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enable the person who takes it to enjoy it in a proper and substantial way. This particular case is not a case of a way of necessity, though I do not say that there might not be ways which would pass by implication as ways of necessity, even if they were only reasonably necessary, and not physically necessary." So much for the implied grants. There is nothing in the conveyance to help you. Then the learned judge continues thus: "Here we have express words "-and that is the other class-" and what we have to decide is, whether this is a way which the owner, by appropriate language, has shown an intention to grant. Now let us look, first of all, at the facts. The facts are that the owner has granted the stable, and that this is a hard-beaten road which has been the only way by which access to the stables has been had. There were doors to the stables leading on to the field, and not facing to the road itself. But this road between A. and B. has really been the path to the stables. Let us see what the grantor has said. He has said that he grants the premises, including the stables, 'together with the buildings, erections and appur

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tenances whatsoever to the several pieces or parcels of land and hereditaments hereby granted and conveyed, or otherwise assured, or intended so to be, or any of them belonging.' That is simply a grant of a preference, and in law carries nothing so far. Then come the important words, "or in any wise appertaining or deemed, taken or known, held, occupied, or enjoyed as part, parcel, or member thereof.' So much for the two classes -grant by implication and grant by express words. The words contained in the conveyance in Kay v. Oxley (ubi sup.) and other cases of the kind, are not indeed to be found in the actual deed of conveyance in this case; but words at least as extensive are introduced by sect. 6, sub-sect. 2, of the Conveyancing Act 1881. I do not need to read again the words of that sub-section. It has been already read by Lindley, L.J. It is true that the section applies if only and so far as a contrary intention is not expressed in the conveyance (see sub-sect. 4). Here, however, the only words that can be suggested as expressing a contrary intention are the words " building land" occurring in the reservation of a right of way, and on the plan attached to the conveyance. Bearing in mind the principle that a grant must be construed in case of ambiguity against the grantor, and the well-established deduction from that principle that a reservation in the grantor's favour not being a reservation of an easement of necessity must be expressed in clear and unambiguous language in order to be valid, it does not, in my judgment, need authority to prove that these words which may be satisfied without interference with the rights as to light enjoyed at the time of the conveyance, are not inconsistent with the continuation of them. But the considered judgment of the Court of Common Pleas delivered by Tindal, C.J., in Swansborough v. Coventry (9 Bing. 305, and of which a better report is to be found in 2 Moo. & Sco. 362), showing these words to be insufficient of themselves to rebut the presumption of an implied grant, is à fortiori an authority for holding them insufficient to exclude the operation of the Conveyancing Act in bringing about an express grant. I will read the words of the Chief Justice (at p. 370 of 2 Moo. & Sco.): "The very term 'build

[CT. OF APP.

ing land' is a loose and general expression, and might be equally satisfied by the power of erecting a building which should leave the plaintiff's lights altogether undisturbed or partially obstructed, only, or altogether blocked up." That is quite sufficient, I think, to establish that, according to the decision of that very strong court at that time, "building ground" will not be enough nor "building land," which is the same thing. I have said that the case of The Birmingham, Dudley, and District Banking Company v. Ross (ubi sup.) needs some examination. There, as in Myers v. Catterson (62 L. T. Rep. 205; 43 Ch. Div. 470), and in Rigby v. Bennett (48 L. T. Rep. 47; 21 Ch. Div. 559), the house in respect of which an easement was claimed was erected not by the grantor, but by the grantee. The grantor, the Corporation of Birmingham, sold not a house, but the site only of a house. It was at the time not of the conveyance, but of the contract for the purchase of the site, that the rights to be enjoyed with the house when built were determined. The decision of the Court of Appeal was that at that time it was agreed in substance that the corporation were to have the unrestricted right of building on the further site of Warwick-lane, which the grantee stipulated should be 20 feet wide. Cotton, L.J. dealt with the question of an express grant by virtue of the Conveyancing Act, having regard to this state of things. His decision was-and it is difficult to see how it could have been otherwise-that, having regard to the pre-existing agreement, no easement over the corporation land on the further side of the land was ever enjoyed de facto by the owners of the house. From this it followed that sect. 6, sub-sect. 2, of the Conveyancing Act 1881, even supposing it to be read at length into the conveyance, had no application. No part of the judgment of Bowen, L.J., except that which excludes the hypothesis of an express grant, has any application to the case of an express grant. It follows, in my judgment, that the numerous cases of which Kay v. Oxley (ubi sup.) is a leading instance in which the quasi easement has been treated as enjoyed with what becomes on severance the dominant tenement, governs the present case. I should have had great difficulty, to say the least, in coming to the conclusion that there was anything to entitle the vendor to the plaintiff to interfere more with the plaintiff's lights than if he had been a stranger, and the lights ancient lights. However, the very fair and equitable treatment of the case by the plaintiff relieves the court from any difficulty in the matter. There can, in my judgment, be no question that he is entitled to the only relief which he has asked for, and the appeal should be allowed.

Appeal allowed. Solicitors for the appellant, Crowders and Vizard, agents for Watson and Booth, Manchester.

Solicitors for the respondent, Minshall, ParryJones, Woosnam, and Smith, agents for Pugh and Bone, Llandudno.

CT. OF APP.]

FLOYD v. J. LYONS AND CO. LIMITED.

March 9 and 12. (Before LINDLEY, SMITH, and RIGBY, L.JJ.) FLOYD v. J. LYONS AND CO. LIMITED. (a). APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION.

andlord and tenant-Covenant by lessor to pay all water rate imposed or assessed upon the premises-Water supplied to lessees for domestic use and also for trade purposes-Waterworks Clauses Act 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 17), s. 3-The New River Company's Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. clx.), ss. 35, 38, 40.

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A lease contained a covenant by the lessor to pay all rates, taxes, and assessments, water rate, and other outgoings, except the gas and electric light, now or hereafter to be imposed or assessed upon the said premises or on the lessor or lessees in respect thereof."

Held, that the lessor was not obliged to pay the

sum charged by a waterworks company for the water for the trade carried on upon the premises by the lessees, supplied pursuant to an agreement between the lessees and the company under their special Act.

Decision of Kekewich, J. reversed.

By an indenture of lease, dated the 11th Jan. 1895, the plaintiff, Mrs. Floyd, demised to the defendants, who were refreshment contractors, the ground-floors and basements of Nos. 19 and 20, Walbrook, in the city of London, for a term of thirty years from the 25th Dec. 1894.

By the lease the lessees covenanted "not to carry on any noisome or obnoxious business or trade," but it was provided that "the use of the premises for the sale of refreshments "should "not be considered as a breach of this covenant."

The lessor covenanted to pay "all rates, taxes, and assessments, water rate, and other outgoings, except the gas and electric light, now or hereafter to be imposed or assessed upon the said premises or on the lessor or lessees in respect thereof."

The premises comprised in the lease were used in conjunction with adjoining premises at 20, Budge-row (in which the plaintiff had no interest) by the defendants wholly as a café for the sale and consumption therein of tea, coffee, and light

refreshments.

Water was supplied by the New River Company to the whole of the premises occupied by the defendants as a café, which were assessed for the purpose of water rate at the annual value of 5501. at an annual water charge of 477. 8s. This figure was made up as follows: As to 161. 10s. for water consumed on the premises for domestic purposes, being assessed on the annual rental of the premises at the rate of 3 per cent.; as to 188. on another item; and as to 301. by special contract with the defendants for water consumed for the purpose of their trade, under sect. 40 of the New River Company's Act 1852.

The defendants attributed one-half of this annual charge of 471. 88. to the Walbrook premises, and one-half to the Budge-row premises; and in paying the rent for the Walbrook premises they deducted one-half of the 471. 88. as being the proportion of water rates payable in respect of those premises, and therefore payable by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff did not object to paying one-half of the first two items mentioned above; but (a) Reported by E. A. SCRATCHLEY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

[CT. OF APP.

denied all liability in respect of the item of 301. for water used for trade purposes, maintaining that that was not within the terms of the covenant.

She gave receipts for money received on account only; and took out a summons raising the question, Whether the covenant by the plaintiff obliged her to pay the sum charged by the New River Company for the supply of water for the trade carried on upon the said premises by the defendants.

The New River Company's Act 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. clx.) incorporates the Waterworks Clauses Act 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c 17), and the latter Act provides by sect. 1 for incorporation thereof with special Acts, and that all the clauses of that Act,

Save so far as they shall be expressly varied or excepted by any such Act shall apply to the undertaking authorised thereby so far as the same shall be applicable to such undertaking, and shall, with the clauses of every other Act which shall be incorporated therewith, form part of such Act, and be construed therewith as forming one Act.

Sect. 3 enacts that,

The expression "water rate" shall include any rent, reward, or payment to be made to the undertakers for a supply of water.

Sect. 68 enacts that,

The water rates except as hereinafter and in the special Act mentioned shall be paid by and be recoverable from the person requiring, receiving, or using the supply of water, and shall be payable according to the annual value of the tenement supplied with water, and, if any dispute arise as to such value, the same shall be determined by two justices.

By sect. 70, rates are to be paid quarterly in advance.

By sect. 72, owners of houses not exceeding 101. in annual value, and not the occupiers, shall be liable for water rate.

By sect. 74, if the water rate be not paid, the supply may be cut off.

Sect. 35 of the New River Company's Act 1852 enacts that the company shall at the request of the owner or occupier of any house or part of a house in any street within their limits furnish a sufficient supply of water for domestic purposes at a rate not exceeding 3 per cent. on the annual value of the house where such annual value shall exceed 2007., with a further special charge for water-closets and fixed baths.

Sect. 38 enacts that,

A supply of water for domestic purposes shall not include a supply of water for steam engines, baths, or for any trade, or manufacture, or business requiring an extra supply of water. Sect. 40 enacts that,

The company may supply any person or body within their limits with water, to be used within such limits, for other than domestic purposes, at such rates and upon such terms and conditions as shall be agreed upon between the company and the person or body requiring such supply.

The summons was adjourned into court, and came on to be heard before Kekewich, J. on the 17th Dec. 1896, when the following judgment was delivered:

KEKEWICH, J.-The question asked by this summons is practically, "When is a water rate not a water rate ?" And the only answer pro

CT. OF APP.]

FLOYD v. J. LYONS AND CO. LIMITED.

posed is, when it is a rate levied for water used for trade purposes, or for purposes other than domestic purposes. That, in my opinion, is not a satisfactory answer. A rate in respect of water, whether levied under sect. 35 or sect. 40 of the New River Company's Act 1852, is a water rate as defined by the Waterworks Clauses Act 1847, s. 3 ("any rent, reward, or payment to be made for a supply of water"), and the 157. claimed is therefore payable by the lessor under her covenant. It may be that if water were used for some purposes, the sum payable for the use of the water would not be strictly a rate; but that is not the case here. The defendants' business, it is true, is not expressly described in the lease, but the lease expressly gives them liberty to use the premises for the sale of refreshments, which would also include the use of water for refreshment purposes. The cases cited only decide that what a man agrees to pay is not a rate imposed by Act of Parliament, and have no bearing on the present point. The question in the summons must therefore be answered by declaring that the covenant entered into by the plaintiff extends to the charge made for water used for the defendants' trade purposes.

From that decision the plaintiff now appealed. Cutler, Q.C. and MacSwinney for the appellant. -The covenant by the lessor to pay "water rate and other outgoings imposed or assessed upon the premises" does not oblige her to pay the sum charged by the New River Company for the water for the trade carried on upon the premises by the lessees, supplied pursuant to the agreement between them and the company, under sect. 40 of the company's special Act. It is conceded that the definition of water rate in the Waterworks Clauses Act 1847 is wide enough to include the charge in dispute; but we contend that the term as used in the covenant has a more restricted meaning. A broad distinction is drawn between water consumed for domestic purposes and water consumed for trade purposes, which is a supply dependent on special contract between the company and the consumers, and over which the lessor would have no control. It could not have been within the intention of the parties that the lessor should covenant to pay an amount which she had no means of even estimating, and which is entirely dependent on the will of the lessees, who are not precluded by the terms of the lease from carrying on the business, for instance, of a manufacturer of mineral waters, and thus incurring an almost unlimited expense for the water used in their business. We submit, therefore, that the covenant only applies to water supplied for domestic purposes under sect. 35 of the company's special Act, the cost of which the lessor could at the time of granting the lease have fairly estimated. True there is in the covenant an exception as to gas and electric light, and the lessees may rely upon that as showing that anything not expressly excepted would have to be paid by the lessor. We meet that objection, however, by saying that, having regard to the Gas Acts, gas and electric light are on a footing which might bring them within the covenant, but not so water. Gas and electric light must be for use on the premises. But under sect. 40 of the company's special Act a mere stranger who is not a lessee in any sense might go to the company and

[CT. OF APP.

get water for the purpose, e.g., of watering his park or supplying a fountain. How can the lessees be able to show that the supply of water for their trade purposes comes within the words of the covenant when the rate is not a charge but is merely a payment? It cannot be imposed on the lessees "in respect thereof "-i.e., the premises: If imposed at all, it is imposed in respect of their‐ trade.

Alexander, Q.C. and Theodore Ribton for the respondents.—The point in this case really turns on the exception to the covenant. The rule of the court is that, where there is a covenant with an. exception, the parties must be taken to have known that without that exception the subject of the LINDLEY, exception would have been included.

L.J.-I doubt if that is always so.] The intention was that the lessor should pay all rates except for gas and electric light. As to the value of an. exception, see

Williams v. Mercier, 52 L. T. Rep. 662; 10 App.
Cas. 1.

Having regard to the decision in Badcock v. Hunt (60 L. T. Rep. 314; 22 Q. B. Div. 145) the court must strike out "water rate altogether or elseinclude in the exception the water rate in question. We do not dispute that a rate in respect of water supplied for domestic or trade purposes isnot charged on the premises. It is not an imposition or an assessment on the premises. It is a mere claim for goods supplied:

Sheffield Waterworks Company v. Wilkinson,
C. P. Div. 410, at p. 424.

They referred also to

The Direct Spanish Telegraph Company v. Shepherd, 51 L. T. Rep. 124; 13 Q. B. Div. 202. No reply was called for.

LINDLEY, L.J.-I think that we have all made up our minds as to the construction of this covenant. The point is a short one, and we shall gain nothing by further consideration of it. In this case, Kekewich, J. has made an order declaring that the covenant by Mrs. Floyd contained in the lease (which I will read presently) for payment of all rates, taxes, and assessments, water rate, and other outgoings, except the gas and electric light, imposed or assessed upon the premises, or on the lessor or lessees in respect thereof, obliges her to pay the sum charged by the New River Company for the supply of water for the trade carried on upon the premises by the lessees. Mrs. Floyd is the owner, apparently, of a house, No. 20, Walbrook, and she leased the ground floor and basement of it to the defendant company. The property was let to the defendant company obviously for the purpose of a refreshment-room or café, or something of that kind; and Mrs. Floyd covenants that she will pay "all rates, taxes, and assessments, water rate, and other outgoings, except the gas and electric light, now or hereafter to be imposed or assessed upon the said premises or on the lessor or lessees in respect thereof." These premises are supplied with water by the New River Company, and the New River Company have an Act of Parliament to which I will refer. Sect. 35 enables the owners and occupiers of houses to demand a supply of water for what are called "domestic purposes.' A supply of water for " domestic purposes is stated in sect. 38 not to include a supply of water for steam

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CT. OF APP.]

FLOYD v. J. LYONS AND CO. LIMITED.

engines or railway purposes, or for warming or ventilating purposes, or for working any machine or apparatus, or for baths, horses, cattle, or for washing carriages, or for gardens, fountains, or ornamental purposes, or for flushing sewers or drains, or for any trade, or manufacture, or business requiring an extra supply of water. Sect. 35 enables the company to charge certain rates for the water which they supply, and that section makes the rate a rate assessed with reference to the annual value of the property supplied. As regards baths and water-closets, there are additional charges. They may vary with the rental of the house. Then, by sect. 39, "The company may, notwithstanding the provisions of this Act or any Act incorporated therewith, take an increased rate or charge by agreement with the person or body requiring a supply of water, and notwithstanding the same may exceed the rates or charges herein specified." Now, it appears that the defendant company want water for the house, and whatever water rate comes fairly within the description of a "water rate imposed or assessed upon the premises, or on the lessor or lessees in respect thereof," the lessor, Mrs. Floyd, has to pay. That she bargained for. But the defendant company also want water for the purposes of their trade, and a considerable part of the water rate-using the word "water rate" in the wider sense-is for their trade purposes. The question is, whether Mrs. Floyd is or is not bound, under this covenant, to pay so much of that water rate as is charged for the trade purposes as distinguished from the house purposes. That depends upon the language of this covenant. One would have thought, on looking at the substance and good sense of the thing, that what the lessor agreed to pay for was the water supplied to the house for house purposes, and not trade purposes. She has nothing to do with the trade which the lessees carry on. But then it is said, that the words are water rate and other outgoings, except the gas and electric light, now or hereafter to be imposed." Mr. Alexander's first point is, that the exception of gas and electric light shows that the water rate is used in a larger sense than I have suggested. But it does not appear to me that the words "rates, taxes, and assessments, and other outgoings," extend what I may call the sensible construction of the words "water rate imposed or assessed upon the said premises, or on the lessor or lessees in respect thereof." These words are all important. They show that, notwithstanding the words "'water rate," it is not all the water rate, but it is all the water rate imposed or assessed upon the premises. It so happens, when you come to look at the Waterworks Clauses Act and the special Act governing this company, that no water rate is in the strict sense imposed or assessed upon the premises, or on the lessor or lessees in respect thereof. It is a mere money demand to be paid by the persons who want the water, and, if they do not pay for it, there is power to cut it off. As was decided in Badcock v. Hunt (60 L. T. Rep. 314; 22 Q. B. Div. 145), a water rate is not a charge on property. Then, Mr. Alexander says, if that is so, you must strike out “water rate" altogether. My answer is No. The language used. "imposed or assessed upon the said premises," shows plainly enough what kind of water rate the lessor was to pay. The meaning

66

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[CT. OF APP.

of that is not capable of being missed. It means the water rate which is payable in respect of the house under sect. 35 of the special Act of the New River Company, and it does not mean any water which the tenants may want for trade purposes. That does not legitimately fall within the expression "water rate imposed or assessed upon the said premises, or on the lessor or lessees in respect thereof. It appears to me, when the case is looked at, that the meaning is reasonably clear; and I think Kekewich, J. has come to a wrong conclusion. He has given too little weight to the words "imposed or assessed," which, though the rate is not technically imposed or assessed, show plainly enough what the meaning of the covenant was. I think that the appeal must be allowed, with costs here and below. The declaration will be that, according to the true construction of the covenant in the lease, Mrs. Floyd is not obliged to pay the sum charged by the New River Company for the supply of water for the trade purposes of the defendant company.

SMITH, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. The question is a very short one, and it turns on a very short covenant. If it had not been for the ingenious argument of Mr. Alexander, in which he introduced one or two cases which he said bore on the subject, I do not think that I should have had the slightest difficulty in construing the covenant, and I confess that I have not much difficulty now.. It is so clear that, unless one embarrasses oneself with those cases, one cannot miss the intention of the parties. The point is this: By the New River Company's special Act, if a man wants water for his house for domestic purposes, he may apply to the company and the company must supply it, and if the company supply it, then the company have a right at law to charge him an ad valorem rate. That is under sect. 35. The first part of the section relates to ordinary water supply, and the second part to a further water supply. But the rate is ad valorem for both. Then there is a further section, viz., sect. 40, which enacts that, if a man does not want water for his house for domestic purposes, he may get water from the company by agreement, and he may get as much as he likes so long as the company will supply it to him, and it must be a question of bargain between the man who wants the water and the company, not only as to how much the company will supply, but the price they will supply it at. There is no limitation as to the cost of that which the company are to supply. Now, in the present case it appears that Mrs. Floyd let the premises at Walbrook to the defendant company, who were about to carry on the business of refreshment caterers on the premises. I understand that she let the ground-floors and basements of two houses. The defendant company wanted water for domestic purposes, but they wanted more than that-they wanted water for trade purposes, and by agreement with the New River Company the New River Company supplied them with water at the annual rent of 301. The dispute is between the defendant company and Mrs. Floyd. The defendant company say that Mrs. Floyd is bound to pay all the water rate, and that as the 301. is a water rate she must pay that. Mrs. Floyd says, "No; this is for water obtained by agreement, and it is not what I bargained to pay under the covenant." One of the arguments was based on the enactment in

CT. OF APP.]

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BELL V. BALLS.

sect. 3 of the Waterworks Clauses Act of 1847, that "the expression water rate' shall include any rent, reward, or payment to be made to the undertakers for a supply of water." That is right enough, but the question is what is the meaning of "water rate" in this covenant. Now, I will read the covenant, and it seems to me perfectly clear. It runs thus: " Also that she "-that is the lessor-" will pay all rates, taxes, and assessments, water rate, and other outgoings "if it had ended there I should have thought that the lessor would not have been so well off as she is. But now we come to the very important words"except the gas and electric light." Mr. Alexander said: "Those words help me, because the probable meaning is, that she would pay all rates except for gas and electric light." I do not agree with that, but I will pass on, for the covenant does not stop there by any means. It continues thusnow or hereafter to be imposed or assessed upon the said premises or on the lessor or lessees in respect thereof." How can this private bargain between the lessees and the New River Company be said to be a water rate now or hereafter to be imposed or assessed upon the premises? It is impossible. Unless you strike out the words, and read the clause without them, the case fails altogether. That is why I say that the case is perfectly clear. You cannot strike them out, and I think, therefore, that my brother Kekewich has come to a wrong conclusion.

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RIGBY, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. I do not think that it is the right way to construe a covenant like this to go through various Acts of Parliament and find out precisely what is the provision of each Act of Parliament, and then argue as if both the parties had thoroughly acquainted themselves with all the provisions of the Acts, and had really intended that the words they used should have quite a strict reference to those provisions. I think that, if it is possible to place a reasonable meaning upon the words you find in this covenant you should do so notwithstanding that the words used are not perfectly accurate with reference to the existing state of things. If we do find that, I do not think that there is any difficulty about the matter. I will deal with the words "the water rate imposed or assessed upon the said premises, or on the lessor or lessees in respect thereof." I should say, first of all, that if any. thing falls within sect. 35 of the New River Company's special Act, that is to say a fair supply of water for domestic purposes, that is a water rate, and that section provides for an assessment of the charge, having regard to the annual value of the house. I leave out the word "imposed" because it has been dealt with in the case of Badcock v. Hunt (ubi sup.), in which it is said that the word "imposed" might mean an obligatory charge. But the word "assessed means reckoned on the value. It is not accurate to say assessed upon the premises; but it is not very far from being accurate to say that the water rate is a rate assessed upon the lessees in respect of the house. That is very nearly accurate. At any rate it is so near that I have not the remotest doubt that in the ordinary acceptation it would be taken that that was one of the things meant. So that we are not reduced to this, that, if we leave out this particular charge for trade purposes, we are bound to leave out

[CHAN. DIV.

every water rate. I do not think so at all. Now, let us consider the matter a little further. Whatever for the purposes of the general Act may be the meaning of the words "water rate"-and they probably are so general that nothing paid for water can be taken out of them-in this Act, when you come to sect. 35, it is a rate which is not assessed upon the person in respect of the premises. It is a rate which is entirely free from any reference to premises; it is only to be a matter of bargain between the person who wishes to have the supply and the company which is authorised to make the supply, and, of course, is supposed here to be willing to give the supply. It is perfectly plain that you may carry on a very large trade in a very small house or on premises of small value, and when you are dealing with the questions that are dealt with in sect. 35, approximately the annual value of the house determines the amount you are to pay. Therefore I do not see how it is possible fairly to say that the rates charged in sect. 35 are not within the covenant; or, on the other hand, how it is possible to say that the rates charged under sect. 40 for trade purposes do fall within it. Then it was said that the words in the covenant except the gas and electric light" show that the lessor must pay all rates whatsoever because she never excepted anything that would fall within the covenant. I do not agree with that. Many an exception is put in, though the parties had not intended to assert that what was not included in the exception was included in the covenant. The lessor says, "I shall not pay for gas or electric light, and I will except them so as to be quite safe." I do not think any such conclusion as Mr. Alexander sought to induce us to draw can fairly be drawn from those words. The water supplied for trade purposes is not, in my opinion, within the covenant, and as the only appeal is about that, I think that the appeal must be allowed. As regards the other, I think that the lessor is well advised not to contest it.

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Appeal allowed.

Solicitor for the appellant, T. G. Bullen. Solicitors for the respondents, Edward Lee and Davis.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.

CHANCERY DIVISION.
Feb. 11, 12, and March 10.
(Before STIRLING, J.)
BELL v. BALLS. (a)

Specific performance-Sale by auction-Sale of lands-Authority of auctioneer to bind the purchaser-Authority of auctioneer's clerk-Mistake-Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), s. 4.

In an action for specific performance of a contract of sale by auction of freeholds, the defendant, to whom the property was knocked down, alleged that on going into the sale-room he had a conversation with the auctioneer, who asked him to give him a bid (which was admitted by the plaintiffs, the vendors) and that in consequence of that request he bid for the property, but without any intention of becoming the purchaser.

(a) Reported by A. W. CHASTER, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

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