to keep herself and to indemnify her husband from all debts and liabilities which she might contract. The husband further agreed to pay his wife 151. a year for the clothing of each girl until she should attain the age of fifteen, and such further sum afterwards as the husband and wife should agree upon until each girl should attain twenty-one. The agreement was to become void if the parties became reconciled, or if their marriage should be dissolved for any future misconduct. On the 5th Aug. 1896 the wife obtained a decree for judicial separation on the ground of adultery on the part of the husband since the date of the separation deed, and she obtained an order giving her the custody of both daughters, one of whom is now over seventeen, and she is to pass part of her holidays with her father. The wife afterwards applied for permanent alimony and maintenance for the daughters. The registrar dismissed her application, on the authority of the first decision of Gandy v. Gandy (46 L. T. Rep. 607; 7 P. Div. 168); but on appeal Barnes, J. reversed this decision, on the authority of the second decision in that case, and gave the wife liberty to proceed with her application. From this decision the husband has appealed to this court. It will be observed that this is a case of judicial separation, and not of divorce, and that, whilst the separation deed left the custody of the children with the husband, the decree of the Divorce Court has given that custody to the wife. Further, the husband's covenant to pay the school bills of the girls only extends to the bills at the school at which they were at the date of the deed, and one of the girls being over fifteen no sum for her clothing is payable under the separation deed, the husband and wife not having agreed upon any allowance. The husband in this case has by his counsel expressed his willingness to do whatever the court may think right as regards the girls, but this offer does not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor the right of the wife to invoke its aid. The separation deed contains no express covenant not to sue for a greater allowance than 150l. a year, and is in this respect less explicit than the deed in Gandy v. Gandy. The covenant not to molest is shown by the next clause not to apply to proceedings in the Divorce Court based on subsequent misconduct even if it could so apply apart from such context, and the covenant by the wife to pay her own debts and indemnify her husband against them does not prevent her from applying for maintenance for the children. Under these circumstances Barnes, J. was right in holding the second decision in Gandy v. Gandy, rather than the first decision, applicable to the present case. No doubt there are observations in the judgments on the first occasion which favour the contention of the husband, but, as already pointed out, nothing then turned on the custody or maintenance of the children. It was contended by counsel for the husband that, even if an order were made for the maintenance of the children it ought to be confined to that, and ought not to extend to alimony for the wife. But it is obvious that, in considering what ought to be done as to either allowance, the court must consider the other. Barnes, J. made the order in the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon the court by 20 & 21 Vict. c. 35, s. 17 (alimony) and sect. 35 amended by 22 & 23 Vict. c. 61, s. 4 (maintenance). We see no reason to [CHAN. DIV. alter the form of the order, especially having regard to the form adopted in Gandy v. Gandy and the observations of Cotton, L.J. in 30 Ch. Div. 57, at pp. 79 and 80, and the orders ultimately made by the Divorce Court for alimony after the second decision of this court in that case. The whole case as to alimony and maintenance is properly open as soon as the position of the parties provided for by the deed is altered by the order of the court changing the custody of the children. The appeal in this case must also be dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed, Solicitor for the appellant in Bishop v. Bishop, Edward J. H. Carter. Solicitors for the respondent, Edwin Smith and Ellis. Solicitors for the appellant in Judkins v. Judkins, Arnold Williams and Co. Solicitor for the respondent, H. B. Wade. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. CHANCERY DIVISION. Re WILMOT; WILMOT v. BETTERTON. (a) Will-Construction-Gift of real and personal estate to spinster" and to any lawful issue she may have "-Rule in Wild's casee-Joint tenancy. A testator devised and bequeathed all his real and personal estate to B. for life, and after her decease to P. for life subject to a forfeiture in a certain event, and the will proceeded: "And from and after the decease of" P., "I give and bequeath the property so given and belonging to P." for life to my ward" E. " and to any lawful issue she may have, such issue to take a vested interest in my said property upon attaining the age of twenty-one years.' The testator died possessed of real and personal estate. E. sur vived the testator and died intestate without having been married. Held, (1) that the direction that the issue should take vested interests was inconsistent with the use of the word "issue as a term of limitation, and that consequently E.'s issue took as purchasers. and that her heir-at-law was entitled to the real estate; (2) that as to the personal estate E. and her issue (had she had any) would have taken concurrently as joint tenants, and that consequently her legal personal representative was entitled to the personalty. THIS was an originating summons taken out by the plaintiff for the determination of the question whether the real and personal estate of the testator Samuel Charles Wilmot was devised and bequeathed to Ellen Ellendii for her life, subject to the prior life interest of the defendant therein, and upon her death the plaintiff as the testator's heir-at-law and sole next of kin was entitled thereto, or whether Ellen Ellendii took other and if so what interest in the same. The defendant Elizabeth Betterton was the sole surviving executrix of the testator. any The testator by his will, after giving certain directions for payments of certain legacies, gave (a) Reported by W. L. RICHARDS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. the residue of his real and personal estate to the defendant for life, and upon her decease he directed that Emily Packe should have a life interest in the same, subject to forfeiture in a certain event, and the will then proceeded as follows: And from and after the decease of the said Emily Packe or the forfeiture of her interest under this my will, I give and bequeath the property so given or belonging to her the said Emily Packe for life to my ward Mademoiselle Ellen Ellendii, now residing with me, and to any lawful issue she may have, such issue taking a vested interest in my said property upon attaining the age of twenty-one years. The testator died on the 26th April 1889. Ellen Ellendii died on the 22nd Nov. 1893 intestate and without ever having been married. By an order dated the 10th Dec. 1896, F. E. Grace was appointed to represent the interests of the next of kin and heir-at-law of Ellen Ellendii. Graham Hastings, Q.C. and A. W. Rowden for the plaintiffs.-Ellen Ellendii took a life interest only in the property. They cited the following cases: Hockley v. Mawbey, 1 Ves. jun. 143; Doe v. Elvey, 4 East, 313; Audesley v. Horne, 1 L. T. Rep. 317; 26 Beav. 193; 1 D. F. & J. 226; Jarman on Wills, 4th edit., vol. 2, p. 398; 5th edit., vol. 2, p. 1236. G. A. Scott for the defendant. Grosvenor Woods, Q.C. and Edward Ford (for F. E. Grace, representing the heir-at-law and next of kin of Ellen Ellendii) contended that in the events which had happened the heir-at-law of Ellen Ellendii was entitled to the real estate, and her next of kin was entitled to the personalty. They referred to Theobald on Wills, pp. 255, 258. 325; Buffar v. Bradford, 2 Atk. 220; Newill v. Newill, 26 L. T. Rep. 175; L. Rep. 7 Ch. Re Adam's Policy Trusts, 48 L. T. Rep. 727; 23 Jeffery v. De Vitre, 24 Beav. 296; Butler v. Ommaney, 4 Russ. 70. They also pointed out that if Ellen Ellendii took a life interest only, there would be an intestacy under the will upon her decease. Graham Hastings, Q.C. in reply. April 10.-STIRLING, J., having read the will and stated the facts as above set out, delivered the following written judgment:-The question raised by the summons is whether Ellen Ellendii took aoy and, if any, what interest in the real and personal estate of the testator. I shall first of all deal with the real estate. In Roddy v. Fitzgerald (6 H. of L. Cas. 823) Lord Cranworth thus states the law as to the effect of a devise to A. B. and his issue, at p. 872: "The word issue, when it is used in a will, is primâ facie a word of limitation; that is to say, a gift to A. B. and his issue, gives him an estate tail, it is the same as a gift to him and the heirs of his body. But if the context makes it apparent on the face of the will that the word is not so used, then it may be treated as a word of purchase." In the present case the direction that the issue should take a vested interest in the testator's property upon attaining the age of [CHAN. DIV. The twenty-one years seems to me inconsistent with the use of the word as a term of limitation. testator intended that the issue taking interests under the will should themselves attain vested interests at twenty-one. Now if issue as used in the primary gift be a word of limitation the whole interest is given to Ellen Ellendii as tenant in tail and nothing could ever vest in her issue. In my judgment, therefore, the issue took as purchasers. What then is the effect of a devise to A. B. and his issue where the issue are purchasers? On this question guidance is to be obtained from the rule in Wild's case (6 Co. Rep. 17), which is thus stated by Lord Cranworth in Byng v. Byng (10 H. of L. Cas. 171, at p. 178): "Where there is a devise of land to a man and his children, and he has at the time of the devise no child, then primé facie the word "children" shall be taken to be a word of limitation, and the first taker shall have an estate tail; but, on the other hand, if the first taker has children at the time of the devise, then the will shall prima facie be construed as giving a joint estate to the first taker and the children as purchasers." His Lordship then goes on to say. I have qualified the rule as stated by Lord Coke, by introducing the words 'primâ facie,' because he certainly did not mean to state the rule as one which must take effect where a contrary intention was apparent; and it is clear that in acting on the rule in both its branches, the courts have always considered themselves at liberty to disregard it where an adherence to it would defeat the intention of the testator, as collected from other passages of his will." The rules in Wild's case were by Sir George Jessel, M.R. held to be applicable to a devise for the testator's children and their issue and heirs (see Underhill v. Roden, 34 L. T. Rep. 227; 2 Ch. Div. 494). According to the second branch of the rule where the word children is regarded as a word of purchase under a devise to A. and his children, A. and his children take concurrently as purchasers. So under a devise to A. and his issue where the word issue is regarded as a word of purchase, A. and his issue take concurrently as purchasers. Then arises the question as to when the class of issue to take is to be ascertained. As is stated by Wood, V.C. in Browne v. Hammond (John. 210, see at p. 212, note (a): the rule is, that a devise or bequest to children as a class, distributable at the death of some other person, vests in all children in existence at the death of the testator; the gift, however, opening so as to let in such after-born children, if any, as may come into xistence before the period of distribution." Here the period of distribution would be primê facie the death of the survivor of Elizabeth Betterton and Emily Packe, or the time of the forfeiture of her interest by the latter if she survived; it might in certain circumstances be later, as for example, if Ellen Ellendii had died before the period of distribution leaving issue surviving her none of whom had attained twentyone at the death of the survivor, or the time of forfeiture by Emily Packe. Into this, however, it is unnecessary to enter. It appears to me that Ellen Ellendii took a vested interest on the death of the testator liable to be divested pro tanto by the birth of issue before the period of distribution, an event which did not happen. It appears to me therefore that her heir-at-law is entitled to the real estate. It was urged in oppo sition to the view above expressed that Ellen Ellendii took only an estate for life, and in support of this contention the cases of Hockley v Marbey (ubi sup.), Doe d. Davy v. Burnsall (6 T. R. 30; 1 B. & P. 215), and Doe v. Elvey (ubi sup.) were cited. The first of these cases appears to be under the rule that where words of distribution, together with words which would convey an estate in fee, are attached to the gift, as to which, see Clifford v. Koe (5 App. Cas. 447, 456). As to the two latter cases I refer to the remarks in 2 Jarman on Wills, 4th edit., p. 414. Secondly, as to the personalty. It has been held that the rule in Wild's case has no application to personalty, see Audsley v. Horne (ubi sup.). Under a gift of personalty to A. and his children, the parent and children take prima facie concurrently as joint tenants, but slight circumstances have been laid hold of by the courts as enabling them to come to the conclusion that a gift for life to A. with remainder to his children was intended, see Newill v. Newill (ubi sup.). In the present case I am unable to see anything to take the case out of the ordinary rule, and in my opinion the personal estate will go to the legal personal representative of Ellen Ellendii. Solicitors: Taylor, Stileman, and Underwood; Peacock and Goddard. March 23, 24, and April 6. (Before KEKEWICH, J.) VISCOUNT HILL v. BULLOCK. (a) Fixtures-Mansion-house - Tenant for life in possession-Natural History Museum-Stuffed birds and animals-Cases fixed to the wall. Stuffed birds and animals fastened to iron cases fired to the wall of a natural history museum, the museum being expressly built for the reception of the collection, are not part of the museum, so as to be fixtures annexed to and passing with the mansion-house. THE first plaintiff in this action, the fourth Viscount Hill, was tenant for life in possession of Hawkstone Hall and estates in Shropshire, subject to a mortgage to Lord Penrhyn. The other plaintiff, William Slaney KenyonSlaney, was the surviving trustee of the settlement of the family estates, dated the 17th June 1887, under which the plaintiff Viscount Hill was tenant for life in possession. The defendant, Charles Ernest Bullock, was the trustee in bankruptcy of the plaintiff's father, the third Viscount Hill, who was adjudicated bankrupt on the 24th Aug. 1894, and died on the 30th March 1895. The present action was brought in consequence of a claim by the defendant, the trustee in bankruptcy of the late viscount, to certain articles in the mansion-house as being the property of the late viscount. The articles so claimed by the defendant consisted of (a) fixed cases with birds and animals and other objects in the bird gallery or museum ; (b) the picture-rods and stair-rods throughout the house fitted into rings or brackets attached to the stairs or walls; (c) fixed tables and other furni(a) Reported by FRANCIS E. ADY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. [CHAN. DIV. ture and decorative objects in the hall and various rooms. The plaintiffs claimed a declaration that these articles belonged to the mansion-house as fixtures, or as being in the nature of fixtures, and that the plaintiff, Viscount Hill, as tenant for life, was entitled to the said articles subject to the mortgage to Lord Penrhyn and consequential relief. Between the years 1831 and 1834 Rowland Hill, the second Viscount Hill, built the bird gallery or museum expressly for the purpose of the collection. The stuffed birds which formed the principal part of the collection, and contained among other rare varieties a fine specimen of the great auk, stood and were fixed in open wooden cases or trays, removable like a drawer, inclosed in iron cases with glass doors, these iron cases being fixed to the wall of the museum by T irons let into the wall, which at the back of the cases had been left in its original rough and unplastered state. The museum also contained a stuffed lion, a leopard, the skeleton of an elk, and specimens of a large variety of other animals. The hall and saloon contained various fixed tables and furniture of a decorative character, among them being a trophy consisting of the Royal uniform and accoutrements of King George III. Renshaw, Q.C., Christopher James, and Horace J. Rowlands for the plaintiffs.-We submit that the cases and the birds and animals are part of the ordinary decoration of the gallery or museum, and pass with the mansion-house. The birds are fastened to the cases by nails : Lawton v. Lawton, 3 Atk. 12; Lord Dudley v. Lord Warde, Ambl. 112; The cases of birds are all put up in pursuance of a common design, and form part of the gallery : D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, L. Rep. 3 Eq. 382; Norton v. Dashwood, 75 L. T. Rep. 205; (1896) 2 Ch. 497; Bulkeley v. Lyne Stephens, 11 Times L. Rep. 564; Holland v. Hodgson, 26 L. T. Rep. 709; L. Rep. 7 C. P. 328; Hobson v. Gorringe, 75 L. T. Rep. 611; (1897) 1 Ch. Ex parte Astbury, 20 L. T. Rep. 997; L. Rep. 4 Ch. Mather v. Fraser, 2 K. & J. 536. The cases with the birds are a decoration, but without them would be useless and ugly. P. O. Lawrence, Q.C. and M. Muir Mackenzie for the defendant. We submit that none of the cases cited go so far as your Lordship is asked to go in this case. D'Eyncourt v. Gregory (3 Eq. 382) is the strongest case, but is very different from this. Here the birds and animals are chattels, easily removable, and nothing has affected them to make them anything more than chattels. The iron and wooden cases may be affixed to the freehold, but not the contents. The contents are chattels, just as books in fixed bookshelves, or butterflies fastened by pins. The cases are merely intended for the protection of the birds, and the birds do not belong to the cases as part of them. In Ex parte Astbury, at p. 638 of L. Rep. 4 Ch. App., Giffard. L.J. says: "As regards these weighing machines, it appears that, where they are placed inside the building, the floor is prepared for them, and where they are placed outside the soil is prepared for them-that is to say, a square receptacle is made and is bricked, and, when that square receptacle is made and bricked, the weighing machine is placed in it, and may, of course, be taken out again, for it is not fixed by nails, or by screws, or in any other way." And the Lord Justice held that the weighing machines were not fixtures. That case, we submit, governs the present one. Christopher James in reply.-In the case of Norton v. Dashwood, Chitty, J., at p. 500 of (1896) 2 Ch., says that, in considering any question of fixtures, there are three circumstances to be regarded, and I will apply them to this case. First, the mode of annexation of the articles, and the extent to which it is united to the freehold. Here we have a case of birds, not a case and birds, but all one article, permanently affixed to the wall. Secondly, its nature and construction, as whether it has been put up for a temporary purpose, or by way of permanent improvement. Here the museum or gallery has been in existence for over sixty years. Thirdly, the effect its removal will have upon the freehold; and on that point there is no doubt that the removal of the cases would damage and disfigure the walls. Cur, adv. vult. April 6-KEKEWICH, J.-It is conceded that all the articles in question belong to the defendant as trustee in bankruptcy of the late Viscount Hill, except and so far as they can be treated as in fact or in the eye of the law annexed to the mansion-house of Hawkstone, of which the present Viscount Hill is now tenant for life in possession. In the course of the argument, Mr. Lawrence, on behalf of the defendant, abandoned his claim to certain tables which had been removed, but not sold, and which were alleged to have been fixed to the walls of the apartments in which they stood, in order to complete the design of these apartments. Mr. Lawrence did not admit that he did this on compulsion, and the abandonment of these particular articles cannot be treated as weakening his case or strengthening that of the plaintiff as regards any others. On the other hand, it was practically, if not nominally, admitted by the plaintiff that all such things -e.g., glasses-as are generally treated as personal chattels, and which can be removed without injury to the freehold, passed to the defendant, and no more need be said about them. There was a contest to the last about a Royal uniform, generally described as "the trophy," which was fixed to a case hung on a wall. This having been not only removed but sold, the defendant was not in a position to restore it, and I think he cannot be made liable for it. I am of opinion that "the trophy" falls within the class of personal chattels above mentioned. There remains to be considered the question whether any and which of the contents of the museum belong to the defendant, or must be treated as part of the freehold. These contents consist of a collection of stuffed birds made with some care and catalogued. Mr. Lawrence from the first admitted that he could not remove the cases, which are of solid manufacture and are securely fixed to the walls in such a manner that they undoubtedly form part of the apartment-the museum-in which they stand. This, of course, does not satisfy the plaintiff, whose position was neatly and forcibly stated 66 [CHAN. DIV. by Mr. James in reply. "I want," said he, 'neither cases nor birds, but cases of birds." The birds are fixed as such things usually areon twigs or imitations of rock, which in their turn are fixed on wooden trays fitted into the metal cases. There is really no difficulty in removing these wooden trays, nor really would there be any difficulty in leaving the trays and removing the birds so that they could be fixed in a similar or different manner elsewhere. It seems to me that the contents of the cases must be regarded as movable personal chattels, unless they can be brought within some recognised exception to the general law respecting fixtures. In fact, the argument on behalf of the plaintiff depended entirely on the application to the circumstances of this case of the decision of Lord Romilly in D'Eyncourt v. Gregory (L. Rep. 3 Eq. 382). Before considering the principle which that case is said to have established, or, in other words, the exception to the general law which it is said to have laid down, it is well to observe what question was then before the court in respect of which the decision is applicable to the present case. The question arose on a will by which the tenant for life of settled estates and the owner of other estates in fee simple had endeavoured, by the doctrine of election, to force both into one settlement and to comprise in it the decorative contents added by himself to a mansion-ho use forming part of the settled estates. The key to the decision is found in a passage in Lord Romilly's judgment, commencing at the bottom of page 393: "In the first place I think it is obvious that the testator by the shifting clause meant to coerce as powerfully as he could the tenant in tail in possession of the settled estates, and to induce him to resettle those estates: and, in the event of his refusing to do so, the testator intended to take away from him every article of property he could." We must read the rest of the judgment, so far as it concerns the present case, with reference to that passage. Having that in view, Lord Romilly says, on page 396: "I think it does not depend on whether any cement is used for fixing these articles or whether they rest by their own weight, but upon this-whether they are strictly and properly part of the architectural design for the hall and staircase itself and put in there as such as distinguished from mere ornaments to be afterwards added." And a little lower down he admits the distinction which he endeavoured to make to be extremely thin and difficult of application. I do not think that any of the other authorities cited directly bear on the point before me. Lawton v. Lawton (3 Atk. 12) was cited more for showing how the court deals with these questions as between tenant for life and remainderman than for any other purpose, and I cannot see that it otherwise assists the plaintiff. Reference was made to some other decisions where well-recognised rules in favour of what are called "trade fixtures" were applied, and also to some where equally well-recognised rules touching the relative rights of mortgagor and mortgagee were discussed. There is no advantage in further alluding to them, for they really do not bear on the question in hand. D'Eyncourt v. Gregory has been cited and followed in two recent cases. In the first of these, Bulkeley v. Lyne Stephens (11 Times L. Rep. 564), Stirling, J. applied Lord Romilly's principle to circumstances which, in CHAN. DIV.] Re CROSSLEY; BIRRELL v. GREENHOUGH. his judgment, brought that case within it. He upheld the report of a referee who had found that certain statues and other things specified formed part of the original design of the mansion-house, and in that sense were annexed to the freehold. In the second, Norton v. Dashwood (75 L. T. Rep. 205; (1896) 2 Ch. 497), Chitty, J. again followed D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, and held that tapestry passed as a fixture under a devise of the mansionhouse, but, as I understand the judgment, because the tapestry was physically annexed, and not by reason of any architectural design. Here I have a case quite different in detail from Bulkeley v. Lyne Stephens, and though not failing to note that the principle was there applied, I do not find in Stirling, J.'s judgment any lines according to which I can determine the limits of its application here. I, of course, see that if the cases are emptied of their contents the character of the museum will be entirely altered. In truth, it will cease to be a museum and will be converted into a room which may become a museum again, and in which some extensive and useful preparations have already been made towards that end. the cases have been again stored with their appropriate contents they not only answer no useful purpose, but may well be regarded as an eyesore. Yet I think the architectural designs of the museum must be restricted to the preparations just mentioned, and cannot properly be Until extended to the collection in view of which those preparations were originally made. The contents of any particular case cannot be regarded as permanent, and, in fact, it appears that, as was natural, additions have from time to time been made to the museum, so that now, although still comprising those originally placed there, it also comprises others intended to make the collection more perfect. So far as I know, these additions have not introduced any variations into the original arrangement, but successive owners of the mansion-house might well from time to time make variations, and I should rather suppose that some would be occasionally required to maintain the scientific order of the collection. These and other considerations force me to the conclusion that the contents of the cases cannot be regarded as falling within the principle stated by Lord Romilly, and I must hold that they are not annexed to the mansion-house, but belong to the defendant. If this view be sound, it follows that the many objects of a like character to the contents of the cases which are to be found in the museum placed where the convenience of the moment or the taste of the occupant dictated also belong to the defendant. As regards all these, the position of the plaintiff is far weaker than as regards the contents of the cases, about which only I have entertained any serious doubt. Solicitors: Stibbard, Gibson, and Co., for Rowlands and Co., Birmingham; Pritchard, Englefield, and Co., for E. Bygott, Wem. April 7 and 8. [CHAN. DIV. (Before KEKEWICH, J.) Re CROSSLEY; BIRRELL v. GREENHOUGH. (a) Charity-Mortmain-Impure personalty-Metropolitan Board of Works (Loans) Act 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 102), s. 5. Metropolitan Board of Works Consolidated Stock being charged on land is impure personalty within the Mortmain Acts. Cluff v. Cluff (2 Ch. Div. 222) considered. ORIGINATING SUMMONS by the executors and trustees of the will of John Thomas Crossley, Q.C., for the determination among others of the following question: (3.) Whether the sum of 40001. Metropolitan Three-and-a-half per Cent. Consolidated Stock forming part of the testator's estate is personal estate not capable of being bequeathed by will for charitable purposes either under the Act 9 Geo. 2, c. 36, or under the Mortmain and Charitable Uses Act 1888. The testator died on the 3rd Jan. 1892, and his will was proved by all the executors on the 2nd April 1892. By his will, made on the 6th Sept. 1890, John Thomas Crossley, after giving various legacies, annuities, and specific gifts, gave, devised, and bequeathed, and appointed all his real and personal property to his trustees upon the trusts thereinafter declared. He directed and declared that his trustees or trustee should at such time or times and in such manner as they or he should think fit, by the calling in, collection, sale, and conversion into money of such parts of his general estate as should consist of personal estate or property not being capable of being bequeathed by will for charitable purposes, and if that should be insufficient, then by the mortgage, sale, or conversion into money of such parts of his general estate as should consist of real estate or chattels real, and if that should be insufficient then by the calling in, collection, sale, or conversion into money of such parts of his general estate as should consist of pure personal estate or property capable by law of being bequeathed by will for charitable purposes, raise such sum or sums of money as should be required for the payment of, and should with the money to be so raised pay and discharge, all his just debts and funeral and testamentary expenses, and all the pecuniary legacies thereby bequeathed other than annuities, and except also all other if any legacies thereby bequeathed for any charitable purposes. And he directed that all legacies given by his will for any charitable purpose, and the legacy or succession duties payable in respect of the same, should be paid exclusively out of that part of his general estate which might lawfully be bequeathed by will for charitable purposes. And testator directed that his trustees or trustee should hold all the residue of his general estate, and the moneys, stocks, funds, shares, securities, and property of which the same should consist upon trust in the first place to pay and discharge the annuities. And testator directed and declared that, subject to the performance of all the trusts and directions therein before expressed, declared, and contained, (a) Reported by FRANCIS E. ADY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. |