That covers

But sup

Motion for Rule that was the only thing which the statute meant. for New Trial. fitting out, because a man who is building and fitting out a ship has it in his power to make a particular thing of her. posing he is building her under a contract, supposing the ship is ordered by the belligerent Government itself (and that is the case to which this evidence points), can any one possibly say that this statute does not strike at the case in which a belligerent Government gives an order to a merchant in Liverpool to equip a vessel for them and to take her to sea as a ship of war of theirs? And the merchant at Liverpool knowing fully that that is the purpose for which the ship is employed, which the very character of the employment proves, is not the merchant as much guilty, is not the shipbuilder as much guilty, is not the engineer as much guilty as the agents of the Confederate Government who are violating the neutrality of the country in the first instance?

Now all this was totally lost sight of at the trial, nay, doctrines entirely inconsistent with it were laid down, and I say that unless your Lordships are to make law instead of interpreting it, unless you are to deviate from the plain language of this statute and the natural meaning of its words for the sake of destroying its effect, for the sake of preventing it from checking and suppressing the mischief, you must say that any species of furnishing, any species of equipment, any species of fitting out, with or without arms, provided it be done with this intent, which I agree must be a fixed intent of a person capable of having the intent and assisting in that intent formed within this country, if you have that intent proved (and you have evidence to prove it here) this is a case which the statute strikes at, and you may as well drop the whole Act out of the Statute book if it does not.

Mr. Baron Bramwell. Just let me tell you a difficulty which has occurred to me with reference to this Act of Parliament, not at the present moment, of course. The words are, "equip, fur"nish, fit out, or arm with intent that such vessel shall be

employed as a transport or store ship, or with intent to cruize " or commit hostilities." The equipping therefore must be either as a transport or store ship or with the intent to cruize or commit hostilities. So also must be the furnishing, fitting out, or arming.

It

may be said that in this case there was no reasonable evidence upon which the jury could find that this vessel was equipped as a transport or store ship, therefore you may leave those words out. Then it may be said that there was no equipment of her of such a kind that she could cruize or commit hostilities, and that therefore that part of the intent fails to be made out. Now I understand that to be a difficulty which has been felt in the construction of this Act of Parliament, and I throw it out for your consideration if it has escaped you.

Mr. Attorney General.-I am very much obliged to your Lordship. It has not escaped me, but my answer is this, that the Act is intended to prevent and not to punish; steps which are being taken to that end are steps which, if taken with that intent, are as much against the Act as the completion of those steps would be.

It is perfectly plain that the ship was meant to be completed in Motion for Rule some way or other; she was in course of equipping; she was in for New Trial. course of furnishing; she was in course of fitting out, and if the evidence was such as to show that her object and purpose was to be employed as a war ship, it is clear that she would be completed for that purpose, and that any equipments not yet given which were necessary for that purpose would be added at one time or another, the whole being in pursuance and in completion of one and the same intent; and an authority in the United States, to which I shall have occasion to refer, at all events has distinctly laid it down that it is not at all necessary that the entire equipment, without which the ship cannot be effectually employed upon this service, should be made in this country, provided that any part is made here.

Mr. Baron Channell.-Do you say that the statute points to something incomplete?

Mr. Attorney General.-The words "attempt or endeavour" plainly point to something which is incomplete.

Lord Chief Baron.-Suppose the case of the building of a mere hull with the intention that it should be towed away across the Atlantic by a tug, and suppose that there was some Confederate port open, which there is not, that hull being incapable in that state of being used for any purpose whether of merchandise or war, do you mean to say that that would be illegal?

Mr. Attorney General.—That would raise an entirely different question.

Lord Chief Baron.-Would it be illegal?

Mr. Attorney General.—I will assume for a moment that it is not illegal.

Lord Chief Baron.-I am bound to say that if it be illegal you would be entitled to your rule at once, because no doubt I meant to lay down distinctly that the mere hull of a vessel in no condition fit for any use whatever, might be made and sold at Liverpool to anybody.

Mr. Attorney General.-My case does not in the least degree require that I should argue that the case imagined by your Lordship, which is obviously not one which is very probable and practical, would be brought within the words, "equip, furnish, fit out, or arm."

Lord Chief Baron.-The Court will adjourn for a short time.

After an interval.

Lord Chief Baron.—Mr. Attorney General, we have availed ourselves of the opportunity of the Court adjourning for a short time to consider the matters which you have brought before us; and without in the least saying what the opinion of any member of the Court is as to the ultimate fate of the rule, I certainly, for one, and I believe all my brothers are of the same opinion, think that what you have stated is unquestionably matter fit to be discussed. If, therefore, you are content now to take a rule to show cause why the verdict should not be set aside as being

Motion for Rule contrary to the evidence, or as not being warranted by the for New Trial. evidence, being contrary to the weight of it, and on the ground

of misdirection on the part of myself at the trial, or on the ground that though there might be no positive misdirection, there might be such a want of information furnished to the jury as not to enable them fairly to discharge their duty,-if you are contented to take a rule upon those two grounds, dividing the second into either positive misdirection or imperfect direction, you may take a rule to show cause at once.

Mr. Attorney General.-1 thank your Lordship; that is what I have been asking your Lordships for, and of course, being told that I may have it, I have no more to say.

Lord Chief Baron.-Very well, take a rule to show cause.

Mr. Attorney General.-My Lords, my learned friends remind me that it will be necessary in drawing up the rule to state the grounds of the rule.

Lord Chief Baron.-I hope that I am not wrong in this. I believe that you may take the rule precisely in the terms which I have now announced. If you like to put it more shortly as misdirection or imperfect direction, you can do it.

Mr. Attorney General. That is very satisfactory to me, my Lord.

Mr. Baron Channell.-We understand that that will include the incomplete information.

Lord Chief Baron.-Perhaps you had better take it in the language in which I pronounced it when I addressed you just

now.

Mr. Baron Pigott.-Misdirection enables the Court to mould the meaning of that word by-and-by; misdirection is understood, but non-direction is not recognized as a ground for a rule.

Mr. Attorney General.--If that is so technically, of course we are quite satisfied to abide by the proper form.

Mr. Baron Bramwell.-There can be no doubt that it must be stated wherein the misdirection consists, but surely there will be no difficulty about it, Mr. Jones will attend to that.

Mr. Jones. It is only with reference to the terms of the rule of Court upon the subject. If we go into the Court of Error they will say, "You ought to have specified it."

Mr. Baron Bramwell. If there should be any difficulty, I daresay that myself, or one of my learned brothers, will settle it.

Lord Chief Baron.-I may state to you, Mr. Attorney General, that I imagined that I had taken pains, and I hoped that I had laid down the law as I understood it to be laid down by the highest possible authority, at least now, in what is called "another place :" some people call it "another place."

Mr. Attorney General.-Your Lordship may be aware that any authority to which your Lordship may be referring, is incapable of defending himself here as to what he has said in another place, or vindicating that from misinterpretation.

Lord Chief Baron.-I thought that I was remarkably safe in taking that course. After all I may have been wrong.

Mr. Attorney General.-If I can divine the sentiments of any Motion for Rule person to whom your Lordship may be alluding, I may take the for New Trial. liberty of saying, that I understand that person to have vindicated the conduct of his own Government in that other place; and at the same time to have said, that in his judgment, although it may not be infallible, the "Alabama" had offended against the law of the land.

After a short interval.

Mr. Attorney General-My Lords, I have received from the officer of the Court an intimation which I am afraid makes it necessary for me to refer again to a subject which I thought had been disposed of. I am informed that the grounds of misdirection must be stated on the brief.

Mr. Baron Bramwell.-Yes.

Mr. Attorney General.-I am quite content to state those which we conceive to be the grounds of misdirection, if that is

meant.

Mr. Baron Channell.-The technical mode of drawing up the rule would be, that there was misdirection in this, then mentioning what you suppose to have been the misdirection; and if the Court has granted you the rule on the ground of incomplete or imperfect direction, then to state the grounds of that incomplete and imperfect direction.

Mr. Attorney General.-We shall be at liberty to state that in our own way?

Mr. Baron Channell.-Yes.

Lord Chief Baron.—Mr. Attorney General, the terms of the rule of course should be submitted to the Court before the rule is granted. There will be no difficulty about that. I have no doubt that Mr. Jones will so frame it that either the Court will assent to it, or he will assent to what the Court suggests as the mode.

Mr. Baron Bramwell.-Of course, Mr. Attorney General, as I understand, we cannot possibly allow a rule to be drawn up saying that the Chief Baron misdirected in this, when he says that he gave no such a direction; of course we cannot do that. Mr. Solicitor General.-There is the difficulty.

Mr. Attorney General.-What I had proposed was to have extracted verbatim from the short-hand writer's notes certain passages to which we should object, which probably would not be excepted to. I have made a division into six heads of the language as it stands on the short-hand writer's notes; and I should have been disposed to have placed every one of them upon the rule.

Lord Chief Baron.-1 will see Mr. Jones upon the subject if

necessary.

Mr. Baron Channell.-There will be no difficulty about it.

Mr. Solicitor General.—I rather understood from your Lordships, if I may be allowed to say so, that in this particular case you

Motion for Rule would allow the rule of practice to be somewhat modified by a for New Trial. more general statement than usual.

Lord Chief Baron.-We will see whether that can be done. Mr. Solicitor General.—Very well, my Lord; we will try what we can do.

Lord Chief Baron.-It should be observed, and it may be quite right that I should state it in public, that when the Attorney General presented to me the paper I made the instant objection to it which I have made all along.

66

Mr. Attorney General.-Yes, my Lord, we are quite aware of that. Lord Chief Baron.-I said "I certainly did not mean this, and "I do not believe that I have done it," and if the objection had been taken, as I must say I think it ought to have been, a little earlier, and if an intimation had been given to me I should have corrected it at once, and have said "Gentlemen of the jury, it is supposed that I have said so and so, I mean nothing "of the kind. On my own behalf I must say that the learned "Attorney General now remembers that the moment the paper "was put into my hands I said, 'Mr. Attorney General that is "not mine."" At present we need only say this-I repeat that if Mr. Jones will communicate with me upon the subject I have no doubt that we shall be able to put upon the rule everything which you wish put upon it.

Mr. Attorney General.-I should think so; I should wish to do it, with your Lordship's permission, by taking the very terms of the short-hand writer's notes, including the final passage to which your Lordship has referred, and then it would open to us the alternative view which your Lordship has mentioned, namely, that even if the direction properly interpreted should be considered to be right, still it might possibly have the effect of misleading the jury.

The Court then made the following rule.

IN THE EXCHEQUER.

Thursday, the 5th day of November 1863.

Between Her Majesty's Attorney General, Informant, and Hermann James Sillem and others, claiming the "Alexandra,” Defendants.

By Information of Seizure.

Upon the motion of Sir Roundell Palmer, Knt., Her Majesty's Attorney General, it is ordered by the Court that the said defendants do within a week after service of this Rule, or a copy thereof, show cause to this Court why the verdict found for the defendants upon the trial of this cause before the Right Honourable the Lord Chief Baron of this Court, at the sittings in Middlesex after Trinity term last, should not be set aside, and a new trial of this cause had on the ground-1st, that the verdict