there can be no reference to justices. It is only where there is a difference that there can be a reference to justices. Of course, sect. 70, which is only carrying out and pointing out what is to be done when the justices have been applied to, will also fall out, and we have so got rid of sects. 68, 69, and 70. But the suggestion is that we have not got rid of sect. 71. Now let us look at the words of sect. 71. It enacts that, if any owner shall consider the accommodation works made by the company-there are none; there is a bargain that there should be none-or directed by the justices-there are none; it was bargained there should be no reference to the justices. Therefore all these words are inapplicable to the present case. If they consider those insufficient for the commodious use of their respective lands, it shall be lawful for any such owner or occupier at any time, and so on. Now, if it had not been for those words "at any time" I doubt whether any reasonable argument would have been found. Why are the words "at any time" there? I think it is plain that they are there to distinguish that case from the other case which is excluded by the agreement, of there being works to be done by the company, either without or under the direction of the justices; and, practically, these words "at any time" are contrasted with the five years from the completion of the works in sect. 73. To my mind, it appears reasonably clear that this was not intended to give a right vastly larger, as it would be in many cases, and as it probably would be in the majority of cases, in its scope and in its importance, than what is given by what I may call the principal section-sect. 68. Its object was clearly only to say what was to happen in the case of a landlord who, by over-trustfulness, or by not having ascertained really what accommodation he was entitled to, or by not having taken steps within the five years, has not got his accommodation works. A railway company often takes pretty nearly five years for its works, and the accommodation works are to be made forthwith after the part of the railway passing over the land has been laid out or formed. By some accident or by some oversight the landlord may have failed to bring the company to book, as it were, to get them before the justices at the proper time, and to get an order at the proper time. In that case he is not to lose the right altogether, but he is to be in the same position as if the five years, for instance, had not passed by. He is to be in the same position, notwithstanding that the company may have done what they thought right, and that he may not have gone to the justices-notwithstanding even that the justices may have given directions in particular cases, and they may have been asked to give directions in others and have not done so. Notwithstanding all these things, the landlord may, although the five years have elapsed, and indeed at any time, come and ask in the words of the section, to be at liberty (it is a valuable right and liberty) to do these things which the company might have been made to do if the proper steps had been taken at the proper time, if he brings himself within the section. I do not see that it goes beyond that at all. But, at any rate, in this particular case he has bargained that he will come under that case which really excludes the jurisdiction of the justices altogether, and which makes it impossible that there could be a question as to the sufficiency [CT. OF APP. of any works done. He has been paid for being placed in the position that no works are to be done. I think it is reasonably clear that in this case, whatever the nature of the works proposed might be, sect. 71 does not apply at all. I do not differ in the least with what has been said about the nature of the works, because I think there would be a very grievous difficulty in getting that particular work in as an accommodation work. Certainly to my mind you cannot do anything that would be convenient for the landowner, but you can construct such an accommodation work as might have been constructed under sect. 68, or might have been required under sect. 68, and I do not think you can ask for anything more. Appeal allowed. Solicitors for the appellants, Tamplin, Tayler. and Joseph, agents for Strick, Bellingham, and Hanson, Swansea Solicitors for the respondent, Cheston and Sons. May 24, 25, 27, and June 3. (Before LINDLEY, LOPES, and RIGBY, L.JJ.) DALTON v. FITZGERALD. (a) APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION. Estoppel-Settlement of estates by grantor having no title-Successive entries by tenants for life by virtue of such settlement-Acquisition of possessory title-Rights of remaindermen-Statute of Limitations. J. D. was at the time of making his will and at his death entitled to considerable real estates, including the T. and B. estates. He had several daughters, and one son who married in 1809,. when the T. estate was settled upon certain uses nearly all of which failed by the death of the son in J. D.'s lifetime. By his will, made in 1828 (when two daughters only survived), J. D. recited the settlement of 1809, and stated erroneously that that settlement included the B. estate, and expressed his desire that the said estates should be settled upon the uses thereinafter declared, and the said estates passed to the trustees of the will. The testator died in 1837, and his two daughters became his co-heiresses at law. By an indenture of 1842 a settlement was made for the purpose of effectuating the said will It included both the T. and B. estates, which were settled on the daughters and their issue, remainder to J. F. for life, remainder to his sons in strict settlement, remainder to G. F. for life, remainder to his sons in strict settlement, with remaindersThe daughters executed the deed, but J. F. and G. F. did not. One daughter died in 1843, and the sister became sole heiress. She died in 1861 a spinster. J. F. thereupon entered into possession of the said estates, and died without issue in 1867, when G. F. entered into possession of the same. He died with over. out issue in 1894, and the property passed to the plaintiff. G. F. had procured himself to be registered in the Land Registry as owner in fee of the B. estate, and by codicil devised this estate to the defendants. An action was brought claiming a declaration that the B. estate was effectually comprised in the settlement of 1842.. and for rectification of the register, and it was (a) Reported by E. A. SCRATCHLEY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law contended by the plaintiff that the defendants were estopped from denying the validity of such settlement. Held, that G. F. never acquired a legal title to the estates by the Statute of Limitations as against the plaintiff, and that as between them the deed of 1842 regulated their rights; that the defendants, as G. F.'s devisees, were in no better position than he was; and that, so far as title was concerned, the plaintiff was entitled to the estates for life under that deed. Board v. Board (29 L. T. Rep. 459; L. Rep. 9 Decision of Stirling, J. affirmed. APPEAL by the defendants from a decision of Stirling J. (ante, p. 82). Elton, Q.C. and Buckley, Q.C. (with them T. H. Carson) for the appellants-On no principle can any of the lands in question be treated as falling within the settlement of 1842. They were not included in the settlement of 1809. See Gile's and Newton's case, Godbolt, 136; Doe d. Clayton v. Williams, 11 M. & W. 803. Therefore they were not devised by the will of 1828: Doe d. Harris v. Greathed, 8 East, 91. When John Dalton, the son, died in 1819 the lands passed to his father in fee, and not being included in the father's will, his two daughters, Elizabeth and Lucy Dalton, became entitled as his co-heiresses to the property. The lands were not included in the settlement of 1842, which was executed for the express purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the will of John Dalton, but on the death of Elizabeth and Lucy the lands became the property of a Miss English. The settlement of 1842 conferred no beneficial interest on anybody beyond what the will of John Dalton gave. It recited the settlement of 1809 and the will of John Dalton. It was therefore apparent on the face of the deed itself that the testator had made a mistake. Sir James Fitzgerald entered in 1861 under the limitations of the settlement of 1842, and Miss English could have ejected him. Sir Gerald took possession in 1867, and Miss English might have ejected him. He was advised that he had acquired a statutory title, and had that title registered. All the persons who have 'been in possession have been in possession as against John Dalton and his representative Miss English. That possession might have been interrupted at any moment, so Sir Gerald did acquire a good title. The cases on estoppel divide themselves into two classes-first, where a testator has no title other than possession, i.e., a defective title-but makes a good devise assuming the title to be good; and, secondly, where a testator has a title of some sort, it may be no more than possession, but does not make a good devise There may exist a third class, where a testator has not only a good title but also makes a good devise. In the second class of cases a person who enters under the impression that he is taking under the will is not estopped from setting up a title against the remaindermen. In cases, however, where a testator has no title, or a defective title, but is in possession and makes a good devise to a tenant for life and remaindermen, the tenant for life is a grantee, and is estopped from setting up a title [CT. OF APP. by the Statute of Limitations against the remaindermen: Hawksbee v. Hawksbee, 11 Hare, 230; Asher v. Whitlock, 13 L. T. Rep. 254; L. Rep. 1 Anstee v. Nelms, 1 H. & N. 225; Board v. Board, 29 L. T. Rep. 459; L. Rep. 9 Q. B. 48; Doe d. Carter v. Barnard, 13 Q. B. 945. [LOPES, L.J. referred to 2 Smith's L. Cas., 9th ed., pp. 798, 799.] The present point is not touched by Kernaghan v. McNally (12 Ir. Ch. 89), and the decision there is one not to be followed. It is not binding on this court, and is moreover distinguishable. The class of cases which governs the present case is where the testator has a good title to the fee, but does not dispose of his property by his will; his will is misunderstood, and it is thought that he has devised it and a tenant for life takes possession instead of the heir. Under those circumstances the tenant for life is not a grantee. He takes adversely both to the testator and the heir, and is not estopped from saying that the will was misunderstood, and that he has acquired a statutory title: Paine v. Jones, 30 L. T. Rep. 779; L. Rep. 18 Eq. Re Stringer's Estate, 37 L. T. Rep. 233; 6 Ch. Doe d. Marchant v. Errington, 6 Bing. N. C. 79; Comyn's Dig. tit. "Estoppel "; Doe d. Crisp v. Barber, 2 Durn. & E. 749 ; Sugden's R. P. Stat. 2nd ed. p. 9. [LINDLEY, L.J. referred to p. 65, sect. 97, of Sugden's R. P. Stat.] The deed of 1842 was not intended to confer any title apart from the will, and the parties must be treated as deriving their title from the will. This case therefore falls within the category of those where there is no estoppel. We rely on Paine v. Jones (ubi sup.), which is a decision directly in our favour. In that case Malins, V.C. distinguished Board v. Board (ubi sup.), Hawksbee v. Hawksbee (ubi sup.), and Anstee v. Nelms (ubi sup.). There is no decision of any English court opposed to Paine v. Jones (ubi sup.). Possession is a question of fact; it cannot be qualified as being under a will or under a deed. The state of mind of the person who takes possession has nothing to do with the Statute of Limitations. The remaindermen have acquired nothing from him; there was no consideration. The only analogy suggested is that of a tenant who encroaches; but, as between landlord and tenant, the tenant is deemed to have taken in the additional land as part of his tenancy, and for the benefit of the landlord. That doctrine does not therefore affect the present case: Shelford's R. P. Stat., 9th ed., p. 39; Whitmore v. Humphries, 29 L. T. Rep. 496; L. Attorney-General v. Tomline, 43 L. T. Rep. 486; Here the property was not really trust property; therefore any encroachment that was made was not for the benefit of the trustees. A tenant for life stands in no fiduciary position towards the remaindermen : Dicconson v. Talbot, 24 L. T. Rep. 49; L. Rep. 6 It is immaterial that Sir Gerald thought that he was acting under the deed and was tenant for life: Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H. of L. Cas. 1. Graham Hastings, Q.C. (with him J. T. Prior) for the respondent.-The question here has to be determined with reference to the settlement of 1842, applying the principle of Board v. Board (ubi sup.) to that deed. It is said that the reasoning of Board v. Board (ubi sup.) cannot be made to apply to a case of this kind, because here the parties thought that they took under a will. It is said that they could not take under the deed because the deed refers to the will, and under that they could not take at all. It makes no difference that they take under the will. In the case of Anstee v. Nelms (ubi sup.) two of the judges (Pollock. C.B. and Martin, B.) thought that it did not matter whether it was a will under which possession was taken. Paine v. Jones (ubi sup.) is the only case really against my contention. Re Stringer's Estate (ubi sup.) is not easy to understand. But, at any rate, it does not go so far as it is sought to be carried in the present case. As to the Irish case of Kernaghan v. McNally (ubi sup.), all that was intended to be decided in the first instance was that, as between the heir and younger children, the heir was barred; but I cannot say that I rely on that case. Elton, Q.C. replied. Cur. adv. vult. June 3.-The following written judgments were delivered : LINDLEY, L.J.-The question raised by this appeal is whether the plaintiff is entitled to eject the defendants from certain lands in Bulk in the county of Lancaster. In 1894 Sir Gerald Fitzgerald died, seised and in possession of the lands in question. The plaintiff says that Sir Gerald was tenant for life only under a deed of 1842, and the plaintiff claims as entitled in remainder under the same deed. The defendants say that, although Sir Gerald entered upon and enjoyed the lands as tenant for life only, and believed himself to be so, yet that this was a mistake, and that when he died he was really tenant in fee, and that he devised the lands to the defendants on certain trusts. On his death they entered on the lands, claiming to be entitled to do so as the trustees of his will, and in that character and under that title they defend this action. The defendants, however, further contend that, even if they have no title, they are in possession, and that the plaintiff has no title and cannot therefore eject them. Stirling, J. decided in favour of the plaintiff. The case is reported in (1897) 1 Ch. 440, where the facts and documents are sufficiently stated, and, without restating them, I will first examine the question of title. The right of the plaintiff to eject the defendants will then be easily disposed of. Under John Dalton's will of 1828 the lands in question, if comprised in it, would in 1842 have been vested in trustees upon trust to convey them to the persons then equitably entitled to them under the limitations contained in the will, and which limitations were there very fully set out. It was contended by the defendants, and I will assume correctly, that the lands in question did not pass by this will. It is tolerably plain that every one interested in the will thought that the lands were comprised therein. In 1842 the trustees of the [CT. OF APP. will, acting, as they and every one else supposed, in conformity therewith, conveyed the legal estate in the lands comprised in the will, and also, in express terms, the lands in Bulk which are now in question, to the persons who would have been equitably entitled to them if they had passed by the will. The daughters and coheiresses of the testator, to whom, according to the defendants, these lands had descended, were parties to this conveyance, but they were not conveying parties, nor did the daughter who was then married acknowledge the deed under the Fines and Recoveries Abolition Act. Under this deed of 1842 the lands in question were conveyed so that, in the events which have happened, they legally vested according to the deed (1) in the testator's two daughters and coheiresses for their lives; (2) in the testator's nephew, Sir James Fitzgerald, for life; (3) in Sir Gerald Fitzgerald for life; (4) in the plaintiff for life. The surviving daughter and coheiress died in 1861, and Sir James Fitzgerald then entered into possession as tenant for life. He died in 1867, and then Sir Gerald Fitzgerald took possession as tenant for life, and he died in Feb. 1894. Shortly before his death, however, he seems to have been advised that the lands in question had not passed under the will of 1828, and that the deed of 1842 was inoperative as to them, and on the 3rd Jan. 1894 he procured himself to be registered under the Land Transfer Act of 1875 as owner in fee in possession. He did this without notice to anyone interested in disputing his claim. He left a will or codicil devising these lands to the defendants upon certain trusts, and they claim the lands accordingly. The fact that Sir James Fitzgerald and after him Sir Gerald Fitzgerald took and held possession as tenants for life under the deed of 1842, and not otherwise, is conclusively proved by the numerous dealings with those estates by them in their lifetime. Some, but not all of these are noticed in the report. But it is not necessary to refer to them at length. Now it is contended by the defendants that, if the lands in question were not comprised in the will of 1828, the deed of 1842 was inoperative as a conveyance of them, and that Sir Gerald Fitzgerald acquired a good title to these lands by the Statute of Limitations, and that he was entitled, and that the defendants as his devisees are entitled, to set up the title so acquired against the plaintiff, who claims the lands in remainder under the deed of 1842. This contention is really based on a misconception of sect. 34 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, which extinguishes the right and title of the person against whom the statute has run. That section does not confer a statutory title against everybody upon the person in whose favour the statute has run, although it does as against those persons whose rights are barred by the statute. This was pointed out by Martin, B. in Anstee v. Nelms (1 H. & N. 225, at p. 232), when he said that "the Statute of Limitations can never be so construed that a person claiming a life estate under a will shall enter, and then say that such possession was unlawful, so as to give his heir a right against the remainderman." This was approved as good sense and good law in Board v. Board (29 L. T. Rep. 459; L. Rep. 9 Q. B. 48). The misconception as to the effect of the statute is extremely well put in the following passage in Pollock and Wright on Possession, at p. 96: “It would be possible at first sight to suppose that, as between a succession of independent occupiers, who were all wrong-doers as against the true owner, the law must be indifferent, with the result of conferring an absolute title upon the person who happens to be in possession when the time of limitation expires. Reflection, however, shows this to be contrary to the reason and principles of the law. Possession being once admitted to be a root of title, every possession must create a title which, as against all subsequent intruders, has all the incidents and advantages of a true title. William is the possessor and apparent owner of a house; in that house he dies; we will suppose him to die intestate. John, wrongly supposing himself to be entitled as the heir of William, enters and occupies the house. Peter is really William's heir, but ignorant of the facts; in course of time, having obtained information and advice, he sues John. It turns out that William had disseised Giles, the true owner, by mere encroachment or in some other way, and would have had no answer to an action brought by Giles or his assigns to recover the land. But since William's death the period of limitation has expired, and the right of Giles is extinguished. Can John use this as a defence against Peter? No; for the statute has nothing to say, for better or worse, about the person in actual possession, or the relative worth of the qualified rights to possess which may have arisen while time was running against the true owner. It says that Giles, and those who have, or would have had, his estate, shall not from henceforth sue any one; it does not say that Peter shall not sue John. Whether some one has a higher title or not, Peter has a better title than John, as he would have had though the true owner's claim were still enforceable. In the language of the modern authorities, possession is good title'-nothing less-' against all but the true owner.' ." When the authorities are examined they are all in favour of the plaintiff; none really support the defendants' contention. Board v. Board (ubi sup.) is, in my opinion, clearly in point, and clearly right. Whether Kernaghan v. McNally (12 Ir. Ch. 89) did not go too far, it is not necessary to consider. I have great difficulty in reconciling it with Sir E. Sugden's previous decision in Scott v. Nixon (3 Dr. & W. 388). Paine v. Jones (30 L. T. Rep. 779; L. Rep. 18 Eq. 320) is intelligible, having regard to the facts of that case. The widow, who had entered as tenant for life under a will which did not pass the lands in question, was allowed by the court (under circumstances which do not appear) to exclude them from a conveyance to new trustees, and she was allowed to keep possession of them after it had been ascertained that she had no right to them. But I am not satisfied of the soundness of the distinction drawn by Malins, V.C. between cases of persons having no title under a will, because it does not purport to include the lands they claim, although they believe that it does, and persons claiming under a will which purports to deal with land to which the testator had no title, although he thought he had. No doubt a person may by mistake treat himself as tenant for life of property of which he is himself the owner, and such a mistake can be set right unless he has so acted as to render a rectification of the mistake unjust to others. But the distinction drawn by the Vice-Chancellor, although it would include [CT. OF APP. such a case, goes much further, and unless restricted it seems to me likely to lead to error. That case, which is the one principally relied upon by the defendants, is not really an authority for them, owing to its peculiar facts. Nor is the passage read from Sir George Jessel's judgment in Re Stringer (37 L. T. Rep. 233; 6 Ch. Div. 1). What he was objecting to (on p. 10 of 6 Ch. Div.) was the extension of the doctrine of estoppel to tenants for life who do not dispute their testator's title, but who do dispute the legal validity of their dispositions of property which was their own. It appears to me clear that Sir Gerald Fitzgerald never acquired a legal title to these lands by the Statute of Limitations as against the plaintiff, and that as between them the deed of 1842 regulates their rights. The defendants, as Sir Gerald's devisees, are in no better position than he was, and, so far as title is concerned, the plaintiff is entitled to the lands in question for life under the above deed. I pass now to the defendants' contention that, being in possession, it matters not by what title, and that it is sufficient to show that the lands did not vest in the trustees of the will of 1828, and were therefore unaffected by the deed of 1842, and do not therefore belong to the plaintiff. If the defendants had entered, claiming no title under Sir Gerald Fitzgerald, this point would require attention, but in truth it does not arise. The defendants are trustees of his will, and as such they defend this action. We need not consider whether as squatters, claiming no title themselves, there would be any difficulty in ejecting them. The appeal must be dismissed with costs. LOPES, L.J.—I do not propose to restate the facts of this case so fully stated in the court below, but will content myself by enunciating the principles of law applicable to those facts. When certain facts in the case are rightly understood, it does not appear to me to be a case of difficulty, and is covered by authority. It is to be assumed that the lands of Bulk did not pass under the will, and were subsequently erroneously settled with other lands by the deed of 1842, which deed gave Sir Gerald Fitzgerald a life interest in the property so settled. He really had no title to the lands of Bulk, but entered into possession of them under the deed of 1842, exercising powers conferred by that deed, such as the powers of jointuring, and charging portions for younger children. He also paid succession duty as tenant for life. The effect of the deed was to confer a legal title on the beneficiaries under the deed, of whom the plaintiff was one. Sir Gerald Fitzgerald remained in possession of the lands of Bulk sufficiently long to entitle him to the property under the Statute of Limitations if he is not estopped. The defendants are devisees of Sir Gerald Fitzgerald, and "are his privies." Estoppel binds not only the parties but the privies. The defendants, therefore, are in no better position than Sir Gerald Fitzgerald, and if he was estopped they are estopped. If a person obtains possession of land, claiming under a will or a deed, he cannot afterwards set up another title to the land against the will or deed, though the deed or will did not operate to pass the land in question. It is said the property passed by the will, and not by the deed. But how can this be said about the lands of Bulk? They were not included in the will, but were settled, or at any rate were purported to be settled, by the deed. A person having no title to land settles it on A. for life, with remainder to B. A. enters and takes possession and deals with the property as tenant for life; that person is estopped from telling the truth; his mouth is shut-he has availed himself of the settlement for the purpose of obtaining possession of the land, and he cannot afterwards seek to invalidate that which enabled him to obtain possession, and this though subsequently he may have acquired a good title. If a man obtains possession of land, claiming under a deed or will, he cannot afterwards set up another title to the land against the will or deed, though it did not operate to pass the land in question, and if he remain in possession till twelve years have elapsed and the title of the testator's heir is extinguished, he cannot claim by possession an interest in the property different from that which he would have taken if the property had passed by the will or deed. If the interest devised to him by the will is a life estate, the devisees or grantees in remainder will be entitled to enter when that estate determines-and not only is a person who enters under a will or a deed estopped from setting up a title adverse to the will or deed, but anyone who gains possession through a person interested in the land under the will or deed is bound by the same principle of estoppel (Hawksbee v. Hawksbee, 11 Hare, 230; Board v. Board, 29 L. T. Rep. 459; L. Rep. 9 Q. B. 48), which latter case, in my judgment, governs the case now under consideration. I am of opinion that the doctrine of estoppel applies to this case, and that Sir Gerald Fitzgerald and all persons claiming under him are precluded from denying that the settlement was effectual. The appeal must be dismissed with costs. RIGBY, L.J.-I do not think it necessary to restate the provisions of the settlement of 1842. Possession was held under the terms of it from 1842 to 1867. The plaintiff claiming possession as tenant for life under the settlement of 1842, among other contentions, set up the contention that the defendants as deriving title under Sir Gerald Fitzgerald were estopped (whatever the real title might have been) from disputing the right of the plaintiff under the settlement of 1842. Assuming in favour of the defendants that no estate in the lands in question passed by the settlement, I am of opinion that this contention on the part of the plaintiff must succeed, and therefore that it is not necessary to go into any other point argued. It was indeed argued that, on the face of the settlement, the want of title of the grantors sufficiently appeared to prevent an estoppel; but on this point I agree with Stirling, J. I am quite unable to distinguish the present case from that of Board v. Board (29 L. T. Rep. 459; L. Rep. 9 Q. B. 48), the authority of which has not been questioned, and cannot, in my judgment, be successfully questioned. This case arises under a deed, and not under a will, but the doctrine of Board v. Board (ubi sup.) is no part of the law of wills, and depends only upon an estate being taken under an instrument whatever it may be. It follows that it would be useless to inquire further into the validity of the settlement of 1842, the very principle of the decision being that no inquiry into the title is permissible on the part of a person who himself entered by virtue of the settlement or of persons claiming through him. I [CT. OF APP. abstain, therefore, from commenting upon any other part of the case on the ground of the irrelevancy of all other considerations set up. I will add that for my part I do not desire to express any doubt as to the cases of Paine v. Jones (30 L. T. Rep. 779; L. Rep. 18 Eq. 320) and Re Stringer (37 L. T. Rep. 233; 6 Ch. Div. 1). I consider them irrelevant to the present case. I feel the same difficulty in reconciling the decision in Kernaghan v. McNally (12 Ir. Ch. 89) with Lord St. Leonards' decision in Scott v. Nizon (3 Dr. & W. 388) that has been expressed by my brother Lindley. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors for the appellants, Carlisle, Unna, Rider, and Heaton. Solicitor for the respondent, H. B. Bell. Friday, May 28. (Before Lord ESHER, M.R., SMITH and Re SLATER; Ex parte SLATER. (a) APPEAL IN BANKRUPTCY. Bankruptcy-Act of bankruptcy-Assignment for benefit of creditors-Proof-Registered deedOffice copy-Deeds of Arrangement Act 1887 (59 & 51 Vict. c. 57), ss. 6 and 11. Upon the hearing of a bankruptcy petition, the only evidence adduced to prove the act of bankruptcy alleged that the debtor had executed an assignment of all his property for the benefit of his creditors-was an office copy of a deed, registered under the Deeds of Arrangement Act 1887, purporting to be executed by the debtor. Held (dismissing the appeal), that the office copy was, by reason of the provisions of sect. 11 of the Act, sufficient prima facie evidence of the execution of the registered deed by the debtor, and of its execution on the date appearing in the office copy. THIS was an appeal by the debtor against the order of the Divisional Court (Williams and Wright, JJ.) dismissing the appeal of the debtor against a receiving order made in the County Court (76 L. T. Rep. 529). $227.92. On the 18th Nov. 1896 a bankruptcy petition was presented against the debtor in the Stoke-uponTrent County Court. The act of bankruptcy alleged was, that the debtor had executed a deed of assignment of all his property for the benefit of his creditors upon. the 12th Nov. 1896. Upon the hearing of the petition there was produced and put in evidence an office copy of a deed which had been registered, on the 16th Nov. 1896, under the Deeds of Arrangement Act 1887, which purported to be executed by the debtor, and to be dated the 12th Nov. 1896. The Deeds of Arrangement Act 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 57) provides : Sect. 6. The registration of a deed of arrangement under this Act shall be effected in the following manner: (1) A true copy of the deed, and of every schedule or inventory thereto annexed, or therein referred to, shall be presented to and filed with the registrar within seven clear days after the execution of the said deed (in like manner as a bill of sale given by way of security for the (a) Reported by J. H. WILLIAMS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. |