THE CONVEYANCER. Yet if not competent for a plaintiff to convert an action founded on a breach of contract into an action for a tort so as to charge an infant defendant: (see Jennings v. Rundall, 8 T. R. 335). fraud were strictly proved, an action for money had and received would doubtless lie against an infant, even though he had previously been sued ex contractu. At any rate, that was what the Divisional Court apparently thought was possible when ordering the case of Cowern v. Nield (ubi sup.) to go back to the County Court in order to give the plaintiff the opportunity of proceeding in tort against the defendant. Resumption of Cohabitation and Alimony. THE actual decision of the important question whether the resumption of cohabitation by a husband and wife, after desertion by the husband, automatically annuls an order for payment of a weekly sum as alimony to the wife became unnecessary in the recent case of Matthews v. Matthews (noted ante, p. 60) because the same was determined on another point. But enough is to be gathered from what was said by the Lord Chief Justice (Lord Alverstone), in which Mr. Justice Pickford concurred, to permit of a clear notion being obtained of the view of the majority of the court. Mr. Justice Avory, it is true, dissented from the view so expressed. But although his Lordship had something in the nature of a guide for his opinion in the shape of the decision of the Divisional Court in Williams v. Williams (90 L. T. Rep. 174; (1904) P. 145), yet that decision does not appear to satisfy the language of sect. 7 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895 (58 & 59 Vict. c. 39). Moreover, no argument was heard on behalf of the wife in that case, inasmuch as she was not represented by counsel. It was there laid down that where an offence has been committed which primâ facie entitles a married woman to an order under sect. 4 of the Act of 1895, and the offence has been condoned by the wife, the effect of such condonation depends upon the common law and not upon any section of that Act. At common law condonation is an answer to a charge of desertion: (Harris v. Morris, 4 Esp. 41). Notwithstanding that a wife may have put an end to her original cause of complaint against her husband by resuming cohabitation with him, it does not follow that no application to discharge an order made under the Act is obligatory. On the contrary, if proper effect be given to the express provision at the end of sect. 7 of the Act of 1895 if any married woman 66 shall voluntarily resume cohabitation with her husband" an order against him "shall upon proof thereof be discharged such an application founded upon such resumption is an essential course. The resumption, ¡in (other words, has to be a condition precedent to the application; by itself it is ineffectual. Mr. Justice Avory, in relying upon the authority of the decision in Williams v. Williams (ubi sup.), apparently ignored the remark there of Sir Francis Jeune, P., that that case did "not come exactly within the terms of sect. 7 of the Act of 1875, because it took place during the course of the litigation and before the date of the order." In Matthews v. Matthews (ubi sup.) no such nonapplicability of the section could possibly be seized hold of. The suggestion in the course of the argument that the Act of 1895 was framed for the very purpose of getting rid of the decision in Haddon v. Haddon (56 L. T. Rep. 716; 18 Q. B. Div. 778) may seem somewhat far-fetched. That case was decided under sect. 4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1878 (41 & 42 Vict. c. 19), which corresponds to sects. 4 and 5 of the Act of 1895. The introduction of the words with which sect. 7 of the latter Act concludes nevertheless certainly do give some colour to that suggestion. In Haddon v. Haddon (ubi sup.) an order under sect. 4 of the Act of 1878 was held to be absolutely put an end to by a reconciliation and resumed cohabitation of the husband and wife. But even so, the requirement that an application to discharge an order for payment of a weekly sum, or any other order under sect. 5 of the Act of 1895, shall succeed that reconciliation has excellent grounds for its existence. The point on which Matthews v. Matthews (ubi sup.) was really decided is likewise of considerable interest-namely, as to the invalidity of a committal order which deals with a period of arrears exceeding six months. But exigencies of space demand that we should confine ourselves to that very brief reference to it. Donee of a General Power of Appointment Exercising it by Will. 66 would A POINT which is apt to escape the unwary practitioner is that the death of an appointee under a will in the lifetime of the testator will not necessarily cause a lapse, or failure of the appointment, so as to let the property devolve as in default of appointment. But in what cases it will not so devolve is not particularly clear. As pointed out by Lord Justice Romer (then Mr. Justice Romer) in Re Boyd; Kelly v. Boyd (77 L. T. Rep. 76; (1897) 2 Ch. 235), the principle which has to be applied to all cases of this class is clear. You have to ascertain whether the donee of the power meant by the exercise of it to take the property dealt with out of the instrument containing the power for all purp or only for the limited purpose of giving effect to the particu disposition expressed. The difficulty lies in the application d the principle. It is submitted that the following propositions must now be taken as established—namely: (1) That if the testator appoints the property to trustees on trusts which fail by reason of the death of the cestuis que trust in the lifetime of the testator, it is a question of resulting trust. As stated by Lord Justice James in Re Van Hagen; Sperling v. Rochfort (44 L. T. Rep. 461; 16 Ch. Div. 18): The intention is to execute the power and to take the appointed property out of the settlement, but when the power is once fully executed it is not a question of intention, because nobody can reasonably attribute any par ticular intention to a testitor as to what was to be done in an event that was never in his contemplation. It is a question simply of a resulting trust-what will the law do in state of things which has happened and as to which the appointor has not made any express provision? Then if person having a power equivalent to property which enable him to make that property his own or make it part of his own estate, if such a person puts that property into the hands of any person for a purpose which only partially requires it, then the resulting trust in my opinion is for the person who appointed the trustees and who created the trust." And in Brickenden v. Williams (L. Rep. 7 Eq. 310) an appointment of the fund to executors was considered of itself almost conclusive as showing that the appointor had made the property her own for all purposes. (2) That if, without appointing the property to executors or trustees, the testator has dealt with the appointed property and his own property as one mass, then he shows an intention to take the appointed property out of the settlement for all purposes, so that, if any of the dispositions of the appointed property fail, it will devolve as part of his estate and not go to the persons entitled in default of appoint ment. Thus in Re Pinede's Settlement (41 L. T. Rep. 579; 12 Ch. Div. 667) the testatrix, in exercise of a general power of appoint ment by will, appointed that the trustees in whose names the fund was standing should stand possessed of the same in trust to pay a legacy of £2000 (which lapsed) and other legacies amounting to £6100. She bequeathed to her husband £2000, which she authorised her executors to pay, and bequeathed to him certain stock not included in her power of appointment. She directed her funeral expenses to be paid "out of my said trust property," and as to all the residue of her personal estate whatsoever she bequeathed the same to her nephew, who died in her lifetime. She appointed executors. At the date of her will the value of the appointed property was about £11,000, and she had no other property, except the stock bequeathed to her husband and some small savings of her separate estate; and it was held by Jessel, M.R. that the testatrix had made the appointed property her own, and consequently that her husband, who survived her, was entitled thereto. Again, in Coxen v. Rowland (70 L. T. Rep. 89; (1904) 1 Ch. 406), where a testatrix, having a general power of appointment over real estate, gave all the real and personal estate which she might be possessed of or entitled to, or which by virtue of any power or authority she was competent to dispose, in manner following, and then, after making certain specific devises and bequests in which she treated the subjects thereof as her own, she gave the property the subject of the power to her husband, and as to all the residue and exe aqua nte don S&F aw hich make prop ure by Lord Justice Romer and Cozens Hardy, M.R. (dissentiente Lord Justice Vaughan Williams) that the testatrix had by her will exercised the power for all purposes and had blended the settlement funds with her own property, and that the appointed fund, so far as it had lapsed by the death of H. Shaw, went, subject to the payment thereout of her debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and her pecuniary legacies, to her next of kin, and not to the persons entitled under the settlement in default of appointment. That case turned upon the fact that the residuary gift included not only the appointed property, but also the testatrix's own property, and both were made as one mass subject to the payment of the testatrix's debts. Lord Justice Romer considered that Re Davies' Trusts was distinguishable because there the testatrix had not in her residuary gift in terms purported to exercise her power of appointment; he also thought that in Re De Lusi's Trusts there was no intention to blend the appointed property with the testatrix's own property. As pointed out in Jarman on Wills, vol. 1, p. 820, 6th edit., by Mr. Charles Sweet, assisted by Mr. Sanger, all the cases are not quite consistent; but it is thought that in future the tendency will be to hold that slight indications are sufficient to show that the appointor intended to make the property his or her own for all purposes Of course the foregoing remarks only apply to a general power of appointment. NOTES OF RECENT DECISIONS NOT YET REPORTED. remainder of my estate and effects whatsoever and wheresoever real and personal after payment of all my just debts, funeral and testamentary expenses," she gave the same to her husband who predeceased her and it was held by Lord Justice Stirling (then Mr. Justice Stirling) that the gift of residue included ti both property which belonged to her and property over which she had merely a power of appointment, and that the latter di property was to be deemed hers for all purposes, and consewol quently that it went to her heirs, and not as in default of appointRom ment under the settlement (and see Re Marten, referred to later T in this article). (3) If, however, the testator has neither d to appointed the property to trustees nor dealt with the appointed -the property and his own as one mass, then, unless there is something roper else in the will to show that he intended to make the appointed all property his own, that property will, if the appointee should die he pain his lifetime, go as in default of appointment. Thus in Re pplica Davies' Trusts (L. Rep. 13 Eq. 163) S. D., who had under the will of her late husband a general power of appointment over a moiety That of his residuary estate, by will dated in 1869, after directing her hich debts should be paid and giving pecuniary legacies, bequeathed fetim the residue of her personal estate which she had any title ced to or interest in unto her brothers and sisters M., E., W., and fort J. equally, and appointed an executor. M. and J. died in the lifetime of the testatrix, and it was held that she had not set made the appointed fund her own for all purposes, and that the next of kin of the husband were entitled to the shares which M. and J. would have taken if they had survived the appointor. That case was followed in Re De Lusi's Trusts (3 L. Rep. Ir. 232). There a married woman, having under her marriage settlement a general power of testamentary appointment over a fund, made her will which she declared to be a disposition as well of all the Property comprised in the settlement as of all her other property, and she thereby appointed a portion of the fund in favour of S. and his children, but directed that, in default of children of S., such portion should fall into her general personal property and pass to her residuary legatee and appointee; and, after giving certain legacies, she appointed her sister as her residuary legatee and appointee. The will Contained an appointment of executors. M. died in the lifetime of the testatrix; and it was held that the testatrix had not made the fund her own for all purposes, and that it passed to the persons entitled in default of appointment. Again, in Re Boyd; Kelly v. Boyd, before cited, a testatrix who had a general testamentary power of appointment over £5000, after reciting the power, bequeathed the same sum and the residue of her real and personal estate equally among her eight nephews and nieces by name, and appointed an executor; and by codicil she gave various legacies out of her own moneys," and by another codicil she referred to the fact that she had by her will given "a certain fund therein named and also the residue of her estate' to her said nephews and nieces. The testatrix was possessed of considerable personal estate in addition to the £500. Two of the appointees having died in the lifetime of the testator, it was held by Mr. Justice Romer that she had not indicated a sufficient intention to make the £500 her own for all purposes, and consequently the rights of the fund lapsed and went as in default of appointment. The whole question came before the Court of Appeal in Re Marten; Shaw v. Marten (85 L. T. Rep. 704; (1902) 1 Ch. 370). There a testatrix, who had a general power of appointment over the funds comprised in her marriage settlement, by her will, in exercise of the power, appointed that the trustees of the settlement should stand possessed of £9000, part of such funds, in trust for six persons named in the will. And in further exercise of the power she appointed that the trustees prope only ion Zed t 0) ani itself the p ppoint Healt mass, ty ispos of his en Bould stand possessed of the residue of the funds in trust gare essed ity sher ter 65 to £1000 for W. P. Shaw, and as to the residue thereof in trust for H. Shaw, and, after bequeathing certain specific and ecuniary legacies, the testatrix made the following bequest: As to the rest and residue of my real and personal estate, I evise, bequeath, and appoint the same, subject to the payment ereout of my debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, to he said H. Shaw." H. Shaw died before the testatrix. She had ersonal estate of her own, but no real estate; and it was held BY OUR REPORTERS IN THE SEVERAL COURTS. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Company-Debentures-Guarantee Society-Failure of-Scheme of Arrangement-Majority-Resolution to confirm-Persons benefiting under Scheme of Arrangement voting as Debenture-holders -Validity. The plaintiff on this motion was the holder of a debenture of the defendant company, whose debentures had been guaranteed partly by the Law Guarantee Society and partly by the British Steamship Investment Trust. The debentures guaranteed by the society and some of those guaranteed by the trust had been issued to the public. The remainder of those guaranteed by the trust were taken up by the trust itself. At a meeting of the debenture-holders of the defendant company a resolution was passed by the requisite majority adopting a certain scheme of arrangement. The plaintiff contended that this resolution was not binding because the majority necessary to pass it had been obtained by something in the nature of bribery, and accordingly that such resolution was invalid and of none effect. The scheme had been altered to contain clauses beneficial to the trust because without their vote in respect of their holding of debentures in the company it could not be carried, and they had intimated their intention of voting against the first scheme proposed. It was the altered scheme which was carried by the resolution and which the plaintiff contended could not be carried into effect because the resolution was invalid, having been obtained by "bribing" the trust. Cur. adv. vult. Held, that, provided the powers conferred by a trust deed on a majority of the debenture-holders are exercised bona fide, each debenture-holder may vote with regard to his individual interests, and there can be no question of bribery where a scheme openly provides for the separate treatment of persons with special interests; and, further, that there are no grounds in equity for holding that such persons with special interests are incapacitated from voting on such scheme, the duty of the court in such a case being merely to carefully consider the fairness of the scheme. Held, also, that, the case having been argued entirely on the footing of bribery, the plaintiff was not entitled to succeed. [Goodfellow v. Nelson Line (Liverpool) Limited. Ch. Div. : Parker, J. May 10 and 23.-Counsel: Romer, K.C. and Rolt; Maugham. Solicitors: Oldfields; W. A. Crump and Son.] Vendor and Purchaser-Rectification-Rights of Way and Drainage-Mutual Mistake-Conveyance. On the 27th May 1910 the plaintiff N. agreed to purchase the freehold G. B. Estate, which was offered for sale by auction in lots, and on the 1st June 1910 he agreed to sell lot 6 to the defendant J. H. upon the conditions read at the auction. The conditions stated that each lot was sold subject to all rights of There way, water, and other easements affecting the same. was printed with the particulars a stipulation that the lots were In sold subject to all rights of way (including existing occupation ways), methods of water supply, drainage, or other users of_a similar nature enjoyed by the vendors or their tenants. replies to requisitions asking as to rights of way or drainage or other easements affecting the property, N.'s solicitor replied that he was not aware of any beyond those referred to in the particulars and conditions. The estate was conveyed to N. on the 9th Nov. 1910 subject to all easements, and on the 11th Nov. 1910 lot 6 was conveyed to J. H. in fee simple. J. H. on the 15th Nov. 1910 mortgaged the same premises to the second defendant. The same solicitors acted for the defendant J. H. on his purchase from N., and for both defendants in connection with the mortgage. Another lot (3) adjoining lot 6 on the northwest was conveyed to the co-plaintiffs by N. on the 1st Feb. 1911. The purchasers of lot 3 alleged that for many years during J. H.'s occupation of lot 6 as tenant it had been subject to easements of way and drainage in favour of lot 3, and they claimed a declaration and rectification of J. H.'s conveyance accordingly, alleging that N. was in equity a trustee for enforcing these rights. On the question of fact the court found the existence of drainage rights and of an occupation way not abandoned in the plaintiffs' favour. Held, that it was open to N. to have insisted upon the insertion of words reserving rights over lot 6 in his conveyance to J. H. He had not done so, and in any case he could not obtain rectification without showing a mistake common to himself and J. H., of which his belief that sect. 6 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 would apply was no proof. In any case there could be no rectification after a conveyance of lot 3 to parties who were not assignees of the contract with J. H. Semble, the solicitor to the mortgagee was not bound to personally inspect the premises so as to become affected with notice under sect. 3 of the Conveyancing Act 1882. [Slack v. Hancock. Ch. Div.: Eve, J. May 24.-Counsel: Edward Clayton, K.C. and R. Roope Reeve; Jessel, K.C. and C. Gurdon; H. L. Manby. Solicitors: Rawle, Johnstone, and Co., agents for W. J. Holbrook, Derby; Ullithorne, Currey, and Co., agents for Barber, Currey, and Currey, Derby.] Will-Contingent Legacy to Infant Child-Amount not presently ascertainable-Interest on Legacy prior to vesting not allowed. By a settlement made on the marriage of A. and B., B. on the death of A. was entitled to a life estate in the entirety and to a power of appointment in favour of the children over one half of the settled fund; the other half and any part not appointed passed to the children who should attain twenty-one or being daughters marry under that age. By his will A. bequeathed certain annuities, including such a sum to B. annually as would make up her income under the settlement to £4000 per annum, and subject thereto he directed his trustees "to pay to my said daughter C. if she shall attain the age of twenty-one years or marry under that age such a sum as with the value of the capital moneys, stocks, funds, and securities (if any) of or to which she shall become entitled under my said marriage settlement either by exercise of any power of appointment therein contained or otherwise howsoever will make up the full capital sum of £25,000,” and he made other bequests in favour of other children, and directed that the capital of children's shares should not be paid over during B.'s lifetime without securing her annuity, and that any income, after providing for the annuities, should be applied as income of the shares of his children. A. died in 1897 leaving surviving him B., C. (an infant), and another infant child. C. had since attained twenty-one. Held, that as the amount of C.'s legacy could not be finally ascertained till her share in possession under the settlement should be known, the rule referred to in Re Bowlby (91 L. T. Rep. 573; (1904) 2 Ch. 685), by which a contingent legacy from a parent to a child bears interest from the death, does not apply when the amount of the legacy is unascertainable; that the legacy vested in C. at twenty-one, but was liable to be divested to the extent of what she might take under the settlement; and that interest was only payable from then on the amount of the legacy from time to time vested in C. [Re Denham-Cookes (deceased); Denham-Cookes v. DenhamCookes. Ch. Div.: Neville, J. May 21.-Counsel: Peterson, K.C and Leverson; Bramwell Davies, K.C. and H. J. H. Mack Jenkins, K.C. and R. M. Pattisson. Solicitors: Newton, Lewin, and Levett.] Will-Property specifically devised-Memorandum charging same to secure Overdraft at Bank-Guarantee-Debit Balance-LockeKing's Act (17 & 18 Vict. c. 113.) On the 20th No. 1899 a testator executed a memorandum charging the property specifically devised by his will to A. H. with the payment to his bankers of all moneys for the time being due and owng from him to them on any account whatever. He had an account at the bank at the time which he ised for the purposes of his business; this account he was allowed to overdraw. In 1902 the testator had a paralytic stroke, and his son, A. H., took over the management of the business on his father's behalf. For the sake of convenience the testator's account was transferred into the names of A. H., his son, and L., his daughter. In Sept. 1902 A. H. desired to overdraw this account, and the bank allowed him to do so on the testator giving them a gurantee for the overdraft. In Dec. 1907, on the marriage of his daughter L., the account was transferred to the names of A. H. and his other daughter E., and the testator at the same time gave the bank a guarantee for the payment of all moneys then and thereafter due to them on the general balance of the account or for advances or otherwise. When the testator died the guaranteed account was in debit to the amount of over £2000, but the debit balance had since his death been satisfied out of the personal estate of the testator. The question now arose whether the property specifically devised to A. H. was at the date of testator's death charged within the meaning and for the purposes of Locke-King's with the debit balance on the guaranteed account. Held, that Locke-King's Act applied, and that this prope was subject to a charge in favour of the testator personally r the amount of the debit balance in question. [Re Hawkes (deceased); Reeve v. Hawkes and others. Ch Div.: Parker, J. May, 14, 16, and 23.-Counsel: R. Reeve; Grant, K.C. and Heber Hart; R. G. Macdonald. Solicitors for all parties, Lewis and Taylor.] KING'S BENCH DIVISION. Companies-Registration of Company-Discretion of RegistrarName of Company resembling Name already registered "Cal culated to deceive -Companies (Consolidation) Act 19 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69), ss. 8 (1), 15. Rule for a mandamus to the registrar of companies commanding him to retain and register the memorandum and articles of association delivered to him by the Water Softening Materials Company (Sofnol) Limited, upon the grounds tha he is required so to do under sect. 15 of the Companies (Cor solidation) Act 1908, and that the name is not identical with the name by which any company is registered and does not so nearly resemble any name of such company as to be calculated to deceive under sect. 8 (1) of the Act. The facts were as follows: For the last six years the applicant P. carried on under the name of "The Water Softening Materials Company the business and sale of materials and of a mixture called and registered "Sofnol for the industrial treatment of water, and since the 1st March 1912 the business under that name has been carried on by him in partnership with two others On the 26th March, having complied with all the provisions of the Companies Act, P., on behalf of himself and his partners applied to the registrar of companies for the registration of a private company to carry on the business with the name of "The Water Softening Materials Company Limited." The registrar refused to register the name of the company on the ground that it too nearly resembled the name of an existing company. The applicant alleged that the registrar had right to refuse to register the name, but to avoid difficulty expense he applied for the registration of the company with the name of "The Water Softening Materials Company (Sofne!) Limited." The registrar refused to registrar the company in the latter name upon the ground that the name so nearly re sembled that of Water Softeners Limited," a company already on the register, "as to be calculated to deceive." The "Water Softeners Limited was incorporated on the 23rd Feb. 1911, or about five years after the applicant had commenced to carry on the business of "The Water Softening Materials Company The applicant alleged that the main object and business of the company 66 "Water Softeners Limited and were not the same as would be carried on by "The Water Softening Materials Company (Sofnol) Limited," and that the latter name was not identical with the name by which any company in existence is registered, nor does it so nearly resemble any name of any such company as to be calculated to deceive. Sect. 8 (1) the Act says that "a company may not be registered by name identical with that by which a company in existence is already registered, or so nearly resembling that name as to be calculated to deceive," and sect. 15 says that the memorandum retain and register them." Held (discharging the rule), that there was nothing to show that the registrar was wrong when he came to the conclusion that the name of the proposed company was deceive" within sect. 8 (1) of the Act. 66 'calculated to [Rex v. Registrar of Companies; Ex parte Paul and others JJ. K. B. Div.: Lord Alverstone, C.J., Pickford and Avory K.C. May 21.-Counsel: Sargant and Rowlatt; Gore-Browne, and Brackenbury. Stanley B. Worth.] Solicitors: Solicitor to Board of Trade; ரம் 7. E: the sini had s of the erty sp r's death ccount. d that this stator per 1. es and othe Counsel: R on of R Highways-Way becoming a Highway after 1835—No Evidence of intentional Dedication by Owner-Liability of Inhabitants at large to repair-Highway Act 1835 (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50), s. 23. made an order that the respondents (the Bolton justices should pay to the then appellants (Cooke and others) the costs of their appeal to that court. These costs were subsequently taxed and allowed at the sum of £58 19s. 6d., and were paid by the justices of Bolton to the appellants' solicitor. Consequent upon the decision of the High Court, on the 8th Jan. 1912 the appeal was duly reheard and determined by the quarter sessions, and they dismissed the same with costs. The question of the order on the treasurer of the borough of Bolton for payment of the said sum of £58 19s. 6d. was left over for decision until the 15th April; and on the 15th April an application was made to the Court of Quarter Sessions for an order on the treasurer of the borough of Bolton, which is a county borough having a separate court of quarter sessions, for an order for the payment of the £58 19s. 6d., but the court declined to make any order or to state a case. The applicant justices submitted that, as the appeal was dismissed by the quarter sessions and as they could not recover the costs incurred from any other person, they were entitled to an order under sect. 32 of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act 1910 on the treasurer of the borough of Bolton to pay the £58 19s. 6d., the the costs which they were ordered by the High Court to pay on the hearing of the special case. The quarter sessions refused to make an order on the treasurer to pay these costs, on the grounds that they had already dismissed the appeal with costs, and that if these costs could be treated as costs of the appeal to quarter sessions they would be payable under that order, and that they had no power to make any further order dealing with the costs incurred in the High Court. Case stated by the quarter sessions for the county of Surrey, upon an appeal by the appellant against an order made by justices, whereby they ordered that the provisional apportionment approved by the respondent district council should be approved. The quarter sessions dismissed the appeal, subject to this case. The resolution approved by the council was that a private street, known as C-lane, be sewered, metalled, channelled, and made good under the Private Street Works Act 1892. The appellant as a frontager was treated as liable to be charged in the apportionment for the sum of £425. The appellant objected to the apportionment on the grounds that the alleged street did not form part of a street within the meaning of the Act, and also that it was a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large. Before 1800 there was, upon some common land at Walton-upon-Thames, an ancient lane branching from Kingston high road and leading into a common field called Church Field. By an Inclosure Act passed in 1800 and by the award made thereunder in 1804, the common land, including the lane, was inclosed and in part allotted to the predecessor in title of the appellant. The road was set out in the award as a private bridle-way and footway for the use ald. So of the occupiers of a certain allotment, and the justices found that it was not set out or appointed as a highway, and that if ever there had been any highway thereon it was stopped up and extinguished by the Inclosure Act and the award. Until some time after the passing of the Highway Act 1835 the way continued to be a private way. It was admitted by the respondents that the lane now was and had been since 1864 a highway used both by foot passengers and vehicles, but there was no evidence to show how, when, or under what circumstances and at whose expense the lane was originally made or laid down. In Oct. 1910 the respondent council resolved that the way, which had then become a street, should be made up under the Private Street Works Act 1892, and they approved a provisional apportionment of the expenses upon the appellant and others as owners of the property adjoining the street. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the lane being now admittedly a highway was at common law repairable by the inhabitants at large, and that the respondents had failed to adduce any evidence bringing the case within sect. 23 of the Highway Act 1835. For the respondents it was contended (inter alia) that sect. 23 of the Act of 1835 protected them, to which the appellant objected that sect. 23 did not apply because there was no intentional dedication of the lane as a highway. The quarter sessions found as facts that the road was not a public highway in 1835, and, although it might now be a public highway, it was not repairable by the inhabitants at large, and they dismissed the appeal. registers ation) £ compa Water S and do be a facts P. a Gals Ca ture & Lent a der t -h tw the F dhis regis h the inite Ompar of a gistrar id diff отракту отра пу the co me so •сотран e." The 23rd Feb mmenced z terials Co et and bus were not t Softening latter name Ompany i ole any eceive. Set be registe any in ers that name the mem Held, that the road, having become a highway since 1835, was a road or way to which sect. 35 applied, though there had been no evidence of intentional dedication. Appeal dismissed. [Cababé v. Walton-upon-Thames Urban District Council. K. B, Div.: Lord Alverstone, C.J., Pickford and Avory, JJ. May 14.-Counsel: Danckwerts, K.C. and Cababé; Sir F. Low, K.C. and W. Mackenzie. Solicitors: J. Westcott and Sons; Percy Webb.] Justices-Costs-Special Case stated by Quarter Sessions-Respondent Justices-Costs of Appeal to High Court-Right of Justices to Costs incurred in High Court-Licensing (Consolidation) Act 1910, s. 32. Rule for a mandamus to the justices for the Salford Hundred Division, commanding them to make an order upon the treasurer of the county borough of Bolton under sect. 32 of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act 1910 to pay the costs of an appeal to the High Court by way of a special case wherein one Cooke and others were appellants and the prosecutors herein (the justices of Bolton) were respondents, which costs were taxed and allowed at the sum of £58 19s. 6d., and any other costs to which the prosecutors have been put and have not received from the appellants. The rule was obtained at the instance of the justices of Bolton on the ground that the costs of the proceedings before the High Court on the special case were costs which the applicants were put to within the meaning of sect. 32. The Bolton justices were respondents in an appeal by Cooke and others against the refusal by them to grant a renewal of a licence for the sale of intoxicating liquor at certain premises. This appeal was heard by the Court of Quarter Sessions for the Salford Division on the 10th April 1911. The quarter sessions dismissed the appeal, subject to a special case to be stated. The special case was stated, and, upon the hearing of the same by the King's Bench Division, the Bolton justices were the respondents, but they did not appear. The King's Bench Division allowed the appeal (see 105 L. T. Rep. 818), and also Held (making the rule absolute), that the words in sect. 32, which require that the justices shall be paid such sum as is "sufficient to indemnify them from all costs and charges whatsoever to which they may have been put" by an appeal under the Act, were wide enough to include the costs in question, and that the justices were entitled to be repaid the same. [Rex v. Justices of Salford Hundred; Ex parte Justices of Bolton. K.. B. Div.: Lord Alverstone, C.J., Pickford and Avory, JJ. May 22.-Counsel: Rigby Swift; Sanderson, K.C. and R. M. Montgomery. Solicitors: Snow, Fox, and Higginson, for Harcourt E. Clare, Preston; Indermaur and Brown, for R. Winder, Bolton.] Negligence-Savage Animal-Cat with Kittens-Attack on Person carrying Dog-Liability of Owner. Appeal from the decision of His Honour Judge Woodfall, sitting with a jury at the Westminster County Court. The plaintiff, who was carrying a Pomeranian dog, went with her husband into a teashop belonging to the defendants for the purpose of having tea. She put the dog on the ground, keeping hold of its lead. A cat, who was rearing kittens at the time, came out of a storeroom and sprang on the dog and bit him. The plaintiff picked up the dog with the cat on its back and gave it to her husband. They then prepared to leave the shop when the cat sprang on the plaintiff's shoulder and bit her arm. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants claiming damages for the personal injuries sustained by her and also for the injury done to her dog. The jury found that the plaintiff took her dog on the premises by permission of the defendants, or with their acquiescence; that the cat, to the knowledge of the defendants, had while rearing kittens a disposition to attack a dog in her neighbourhood, and a person holding a dog; that the cat attacked the dog unprovoked; that the plaintiff's injuries were the result of the cat attacking the dog; and that the defendants did not in the circumstances take reasonable precautions for the safety of their customers. They assessed the damages at £100, and the learned judge entered judgment for that amount. defendants appealed. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the defendants were liable upon the grounds that they had been guilty of (1) a breach of duty as possessors of a cat known to be vicious, and (2) a breach of the duty which they owed to the plaintiff as a customer whom they had invited into their shop. The Held, that there was no evidence to support the finding of the jury that a cat rearing kittens had a disposition to attack a person holding a dog, or their finding that the defendants knew of the danger. Held, also, that, the plaintiff being on the premises with her dog by the permission but not by the invitation of the defendants, they would only be liable for damages caused by an unusual danger of which they knew or ought to have known, and that, there being no evidence that the defendants knew of the danger, and the risk being so remote that they could not reasonably have anticipated it, they were not liable to the plaintiff for the injury done either to herself or her dog. [Clinton v. J. Lyons and Co. K. B. Div.: Ridley and Bray, JJ. May 10 and 23. Counsel: McCall, K.C., and M. O'Connor; Shakespeare. Solicitors: C. F. Appleton; F. J. Berryman.] LAW LIBRARY. NEW EDITIONS. We have received from Stevens and Sons Limited a second edition of Mr. T. B. Napier's book on The New Land Taxes, which has been called for just two years since its original publication. The work is an examination and explanation, from a legal point of view, of the land clauses of the Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 and the Revenue Act 1911, which, as the author points out, practically opened a new chapter in the fiscal history of the United Kingdom. It is, however, a criticism as well as an explanation, since the author has avowedly not hesitated to express his opinion on the main points in the Act. The author has done much to elucidate the meaning and effect of the various sections by his full and helpful notes, while his explanatory summary of the new taxation is distinctly valuable. The second volume of A Digest of the Death Duties, by A. W. Norman, has been brought out in a third edition by Butterworth and Co. It deals with legacy duty and succession duty almost exclusively, although it has sometimes been necessary to refer to the subject-matter appearing in vol. 1. The book is arranged alphabetically, and the most important titles have been expanded for this edition, while in an appendix will be found the statutes dealing with both duties. The work is both practical and thorough. We are not surprised that a new edition-the fifth-has been called for of a Digest of the Law of Agency, by Mr. William Bowstead (Sweet and Maxwell Limited). It has been fully revised with reference to the cases reported down to the end of 1911, the book being not only complete, but also concise and accurate. We can only repeat what we have previously said, that few works on this subject contain so much useful and sound information as Bowstead on Agency. Mr. Alfred A. Hudson, K.C., has brought out a second supplement to the third edition of his Law of Building and Engineering and Shipbuilding Contracts (Sweet and Maxwell Limited), consisting of a report of the case Roberts v. Hickman and Co. as it was taken from court to court. This case emphasises the fact that engineers and architects who are in quasi-judicial positions must preserve an attitude of judicial independence required of them, quite apart from any fraud or collusion. We have received from Effingham Wilson the third edition, revised and enlarged, of that useful and handy book by Mr. Charles Jones, Book of Practical Forms, vol. 1, for use in solicitors' offices. It is intended as a handy guide for the busy solicitor or clerk in search of precedent or law note. The chief alterations in this edition are in the forms connected with interlocutory proceedings. These have been brought up to date. Three new forms have been added. Sir Frederick Pollock's excellent treatise on the Law of Torts (Stevens and Sons Limited) has reached its ninth edition. As regards the cases noted, the book is well up to date that is to say, those reported in April of this year are included. The recent line of cases in the Court of Appeal dealing with justification and fair comment has necessitated the re-writing of some passages in the chapter on defamation, while decisions in the House of Lords on the extent to which a licensor is bound to protect a licensee from non-apparent dangers or a licensee of tender years from danger apparent to an adult are noticed in more than one place, and the learned author explains the just bounds of their application. Both practitioners and students who desire to be informed as to principles" will find all they require in this work. The index has again been revised by Mr. Edward Potton. 66 Sweet and Maxwell Limited have just published Part 2 of vol. 2 of Mr. J. A. Shearwood's Bar Examination Questions and Answers for Easter Term 1912, a most valuable little publication for students. BOOKS RECEIVED. Westlake on Private International Law. Fifth Edition. Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancery-lane. Price 188. Notable English Trials: The Annesley Case. William Hodge and Co., Edinburgh and London. Price 5s. net. Atherstone, Thursday (J.S.) Basingstoke, Monday, at 10 Bolton, Wednesday, at 9.30 Bromley, Thursday, at 9.30 Burton, Monday (R. By), at 11.30 Caistor, Saturday, at 10 2.30), at 9.30 Cirencester, Thursday (R. By at Clerkenwell, Tuesday, Wednesday, Coventry, Monday (R. By). at Dudley, Tuesday, Thursday, and Durham, Tuesday (R. By) Grays Thurrock, Wednesday, at 11 Huntingdon, Wednesday, at 10 Lewes, Tuesday Lichfield, Tuesday (J.S.) Llanelly, Monday and Tuesday Newton Abbot, Friday, at 10.30 Ross, Saturday, at 10 Spalding, Wednesday, at 10 Stourbridge, Wednesday, at 10 Sunderland, Thursday (R. By) Swaffham, Tuesday, at 10 Tamworth, Monday (J.S.) Tonbridge, Monday, at 10 Torquay, Saturday, at 10.30 Tunbridge Wells, Wednesday, a 9.30 Tunstall, Wednesday, at 9.30 Whitehaven, Thursday, at 9.30 Wincanton, Wednesday (Reg.), st 11 Wisbech, Monday, at 10 Liverpool. Monday (By at 11), RECENT DECISION. GORSE v. SOUTH LANCASHIRE TRAMWAYS COMPANY. Negligence-Tramway-Satisfaction of Road Authority. IN the Leigh County Court, on the 19th April, His Honour Judge H. Y. Stanger, K.C., gave judgment in this case. It was a claim by the plaintiff for £100 damages. He alleged that on the 15th June 1911 he was walking over the highway at Atherton, Lancashire, when he fell over a cable manhole cover belonging to and erected by the defendants on the footpath. The plaintiff fell over the said cable manhole cover, as he alleged, in consequence of its defective condition arising through its projecting above the footpath, and the defective condition arose, in consequence of the negligence of the defendants (a) by structing the manhole and cover so as to project above the footpath, and (b) by allowing and permitting such manhole and cover to project above the footpath. In case liability was established, the damages were agreed at £100. con Merriman (instructed by Hall and Sons) appeared for plaintiff. Acton (instructed by Dootson, Leigh) for defendants. |