case vaccinated, but not for any case not duly registered. The contract further provided that he "shall not be entitled to be paid his account from time to time to be rendered of fees for cases of vaccination, unless he shall have punctually attended at the time and place for the purposes of vaccination and also shall have duly and punctually registered and certified in relation to vaccination, and transmitted to the vaccination officers a certificate of successful vaccination in respect of every person who shall have applied to him for such purpose during the period to which his account or claim for fees from time to time rendered to the said guardians shall relate, and shall have fulfilled all and singular the requirements of the statutes relating to vaccination and the regulations of the Lords of the Council and the Local Government Board." Held that the clause in the contract was to be read distributively, and all that was previously due would not be wiped out by subsequent failure in punctuality. Hence moneys might under the contract be effectively earned for work done up to any date, although they would not be payable under the contract until a month after quarter day, and such moneys were attachable under a garnishee order as soon as earned. Similarly the fees of a registrar of births and deaths, concerning which a registrar is by section 29 of the Births and Deaths Registration Act, 1836 (6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 86), to make out a quarterly account four times a year to be verified and signed by the superintendent-registrar, are to be considered as accruing due, though not payable, and are attachable. Edmunds v. Edmunds (P. D., 15 June, 1904), [1904] P. 362; 73 L. J. P. 97. Food and Drugs, Sale of—see "Sale of Food and Drugs Acts.” Foreshore-see "Seashore." Gas: Arrears of Outgoing Tenant-Incoming Purchaser of Business not requiring Supply-Action to Recover Arrears from Incoming Tenant-Metropolis Gas Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 125), s. 39; Gas Light and Coke Co.'s Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. xxiii.), s. 18. Section 18 of the Gas Light and Coke Co.'s Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. xxiii.), provides that the company shall not require an incoming tenant to pay any arrears left unpaid by the previous tenant, unless the incoming tenant agreed with the defaulting consumer to pay the arrears or continues the business of the outgoing tenant, and has paid a consideration for so doing, but the company shall, notwithstanding any such arrears in the absence of collusion between the outgoing and incoming tenants, supply gas to the latter if required by him to do so. Held that the gas company had no right of action I Gas-continued. against an incoming tenant who did not require a supply of gas for arrears due from his predecessor, even if he had agreed with the defaulting consumer to pay the arrears or had paid for the goodwill of the business. As a condition of supply the gas company could require payment of such arrears. GAS LIGHT AND COKE Co. v. MEAD (1876) (45 L. J. M. C. 71; 33 L. T. 729) approved. Decision of Court of Appeal ([1903] 1 K.B. 593; 72 L.J.K.B. 308; 88 L.T. 314; 51 W. R. 565; 67 J. P. 192) reversed. Cannon Brewery Co., Ltd., v. Gas Light and Coke Co. (H. L., 17 May, 1904), [1904] A. C. 331; 73 L. J. K. B. 747; 91 L. T. 110; 52 W. R. 657; 68 J. P. 461; 2 L. G. R. 949; 20 T. L. R. 543. Public Lamp-Private Property-Objection by Owner to Gas Notice was served under section 24 of the Gasworks Clauses Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 41) upon a gas company to supply gas to a lamp fitted by the Corporation of Liverpool upon a wall in a private unadopted street. The owners of the street would not give their consent under section 7 of the Gasworks Clauses Act, 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 15) to gas pipes being laid down. Held that the gas company were not guilty of neglect or refusal within the meaning of section 36 of the Gasworks Clauses Act, 1871, to supply gas and that the right remedy of the Corporation was under section 150 of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55). Bellamy v. Liverpool United Gas Light Co. (K. B. D., 13 July, 1904), [1904] Local Government Chronicle (Note), p. 829. By section 7 Testing Sunday " Daily"- Long Prevailing Practice -Metropolis-Right of London County Council to Sue-Gas Light and Coke and other Companies Acts Amendment Act, 1880, s. 7. By the South Metropolitan Gas Co.'s Acts of 1869 and 1876, provision is made for testing the quality of the gas supplied. The testing places are to be provided by the company, and to be under the control of the London County Council, and "daily testings" are to be made by gas examiners appointed by the council. of the Gas Light and Coke and Other Companies Acts Amendment Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict., c. clxxxi.), applicable to all the metropolitan gas companies, the provisions as to daily testings were substantially re-enacted by a section which provided that a gas examiner should at each testing-place make daily such number of testings as the gas referees appointed by the Board of Trade should prescribe. A provision in the Act of 1869, which was to be read with the Act of 1880, defined "day" as twenty-four hours, reckoned from 9 a.m. in one day to 9 a.m. in the next. The practice under these and similar Acts relating to other metropolitan gas companies until 1902 had been to test on week-days only. Held that the literal meaning of "daily" in the Act of 1880, read with the Act of 1869, with reference to the South Metropolitan Gas Co. was "every day," including Sundays, taking the day as commencing at 9 a.m., and that the practice prevailing under similar provisions in previous Acts of Parliament from 1869 to 1880 was not sufficient to justify the court in construing the Act of 1880 with reference to that practice, and that therefore the gas examiners appointed by the London County Council were entitled to test on Sundays the gas supplied by the company. YEWENS v. NOAKES (1880) (6 Q.B.D., 535; 50 L.J.Q.B. 132, 135; 44 L. T. 128; 28 W. R. 562; 45 J. P. 8) considered. Held further that the County Council could sue to enforce the rights of the gas examiners without the Attorney General being joined. Decision of Chancery Division' ([1903] 2 Ch. 532) affirmed. London County Council v. South Metropolitan Gas Company (C. A., 8 Dec., 1903), [1904] 1 Ch. 76; 73 L. J. Ch. 136; 89 L. T. 618; 52 W. R. 161; 68 J. P. 5; 2 L. G. R. 161; 20 T. L. R. 83. I Highway :-(1) Dedication and Diversion. Dedication of Footpaths-User-Evidence-Costs of Action against District Council-Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, s. 1. Three paths used for a long time (upwards of 60 years) continuously and uninterruptedly, with the knowledge and consent of the owner, by all sorts and conditions of people, and for all the various kinds of traffic ordinarily taking place between county towns and villages held to be public paths. A path used only by men working at quarries in the neighbourhood held not to be a public path. As to costs, the defendants claimed that they ought to have their costs as if they had succeeded in three out of four actions or in the alternative to have the general costs of the action except so far as the costs had been increased by the issue on which they had failed and based their claim on section 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61). Held this contention was not founded on the true construction of the section and that the plaintiffs were entitled to get the general costs of the action except so far as they had been increased by the issues on which they had failed and the defendants would have the costs as between solicitor and client of the issues upon which the plaintiffs had failed. Leckhampton Quarries Co. Ltd. v. Ballinger and the Cheltenham Rural District Council (Ch. D., 20 May and 15 July, 1904) 68 J. P. 464; 20 T. L. R. 559; [1904] Local Government Chronicle (Note), p. 804. 1 See Law and Legislation, 1903, p. 187. Highway :-(1) Dedication and Diversion-continued. Public Footpath under Inclosure Award-Use for Vehicles- By an award made in 1811, pursuant to a private Inclosure Act, the Commissioners awarded a strip of land, of a width of six feet, as a public footpath. For the last forty or fifty years certain persons had used the path for hand-carts and barrows and in some instances for carts drawn by donkeys or ponies. The plaintiffs put up a post to restrain the wheel traffic, and the defendant removed it. In an action for damages, held that the uses of the lane for wheel traffic was in its inception, and had been all along a public nuisance, that it was illegal, and no length of time could legalise it, and that after the award no one could dedicate the lane as a public highway for carriages. Sheringham Urban District Council v. Holsey (Ch. D., 25 March, 1904), 68 J. P. 395; 2 L. G. R. 744; 20 T. L. R. 402. Sale of Land by Corporation--Building Scheme-Private Square A corporation which had acquired certain land for the purpose of widening a street put up the surplus land for sale in building lots. It was stipulated that buildings of not less than certain specified values should be erected, and that "the corporation reserve the right to waive or alter any of the stipulations as to any land not sold at this sale or (with the consent of the purchaser thereof) as to any land so sold." The plaintiff company and Messrs. Gosling and Sons were purchasers of adjoining lots, and the former insisted that any buildings must be erected in accordance with a building scheme with which the defendants were not entitled to interfere. Messrs. Gosling and Sons had, subsequently to the auction, acquired adjoining land, part of which was an open space or square by means of which access to certain cottages and the back entrances of business premises had been gained, and their plans were modified with the consent of the corporation so as to utilise the open space or square for the purpose of their projected building. This square the plaintiff company contended was a public highway, and they sought an injunction to restrain Messrs. Gosling and Sons from building so as to prevent its use as a public highway. The square was a cul-de-sac and not separated by any bar from the highway and it had never been cleansed, lighted, or paved by the local authority. Held that there was no building scheme which the corporation were not at liberty to alter, and that the inference from the facts was that the square was not a public highway but had always been a private square. AttorneyGeneral and London Property Investment Trust, Ltd., v. Richmond Corporation and Gosling and Sons (Ch. D., 17 Dec., 1903), 89 L. T. 700; 68 J. P. 73; 2 L. G. R. 628; 20 T. L. R. 131. Diversion of Highway-When Notice to be Affixed at each endApplication to More than One Set of Justices-Contents of Certificate-Highway Act, 1835, ss. 84, 85. Under section 84 of the Highway Act, 1835 (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50), if a person desires to divert a highway, and the district council agree, the surveyor of highways is to apply to two justices to view the highway, and by section 85 when it appears upon such view that any public highway may be diverted so as to make the same nearer or more commodious to the public, and the owner of the lands or grounds through which such new highway so proposed to be made shall consent thereto by writing under his hand, the said justices shall direct the surveyor to affix a notice at the place and by the side of each end of the said highway from whence the same is proposed to be diverted, and also to insert the same notice in one newspaper published or generally circulated in the county for four successive weeks next after the said justices have viewed such public highway, and the said several notices having been so published and proof thereof having been given to the satisfaction of the said justices, the said justices shall proceed to certify under their hands the fact of their having viewed the said highway as aforesaid, and that the proposed new highway is nearer or more commodious to the public. Held that the notice at each end of the highway must be first affixed at such a date as will leave a period of twenty-eight days between the date of the affixing and that of the making of the certificate by the justices; that the consent of the owners to the making of the substituted highway need not-following the case of REG. 7. SURREY JUSTICES (1872) (26 L. T. 22)-appear on the face of the certificate; that if after a district council agree as provided by section 84 of the Act of 1835, two justices view a highway and refuse to make a certificate under section 85, application to another set of justices may be made without having recourse again to the district council; and that if the justices certify that upon the view they find the new way to be more commodious, the fact that they go on to state certain additional reasons disclosed by inquiries from third persons would not make the certificate bad. Rex v. Kent Justices (K. B. D., 12 May, 1904), [1904] 2 K. B. 349; 73 L. J. K. B. 858; 91 L. T. 193; 68 J. P. 417; 2 L. G. R. 886; 20 T. L. R. 520. Highway :-(2) Extraordinary Traffic. Contributory Negligence of Highway Authority-Condition of Road to bear Ordinary Traffic-Evidence --Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878, s. 23; Locomotives Act, 1898, s. 12. In an action to recover extraordinary expenses in repairing a highway incurred by reason of damage caused by extraordinary traffic and excessive weight, under section 23 of the Highways and Locomotives (Amendment) Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 77), as amended by section 12 of the Locomotives Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 29) the principle |