Q.B. Div.] STILEMAN-GIBBARD v. WILKINSON AND OTHERS. therein until he shall acquire a settlement in some other parish by a like residence or otherwise. Macmorran, Q.C. (Harper with him) for the appellant union.-The case of Dorchester Union v. Weymouth Union (54 L. T. Rep. 52; 16 Q. B, Div. 31) has decided that a settlement by residence can only be acquired by a continuous residence of three years of such a kind, that residence in each of the three years would confer a status of irremovability. That is not the case here, for Arthur Farr was a "patient in a hospital" for three months of one of the years, and by sect. 1 of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66, that period must be excluded. It matters not whether the hospital in which he was a patient was a workhouse hospital or not. Secondly, the child Edward James Farr had acquired a settlement of his own by residence in the respondent union. He referred to Guardians of Poor of West Ham v. Churchwardens of St. Matthew, Bethnal Green, 70 L. T. Rep. 318; (1894) App. Cas. 230; Reigate Union v. Croydon Union, 61 L. T. Rep. 733; 14 App. Cas. 465. G. Hohler for the respondent union. The period during which Arthur Farr was in the hospital is not to be excluded under the section, for he was not "confined" as a patient in a hospital. He could have left whenever he liked. Since he was voluntarily in the hospital, and always retained his home and an animus redeundi, there was no breach in his residence of three years. He cited Reg. v. Glossop, L. Rep. 1 Q. B. 227; Reg. v. Abingdon Union, L. Rep. 5 Q. B. 406; Hartfield v. Rotherfield, 17 Q. B. 746. On the second point it is impossible for a child who has had no emancipated existence at all, to acquire a settlement by residence for itself. WRIGHT, J.-It seems to me that on the first point argued by Mr. Macmorran, namely, as to Arthur Farr's settlement in the appellant union, the appellants are entitled to our judgment. This case, which is not an easy one, turns upon the construction of sect. 1, of 9 & 10 Vict. c. 66. It is conceded by the appellants that Arthur Farr, the father, resided in Rotherhithe parish a sufficient time to give him a status of irremovability in each of three years, and therefore a settlement unless the periods of his residence in the Brompton Hospital and the convalescent home are to be struck out from the computation of time in one of the three years. That depends upon the question whether, during the time that he was thus absent from his home, he was a patient in the hospital within the meaning of the section. We are bound by the case of Dorchester Union v. Weymouth Union (ubi sup.), to hold that the residence requisite for a settlement shall be a residence sufficient to confer irremovability in each of three consecutive years, and that in computing that period if a man has been absent in the army, or in a number of other ways, you cannot wipe that out from consideration as if no such thing had ever taken place. The question is whether the statute conferring irremovability has been satisfied. It is clumsily worded. [The learned Judge read the material part of the section and continued:] Now grammatically the sentence reads so as to mean "confined" as a patient in a hospital, but the section is so clumsy that I think we are not bound to read it in this way 66 [Q.B. DIV. unless by doing so we can give some meaning to the words. I cannot see that the word "confined as a patient in a hospital could have any definite meaning, and therefore we must refer back to the word "reside" to govern the words as a patient in a hospital." It seems to me, therefore, that the words mean simply being a patient in a hospital, the common sense view of the enactment being I think that every period is to be excluded from the computation of a man's residence, during which he does not maintain himself. In that view the period during which the father of the pauper child was in Brompton Hospital and the convalescent home must be excluded, and therefore according to the decision in the Dorchester case (ubi sup.), the conditions of irremovability in each year have not been satisfied. As regards the other point which was argued it appears even more difficult, but it is unnecessary now to consider it. However, on the whole, I think the appellants are wrong on that point. It is difficult to conceive how a child that has never had any emancipated residence in Canterbury at all, and is unemancipated up to the present time, can have acquired a status for himself while his father was resident in St. Olave's. BRUCE, J.-I am of the same opinion. It is difficult to read the section grammatically, but I can only read it in such a way as to exclude the period of the father's residence in hospital from the computation of the time required for irremovability. Solicitors for the appellants, Arckoll, Cockell, and Chadwick. Solicitors for the respondents, Speechly, Mumford, and Co., for John Plummer, Canterbury. Monday, Dec. 21, 1896. STILEMAN-GIBBARD v. WILKINSON AND Ecclesiastical law-Title to pew in church-Claim by prescription as appurtenant to house-Act of repair-Acts of user and ownership-Claim as lay rector to seat in chancel-Title to sites of pews-Prohibition. In a claim by prescription to a legal right to a pew as annexed to an ancient house in the parish, the claimant must prove, in addition to exclusive occupation during legal memory, acts of user— including repair at his expense, if repair has been necessary or acts of ownership or assertion of proprietary right inconsistent with the right of the Ordinary; but if he proves acts of user or ownership, then proof of actual repair is not essential to establish his claim, and justify the court in presuming a lost faculty. Semble, the lay rector's right to the chief seat in the chancel is a right to more than one sitting. The claimant to a prescriptive right to two pews in the chancel proved exclusive occupation of the pews so far as living memory extended, but failed to prove any actual repair further than that in the year 1850 one of the pews was relined with baize secured by nails driven into the wood, and that in 1871 the woodwork of the pews was (a) Reported by W. W. ORR, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Q.B. Div.] STILEMAN-GIBBARD v. WILKINSON AND OTHERS. removed to his house and kept there, and chairs placed on the sites which were used by the claimant's family as the pews had been : Held, that the relining the pew was not an act of repair sufficient to establish the claimant's right as against the Ordinary; but that the removal of the pews in 1871 was such an act of ownership as would, when taken in conjunction with the exclusive possession, establish the right, and that such removal of the pews was not an abandonment of the right, and that the claimant, therefore, was entitled to a writ of prohibition to prohibit interference with his right to the sites of the pews. ACTION tried before Charles J. without a jury. The facts as stated in the written judgment were as follows: The plaintiff claimed that a writ of prohibi tion be directed to the Chancellor of the diocese of Ely, and to the Rev. H. B. Wilkinson, vicar, and Lewis Jarvis and Arthur O. Clode, churchwardens of the parish of Sharnbrook in the diocese of Ely, to prohibit them from further proceeding in the matter of an application by the vicar and churchwardens to the Chancellor for (amongst other things) a faculty to erect new seats or stalls for the vicar and choir in the chancel of the said church. On the 20th Sept. 1895, the citation was issued, and by Act on Petition, dated the 12th Nov., the now plaintiff in prohibition, Mr. Leonard Gibbard Stileman-Gibbard, alleged a freehold interest in the sites proposed to be occupied by the rew seats or stalls. Notwithstanding the Act on Petition, the Chancellor ordered the case to proceed and fixed the 5th Feb. 1896, for hearing. Thereupon, on the 30th Jan. 1896, a summons for a prohibition was taken out, the hearing of which was remitted from chambers to the Divisional Court. Upon the hearing there the parties were ordered to plead in prohibition, and the question raised by the pleadings, which had now to be determined by the learned judge, was whether Mr. Gibbard, the plaintiff in prohibition, had made out a title against the Ordinary to the sites in question as owner and occupier of an ancient house in the parish called Sharnbrook house or as lay rector of the parish. The facts, which were not seriously in dispute, were as follows: Sharnbrook house is an ancient house in the parish. It was built upwards of 200 years ago and in 1792 was bought by a predecessor in title of the plaintiff. From the time of the purchase the successive owners resided there, and in 1800 the plaintiff's predecessor in title acquired, by the devise of a relative, the lay rectory. When the house was purchased there were at the west end of the chancel of the church two large pews approximately of the same size, one on the north and the other on the south side, which, so far back as living memory extended until 1871, when they were removed in the manner hereinafter mentioned, were in the exclusive possession and occupation of the plaintiff and his predecessors. The pew on the south side was occupied by the owner of Sharnbrook house and his family, that on the north side by the servants. In the other part of the chancel, to the east of the north pew, were [Q.B. DIV. seats in which persons sat who had obtained permission from Mr. Gibbard or his prede cessors, In 1871 a relative of the plaintiff, then resident at Sharnbrook house, the plaintiff being at that time in his minority, caused the old pews to be removed. The woodwork was removed to Sharnbrook house and kept there, and in the site of the old pews chairs were placed on each side of the chancel with matting on the floor. Mr. Stileman, the plaintiff's elder brother, stated that there were two rows of chairs on each side, and according to the evidence of the plaintiff himself they covered the whole length of the old pews, but not the entire breadth. There was, at all events, no doubt whatever that the whole of the ground covered by these chairs they were placed there in substitution of those was within the sites of the old pews, and that pews. The plaintiff also proved that about 1850 one of the pews was relined with baize secured by nails driven into the woodwork of the pews. In 1877 the plaintiff came of age, and continued to attend the services of the church, Occupying the chairs just referred to with his household. In 1883 he himself ceased to attend, owing to some change in the mode of conducting the services of which he did not approve; but visitors at his house and the servants continued from time to time to occupy the chairs. In 1885 temporary wooden platforms were placed in the chancel for the choir, occupying wholly or in part the sites of the old pews. The plaintiff protested strongly against what he regarded as an infringement of his legal rights, in letters addressed to the churchwardens and to the bishop of the diocese, in the months of May, June, and July in that year. Nothing, however, was done, and the choir continued to sit in the chancel. The matter remained in abeyance until 1893, the plaintiff not being during the interval in the habit of attending the church. In 1893 a relative (Miss Bettington) came to Sharnbrook-house who desired to attend the church, and to sit under a memorial window which was placed over the site of the old pews on the south side of the chancel, and the plaintiff then determined to take some steps to assert his title, partly on account of Miss Bettington's wish and partly because he had been informed that it was proposed by the vicar to substitute permanent stalls for the temporary platforms. A long correspondence, commencing in February, 1893, ensued between the plaintiff, the defendants, and the bishop, throughout the whole of which the plaintiff emphatically insisted upou his right to the pews or sites in question. It is unnecessary to refer to this correspondence in detail, and the only observation which the learned judge thought it necessary to make upon the correspondence in 1885 and 1893 was this, that throughout the plaintiff based his claim to the pews upon his right, as lay rector, to the chief seat in the chancel, and did not claim them as annexed by prescription to Sharnbrook-house. Matters were brought to an issue in July by the removal by the plaintiff of the platform on the south side, and later he erected on that side a permanent oaken seat. Q.B. Div.] STILEMAN-GIBBARD v. WILKINSON AND OTHERS. There were other assertions of right on the one side and on the other, and ultimately the application was made to the Chancellor, which it was now sought to prohibit him from hearing. The plan accompanying the application showed choir seats on the north side on the site of the old north pew. On the south side there were also choir seats and a seat for the vicar on the site of the old south pew. Behind the bench for the choir on that side the plan showed another called "Lay Rector's Seat." Dibdin for the plaintiff in prohibition.-The plaintiff is the owner and occupier of this ancient house, and his ancestors were entitled by prescription in respect of their ownership and occupancy of this house to these two ancient pews on the north and south sides of the chancel respectively. The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to the pews by prescription. These pews having been pulled down some years ago by a member of the plaintiff's family and a former occupant of the house, the plaintiff is now entitled in respect of his ownership and occupancy of the house to a freehold interest in the sites of the pews, namely, an exclusive right in the nature of an easement to use the sites by himself, his family and servants for attending divine worship, and for that purpose to erect and use pews and seats on such sites. The plaintiff and his predecessors in title, as being owners and occupiers for the time being of this house, have always been in exclusive possession of the pews and sites, and have always, as occasion required, repaired, altered, and dealt with these pews or the seats or chairs for the time being replacing them at their own expense. Such exclusive possession for so long a period of time establishes the plaintiff's right. With regard to the question of proving repairs, it is quite true that the older authorities speak of proof of repairs being essential in order to obtain prohibition; but the modern authority of Halliday v. Phillips (23 Q. B. Div. 48; and in the House of Lords, 64 L. T. Rep. 745: (1891) A. C. 228) shows that the assertion of proprietary right, or acts of ownership of whatever character, are sufficient to establish the right. Evidence of repair to a pew claimed by prescription is not absolutely necessary, as no repair may have been necessary, or may have been made within the memory of any one living: Knapp v. Parishioners of Willesden, 2 Rob. 358. And the claimant to a pew by prescription as against the Ordinary is only required to prove repair if and when repair is necessary; but if repair is not necessary (as in the present case) then it is not necessary to prove it : Crisp v. Martin, 2 P. Div. 15; But if proof of repairs be necessary, then the plaintiff relies on the relining, about the year 1850, of the pew with baize, secured by nails driven into the woodwork of the pew. The driving of the nails into the woodwork was an act of interference with the pew which amounted to an assertion of a proprietary right to the pews. We rely on this as an act of repair and an act of ownership and assertion of right; and although the repair was only proved with regard to one pew, yet that was sufficient for all : Pepper v. Barnard, 7 Jur. 1128; 12 L. J. 361, [Q.B. DIV. We also rely upon the removal of the woodwork of the pews to Sharnbrook House in 1871, as an assertion of proprietary right, and an act of ownership which is wholly inconsistent with any right existing in the Ordinary, and which of itself is sufficient to establish the plaintiff's right. The plaintiff has therefore made out a prescriptive claim to these pews or their sites by exclusive possession and user; by repair and by assertion of proprietary right. A lost faculty ought therefore to be presumed (Halliday v. Phillips (ubi sup.), and this faculty can be presumed even where it is shown that no repairs have been done: Crisp v. Martin (ubi sup.). The plaintiff also, as lay rector, is entitled to the chief seat in the chancel; and this is not limited to a seat for himself, but includes seats for himself and his family. A. B. Kempe for the defendants.-Though the freehold of the parish church is in the lay rector, the right of possession of the church (including the chancel) is in the minister and churchwardens: Griffin v. Deighton, 8 L. T. Rep. 500, and 9 L. T. Fuller v. Lane, 2 Add. 419, at p. 426. The liability to repair distinguishes the common Kenrick v. Taylor, 1 Wils. 326; cases Churton v. Frewen, 13 L. T. Rep. 491; L. Rep. 2 Walter v. Gunner, 1 Consist, at p. 319; Woolocombe v. Ouldridge, 3 Add., at p. 6; Here no repairs were proved, as the only thing shown was the relining of one pew in 1850, and that cannot be considered as an act of repair, but as ornament : Pettman v. Bridger, 1 Phillim, at p. 331. The pews were pulled down, and so the plaintiff is driven to claim the site of the pews. Such a claim is not known to the law: Brumfitt v. Roberts, L. Rep. 5 C. P. 224; S.C Having pulled the pews down, the plaintiff has not fulfilled the condition under which alone be Q.B. Div.] STILEMAN-GIBBARD v. WILKINSON AND others. was entitled to hold the pews, namely, the keeping them in repair; and even if he or his predecessors in title were ever entitled to the pews by prescription (which the defendants deny), by pulling the pews down he must be taken to have abandoned and lost his right: Moore v. Rawson, 3 B. & C. 332. And the Ordinary now has jurisdiction over the sites of the pews, and to grant the faculty prayed for in the petition, As to the alternative claim by the plaintiff as lay rector to the lay rector's seat in the chancel, the plaintiff is only entitled as lay rector to a single seat in the chancel, and not to a pew: Spry v. Flood, 2 Curteis, 353. Dibdin in reply.-I agree that the burden of repair falls on the holder of the pew, and that if you prove the right, you must infer that it is one subject to repair; but it is not necessary to actually prove repair. If you prove acts of ownership, it is sufficient : Pepper v. Barnard (ubi sup.) ; Best on Presumptions, pp. 110 et seq.; Cur. adv. vult. Dec. 21.-The following judgment was read by CHARLES, J. [His Lordship, after stating the facts as above set out, proceeded:] At the trial, although the exclusive occupation of both the old pews by residents at Sharnbrook-house, so far as living memory extends, was proved to my satisfaction, the plaintiff failed to prove any actual repair of the woodwork or structure of the pews. My attention was drawn with reference to this point to two entries-one in 1842 and the other in 1850, in the book of a deceased person named Scrivener, who had been in the employment of the Gibbard family. Scrivener, I should remark, was a mason, but no doubt he may have done other than mason's work. The entry, however, of 1842 was illegible, and, so far as it was material, seemed to apply to cleaning the chancel and doing something to a pew in the church where Mr. Gibbard certainly had a faculty pew. I can draw no inference of repair of the chancel pews from this entry. The other entry of 1850 records "two days making good floor and setting monument to chancel." This again does not appear applicable to the pews. The plaintiff, however, did prove that somewhere about 1850 the pews were relined with baize secured by nails driven into the wood. It was also proved that when, in the year 1858, a faculty was obtained for reseating the body of the church no reference was made to the chancel pews, although there is a recital in the faculty that the then existing seats in the church were insufficient for the accommodation of the parishioners. The faculty, it may be added, allotted to Mr. John Gibbard, who was a consenting party to the alterations, sittings in lieu of the faculty pew which he possessed at the east end of the nave. I have said that Mr. Gibbard himself in his letters constantly asserted his claim in his capacity of lay rector, but in these proceedings and in the argument before me reliance was principally placed upon his right to the pews by prescription in respect of his occupancy of Sharnbrook House, and with this aspect of the case it will be convenient first to deal. Now, although the possession of a pew raises a good title against a mere wrong-doer, it does not raise any presumpVol. LXXVI., 1950. [Q.B. DIV. tion of right against the churchwardens, the officers of the Ordinary, who, with the incumbent, are defendants in prohibition in this case. Something beyond mere undisturbed possession must be proved against the Ordinary. The claimant, in order to establish his right against him to the pew or pews appurtenant to Sharnbrook House, must show some acts of user or assertion of proprietary right in addition to possession: (Halliday If he can v. Phillips, 23 Q. B. Div. 48). do so, then some rightful origin of the undisturbed enjoyment ought to be presumed against the Ordinary and his officers. In other words, a lost faculty ought to be presumed whereby the occupiers of the particular messuage have had the pew or pews granted to them upon condition of their undertaking, in relief of the parish, the burthen of repair. That this would be the form of the faculty was not disputed, and it was strenuously urged for the defendants that proof of actual repair was essential to justify me in presuming such a faculty, and that this was necessary, no matter what other acts of user or assertion of right were proved. To support this proposition a long line of authorities was quoted, beginning with Boothly v. Baily (Hobart,_69) and ending with Proud v. Price (68 L. T. Rep. 682; 62 L. J. 490, Q. B.) It is needless to allude in detail to them, but Buxton v. Bateman (1 Sid. 88, 201) may be referred to as an example, where it was held on demurrer that in an action against the Ordinary or his officers repairs must be alleged and proved. In another case, again, it was said that, though reparation need not be alleged, it ought to be proved (Phillimore's Ecclesiastical Law, vol. 2, p. 1437), and there can be no doubt that the learned counsel for the defendants did not overstate the case when he alleged that proof of reparation has constantly been said to be necessary to exclude the Ordinary from the right which he would otherwise possess of regulating the seats in the church, and probably in the chancel also. But, in my opinion, the cases do not warrant me in holding that, where other acts are proved to have been done with regard to the pew inconsistent with mere possession by the permission of the churchwardens, a faculty is nevertheless not to be presumed merely because proof of actual reparation is wanting. Repair may not have been necessary, and in that case proof of repair was said by Dr. Lushington in Knapp v. Parishioners of Willesden (2 Rob. at p. 365) not to be "absolutely necessary simply because repair may not within the memory of anyone living have been required." In Pettman v.Bridger (1 Phill. 316) Sir John Nicholl says A prescriptive right must be clearly proved. 66 In the first place, it is necessary to show that use and occupation of the seat has from time immemorial been appurtenant to a certain messuage. Secondly it must be shown that if any acts have been done by the inhabitants of such messuage, they maintained and upheld the right. At all events, if any repairs have been required within memory, it must be proved that they have been made at the expense of the party setting up a prescriptive right. The onus and beneficium are supposed to go together-mere occupancy does not prove the right." The same judge, it was pointed out, stated in Fuller v. Lane (2 Add. 419) that a claimant to a pew appropriated to a house must show "the annexation of the pew to the house Q.B. Div.] STILEMAN-GIBBARD v. WILKINSON AND OTHERS. time out of mind and reparation." But I do not think this circumstance assists the defendants' argument. It rather points to the conclusion that the language used in that, as in other cases, must be taken with some limitation, and that the limitation is that the claimant to a pew by prescription must prove against the Ordinary not only occupation but repair, if repair has been necessary, at his expense. This view is supported by the judgment of Lord Penzance in Crisp v. Martin (2 Prob. Div. 15). And in Halliday v. Phillips, already referred to. repair is treated as an act of user: (see especially per Bowen, L.J., 23 Q. B. Div. at p. 54, in the Court of Appeal; and Lord Herschell, in the House of Lords (1891) A. C. at p. 230). This appears to me to be the true view of the law, and that the question I have to consider is not merely whether actual repair has been proved, but whether any acts of user, including, of course, repair, which is, perhaps, the commonest of all acts of user, have been proved, -acts which are only to be explained on the presumption of a right created by a faculty conferring upon the claimant a legal title. I proceed to consider whether the plaintiff in this case has established any act of ownership beyond occupancy over these pews sufficient to exclude the Ordinary. He relied upon two-the first being the relining of the pews in 1850, which, he submitted, was an act of repair; and the second being the removal of the woodwork of the pews in 1871 to Sharnbrook-house, and the substitution of chairs for continuous seats. With regard to the relining the pew, it has been said that that act cannot be called repair or regarded as an act of ownership, but is a mere question of ornament or comfort (see Pettman v. Bridger, 1 Phill. 325; Morgan v. Curtis, 3 M. & Ry. 389); and this is undoubtedly true of ordinary lining and the putting in of cushions. alleged, however, that here something more was done than simply to line the pews, and that the nails driven into the woodwork constituted a substantial interference with the pews themselves. But I think this distinction too narrow, and that I ought not to hold what was done in 1850 to be an act of repair. But with regard to the removal of the woodwork of the pew in 1871 and the substitution of chairs for the former seats, I am of opinion that what was then done was an act of ownership amply sufficient, when taken in conjunction with the plaintiff's undisturbed possession during the period of legal memory, to prove the plaintiff's right. It was of an unequivocal character, and entirely inconsistent with any right existing in the ordinary; and I hold, therefore, that I ought to presume the existencee of a faculty to account for what would otherwise be-to use the words of Bowen, L.J. in Halliday v. Phillips (23 Q. B. Div. at p. 56) "a high-handed usurpation of these pews." I must add a few words, before disposing of this part of the case, on the question of abandonment. It was contended for the defendants, upon the authority of Moore v. Rawson (3 B. & C. 332), and similar cases, that by entirely removing the old pews in 1871 the plaintiff had abandoned his right; that he had, in fact, thereby so altered the condition of his tenement as to warrant me in drawing that conclusion against him. But it must be remembered that in every case of this kind the material inquiry must be whether there i It was [Q.B. DIV. was any intention to abandon the right. And I am satisfied that in this case no such intention existed in 1871, or subsequently. The plaintiff did in that year it is true alter his mode of enjoyment of the right to sit in that part of the chancel formerly occupied by the pews, using chairs fastened together in place of the old seats. But he did not discontinue his enjoyment. He used the chairs for himself and his household until 1883, when he ceased himself to attend the church, and in the correspondence which began in 1885 with the churchwardens, the incumbent, and the Ordinary he indicated throughout a firm determination to maintain his rights. His noninterference with the choir between 1885 and 1893, which was also relied on, was not, in my opinion, anything more than a mere temporary intermittence of the user, and being unaccompanied by any intention to renounce the_right, does not amount to an abandonment. Having arrived at a conclusion in favour of the plaintiff in respect of his ownership and occupancy of Sharnbrook-house, it is not necessary for me to decide on his alternative claim as lay rector, but having regard to the arguments addressed to me upon that point I think I ought shortly to express my view as to the lay rector's rights in respect of chancel seats. Now it has been stated in numerous cases that, by the common law of the land, or of common right, the rector is entitled to the "chief seat" in the chancel; see, for example, Spry v. Flood (2 Curteis, 353), Clifford v. Wicks (1 B. & A. 498). But the extent of this right is not easy to define; and it was suggested by the counsel for the defendants that, having regard to the origin of such a right, which must have existed before the Reformation, it is a right merely to a seat for the rector himself. This, however, according to the authorities is too restrictive a definition. "The general rule," says Bayley, J. in Clifford v. Wicks (1 B. & A. 498), "is that the rector is entitled to the principal pew in the chancel, but that the ordinary may grant permission to other persons to have pews there.' And Dr. Prideaux writes thus of the parson's right (Prideaux on Churchwardens, 16th edit. 292): "As a lord of a manor, or any other owner of an ancient messuage, may prescribe to a seat in the body of the church, which he and his ancestors have immemorially used and repaired, to the exclusion of the bishop, so may the parson prescribe to a seat in the chancel, which he and his predecessors have immemorially been possessed of. And if not so, yet since the charge of repairing that part of the church, as well as the freehold, is in the parson, it is most reasonable he should be first provided for with a seat for his family in it. And the case is the same, whether the parson be appropriator, impropriator, or instituted rector of the parish." The right to the chief seat, then, appears to be something more than one sitting only. The size and situation of the seat must in each case, I presume, be determined by user, and it may be prescribed for against the bishop where the parson can prove immemorial possession. Repair in such case, I apprehend, certainly need not be proved, for the burthen of repair would by the general law fall upon the parson whose claims to the seat must in the first instance have been based on his duty of repairing the chancel: (Hall v. Ellis, Noy, 133). I may add that the practice |