We do not question the fact of the immediate successiveness of the ideas in the mind of so accurate an observer; but can we be sure that the mountain summit and Prussian education had not previously at all been connected in his thinking? Is it not possible that the subject of Prussian education, having been suggested by the appearance of the German traveller, had engaged the Professor's consideration somewhat at the time when he met the gentleman on the mountain? Nothing could be more natural than this in the case of Sir William. But if this were so, the instance cited would only be one of the ordinary association of thought. In short, we would account for the apparent want of connection, often noticed between successive ideas, either by reference to a previous and temporarily forgotten association, or else by that rapid oblivion which frequently overtakes such links of thought as do not, while passing, secure our interest and attention. It is difficult to conceive how the mind can think, even in the feeblest way, without at the same time knowing that it thinks; this, of course, also in a way correspondingly feeble.

The last argument of Hamilton is derived from our acquired dexterities. When one plays rapidly on a piano, or other musical instrument, he seems to strike many notes-especially in a familiar piece from habit, and without thought of the individual motions. At times even the chief attention of a practised performer may be occupied with objects not at all related to his playing. Some have accounted for this by ascribing the activity wholly, or nearly so, to the body, acting automatically and under the influence, though not under the direction, of the mind. This explanation excludes mental modifications, whether conscious or unconscious. But it is incredible. We would accept the idea of latent modifications in preference to it. There is always, we believe, something intellectual in our dexterities; their apparent automatism is similar to what takes place when one reads aloud to others sentences, and even passages, which make no impression on his own mind, that is, no impression such as can be recalled. Drs. Reid and Hartley endeavored to explain these activities by a force of habit, a proneness of spirit, operating without thought. They liken this to instinct. But we question whether even instinct acts without any thought. There is no understanding of its end, but there is some notion of its immediate work.

The views of Professor Stewart on this subject seem, on the whole, preferable to any others. He holds that actions originally voluntary (and therefore also intellectual) always continue so,

of a series. He thinks that an act of the will precedes every motion of every finger of the musician; and compares the skill of the player to that of the accountant who sums up, almost at a glance, a long column of numbers, retaining no knowledge of the individual figures. The instantaneous forgetfulness accompanying such mental work is experienced by every student. How often, after a page has been rapidly perused, it is difficult to repeat one sentence nay, even one word the author's matter, only, remaining in the memory! This inability to recall the details of each successive act of mind is to be explained by reason of the exceeding ease and quickness of the intellectual performance, and from the corresponding slightness of attention given to each particular; it is not the result of any unconsciousness. So, likewise, when we say that an earnest speaker is unconscious of his delivery, we mean that he pays no attention to it, and that his consciousness of it is weak, disregarded, and without effect; but not, in the strict sense, that he has no consciousness of it at all. That there is a slight consciousness is evident; for if some accessory on which he has been accustomed to depend a pencil, a watch-chain, a buttonhole, a pocket-handkerchief, a coat-tail be removed from reach, it is instantly missed, and some time passes before the previous degree of unconsciousness is regained. In like manner, should some key of the piano become accidentally broken and fail to respond to the quick touch; should some figure in the column of addition be found illegible; should some word be omitted or even wrongly spelled on the printed page, -the want would be immediately perceived, and would induce an attentive and deliberate consciousness.

One qualification, perhaps, might render Professor Stewart's explanation more entirely satisfactory. He says that the slow and the rapid operations “are carried on in precisely the same manner, and differ only in the degree of rapidity." This rapidity is the chief difference; but we believe that there is also somewhat of a change in the mode of the mind's thinking. We are of opinion that combinations, which at first furnish the objects of several successive thoughts, often come to be comprehended in one complex idea, or in one complexity of co-existing ideas, and that this remains and operates in the mind till it has been fully realized in action. Thus a whole bar of music before its execution, or a whole sentence before its utterance, may be included in one easy apprehension. But in the case of any complex conception, our attention does not rest successively on its several parts, but on the conception as a whole. This suggests that

not be the objects of separate and independent thought; and if such be the case, there is still less room for wonder that they are not individually remembered.

Finally, supposing-what we do not believe-that some psychical operations entirely escape our observation, this would not prove that such operations occur outside of the sphere of consciousness, but only that they have been overpassed and neglected within it. If such a doctrine could be proved, it would show that our power of internal cognition, like our power of external cognition, may wholly lose sight of familiar objects because of the presence of others more interesting and impressive. Some show of argument could be made for this theory. But there is no evidence for the assertion of Hamilton, that "the sphere of our conscious modifications is only a small circle in the centre of a far wider sphere of action and passion, of which we are only conscious through its effects."

defined

CHAPTER IX.

MENTAL STATES AND MENTAL ACTIONS.

1. FREQUENTLY, both in philosophic and in ordinary discourse, we distinguish between the states and the actions, and also between the processes and the products of the intellect. The consideration of these distinctions may contribute to clearness of thought; and, with a similar end in view, we may profitably discuss the question, whether the mind is capable of having a plurality of states, or of performing a plurality of actions, simultaneously. Question In speaking of states, we do not refer to those more or less permanent conditions of our psychical powers which manifest themselves in modifications of our activity, and which exist during our inactivity. There are such states; for example, those of vigor and of feebleness, of liveliness and of dulness, of soundness and of insanity, of immaturity and of development. We now refer only to those states of mind of which we are immediately conscious, and which themselves are the manifestations of our immanent faculties and dispositions. Thus doubt, certainty, conviction, belief, knowledge, ignorance, are states; while perceiving, recollecting, judging, imagining, are actions.

Action and state distinguished.

of a series. He thinks that an act of the will precedes every motion of every finger of the musician; and compares the skill of the player to that of the accountant who sums up, almost at a glance, a long column of numbers, retaining no knowledge of the individual figures. The instantaneous forgetfulness accompanying such mental work is experienced by every student. How often, after a page has been rapidly perused, it is difficult to repeat one sentence nay, even one word the author's matter, only, remaining in the memory! This inability to recall the details of each successive act of mind is to be explained by reason of the exceeding ease and quickness of the intellectual performance, and from the corresponding slightness of attention given to each particular; it is not the result of any unconsciousness. So, likewise, when we say that an earnest speaker is unconscious of his delivery, we mean that he pays no attention to it, and that his consciousness of it is weak, disregarded, and without effect; but not, in the strict sense, that he has no consciousness of it at all. That there is a slight consciousness is evident; for if some accessory on which he has been accustomed to depend a pencil, a watch-chain, a buttonhole, a pocket-handkerchief, a coat-tail be removed from reach, it is instantly missed, and some time passes before the previous degree of unconsciousness is regained. In like manner, should some key of the piano become accidentally broken and fail to respond to the quick touch; should some figure in the column of addition be found illegible; should some word be omitted or even wrongly spelled on the printed page, the want would be immediately perceived, and would induce an attentive and deliberate consciousness.

One qualification, perhaps, might render Professor Stewart's explanation more entirely satisfactory. He says that the slow and the rapid operations "are carried on in precisely the same manner, and differ only in the degree of rapidity." This rapidity is the chief difference; but we believe that there is also somewhat of a change in the mode of the mind's thinking. We are of opinion that combinations, which at first furnish the objects of several successive thoughts, often come to be comprehended in one complex idea, or in one complexity of co-existing ideas, and that this remains and operates in the mind till it has been fully realized in action. Thus a whole bar of music before its execution, or a whole sentence before its utterance, may be included in one easy apprehension. But in the case of any complex conception, our attention does not rest successively on its several parts, but on the conception as a whole. This suggests that

not be the objects of separate and independent thought; and if such be the case, there is still less room for wonder that they are not individually remembered.

Finally, supposing-what we do not believe-that some psychical operations entirely escape our observation, this would not prove that such operations occur outside of the sphere of consciousness, but only that they have been overpassed and neglected within it. If such a doctrine could be proved, it would show that our power of internal cognition, like our power of external cognition, may wholly lose sight of familiar objects because of the presence of others more interesting and impressive. Some show of argument could be made for this theory. But there is no evidence for the assertion of Hamilton, that "the sphere of our conscious modifications is only a small circle in the centre of a far wider sphere of action and passion, of which we are only conscious through its effects."

CHAPTER IX.

MENTAL STATES AND MENTAL ACTIONS.

1. FREQUENTLY, both in philosophic and in ordinary discourse, we distinguish between the states and the actions, and also between the processes and the products of the intellect. The consideration of these distinctions may contribute to clearness of thought; and, with a similar end in view, we may profitably discuss the question, whether the mind is capable of having a plurality of states, or of performing a plurality of actions, simultaneously.

Question defined

Action and state distinguished.

In speaking of states, we do not refer to those more or less permanent conditions of our psychical powers which manifest themselves in modifications of our activity, and which exist during our inactivity. There are such states; for example, those of vigor and of feebleness, of liveliness and of dulness, of soundness and of insanity, of immaturity and of development. We now refer only to those states of mind of which we are immediately conscious, and which themselves are the manifestations of our immanent faculties and dispositions. Thus doubt, certainty, conviction, belief, knowledge, ignorance, are states; while perceiving, recollecting, judging, imagining, are actions.