unless there is a contrary intention apparent on the face of the ballot paper itself, then the presumption ought to prevail. The order does not contemplate giving less than the whole number of votes. [KENNEDY, J.-The order says that a voter "may," give all his votes to one candidate, or distribute them; your reading of it would be that he "must" give all his votes. The order does not say so]. The Ballot Act provides for a cross in all cases, but in these school board elections figures may be used. I submit that the mode of counting the crosses ought to be as follows: One cross only against one name gives as many votes as the voter has to dispose of-in this case fifteen votes; one cross against each of three names gives five votes to each of the three; one cross against each of five names gives three votes each; and so on, where the number is a factor or accurate divisor of fifteen. In all such cases the principle can and ought to be applied. But in some cases the principle cannot be applied, for instance, if there be one cross against each of

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two or four names, and in all such cases one cross ought to count as one vote. In the present ease the value of the crosses has been found as a matter of fact; and it is more a question of fact than of law:

Phillips v. Goff (ubi sup).

Corrie Grant (J. A. Johnston with him) for the 1 respondents. We submit that the proper way to count these votes is that one cross should be counted as one vote and no more under any circumstances. If any other principle were adopted, it would lead to the utmost confusion, and in fact a returning officer would have to do an arithmetical sum in each case for each paper. As to the spoiled papers they ought not to have been counted at all, as they were spoiled papers, and there was no evidence that they were ever in the ballot boxes at all.

Day in reply.-There were at least three lostpapers. To invalidate the election at common law all I have to show is that the election "might" have been different, not that it "would” have been different. That is shown by these lost papers, and therefore at common law the election is void. Cur, adv. vult.

Feb. 17. The judgment of the Court (Hawkins and Kennedy, JJ.) was read by

HAWKINS, J.-This case was argued before my brother Kennedy and myself on the 28th Jan., when we took time to consider our judgment. At the triennial election of a school board for the United District of Brighton and Preston, on the 1st Oct. 1896 there were fifteen members to be

elected, and eighteen candidates. The respondents, Beves, Stevens and Roth, against whom alone the petition was presented, were three of the successful candidates. As against their election it was alleged in the petition that the returning officer had erroneously counted the ballot papers, and the votes recorded thereon, and that, by reason of such errors the result of the poll at the election was not accurately ascertained and that three other of the candidates-namely Bartlett, Dodson, and Houghton-ought to have been returned. By an order made by me on the 16th Nov. it was directed that the questions involved in the petition should be raised by a special case to be settled by Mr. Edwin C. Cooke, and that there should be a re-count by him of the votes recorded for the respondents and for the said Bartlett, Dodson, and Houghton. Such re-count has accordingly been made, and this special case stated for our consideration. The facts found by Mr. Cooke are very clearly stated in it. As to seven ballot papers they did not bear the official mark, stamp, or perforation. The votes recorded in them were, therefore, rightly disallowed in accordance with the second section of the Ballot Act 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 33). The most important question discussed before us was as to the principle upon which certain crosses upon some of the ballot papers should be counted. In the second schedule to the Elementary Education Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 86), it is enacted that "the election of a school board shall be held at such time, in such manner, and in accordance with such regulations as the Education Department may from time to time by order prescribe," provided that "any poll, so far as circumstances admit, shall be conducted in like manner in which the

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poll at a contested municipal election is directed by the Ballot Act 1872 to be conducted." On the 1st Aug. 1895, the Lords of the Committee of the Privy Council on Education, by virtue and in pursuance of the powers in them vested under the Elementary Education Acts 1870-1893, published a general order regulating the triennial election of a school board in a borough, in which, amongst other things, it was ordered that, subject to the provisions of that order, the poll shall be conducted in like manner as a poll at a contested municipal election is directed by the Ballot Act 1872 to be conducted. Provided that

(a) Every voter shall be entitled to a number of votes equal to the number of members of the school board to be elected, and may give all such votes to one candidate, or may distribute them among the candidates, as he thinks fit." "(b) The voter may place against the name of any candidate for whom he votes the number of votes he gives to such candidate in lieu of a cross; and the form of directions for the guidance of the voter in voting contained in the Ballot Act 1872 shall be altered accordingly." By sect. 2 of the Ballot Act 1872, "the ballot of each voter shall consist of a paper (called a ballot paper) showing the names and description of the candidates." The ballot paper marked with the prescribed official mark, is to be delivered to the voter within the polling station; and the voter having secretly marked his vote on the paper and folded it up so as to conceal his vote, shall place it in a closed box, in the presence of the presiding officer, after having shown to him the official mark at the back. Schedule 2 of the Act provides for the placarding outside any polling station and in every compartment thereof a form of directions for the guidance of the voter in voting. The form of directions adopted in the present election (so far as is material to the question before us) ran thus: "Every voter is entitled to fifteen votes, and may give all such votes to one candidate, or may distribute them among such of the candidates as he thinks fit. The voter will first obtain a ballot paper from the presiding officer. The voter will then go into one of the compartments, and with the pencil provided in the compartment place in the right hand side of the ballot paper against the name of any candidate for whom he votes the number of votes he gives to such candidate." Appended to these directions were examples of ballot papers with votes marked. In each example opposite the name of each of the several candidates in a column headed "Number of votes for each candidate" the number of votes intended to be given for such candidate is recorded in figures. In neither of the examples, however, is there any mention made of the option given to the voter to record his votes by crosses instead of figures, nor of the mode in which he can by crosses indicate the number of votes he desires to give to any particular candidate. seems to us that this form of directions may be usefully amended in any future election. Upon the recount of the votes it was found that a great number of the ballot papers were marked, and the votes distributed by figures in the form above mentioned. No question has arisen with regard to these. Many others, however, were marked with crosses only, some with a single cross against one name only, others with a single cross against several names, and others with

It

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The

(c)

several crosses opposite the names of particular candidates. As regards these, very important questions have arisen as to how they should have been counted by the returning officer. seventh paragraph of the case very conveniently classifies them as follows: "(a) Five ballot papers marked with a single cross opposite the name of a single candidate." These were counted by the returning officer as fifteen votes for each cross. "(b) Two ballot papers marked with a single cross opposite the name of each of three candidates." These were each counted by the returning officer as five votes for each cross. Ten ballot papers marked with a single cross opposite the name of each of five candidates." These were each counted by the returning officer as three votes for each cross. "(d) Eighteen ballot papers marked with a single cross opposite the names of two, four, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten candidates." These were each counted by the returning officer as one vote for each cross. “(e) Three ballot papers marked with more than one cross and for more than one candidate." These were counted by the returning officer as one vote for each cross. Mr. Cooke, as regards (a), (b), and (c), finds that the returning officer was right, and that the voters intended to vote as he counted the votes; but as regards (d) and (e) he finds that the returning officer ought to have rejected them altogether upon the ground of uncertainty, inasmuch as these crosses do not by any form of multiplication give a product of fifteen, which is the full voting power of the voters. It is right to mention that in dealing with these ballot papers and in finding as he has done in regard to the intentions of the voters, Mr. Cooke has not acted upon his own independent judgment, but in deference to the views of Lord Coleridge expressed in Phillips v. Goff (17 Q. B. Div. 815) as to the principle upon which the votes recorded upon them should be counted-viz., "that a voter must be taken to vote up to the full extent of his voting power." That was a school board election case similar to the present, with this difference only, that the number of members to be elected was eleven instead of fifteen. In some of the ballot papers a single cross appeared opposite the name of one candidate only. This cross the returning officer had counted as eleven votes for that candidate. In reference to these papers, Lord Coleridge expressed himself thus: "It may be said that the voter, knowing that he might cumulate his votes, and desiring to do so, meant to plump for that candidate; or it may be said that this interpretation of his intention would be breaking into the principle that a single cross indicates a single vote, and, therefore, that the voter ought to be taken to have meant to give one vote only to the candidate, leaving his other ten votes undisposed of; or it may be said that the putting a single cross opposite the name of one candidate being as consistent with the one of these views as the other, the commissioner onght to reject the voting paper as void for uncertainty. My own opinion is that the first view is the correct one. It seems to me exceedingly unlikely that a man who takes the trouble to vote at all should not vote up to the full extent of his voting power. I do not think that is the right inference to draw, and I should, therefore, myself arrive at the conclusion that the voter intended to give all his eleven votes to the one

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candidate opposite whose name he had put the cross. At the same time that view is not so clear to my brother Denman as it is to me, and no doubt either the second or the third of the views I have mentioned might not unreasonably be adopted by the commissioner. I think the question whether the single cross means one thing or another is a question not of law, but of fact, which the commissioner is the proper authority to determine. We must leave it to him to say whether in his opinion the single cross meant one vote or eleven votes, and, if he has a real doubt upon the matter, he must act upon it, and reject the voting paper as void for uncertainty." Denman, J. thought the single cross put opposite the name of a single candidate indicated an intention to give one vote only, but he agreed with the Lord Chief Justice that the question was not wholly one of law, and he expressed an opinion that it could be better dealt with at the place by the commissioner, with his experience and knowledge of the habits and ways of the class of persons who vote at such elections. We do not doubt that the actual intention of the person, who performs any act, whether it be voting or anything else, is a question of fact, and if the duty of ascertaining it is by law cast upon any tribunal or official person, such tribunal or officer must endeavour to discharge that duty upon such evidence as is available, and, naturally, the best evidence-assuming it to be credible-would be that of the individual whose intention is in question. In order to determine the result of an election by ballot the returning officer has no duty cast (upon him to inquire into or determine the real intentions of the voters whose ballot

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papers he is required to count. He has no machinery at his command for doing so. The ballot paper alone is all he has to do with. If, on the face of it, it is marked in the manner required by the Ballot Act and no ambiguity is apparent upon it, we consider it to be his duty to count the votes as they appear upon it, and it is beyond his duty or power to alter the effect of a mark or a figure upon it—even though, from circumstances outside the voting paper, he were sure in his own mind that the voter intended to vote differently. The voter is secretly himself to mark the vote or votes he intends to give, and deposit his paper in the sealed ballot box. The returning officer's duty is to count what he finds in that box after the poll is closed, and in doing so not to speculate on what the voter intended. Counting "is the only thing he has to do, so far as relates to the ascertainment of the numbers of votes recorded for the several candidates (see sect. 31 et seq. of the Ballot Act 1872), and we are of opinion that he cannot look beyond the face of the ballot paper. It must not be forgotten that in these school board elections the voter, having the option to use either crosses or figures, has every facility afforded him by the use of figures unmistakably to indicate on his ballot paper the number of votes he desires to give for any par ticular candidate, and if he chooses to use crosses instead of figures, it being common knowledge that ordinarily each cross means only one vote, he must take care to make as many crosses as he intends to give votes to his favoured candidates. The form of directions expressly points to his marking the number of votes he gives. It seems to us that to allow the returning officer, whose

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plain duty is simply to count the votes as they appear recorded before his eyes on the face of the ballot paper-acting upon a questionable presumption (admittedly not one of law) that the voter must be taken to have meant to exhaust his voting power-to multiply a single cross by the number of members to be elected, or to multiply two or three single crosses against the names of as many candidates by a proportionate number of such votes, would be to introduce an element of uncertainty in the value of the marks upon the ballot paper never contemplated by the Ballot Act itself. As well might it be said that, if a voter placed opposite the name of a single candidate thirteen crosses only, the returning officer ought to count two more to make up the full voting power of the voter. This multiplication, however, is what the returning officer did in classes (a), (b), and (c) above mentioned. In this particular case, the number of persons to be elected being fifteen, there would be no difficulty in applying the presumption to ballot papers where single crosses were marked against single names nor where single crosses were marked against three or five names only, for fifteen is divisible by three and five. But with regard to ballot papers where single crosses were marked against two or four or six or seven names, inasmuch as fifteen is not divisible by any of those numbers, each cross could only be counted as a single vote. The same result would, of necessity, attend single crosses against every number of candidates between seven and fifteen. A moment's consideration will suffice to show that a single cross agaiust two, four, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen names only would make it absolutely impossible to exhaust the voting power among them, and wasted votes would be the inevitable result. To test this let us assume in this case single cross against the names of four candidates. Fifteen cannot, for voting purposes, be divided by four so as to exhaust the voting power of the voter. It is true twelve of the fifteen votes might be exhausted if three votes were counted for each cross, but then there would be three wasted. As, however, according to our view, each ought to have been counted as a single vote eleven would be wasted. It is obvious that if the returning officer were, in such cases as above discussed, called upon to consider and determine the intent of the voter, and according to such intent to give to single crosses a value not ordinarily attributed to them, that would entail upon him the necessity of inquiries and calculations not involved in the mere duty of counting. For the guidance of the returning officer in counting votes we feel it right to note that, subject to what we have said, we do not think a ballot paper ought to be altogether rejected, because it may be doubtful on the face of the paper whether the voter intended by it to give one vote or fifteen votes. In such cases, where the intention to give at least one vote is clear, such vote ought to be counted, and it would be wrong to reject it for uncertainty simply because it was doubtful whether the remaining fourteen votes ought not to be added to it. In our opinion it is far more in accordance with the spirit and object of the Ballot Act, and far more reasonable and practical to take the crosses made by the voter himself, whether one or more,

a