district registry and objected to. I am not disposed to put so narrow a construction on that rule, and I do not see why under that rule, if there was nothing else in it, the learned judge would not have had jurisdiction to do that which he has done. He has ordered as to those costs which have been objected to that they be referred to Master Butler for re-taxation, and to hold that the learned judge had no jurisdiction to do so, would, I think, be to construe the rule somewhat too narrowly. Then there is the other rule which is even wider, that is to say, Order LXV., r. 27 (41), which says: "Any party who may be dissatisfied with the certificate or allocatur of the taxing officer, as to any item or part of an item which may have been objected to as aforesaid, may within fourteen days from the date of the certificate or allocatur, or such other time as the court or a judge, or taxing officer, at the time he signs his certificate or allocatur, may allow, apply to a judge at chambers for an order to review the taxation as to the same item or part of an item -that was the application before Bruce, J., "and the judge may thereupon make such order as the judge may think just; but the certificate or allocatur of the taxing officer shall be final and conclusive as to all matters which shall not have been objected to in manner aforesaid." Now I have no doubt that Bruce, J. was justified in saying, "Having regard to what I see of this taxation by the district registrar, I am not satisfied with it, and I am not disposed to send it back to him. It has been twice before him; what is the use of doing so? I shall, in the exercise of my discretion, refer the disputed items to a person who has greater experience." That is a question of discretion, and it appears to me that we should be unwarranted in saying that the learned judge could not do that. It seems to me, therefore, that under both those rules-certainly under the first, if not under the second-the learned judge had power to make that order. We do not go into the mode in which the learned judge has exercised his discretion. As a general rule the learned judge goes over a taxation, and to say that, when he sees that a taxing master has gone wrong on a particular track, the learned judge cannot refer it back, is tying his hands. It is quite obvious that Bruce, J. was not satisfied with the way in which the district registrar has taxed this bill, and he said, "I will take the assistance of a taxing master who has more skill and more experience." I think that the jurisdiction was in the learned judge, and it is quite impossible for us to review the mode in which he has exercised it; and that therefore this appeal must be dismissed with costs. I would add, as a direction to the taxing master, that the taxation would only be if the objections are right, because the order as it stands does not say so.

CHITTY, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. I think that the learned judge had jurisdiction to make the order now appealed from, having regard to Order XXXV., r. 4. I do not read the words at the end of that rule, "unless the court or a judge shall otherwise order," to mean that the order must be made at the trial, and that it cannot be made separately. I think that it can be made separately, and be made after judgment, and after taxation has commenced, because I do not agree with Mr. Williams that this taxation is final. It is final as to certain items, but it is still

[CHAN. DIV.

sub judice as to the matters referred for re-taxation. Then I turn to Order LXV., r. 27 (41), and I think that we should not be justified in cutting down the meaning which it appears to me is clear on the face of the rule itself. Order LXV., r. 27 (41) says that "the judge may thereupon make such order as the judge may think just." I conceive that it would be an impossible reading of that rule to say that the judge had not jurisdiction to make such an order as this, first, because nothing more is required. But, if anything more is required, I say, secondly, because it is a taxation, and, although judges may be learned in the law, in my experience they are not highly skilled in questions of taxation. I can conceive a learned judge saying, after consulting the learned judge who tried the case, as I understand Bruce, J. did, "I will say as to some of these items that they ought not to be allowed, but if I sit here and tax them myself I shall be in the dark; I will send for the taxing master." But a very long time would be occupied in adopting that course, and he might say, "I will give some of my private time to this business, and I will ask the taxing master to come to my room after four o'clock," which he could do. He might get all the assistance that he could for the purpose of arriving at a just conclusion. The learned judge in the present case has made, after carefully considering the circumstances, such an order as he thinks just. It is not necessary for me to travel into the circumstances. I think that the general view is on a question of principle, and I do not conceive that the learned judge is bound by any such principle; it is not to be found in any Act of Parliament or in any rule. It is an order of convenience, because certain litigants would make a judge travel right through a bill. But where there are grounds-and there are some primâ facie grounds here-for saying that the allowance on taxation is excessive, then the learned judge can take that either into his own hands, or do as Bruce, J. has done, that is to say, get such assistance as he can derive from a skilled and experienced man. The taxation would, of course, only be if the objections are right.

Appeal dismissed.

If the applicant does not make out his case on the affidavits which he files in support of it, and then the respondent answers those affidavits, the applicant is entitled to read the affidavit which has been filed against him to prove his case. THIS WAS summons by Leonard Charles Margetson, as solicitor for Mr and Mrs Pugh, plaintiffs in proceedings relating to the taxation of a bill of costs, charges, and expenses delivered by the respondent Herbert Stanley-Jones, the former solicitor of Mr. and Mrs. Pugh.

a

The summons asked that the costs of Mr. and Mrs. Pugh in the proceedings might be ordered to be taxed and paid by the respondent, or, in the alternative, that it might be ordered that the applicant be at liberty to continue the proceedings for the purpose of recovering and obtaining his costs from the respondent.

It appeared that Mr. and Mrs. Pugh had employed the applicant Margetson in proceedings for the taxation of the costs of the respondent Herbert Stanley-Jones, and behind the back of Margetson they came to an agreement with H. Stanley-Jones to stay all further proceedings, Jones paying them a sum of 251. towards the costs of the proceedings. H. Stanley-Jones knew that the Pughs were in necessitous circumstances, and in his affidavit stated that he had paid "the said sum of 251. gratuitously to Mr. and Mrs. Pugh because they had been his clients for some time, and appeared to have spent all their money."

Mr. and Mrs. Pugh withdrew their retainer to Margetson, and had not paid him any part of the costs due to him.

Warrington, Q.C. E. S. Ford, and H. CourthopeMunroe for Margetson. - The bargain between the Pughs and the respondent was collusive for the purpose of preventing the applicant getting his costs. A bargain of that kind is bad.

Price v. Crouch, 60 L. J. 767, Ch.

T. Ribton for the respondent.-The applicant has to prove one of two things, namely, that he has given express notice of his lien, as was the case in Price v. Crouch and Ross v. Buxton (60 L. T. Rep. 630; 42 Ch. Div. 190), or he must prove collusion between the parties for the purpose of defeating his rights. The affidavits of the applicant do not prove either, and he is not entitled to read the affidavits filed in answer to him in order to prove his case.

KEKEWICH, J.-It is a professional rule that when parties to a dispute are represented by solicitors, neither of those solicitors should communicate with the principal of the other touching the matters in question. That is a binding rule in the profession, and is strictly consonant with good sense and convenience, because it is impossible that solicitors can really do their duty unless they have the full confidence of their clients and are enabled to communicate the one with the other. But the courts have uniformly held, without in the slightest degree impeaching the propriety and advantage of that rule, that if the parties have solicitors, and the solicitor for the one party meets the principal on the other side, and a bargain is made, that bargain is good. It cannot be said that the authority of the principal is gone, because such a thing as that is impossible, and therefore, whether there is litigation pending or not, if the solicitor for the plaintiff meets the defendant and makes a com

[CHAN. DIV.

promise with him, that compromise is binding on the defendant or the plaintiff as the case may be, notwithstanding that up to that time he was represented by a solicitor. That is as much common sense as the rule itself, but what the court has also said is that if that is not done honestly, in a straightforward way, and merely to get rid of litigation, but also with a view of defeating the solicitor's lien, that contention shall not prevail. If the one solicitor meets the party on the other side, or if the two parties compromise knowing of the lien of the solicitor, and are intending to defeat it, then that shall not be allowed, and the only question is whether that was the intention. That runs through all these cases. Lindley, L.J. refers to it in the case of The Hope (49 L. T. Rep. 158; 8 Prob. Div. 144), where he said, at page 146 of 8 Prob. Div.: "There is no rule that the parties may not compromise an action without the intervention of their solicitors. They must, however, do so honestly, and not intend to cheat the solicitors of their proper charges." I recognise the rule. Did they not cheat here? The word is not at all too strong, and I recognise the propriety of the use of it. The question is whether in this case I have such evidence as satisfied the court in the case of Price v. Crouch (60 L. J. 767, Ch.). Here comes in the point urged by the counsel for the respondent. He says that if the applicant does not make out his case on the affidavits which he files in support of it, and then the respondent is ill-advised enough to answer those affidavits, which, in the view put forward, he need not have answered, then the applicant cannot read that affidavit which has been filed against him, and which presumably proves his opponent's case, but is bound to read his own affidavit independently, and thus give the respondent the opportunity of showing that no case has been made out. I challenged the counsel for the respondent to find any authority for that proposition, and he says that it is the ordinary practice, and there is no authority for it. It is strange that such a practice has never come under my notice during the years in which I have been engaged in the Chancery Division. The rule affecting the proper conduct of the case is, that if your opponent does not make out a case, you must have the courage to say so, and not file affidavits at all. If you think his case requires an answer, you must take your chance by your answer of covering your opponent's case. I will not pause

to inquire whether the affidavits of the applicant made out any case. It was a weak one no doubt. I will assume that the plaintiff has not made out any case in his affidavit, but I am clear that the affidavit in answer does. I must read the evidence of Mr. Jones himself in connection with that which he incorporated with it, and which was an affidavit not made at the same time, but only referred to as H. S. J. But then he says that the substance of what passed is incorporated in that affidavit. Then what passed? Mr. Jones had an interview with Mr. and Mrs. Pugh, and the result of it was that, knowing they were in necessitous circumstances, he paid them 251., not as a kind of bargain to stop the taxation, of which he said he was not afraid, but having that inevitable result, which they both knew; and be the bargain a bargain or no bargain, as it may be in the legal sense of the words, both parties perfectly well

knew that once the 251. was paid, the taxation would be dropped, and Mr. Jones would be free from any anxiety caused by the order for taxation. It is said, indeed, that the money was paid with a view of satisfying part of the costs of the proceedings. They say in their affidavit that Mr. Jones had offered to contribute a sum of 251. towards our costs of these proceedings." What Mr. and Mrs. Pugh knew I do not know. It is evident they were in poor circumstances, and were probably over-persuaded by Mr. Jones. But I must take them to know what were the ordinary consequences of their acts, and that they were accepting 251., as they say themselves, towards their costs, without the slightest intention of its being applied towards the payment of their costs. Mr. Jones, on the other hand, knew of their difficulty, and although he stated that he paid the money towards their costs, he must be taken to have known as a solicitor, and being well acquainted with this particular old client, that the money would not find its way into Mr. Margetson's pocket in reduction of his costs. It seems to me that without any such cross-examination as the counsel for the respondent invites, the opponent was well advised enough. I have a distinct case of cheating. I think that what was done on Mr. Jones's part was intended to cheat Mr. Margetson of his costs. I cannot quite acquit Mr. and Mrs. Pugh, but I have no doubt that they did not realise the impropriety of what they were doing. The case seems to me to come distinctly within the authority of Price v. Crouch (60 L. J. 767, Ch.). As for the particular order which the applicant wants, I did not require authority, but I was impressed with the idea that the court could not do what was right. Here I have the case. The only question is what the form of order should be. As I propose to make an order in a more extended way, it will include the sum of 251., which will only be allowed towards the costs as a whole. The summons in the case of Price v. Crouch asked that the costs of the action might be taxed, and paid to the applicant, or, in the alternative, that the applicant might be at liberty to continue the proceedings in order to recover the costs. Where a plaintiff and defendant compromise an action with the knowledge that they are so acting as to deprive the plaintiff's solicitor of his costs, such solicitor is entitled to an order for the payment of his taxed costs of the action by the defendant, or for continuance of the action for the recovery of such costs. Reading there "taxation for "action," the present summons asks exactly the same thing. The Divisional Court sustained the order of the judge in that case. I am at liberty to consider that either of the alternatives would be right. It seems to me that the first alternative is right. There is an apparent anomaly in allowing proceedings to be continued which cannot be continued in the name of the client who has withdrawn his retainer. There is also this, that, if the order to continue the proceedings is made, new costs must be incurred, and Margetson has no right to incur costs except with the view of recovering those already incurred, so that ought to be avoided if it can be done consistently with the judgment. The first alternative seems not to be open to objection. I, therefore, make an order that the costs incurred by Mr. Margetson up to the receipt of the letter of the 9th Sept. 1896, be taxed and

[CHAN. DIV.

paid by the respondent to the applicant. I am directing such taxation as is necessary for ascertaining those costs, and no further costs need be incurred, and in addition I direct that Mr. Jones do pay the costs of this application. Solicitors: Leonard Charles Margetson; Herbert Stanley-Jones.

Tuesday, June 15.

(Before KEKEWICH, J.)

HALL AND Co. v. TRIGG. (a) Practice Contempt —Committal-AttachmentIrregularity-Affidavits-Order LII., r. 4.

Where notice of motion is given to commit a defendant, or for liberty to issue a writ of attachment against him for contempt in disobeying an order of the court, it is necessary to serve a copy of the affidavit of service of the order upon the defendant contemporaneously with the notice of motion, although the order was made by consent of the defendant's counsel. Service, however, is unnecessary if the court is satisfied that the defendant was present in court when the order was made, and knew personally what was done.

THIS was an action by the plaintiffs, lime and cement merchants at Redhill, for an injunction to restrain the defendant, a former traveller of the plaintiffs, from soliciting their customers or carrying on a similar business within a certain distance of Redhill, contrary to an agreement for service entered into by the defendant.

On the 19th Feb. 1897 a motion on behalf of the plaintiffs for an interim injunction was heard, counsel appearing for both plaintiffs and the defendant, and the court, by consent, made an order for a perpetual injunction, the defendant to pay the costs.

The plaintiffs now gave notice of motion to commit the defendant, or, in the alternative, that they might be at liberty to issue a writ of attachment against the defendant for contempt in soliciting customers in breach of the order.

The notice of motion gave notice of the plaintiffs' intention to read certain affidavits, but these affidavits did not include an affidavit of service of the order of the 19th Feb. 1897.

Warrington, Q.C. and Whinney for the plaintiffs.

E. Beaumont for the defendant. I raise the preliminary objection that no copy of the affidavit of service of the order of the 19th Feb. 1897, has been served with the notice of motion in accordance with Order LII., r. 4.

Lawrence, 71 L. T. Rep.

Re Dunning; Sturgeon v.
57; 63 L. J. 784 Ch.;
Taylor v. Roe, 68 L. T. Rep. 213;
Rendell v. Grundy, 71 L. T. Rep. 564; (1895) 1
Q. B. 16.

Warrington. The order of the 19th Feb. 1897 was a consent order; equivalent to an undertaking. [KEKEWICH, J.-Do you require to prove that a consent order has been served?] No; if the order you seek to enforce is an undertaking no evidence of service is required. The order being by consent, has been brought to the notice of the (a) Reported by FRANCIS E. ADY, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

motion.

E. Beaumont in reply.-There is no authority on the question. The man is entitled to have the order served upon him apart from the consent given by his counsel. If the defendant had appeared in person, that would have been another matter.

KEKEWICH, J.-The object of an affidavit of service is to satisfy the court that it is in a position to do justice between the litigants, who thus if not fully forearmed, are at any rate fully forewarned. This applies equally, whether the application to the court is for a writ of attachment or for any other purpose whatever, where an affidavit of service is required. The affidavit of service must show, according to the rules and practice of the court, that the notice of motion or order, or whatever else is to be brought to the attention of the respondent, has been brought to the attention of the respondent in a proper way. In some cases it may be personally, and in other cases through his solicitor or agent. That is the object. If that object is fulfilled in any other way than by the service of the order, and the court is satisfied, then the service becomes unnecessary. It may be convenient, but is unnecessary if really the respondent knows what would be brought to his knowledge by service of the affidavits. A man is not allowed to come to the court and say: "I told the respondent there was an order against him in a case. That does not bring the exact form of the order to his knowledge. For that purpose it is necessary that there should be an affidavit of service of the original order, and that a copy has been delivered to the respondent, so that he knows exactly what the order is. That can be got over not only in a case where the man himself is in court when the application is heard, and, rising in the well of the court, either consents to or opposes the application, and the order is made either adversely to him or otherwise. In that case it is enough to show that the man was present, and knew personally what was done. That is an ancient and well established exception, and many persons have been sent to prison without service of the order because it was brought to their attention in that way, and they knew of it. There are many cases in which respondents have been held bound by an order on the court being satisfied that the respondent was present in person, and must be deemed to have heard what passed. The question I have to consider here goes a step further, for the order was made by consent, not of the man himself, but counsel consented to what he thought was a proper order. But is there any difference between those cases? Can I presume that the man knew of it? What one could do in a case where the liberty of the subject was not concerned I do not consider now; but where the liberty of the subject is concerned, I think I ought to enforce the law in the strictest possible way, and in substance I see no difference between a consent order and an adverse order. On that point, therefore, the motion fails, and the preliminary objection that the service of the order must be proved, and brought to the attention of the respondent prevails. The order should have been brought to the notice of the respondent conLemporaneously with the notice of motion; it

[IN BANK. should have been attached to it or handed over about the same time. I think it is a mere slip in this case. There will be liberty to renew the motion, and the costs will be reserved.

Solicitors: Foster, Spicer, and Foster; Rawlings and Butt.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, IN BANK

RUPTCY. Monday, May 24.

AND

(Before WILLIAMS and WRIGHT, JJ.) Re GINGER; Ex parte THE LONDON UNIVERSAL BANK LIMITED. (a) Bankruptcy-Bill of sale-Trade goods-Order and disposition of the bankrupt with consent and permission of the true owner-Bills of Sale Act 1878 Amendment Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 43), s. 7—Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 44.

The construction of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, s. 44, is unaffected by the Bills of Sale Act 1882, and the possession by the bankrupt of goods used in trade, which he has assigned by a bill of sale, under circumstances such as to raise a reputation of ownership, is a possession by the bankrupt with the consent and permission of the true

owner.

THIS was an appeal by the liquidator of the London and Universal Bank Limited from the decision of his Honour, Sir A. G. Marten, Q.C., the judge of the County Court at Luton, delivered on the 22nd Oct. 1896.

By an indenture made the 28th Feb. 1896, between the bankrupt-therein described as "Alexander McLean Ginger, of Slapton Bury Farm, Slapton, near Cheddington, in the county of Buckingham, dairy farmer, hereinafter called the mortgagor "-of the one part, and the bank, thereinafter called the mortgagees, of the other part, it was witnessed that, in consideration of the sum of 500l. paid to the mortgagor by the mortgagees (the receipt of which the mortgagor thereby acknowledged), the mortgagor did thereby assign unto the mortgagees, their successors and assigns, all and singular the several chattels and things specifically described in the schedule thereto annexed, by way of security for the payment of the sum of 500l. and interest thereon at the rate of 1s. in the pound per month; and the mortgagor did further agree and declare that he would duly pay to the mortgagees the principal sum aforesaid, together with the interest then due as follows: "751. for interest on the 28th May next, and the principal sum of 500l., together with the interest then due at the rate aforesaid, on the 28th Aug. 1896;" and the mortgagor did also agree with the mortgagees that he would (1) pay all rent, rates, and taxes as they became due and payable in respect of the premises on which the chattels and things should be, (2) keep insured the property from fire. There was also the following proviso:

Provided always that the chattels hereby assigned shall not be liable to seizure or to be taken possession of by the said mortgagees for any cause other than those specified in sect. 7 of the Bill of Sale Act (1878) Amendment Act 1882.

The schedule annexed to this bill of sale was entitled, "Inventory of furniture, live and dead (a) Reported by J. ANWYL THEOBALD, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

IN BANK.]

stock, and other effects upon Slapton Bury Farm, Slapton, near Cheddington, in the county of Buckingham, the property of Alexander McLean Ginger," and concluded thus:

Also the tenant right, valuation, goodwill, crops in ground in and about the farm and premises known as Slapton Bury Farm, near Cheddington, in the county of Buckingham.

The bill of sale was registered on the 3rd March 1896.

By another indenture made on the 20th March 1896 between the same parties, it was witnessed that, in consideration of the sum of 2201. then paid to the mortgagor by the mortgagees (the receipt of which the mortgagor thereby acknowledged), the mortgagor did thereby assign unto the mortgagees, their successors and assigns, all and singular the several chattels and things specifically described in the schedule thereunder written, by way of security for the payment of the sum of 2201. and interest thereon at the rate of 1s. in the pound per month, and the mortgagor did further agree and declare that he would duly pay to the mortgagees the principal sum aforesaid, together with interest then due, on the 20th June then next, and the indenture contained covenants similar to those in the former bill of sale. The schedule to this second bill of sale (unlike the first) contained no title referring to the farm, but included a list of animals and other chattels, and concluded thus:

Three hundred acres of grass, the crops of seventy acres of arable land, the tenant right, goodwill, and valuation of Slapton Bury Farm.

This bill of sale was registered on the 27th March 1896.

On the 9th April 1896 a bankruptcy petition was presented, the act of bankruptcy being the failure to comply with a bankruptcy notice dated the 31st March 1896.

The receiving order was made on the 20th April 1896, which on the 11th May was followed by an order for adjudication. The estate of the bankrupt was sold as a going concern for 21541., which was paid into court.

By the Bankruptcy Act 1883 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 52) s. 44, it is provided as follows:

The property of the bankrupt divisible among his creditors, and in this Act referred to as the property of the bankrupt shall comprise the following particulars; (iii.) All goods being, at the commencement of the bankruptcy, in the possession, order or disposition of the bankrupt, in his trade or business, by the consent and permission of the true owner, under such circumstances that he is the reputed owner thereof; provided that things in action other than debts due or growing due to the bankrupt in the course of his trade or business shall not be deemed goods within the meaning of this section.

The Bills of Sale 1878 Amendment Act 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 43), s. 7, enacts:

Personal chattels assigned under a bill of sale shall not be liable to be seized or taken possession of by the grantee for any other than the following causes :-(1) If the grantor shall make default in payment of the sum or sums of money thereby secured at the time therein provided for payment, or in the performance of any covenant or agreement contained in the bill of sale and necessary for maintaining the security; (2) If the grantor shall become a bankrupt, or suffer the said goods or any of them, to be distrained for rent, rates, or taxes; (3) If the grantor shall fraudulently either remove or suffer the said goods,

[IN BANK.

or any of them, to be removed from the premises; (4) If the grantor shall not, without reasonable excuse, upon demand in writing by the grantee, produce to him his last receipts for rent, rates, and taxes; (5) If execution shall have been levied against the goods of the grantor under any judgment at law.

The motion before the County Court judge asked for a declaration that the bank was at the commencement of the bankruptcy entitled as mortgagees to the chattels and property comprised in the two bills of sale. The learned County Court judge refused to make the declaration asked for on the ground that the chattels and property in question were in the possession of the bankrupt with the consent of the true owner under such circumstances as to raise a presumption of ownership in the bankrupt, within the meaning of sect. 44 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883.

Jelf, Q.C. and Muir Mackenzie in support of the appeal. The Bills of Sale Act 1882, s. 15, partially repealed sect. 20 of the Bills of Sale Act 1878, but for the purpose of this case sect. 20 of the Act of 1878 is still in force. [WILLIAMS, J. referred to Stansfield v. Cubitt (27 L. J. 266, Ch. ; 2 De G. & J. 222).] The provisions of the Bills of Sale Act 1882 are very confined, and it has been held that sect 20 of the Act of 1878, which is referred to as the principal Act, still applies to bills of sale given otherwise than as security for money. I wish to place these two arguments before the court: (1) That the Act of 1882 intended to leave the Act of 1878 applicable to bills of sale given otherwise than by way of security for the payment of money. (2) That there can be no taking possession of the goods granted under a bill of sale except on the grounds set forth in sect. 7 of the Act of 1882. The learned County Court judge has held that the goods comprised in the two bills of sale granted by Ginger passed on his bankruptcy to his trustee, as being within sect. 44 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, although at the time of the bankruptcy no default had been made by the grantor which would have entitled the grantee to take possession. It is impossible that there could have been consent in this case. There cannot be consent where there

is no correlative power of not consenting. If the decision of the learned County Court judge is right, it is impossible to lend money on a bill of sale without, if the grantor becomes bankrupt, losing both the money and the goods on which the money was advanced. The bill of sale owner is not the true owner within the meaning of sect. 44 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, for he cannot take possession of the goods until default without committing a trespass:

Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 55 L. T. Rep. 362; 11 App. Cas. 426.

The onus of proving that the possession was with the consent of the true owner rests upon the trustee :

Whitfield v. Brand, 16 M. & W. 282; 10 L. J. 103, Ex.

Before the Act of 1883 the grantee could take possession on demand, but that Act deprived him of the power of making his own bargain, and it cannot be that, after complying with all the requirements of that Act, he has no better security than ordinary creditors. [WILLIAMS, J. -The reputed ownership clause in effect only