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by the will were property "settled by a will or disposition" made by the wife, and were exempted from estate duty in so far as probate duty had been paid upon them. In respect of that portion however (viz., the value of the husband's life interest), on which probate duty had not not been paid, estate duty was chargeable. (AttorneyGeneral v. Doddington.) Settlement estate duty-Contingent settlementAbsolute settlement of part of estate with contingent settlement of residue-Liability of whole to duty-Finance Act 1894.-A contingent settlement of property is a settlement of the property within the meaning of sect. 5 (1) of the Finance Act 1894; and an absolute settlement of part of the property together with the contingent settlement of the residue, is a settlement of the whole, and renders the whole liable to settlement estate duty under that section. A testator devised his property to trustees upon trust to pay the income thereof to his wife during her life, and after her death in trust for all the testator's children who being sons, should attain the age of twenty-one, or being daughters should attain that age or marry under that age, and if there should be only one child, then in trust for that child, and he directed that the share of each of his daughters should be retained by the trustees and the income thereof paid to such daughter for life for her separate use, and after her death to her children. The testator died leaving at his death two sons and one daughter, all being under the age of, twenty-one. Held, that, there being an absolute settlement of part of the estate (the daughter's third), together with the contingent settlement of the residue (the sons' two thirds), there was a settlement of the whole within sect. 5 (1), and that the Crown was entitled to settlement estate duty upon the whole. (The Attorney-General v. Fairley and others.)

FIRST OFFENCE. (See JUSTICES.)

FISHERY.

Grant of exclusive right of fishing with rod and line -Profit à prendre-Pollution of river by stranger - Injury to spawning beds-Right of actionDamages. A grant from the freeholder of an exclusive right of fishing with rod and line for a specified term of years at a certain rental in part of a river is not a mere licence, but implies a right to take away the fish when caught, and is a profit à prendre; and, therefore, the grantees of such incorporeal hereditament have a right of action against any person who pollutes the river to the prejudice of, and injury and damage to, the grantees and their fisheries. (Fitzgerald v. Firbank.)...

FIXTURES.

Mansion-house - Tenant for life in possession Natural History Museum Stuffed birds and animals-Cases fixed to the wall.-Stuffed birds and animals fastened to iron cases fixed to the wall of a natural history museum, the museum being especially built for the reception of the collection, are not part of the museum, so as to be fixtures annexed to and passing with the mansion-house. (Viscount Hill v. Bullock.)

FOREIGN JUDGMENT.

Ship - Lien Proceedings in foreign court Judgment in rem.-A ship, owned by an English joint-stock company, was arrested on her arrival at a German port by a court of competent jurisdiction in an action commenced by the holder of a bill of lading for non-delivery of goods at that port. By German law non-delivery of goods specified in a bill of lading entitles the holder of the bill to a lien on the ship. In these proceedings the German court declared the holder of the bill of lading in question to be entitled to a lien on the ship, directed the ship to be sold, and ordered the

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lien to be satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale. In the meantime a winding-up order had been made against the company owning the ship, founded upon a petition which had been presented some time before the ship's arrest in the German port. In an action by the liquidator of the company to recover from the holder of the bill of lading the money he had received by order of the German court in satisfaction of his lien, Collins, J. gave judgment for the defendant. On appeal: Held, that the judgment of the German court was a judgment in rem, and that, therefore, the holder of the bill of lading was entitled to the money received by him under it, free from any claim by the liquidator. (The Minna Craig Steamship Company and James Laing v. The Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, London, and China.)

FRIENDLY SOCIETY.

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Dispute between member and society-Expulsion of member Jurisdiction of court. A dispute between a friendly society and a member who has been expelled as to the legality of the expulsion is not a dispute which must be decided in the manner provided by the rules of the society, within sect. 22 of the Friendly Societies Act 1875, as amended by sect. 10 of the Friendly Societies Act 1895. (Paliser v. Dale.)

Betting

GAMING ACT.

Place used for betting - What is a place."-Any area of inclosed ground, covered or uncovered which is known by a name or is capable of reasonably accurate description, may be a "place" within the meaning of sect. 1 of the Betting Act 1853. The defendant, a professional bookmaker, on the occasion of a race meeting at Hurst Park, was present, together with many other bookmakers and a large number of the general public, in an inclosure known as Tattersall's Ring, shouting out the odds and making bets on horses with all who chose to bet. The inclosure was forty yards long by thirty wide, and was bounded on one side by the grand stand, and on the other three by a paling breast high. The defendant did not confine himself to any fixed spot, and had no stool, umbrella, or anything in the nature of a fixture, to denote where he carried on betting, but moved about. Held, that the defendant was using a place" for the purposes of betting within the meaning of sects 1 and 3 of the Betting Act 1853. (Hawke v. Dunn.)

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355

Using a place for purposes of bettingWhat is a "place Betting Act 1853.-The appellant, a professional bookmaker, on the day of a certain horse race, stationed himself at a particular spot on a piece of ground called the Pit Heap, with his back against the hoarding of a skittle alley, and there made bets on the race with all who chose to bet with him. The Pit Heap was a vacant and uninclosed space, to which the public were allowed free and unrestricted access from various sides, and on the day in question a large crowd were assembled there. The appellant remained all the time on the same spot, but it was not in any way circumscribed or fenced in or otherwise distinguished. Held, that the appellant was using a place for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto within the meaning of sect. 3 of the Betting Act 1853. (McInany, app., v. Hildreth, resp.).. Money lent for deposit at boxing match-Repayment dependent on result of match.-Money lent for the purpose of depositing it with the stakeholder of a boxing match, upon the terms that repayment by the borrower should depend upon the result of the fight, is money paid in respect of a contract or agreement rendered null and void by the Gaming Act 1845, and therefore a promise to repay such money is null and void under the Gaming Act 1892, sect. 1, and no action can be maintained to recover it. (Carney v. Plimmer.)... 374

GUARANTEE.

Memorandum in writing-Two documents - Statute of Frauds (29 Car. 2, c. 3), s. 4-ConstructionAssignment. In 1879 the defendants wrote to the plaintiff, by letter dated 15th Sept. :-" Burton, Balderson. Dear Sir,-We hereby guarantee the safety of the above investments;" and, by letter dated 16th Sept.: "We acknowledge to have received from you the sum of 7101. as under: a mortgage on the estate at T. the property of Mr Burton, 3601.; a mortgage on the estate at F., the property of Mr Balderson, 350l." The plaintiff A. advanced to Burton on mortgage of the estate at T. the sum of 3601. through the defendants. In 1891 the plaintiff A. conveyed and transferred to the plaintiff B., in consideration of 3001., the benefit of the mortgage. In 1896 the plaintiffs' sued the defendants to recover the sum of 3601, from them as guarantors of the mortgage. Held, (1) that the two letters could be read together and were a sufficient memorandum of the contract within sect. 4 of the Statute of Frauds; (2) that the defendants guaranteed that the loan would be repaid; and (3) that the plaintiff B. could not sue upon the guarantee, and the plaintiff A. could recover only 601. (Sheers and another v. Thimbleby and Son.) page 709

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HIGHWAY.

Extraordinary traffic-Damage-" Person by whose order" traffic conducted-Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act 1878.-A landowner was carrying on extensive building and other works upon his land. With respect to the materials for these works, samples were submitted by various contractors and prices were fixed, inclusive of the cost of delivery upon the land, which was to be done by the contractors. From time to time the contractors were asked to supply and deliver materials according to sample and at the fixed price, and they did so. The landowner did not contract or direct that the materials should be brought by any particular road, or from any particular place, or in any particular manner. The traffic resulting from the carriage of these materials was extraordinary traffic," and caused damage to the main road, whereby the county -council incurred "extraordinary expenses." Held, that the traffic was not conducted by the order of the landowner within the meaning of sect. 23 of the Highways Act 1878. (Lord Gerard v. The Kent County Council.)...

HUSBAND AND WIFE. Deed of separation - Permanent maintenance Specified allowance for-Divorce-Judicial separation-Increased alimony-Jurisdiction to grant.Under the power of the Divorce Court, on a dissolution of marriage or a judicial separation, to compel a husband to provide for his wife, and to make orders for the maintenance and education of the children of the marriage, the husband may, where there has been an alteration of circumstances, be ordered to pay to the wife a larger sum by way of alimony than she had agreed to accept by a prior deed of separation, notwith-standing that she has thereby expressly -covenanted not to sue him for an increased allowance. A covenant by a husband or wife not to sue the other for a divorce grounded on future misconduct is invalid, and an express covenant not to sue for increased alimony in the event of such a divorce cannot be recognised. (Bishop v. Bishop. Judkins v. Judkins.) ... 28, 169, 409 Judicial separation suit-Wife's petition-Countercharge of adultery-No relief sought-Alleged adulterer-Application for leave to interveneMatrimonial Causes Act 1857-Practice-Leave refused. A petition by a husband claiming a divorce from his wife and damages against the co-respondent was dismissed, by consent, before trial. Thereupon the wife filed a petition claiming a judicial separation, and the husband, in his answer, counter-charged the adultery which he

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had alleged in the former suit, but he asked for no relief. The alleged adulterer applied for leave to intervene and defend. Held, that the practice of the Ecclesiastical Courts governed the case, and that, as that practice afforded no precedent for allowing an intervention in such circumstances, the application must be refused. (Farrell v. Farrell.) ...page 167 Maintenance Non-liability of husband to maintain adulterous wife-Poor Law Amendment Act 1868. -In 1862 the appellant married F. H. M. They lived together a few months and then the husband joined the Marines. Nothing more was heard of him, and in 1889 F. H. M. married R. G., and lived with him as his wife. On hearing the appellant was alive the wife still continued to live with R. G. F. H. M. became chargeable to the T. Union in 1896, and the guardians applied for an order against the husband, the appellant, which the magistrates made. Held, that the wife was guilty of adultery, and that the appellant could not be compelled to support F. H. M. his wife. (Mitchell, app., v. The Torrington Union, resps.)

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In an

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Separation deed-Covenant against molestationAmerican divorce proceedings Molestation, what amounts to.-A husband and wife were married in 1868. In 1880 they entered into a deed of separation, by which the husband covenanted not to molest the wife. In 1896 he served on her notice of his intention to commence divorce proceedings in El Paso, Texas, the ground alleged being the wife's desertion since 1880. action by the wife for an injunction to restrain him from taking any proceedings in the Texan action Held, that under the circumstances the proceedings were vexatious and unreasonable, and amounted to molestation, and that an injunction could be granted to prevent him taking any steps in the action in England. (Hunt v. Hunt.) 779 Summary jurisdiction-Summary proceedings for separation-Costs-Jurisdiction of County Court. -By sects. 4 and 5 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895, a married woman, whose husband shall be guilty of any of the offences therein specified, may apply to a court of summary jurisdiction for an order of separation, which order may make provision (inter alia) for payment by the wife or the husband of the costs of the parties. A married woman took proceedings in a court of summary jurisdiction against her husband for separation on the ground of cruelty, but the summons was dismissed, and no order made as to the wife's costs. The solicitor for the wife brought an action in a County Court against the husband to recover these costs. Held, that an exclusive jurisdiction as to the costs was conferred by the Act on the court of summary jurisdiction, and that neither the wife nor her solicitor could maintain an action in the County Court to recover the costs from the husband. (Cale v. James.)

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INCOME TAX.

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Interest paid by mortgagor to mortgagee-Chargeability of such interest in hands of mortgagee.A benefit building society was formed for the purpose of raising by subscription of members a fund out of which to make advances to members on the security of property by way of mortgage. The members were of two classes: investors, who invested capital in the society for which they received interest; and borrowers, who borrowed money from the society upon mortgage of their property, and repaid the same to the society in weekly sums spread over a considerable time, each weekly payment containing a varying amount of interest and capital. There were also depositors, who deposited money in the society and received interest for the same. To meet expenses the interest charged to borrowers was larger than that paid to investors and depositors, and thereby a fund was created which, after payment of expenses, was from time to time divided amongst

the members. Held, that the interest so received by the society from its borrowing members was not annual interest within the meaning of the Income Tax Acts, but was "interest within the meaning of the words " all interest of money, annuities, and other annual payments," and that therefore the fund in question, in so far as it consisted of interest received by the society, was chargeable as such to income tax in the hands of the society who received it, whether or not it had paid income tax in the hands of the mortgagors. (The Leeds Permanent Benefit Building Society, apps., v. Mallandaine (Surveyor of Taxes), resp.)

INJUNCTION.

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Right of property in unpublished informationPublication in a limited area-Cause of actionProcuring breach of contract-Proof of damagesCopyright.-Information which has been acquired by expenditure of labour and money and communicated to a limited number of persons upon certain conditions is valuable property in the hands of the person or company acquiring the same, notwithstanding that such information may have been previously published to the world at some distant place. The plaintiffs, by expenditure of labour and money, acquired racing news upon various racecourses, and transmitted the same by special means to London, and thence to their subscribers upon certain terms. The defendant syndicate, who supplied racing information to the defendants the Central News, published for their own benefit information acquired from some subscriber of the plaintiffs, with knowledge on the part of their manager that it was acquired contrary to the terms imposed on the plaintiffs' subscribers. The defendants, the Central News, published the same information as the defendant syndicate. The racing news in question was published on a board erected on the racecourse. The defendants, the Central News, carried on their business independently of the defendant syndicate save that the two defendants had a working agreement for the mutual supply of news, and were otherwise closely connected. Held, (1) that the information transmitted by the plaintiffs to their subscribers had not been published to the world, and the plaintiffs had a right of property in it; (2) that an injunction restraining the defendant syndicate from surreptitiously obtaining or copying such information from the plaintiffs' documents must be granted; (3) that the defendants, the Central News, were not liable for the acts or omissions of the manager of the defendant the syndicate. (Exchange Telegraph Company Limited v. The Central News Limited and Column Printing Telegraph Syndicate Limited.)

Master part owner of ship-Barratry of masterMortgagee of master's interest-Mortgagee's right under policy.-The master and part owner of a ship mortgaged his interest. The ship was insured by the master for the benefit of himself, his co-owners, and the mortgagee. The ship foundered, and it was alleged by the insurers that she was wilfully cast away by the master. Held, that the alleged wrongful act of the master was no defence to a claim by the mortgagee upon the policy of insurance. (Small and others 2'. United Kingdom Marine Mutual Insurance Association.)...

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Policy-Liability of broker for premiums-Custom of merchants.-An express promise by the assured in a policy of marine insurance to pay the premiums to the underwriter is not inconsistent with, and does not exclude, the general custom in marine insurance that the broker, and not the assured, is liable to the underwriter for the payment of premiums. (The Universo Insurance Company of Milan v. The Merchants Marine Insurance Company.) Ship disabled on voyage Necessary repairsDamage to cargo-General average.-A ship rendered unnavigable by an accident in the course of the voyage may, while lying in harbour perfectly water-tight and with her cargo uninjured, be in peril so as to make any unusual act done with her to render her once more navigable, a general average act, and any damage incidental to such act a general average loss. The H. G. was on a voyage from B. A. to London. While leaving B. A. she bumped on the harbour bar. On coming outside the harbour of L. P.-a station at which she was to coal-she became unnavigable owing to her screw going wrong. She was towed into the harbour. A large part of her cargo was perishable, and there was no proper accommodation for stowing it at L. P. The master, in order to repair the screw, tipped her by the head (with cargo still on board) by filling the fore ballast tanks with sea-water, and emptying the stern tanks. Unknown to the captain, one of the pipes through which the fore tanks were filled was fractured, and the sea-water going through it escaped into the cargo. The plaintiff's goods were injured. Held, that, while lying in L. P. harbour, the ship and cargo were in peril; that the master's act in tipping the ship by the head was a general average act; and that the damage to plaintiffs' goods was a general average loss. (McCall and Co. Limited v. Houlder and Co.)

INSURANCE OF SECURITIES. Debenture-Contract of insurance to pay debenture if not paid at maturity-Postponement of payment of debentures by special resolution-Liability of insurer under policy.-The plaintiff, who was the holder of a debenture for 500l., in Oct. 1891 insured his debenture with the defendants from the date of the policy until the 4th Nov. 1895, the date at which the debenture matured and was to be paid, and in this policy the defendants guaranteed to the plaintiff the payment of the principal sum secured by the debenture if the debtors made default in the payment of 86 any principal money due under the debenture," and the policy was stated to be subject to a condition indorsed thereon that the plaintiff should not assent to any arrangements modifying his rights under the debenture without the defendants' consent. In 1892 some of the debentures issued by the debtors were maturing, and, as the debtors were not able to meet them, a special resolution of the debenture-holders-binding on all the debenture-holders-was passed postponing the date of payment of the debentures, including the plaintiff's debenture. The plaintiff had notice of the meeting of the debenture-holders, but took no part therein. After the 4th Nov. 1895, the date on which the debenture ought to have been paid, the plaintiff claimed payment from the defendants under the policy, but the defendants refused to pay on the ground that by the special resolution the date of payment was postponed, and as such date had not yet arrived there had been no default in such payment by the debtors. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, on the ground that the contract between him and the defendants was a contract of insurance against a particular event, namely, the default by the debtors to pay the plaintiff the amount of his debenture on the 4th Nov. 1895, and that the words in the policy payment under the debenture" meant payment on the day mentioned in the debenture, and as that day had passed without payment the defendants were liable, though they would upon pay

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469

First offence-Mitigation of penalty.-In the case
of first offences under the Cotton Cloth Factories
Act 1879, the justices have no jurisdiction to
reduce the fine below the amount fixed by sect. 13,
notwithstanding the provisions of sects. 4 and 51
of the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1889. (Osborn,
app., v. Wood Brothers, resps.)
Jurisdiction-Search-warrant-Sufficiency of infor-
mation-Allegation of reasonable suspicion of
larceny-Goods not specified. A justice has
jurisdiction to grant a search-warrant upon a
sworn information which may reasonably be
understood to allege reasonable cause to suspect
that goods have been stolen. It is not necessary
that the information or the warrant should specify
the goods. (Jones v. German.)...

Subse-

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136

LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Building agreement-Option to purchase freehold-
Exercise of option-Subsequent determination of
building agreement for default by tenant--Posses-
sion. By a building agreement under which the
defendant was to erect within a specified time cer-
tain buildings on the plaintiff's land (of which the
defendant was to have possession), and was to
forthwith proceed with the works, and the plaintiff
as soon as the buildings were completed was to
grant the defendant a lease thereof for ninety-nine
years, it was provided that, if the defendant did
not perform the several agreements on his part
therein contained, the plaintiff might by notice in
writing determine the agreement, and thereupon
re-enter. The agreement contained an option to
the defendant to purchase the freehold, and this
option was eventually exercised by him.
quently the plaintiff gave the defendant notice to
determine the agreement on the ground that he
had made default in not forthwith proceeding
with the works, but as the defendant refused to
give up possession of the premises, the plaintiff
brought an action to restrain him from trespassing
upon or interfering with the plaintiff's possession
of the premises. Held, that, although the defen-
dant had made default in the performance of the
building agreement, yet, as it was not a condition
precedent to the exercise of the option to purchase
that the defendant should not have made such
default, the option was well exercised and created
a valid contract for the sale and purchase of the
property, and that the determination of the build-
ing agreement did not destroy or affect the con-
tract for sale and purchase, which was a distinct
contract from that created by the building agree-
ment, and that the possession of the defendant
ought not to be interfered with; and action dis-
missed with costs. (Raffety v. Schofield.)
Covenant by lessor to pay all water rate imposed
or assessed upon the premises-Water supplied to
lessees for domestic use and also for trade purposes
--Waterworks Clauses Act 1847-The New River
Company's Act 1852. A lease contained a
covenant by the lessor to pay "all rates, taxes
and assessments, water rate, and other outgoings,
except the gas and electric light, now or hereafter
to be imposed or assessed upon the said premises
or on the lessor or lessees in respect thereof."
Held, that the lessor was not obliged to pay the
sum charged by a waterworks company for the
water for the trade carried on upon the premises
by the lessees, supplied pursuant to an agreement
between the lessees and the company under their
special Act. (Floyd v. J. Lyons and Co. Limited.) 251
Covenant by tenant to pay all taxes, rates, duties,

&c.-Cost of new drainage. -The tenant of a
house under a lease covenanted with his landlord
that he, the tenant, would pay all taxes, rates,
duties, assessments, and impositions, parliamen-
tary, parochial, or otherwise, which now are or

648

shall at any time during this demise be assessed
or imposed on or in respect of the said demised
premises. The landlord having, in compliance
with a notice from the County Council under
the Public Health (London) Act 1891, executed
certain repairs to the drains: Held, that he was
entitled under the covenant to recover the
amount so expended from the tenant. (Brett v.
Rogers.)

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Covenant not to assign or underlet without lessors'
consent Breach - Forfeiture Relief - Under-
lessee. Sect. of the Conveyancing Act 1892
does not amend sect. 14 of the Act of 1881, but is
an independent section giving powers for the
relief of underlessees different from those which
exist in the case of lessees; and the court has
jurisdiction, under sect. 4 of the Act of 1892, to
grant relief against forfeiture to an underlessee
where the breach of covenant is the lessee's
assigning or underletting without the consent of
the lessor. But it is a relief which ought to be
given with caution and sparingly, and, before
asking for it, the lessee ought to be in a position
to prove that he is blameless, and exercised all
those precautions which a reasonably cautious
and careful person would use. (Imray v. Oak-
shette.)
Lease of hotel-Covenant by lessee not to buy wines
and spirits except from lessor-Proviso for abate-
ment from rent-Covenant running with the land
-Severance of ownership of lessor's business and
ownership of reversion.-A covenant by the lessee
contained in the lease of an hotel that he will not
during the term created by the lease buy, receive,
sell, or dispose of, in, upon, out of, or about the
premises any wines or spirits other than shall
have been bona fide supplied by or through the
lessor (a wine and spirit merchant), his successors
or assigns, is a covenant which runs with the
land, and is binding on the assigns of the lessee,
even though such assigns are not mentioned. And
where such covenant is coupled with a proviso for
abatement from the rent so long as the lessee
shall well and truly observe the covenant, the
assigns of the lessee are entitled to the benefit of
the proviso, and may claim the abatement, not-
withstanding that the ownership of the business of
the lessor and the ownership of the reversion have
been severed by a sale of the business, while they
continue to obtain wines and spirits from the pur-
chasers of the business. (White . The Southend
Hotel Company Limited.)

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Re-entry or forfeiture-Breach of covenant-Notice
'specifying the particular breach complained
of "-Form of notice-Action to recover posses-
sion. A notice under sect. 14, sub-sect. (1), of
the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881,
must, in order to satisfy the provisions of that
section, give sufficient particulars of what the
lessor regards as constituting the breach of
covenant or condition complained of, to enable
the lessee to remedy them before action brought,
and a notice to the lessee that he has broken a
specified covenant is not sufficient. A lessor
served on his lessee a notice that he had broken
the covenants for repairing the inside and outside
of six specified houses, contained in the lease of
such houses, and requiring him to repair the
houses and pay compensation for the breach, and
as the lessee did not comply with the notice,
brought an action against him for recovery of
possession on the ground of breach of covenant.
The lessee denied the breach, and pleaded that
the notice was not sufficient under sect. 14 of the
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1881, as
it did not specify the particular breach com-
plained of. Held, that the notice was not suffi
cient to satisfy the provisions of sect. 14, sub-
sect. (1), of the Conveyancing and Law of
Property Act 1881; and the action was dismissed.
(Fletcher v. Nokes.)

LICENSING.

Intoxicating liquor-Licence to sell-Transfer of
licence-Protection order-Licence still in force.-

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