Mam his Lordship pointed out, George v. Skivington (ubi sup.) has been the constantly relied upon as establishing that a person who undertakes to do work under a contract with another contracting party men is bound to use due care in doing that work, and may be sued for red in the breach of that due by a person who is not a party to the he contract, provided that the defendant knew that the person was hich going to use the thing made. But it could not, in the opinion of pre the learned judge, be regarded as good law in so far as it laid s effe down that 'general proposition. The conclusion come to by the omed Divisional Court appears from the headnote to our report. And After their scrutinising disquisition on the position occupied by George v. Skivington (ubi sup.) in the books, enabling them to arrive at that conclusion, it is a case which should rank with those that ought to be relegated to obscurity.

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THE CONVEYANCER.

Following Assets.

Newstead and Blake v. Gale turned on the special circumstances in each case. In the former the conduct of the mortgagees altered the rights and the position of the legatees, and in the latter the conduct of the mortgagees amounted to an equitable release of the personal estate in the hands of the legatees. MISCELLANEOUS PRECEDENTS (continued). Disentailing Assurance of Freeholds (a Special Form). THIS INDENTURE made the day of 191 BETWEEN in the county of of the first part C. B. in the county of of the second part E. B. of of the third part G. B. of of the fourth part and X. Y. of the fifth part.

A. B. of of

of

in the county of

in the county of

in the county of

WHEREAS under an indenture of settlement (hereinafter called the "principal settlement") dated the

day of

188 and made between I. B. (since deceased) of the one part and K. B. M. B. and C. S. of the other part and under the trusts therein contained called the "X. settlements" and of a deed poll of appointment dated the day of 189 under the hand and seal of N. B. Ithe late husband of the said A. B. the said E. B. as one of the four children of the late W. B. in the principal settlement named is equitable tenant in tail in reversion or remainder expectant on the death of the said A. B. of one equal undivided part or share of the messuages and hereditaments hereinafter described (subject to certain annuities payable out of the rents and profits of the entirety of the said messuages and hereditaments to O. B. and the said C. B. during their respective lives as in the principal settlement mentioned and subject to the charges mentioned in the schedule hereto so far as the same affect the said hereditaments or any part thereof or any undivided shares or share thereof respectively).

AND WHEREAS the said A. B. is protector of the settlement created by the principal settlement and the X. settlements.

AND WHEREAS under the principal settlement and the trusts therein contained called the "Y. settlements" the said E. B. as one of the said four children is equitable tenant in tail in reversion or remainder expectant on the death of the said C. B. (now aged years or thereabouts) without issue (subject to her power to appoint a life interest in favour of any husband of hers) of one equal undivided part or share of the said messuages and hereditaments (subject to the said annuities payable as aforesaid and to the said charges so far as the same affect the said hereditaments or any part thereof or any undivided shares or share thereof respectively).

AND WHEREAS the said C. B. is protector of the settlement created by the principal settlement and the Y. settlements.

AND WHEREAS in certain events and contingencies the said E. B. may become entitled to an equitable estate tail in certain other undivided shares or share of the two shares of

the said messuages and hereditaments comprised in the said X. settlements and Y. settlements respectively subject as aforesaid.

THE recent decision of Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady in Re Eustice; Lee v. McMillan (132 L. T. Jour. 468; (1912) 1 Ch. 561) serves to remind practitioners that the remedy of a creditor by following the assets of his debtor is not so hopeless or difficult as it is sometimes considered to be. In that case a man mortgaged a freehold house in 1882, and in Aug. 1897 he sold and conveyed the equity of redemption to the defendant McMillan and died very shortly afterwards, having by his will appointed the defendant McMillan (and another person who renounced) his executors, and having devised and bequeathed his residuary real and personal estate to them upon trust for sale and payment of his debts, funeral, and testamentary expenses, and to hold the surplus in trust for his wife for life, with remainder to certain persons, including the defendants McMillan and Eustice. The mortgagee was aware of such conveyance and death, but, as he received his interest regularly from the purchaser, he took no steps to realise This security, or to enforce the mortgagor's covenant. In 1910 the purchaser of the equity of redemption made default, and the security proved deficient. In the meantime the mortgagor's estate had long since been distributed. And it was held that the mortgagee was entitled to follow the mortgagor's assets for any deficiency in the security. As pointed out by the learned judge, it had already been decided in Ridgway v. Newstead (4 L. T. Rep. 6; 3 De G. F. & J. 474) that delay alone is not sufficient to prevent the creditor from asserting his rights, and, as stated by Lord Justice Cotton in Blake v. Gale (55 L. T. Rep. 234; 32 Ch. Div. 578), there must be to produce that effect changes of position in the legatees during that period, or other circumstances which make it inequitable to allow him to do so. As is frequently the case, the law on the subject was fully discussed and considered in the Irish case of Leahy v. De Moleyns (1896, 1 I. R. 206), where relief (was granted twenty-nine years after the death of the mortgagor. Without going fully into the facts of the case, it may be stated that there a testator in 1885 mortgaged freehold lands of which he was absolute owner, and also his life estate in other. freeholds, to secure £3109 advanced by the mortgagees and interest, the mortgagees being trustees ofja marriage settlement. The testator died in 1862, having by his will devised the mortgaged lands to his son A. for life, with remainder to his first and other sons in tail male, and he devised other freeholds to his son B. in like manner, and bequeathed his residuary personal estate to his executors upon trust for his daughters. Interest was paid by the devisee of the mortgaged land down to 1886, when it fell into arrear, and a receiver was appointed. In 1891 the mortgagee commenced an action to administer the real and personal estate of the mortgagor, and claimed the right to follow the assets in the hands of the surviving executor as trustee for the residuary legatees, or which had been paid by him to them. No interest had been paid except by the devisee. And it was held by the Irish Court of Appeal that the Statute of Limitations did not apply, and that there were no special circumstances or conduct on the part of the plaintiffs to disentitle them to follow the assets. As pointed out by the Lord Chancellor, the decisions in the cases of Ridgway v.

AND WHEREAS under the principal settlement and the trusts therein contained called the Z. settlements the said G. B. as one of the two surviving children of S. B. is tenant in tail in possession of one equal undivided part or share of the said messuages and hereditaments (subject to the said annuities and to the said charges so far as the same respectively affect the said hereditaments or the said undivided part or share thereof).

AND WHEREAS under the principal settlement and the Y settlements and the Z. settlements the said G. B. is equitable tenant in tail in reversion or remainder expectant on the death of the said C. B. without issue and subject to her said power to appoint a life interest as aforesaid to one equal undivided part or share of the said messuages and hereditaments subject to the said annuities and to the said charges so far as the same affect the said hereditaments or any part thereof or the said undivided part or share thereof.

AND WHEREAS in certain events and contingencies the said G. B. may become entitled to an equitable estate tail in certain other undivided shares or share of the two shares of the

said messuages and hereditaments comprised in the X. settlements and the Y. settlements respectively subject as aforesaid.

AND WHEREAS the said E. B. and G. B. with the concurrence of the said A.B.and C.B.as protectors respectively of the said respective settlements are desirous of barring all their said estates tail whether equitable or legal and whether in possession reversion remainder or otherwise in the messuages and hereditaments hereinafter described or referred to and of assuring their said respective shares whether in possession remainder reversion or otherwise in the same messuages and hereditaments in manner hereinafter expressed.

NOW THIS INDENTURE WITNESSETH AS FOLLOWS:

1. In consideration of the premises the said E. B. with the consent (hereby testified) of the said parties hereto of the first

in the county of

and second parts respectively as protectors of the said respective settlements hereby grants and disposes of unto the said X. Y. and his heirs ALL that one equal undivided part or share of him the said E. B. to which he is entitled in reversion or remainder expectant on the death of the said A. B. as aforesaid and subject as aforesaid of and in the messuages and hereditaments hereinafter described AND ALSO all that one equal undivided part or share to which he is entitled in reversion or remainder expectant as aforesaid and subject as aforesaid of and in the same messuages and hereditaments AND ALSO all the other undivided parts or shares to which the said E. B. is now or may in any event become entitled of and in the two shares comprised in the said X. settlements and Y. settlements of and in ALL and singular the messuages and hereditaments situate in the parishes of and comprised in or assured by the principal settlement or which are now by any means subject to the subsisting uses or trusts thereof respectively and all other (if any) freehold hereditaments or undivided parts or shares (except the share comprised in the trusts in the principal settlement referred to as the Ž. settlements) of freehold hereditaments of which the said E. B. is now by any means tenant in tail at law or in equity and whether in possession reversion remainder or otherwise under or by virtue of the principal settlement or any of the settlements therein contained (except the Z. settlements) or otherwise TO HOLD the same unto the said X. Y. and his heirs (subject to the annuities and charges herein before mentioned so far as the same affect the same premises respectively and to the estates uses and trusts prior to and to the powers (if any) over-reaching the estates tail of the said E. B. at law or in equity or any of them but discharged from all estates tail of the said E. B. at law and in equity and all estates rights interests and powers to take effect after the determination or in defeasance of such estates tail) to the use of the said E. B. his heirs and assigns for ever.

2. In consideration of the premises the said G. B. with the consent (hereby testified) of the said parties hereto of the first and second parts respectively as protectors of the said respective settlements hereby grants and disposes of unto the said X. Y. and his heirs ALL that one equal undivided part or share of him the said G. B. to which he is entitled in possession as aforesaid and subject as aforesaid of and in the messuages and hereditaments hereinafter described AND ALSO all that one equal undivided

two

part or share of him the said G. B. to which he is entitled in reversion or remainder expectant as aforesaid and subject as aforesaid of and in the same messuages and hereditaments AND ALSO all the other undivided parts or shares to which the said G. B. is now and may in any event become entitled of and in the shares comprised in the X. settlements and the Y. settlements of and in ALL and singular the messuages and hereditaments situate in the parishes and in the county of comprised in or assured by the principal settlement or which are now by any means subject to the subsisting uses or trusts thereof respectively and all other (if any) freehold hereditaments or undivided parts or shares (except the one share comprised in the Z. settlement) of freehold hereditaments of which the said G. B. is now by any means tenant in tail at law or in equity and whether in possession reversion remainder or otherwise under or by virtue of the principal settlement or any of the settlements therein contained (except the Z. settlement) or otherwise TO HOLD the same unto the said X. Y. and his heirs (subject to the annuities and charges hereinbefore mentioned so far as the same affect the same premises respectively and to the estates uses and trusts prior to and to the powers (if any) over-reaching the estate tail of the said G. B. at law and in equity or any of them but discharged from all estates tail of the said G. B. at law and in equity and all estates right interest and powers to take effect after the determination or in defeasance of such estates tail) to the use of the said G. B. his heirs and assigns for ever.

IN WITNESS &C.

[Schedule.]

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SANITARY ASSURANCE.-Before renting or purchasing a house it is advisable to obtain an independent report on the condition of the Drains, Sanitary Fittings, and Water Supply. Moderate fees for Sanitary Inspections on application to the Sanitary Engineering Company, 115, Victoria-street, Westminster. 'Phone, 4316 Victoria. Sanitation," London.-[ADVT.]

་་

This was a summons to vary a taxing master's certificate. The facts were as follows: In 1909 the client, being in need of money, instructed his solicitor to apply to a bank for a loan of £3000, to be secured by the deposit of a memorandum of charge upon certain property belonging to him. The solicitor applied to a bank, who made it a condition for the advance that the solicitor should on their behalf investigate and advise them that the title was one upon which they could properly adva the £3000, and that the solicitor should himself give a guarante for the repayment of that sum when lent. The solicitor gave the guarantee and also advised the bank as to title, and carried the transaction through on behalf of the bank and his client in the following way: the deeds were deposited, a memorandum of charge was executed, and nothing remained to be done except the advance of £3000. The client suggested that there was no need to advance the whole sum at once, which would saddle him with interest and bankers charges on the whole amount, but that it should be advanced as and when required. In accordance with this suggestion the bank, instead of crediting the whole amount to the joint account, opened a joint account and allowed the client to draw on it. From the 18th Nov. 1909, when the memorandum was executed, to the 8th Feb. 1910 the whole sum, with the excep tion of 11s. 11d., was advanced. The form which the security took was not a charge of any definite amount, but followed the usual practice of bankers, and was for any sum which might from time to time be due. The client now contended that the transaction so carried out was not within the scale fee allowed by the Solicitors' Remuneration Act 1881, and this contention was upheld by the taxing master. The solicitor applied to vary the taxing master's certificate.

Held, having reviewed all the circumstances of the case, that the scale fee was applicable; that the transaction was a mort gage and a completed mortgage within the rule; and that the master's certificate must be varied.

[Re H. T. Baker, a Solicitor Ch. Div.: Parker, J. May Counsel: Ward Coldridge; R. M. Pattisson. Solicitors: G.W. Grice Hutchinson; Crossfield, Cushing, and Wheldon.]

KING'S BENCH DIVISION, IN BANKRUPTCY. Bankruptcy-Assigned Action-Writ of fi. fa.-Seizure by Sheriff -Interpleader Summons-Order for Sale-Act of Bankruptcy -"Goods held by Sheriff for Twenty-one Days"-Bankruptcy of Judgment Debtor-Title of Trustee to Proceeds of Sale-Bankruptcy Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 71), s. 1-Order LVII, rr. 7, 8, 12.

On the 18th May 1911 the sheriff seized the goods of a judgment debtor under a writ of fi. fa. for £124 17s. 5d. and costs, issued by B.'s Library Limited, the judgment creditors. M. and Co. having claimed a lien on the goods for £70, the sheriff took out an interpleader summons on the 9th June. On the 12th June the interpleader summons, which was of the usual kind, was heard, and M. and Co.'s claim was admitted; and by consent the sheriff was ordered to sell and out of the proceeds to pay £70 to M. and Co. and to retain his costs of the execution. On the 13th June the sale by the sheriff took place, and, after the deduction of his costs and payment of £70 to M. and Co., the balance of £109 16s. 10d. was handed over by the sheriff to B.'s Library Limited, the judgment creditors, on the 5th July. Meanwhile another creditor had on the 29th June presented a bankruptcy petition against the judgment debtor, alleging as an act of bankruptcy the seizure and sale by the sheriff; and on this petition a receiving order was made on the 23rd Oct. and the debtor was subsequently adjudicated bankrupt. The trustee in bankruptcy proceeded to bring an action against B.'s Library Limited for the return of the balance of £109 16s. 10d., paid by the sheriff on the 5th July, on the ground that the fact of the sheriff having been in possession of the goods for twenty-one days on the 10th June constituted an act of bankruptcy. For the plaintiff it was contended that the proviso in sect. 1 of the Act of 1890," where an interpleader summons has been taken out in regard to the goods seized, the time elapsing between

over to them

Idate at which the sheriff is ordered to withdraw, or any interpleader issue ordered thereon is finally disposed of, shall not be taken into account in calculating such period af

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twenty-one days," did not apply because no interpleader issue was ordered; and that therefore the period of twenty-one days expired on the 21st June. But if the proviso was applicable, the interval between the date of the summons and the date of the order was two days, and the twenty-one days expired on the 12th June, and the act of bankruptcy was complete before the sale by the sheriff on the 13th June. For the defendants it was argued that the proviso must be construed liberally, and the whole period of the interpleader proceedings-which from the date of issue to the date of hearing of the summons amounted to four days-must be deducted, and therefore the sale on the 13th June occurred before the expiry of the twenty-one days.

Held, that the claim of the trustee to the £109 16s. 10d. failed. The proviso was meant to protect the judgment creditor during the time that the matter was taken out of his control, and was not limited to cases of an order directing the sheriff to withraw or of an order directing an interpleader issue. The whole period occupied by the interpleader proceedings, until the issue raised was finally disposed of, had to be taken into consideration in computing the period of twentyone days, and that period did not expire until the day after the sale by the sheriff took place.

[Mason (Trustee of Chetwynd, a Bankrupt) v. Bolton's Library Limited. K. B. Div. in Bank.: Phillimore, J. May 10.Counsel: Clayton, K.C. and R. J. Willis; E. W. Hansell and Douglas Hogg. Solicitors: G. Castle; Tackley and Fall.]

PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. Summary Jurisdiction (Married Women) Act 1895-Licensing Act 1902, 8. 5 (2)-Habitual Drunkards Act 1879-Order of Justices-Wife's Appeal.

Appeal by a wife from an order of the justices for Colchester made on the application of the husband, R. C. T., who alleged that she was a habitual drunkard as defined by sect. 5 of the Habitual Drunkards Act 1879, whereby it was adjudged that the husband was no longer bound to cohabit with his wife, that the legal custody of the child of the marriage be committed to the husband, and that the husband should pay his wife the weekly sum of £2. The grounds of appeal (inter alia) were that there was no evidence that the wife, A. M. T., was a habitual drunkard as defined by sect. 3 of the Habitual Drunkards Act 1879, and that the order dated the 17th Oct. 1911 was bad on the face of it inasmuch as it contained no finding of any fact sufficient to warrant the justices in making the order. Sect. 3 of the Act of 1879 defines habitual drunkard" as a person who, not being amenable to any jurisdiction in lunacy, is notwithstanding, by reason of habitual intemperate drinking of intoxicating liquor, at times dangerous to himself or herself or to others, or incapable of managing himself or herself, and his or her affairs." It was contended on behalf of the wife that, though she might have been intoxicated on a few occasions and when sober might have used violence, such conduct did not bring her within the definition. On behalf of the husband it was submitted that the order of the justices was right.

66

Held, that, though the wife might be habitually intemperate, the evidence went to show that the acts of violence on her part were not committed while intoxicated, and that there was no evidence to connect the latter with the intemperance which was necessary in order to bring the case within the definition. Appeal allowed, and the order of the justices discharged.

[Tayler v. Tayler. P. Div.: Sir S. T. Evans, P. and Bargrave Deane, J. June 4.-Counsel: A. H. Poyser; Barnard, K.C. and C. E. Jones. Solicitors: Birkett, Ridley, and Francis, Ipswich; Leighton and Pretty, Ipswich.]

and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancery-lane. Price 18s. Notable English Trials: The Annesley Case. William Hodge and Co., Edinburgh and London. Price 5s. net. Butterworths' Workmen's Compensation Cases. Vol. 5, Part 2, 1912. Butterworth and Co., Bell-yard, Temple Bar. Price 78. 6d. net.

Ameer Ali on the Legal Position of Women in Islâm. Hodder and Stoughton, Warwick-square, E.C. Price 18. 6d. net.

Higgins on War and the Private Citizen. P. S. King and Son, Orchard House, Westminster. Price 5s. net.

American Law Review. May-June. Reeves and Turner.
Third Sheet.

COUNTY COURTS.

SITTINGS OF THE COURTS.

FOR THE WEEK ENDING Saturday, June 15.

at 10

Tuesday,

Thursday,

10

Llangollen, Monday Loughborough,* Tupday, at 9.30

*

* Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary.

Jurisdiction of the Registrar.

IN reference to the jurisdiction of a County Court registrar to hear and determine a disputed claim, a point of some interest was decided in the case of Rosin v. Joseph Rank Limited (noted ante, p. 81). The Divisional Court there held that, in respect of a case tried by the registrar under sect. 92 of the County Courts Act 1888, the County Court judge can entertain an application for a new trial by virtue of sect. 93 of the same Act. The words of the latter section are so wide, giving, as they do, power to grant a new trial "in every case whatever," that it would seem impossible to limit them only to cases tried by the judge himself, although this contention had been successful in the County Court. The words of sect. 92 which confer this jurisdiction to try cases on the registrar are as follow: "Subject to rules and orders under this Act, a registrar may, on the application of the parties and by leave of the judge, hear and determine any disputed claim where the sum claimed or the amount involved does not exceed two pounds." The only rules dealing with the exercise of this jurisdiction are rules 24 and 25 of Order XXII., which, shortly, allow the leave to be either general or special, and require the registrar to ask the parties if they desire to have the case tried by him or the judge. The rule relating to the leave is peculiar, for it involves a want of uniformity in practice, in some cases the registrar being allowed to try all such disputed claims, in others the registrar being allowed to try none such, while in others the judge's consent is asked for in any specific case where convenient or necessary. It will be remembered that in the new County Courts Bill it is proposed to increase this permissive jurisdiction so as to include disputed claims up to £5, and, although this increase has been opposed in some quarters, it appears to be safeguarded by the effect of the decision above referred to, and by the consent of the parties being made a sine quâ non. That the court is careful to construe these questions of official jurisdiction strictly was shown in the case of McInally v. Blackledge (104 L. T. Rep. 642; (1911) 2 K. B. 432), where, notwithstanding the consent of the parties, it was held that the judge has no power to make the registrar his deputy apart from the provisions of sect. 92, and that a judg ment given by a registrar purporting to sit in such a capacity could not be the subject of an appeal. Although the Act as illustrated by these two cases shows that the jurisdiction of the registrar to try disputed claims is confined within a somewhat narrow compass, it must be remembered that under sect. 104 the parties are perfectly at liberty to refer the whole matter to him as arbitrator, and under that section his award can be entered up as a judgment in the action, and is as binding and effectual as if it has been given by the judge.

RECENT DECISION.

BRADBURY AND Co. v. GREAT NORTHERN AND GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAYS JOINT COMMITTEE.

Railway Company-Consignor of Goods-Request to put on Rail— No Place of Consignment given-Future Directions-Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 20), s. 98.

A railway company is under no obligation to receive goods on rail unless the place of consignment is given them at the time by the sender.

THIS action was tried on the 30th May before His Honour Judge Sir Sherston Baker, sitting at the Sleaford County Court of Lincolnshire. Messrs. Bradbury and Co., corn and hay dealers, of Peterborough, had for some time been in the habit, in common with other dealers, of sending produce to a railway station to be put on rail, subsequently sending instructions as to where the same was to be conveyed. This they did under a written agreement with the defendants. On the 22nd Feb. the defendants put an end to the agreement. On the 24th Feb. the plaintiffs nevertheless sent a consignment of seeds to Scopwick Station to be put on rail. The stationmaster there, acting under the instructions of the defendants, refused to put the seeds on rail without a note stating whither they were to be carried. The plaintiffs therefore had the trouble and expense of carrying the seeds back again. This they estimated at a loss of 58. to them, and sued the defendants for the game. It was admitted on both sides that this was a test case.

Dyer for the plaintiffs.-The defendants ought to have received the goods. They are common carriers, and their duty is to receive all goods of which they make a public profession to

carry.

66

Bruce Thomas for the defendants.-A common carrier has a right to know whither he is to take goods brought to him. Holt, C.J. in Lane v. Cotton (1 Ld. Raymond's Reports, 646, at p. 652) says: So a common carrier may refuse to admit goods into his warehouse before he is ready to take his journey." Moreover, sect. 98 of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 20) enacts that "every person being the owner or having the care of any carriage or goods passing or being upon the railway shall, on demand, give to the collector of tolls at the places where he attends for the purpose of receiving goods or of collecting tolls for the part of the railway on which such carriage or goods may have travelled, or be about to travel, a exact account in writing. at what point the same a intended to be unloaded or taken off the railway." The def dants were justified in refusing to accept the goods with notice of the place to which they were to be sent.

Dyer in reply.-The above section applies only to goods which are already in transit.

His HONOUR.-It is not necessary for me to determine whether the above section applies to this case or not. I am inclined to think it does. But I have no doubt that at common law, railway ompanies, as common carriers, are under no obligation whatsoever to receive goods unless they are informed whither the consignor desires them to be sent. Common carriers are bound, as is well known, to carry safely all those goods which they publicly profess to carry, unless they be prevented by the act of God, the King's enemies, or natural deterioration of the goods. But they are under no obligation to receive goods and load their stations with them for an indefinite period awaiting an order of the consignor whither to convey them, an order which may come soon, or may come late. I find for the defendants.

Recognisances upon Appeal.

A POINT of considerable importance to practitioners was decided by the Divisional Court this week in Re Denman; Ex parte Grafton Club. Certain persons who had been convicted by a metropolitan police magistrate of an offence in connection with the sale of wines and spirits upon unlicensed premises decided to appeal to quarter sessions against the finding of the magistrate. The date of the conviction was the 21st May, and the appellants gave notice of appeal on the 25th May. By arrangement between the parties, the 29th May was the date fixed for the appellants to enter into their recognisances to prosecute the appeal. On the last-named date the parties attended before the magistrate in accordance with the arrangement, but he refused to take the recognisances of the appellants on the ground that they were out of time. The Divisional Court refused to grant a rule for a mandamus directing the magistrate to enter the recognisances of the appel lants. The Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879 governs the procedure upon appeals to quarter sessions from courts of summary jurisdiction. Sub-sect. 2 of sect. 31 of that Act provides that the appellant shall within seven days after the day on which the said decision of the court was given, give notice of appeal by serving on the other party and on the clerk of the said court of summary jurisdiction notice in writing of his intention to appeal and of the general grounds of such appeal." Subsect. 3 enacts that "the appellant shall days after the day on which he gave notice of appeal, enter into a recognisance before a court of summary jurisdiction with or without a surety or sureties, as that court may direct, conditioned to appear at the said sessions and to try such appeal, and to abide the judgment of the Court of Appeal thereon, and to pay such costs as may be awarded by the Court of Appeal. It will be observed that those sub-sections definitely fix the time within which the notice of appeal must be served and the

66

within three

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being

recognisances entered into respectively, and do not allow such time to be extended at the discretion of the court. The court of summary jurisdiction which enters the recognisances of the appellant has no jurisdiction to htt decide whether the Act has been complied with (Reg. v. Wiltshire Justices, 24 Sol. Jo. 914), although, as the Divisional Court has held, it can refuse to enter such recognisances if the notice of appeal has been served more than three days. These two decisions seem somewhat conflicting at first sight, and, if the decision in the case of the Wiltshire justices be correct, it is somewhat difficult to understand why the magistrate could refuse to take the appellants' recognisances on the ground that they were out of time, for such refusal would appear to ot involve a decision by the magistrate that sub-sect. 3 had not been complied with. The only ground upon which the decision of the Divisional Court can be distinguished is that the court would not compel by mandamus the magistrate to perform a good purely ministerial act in a case where a condition precedent to the right of the appellants to be heard at quarter sessions had not been complied with.

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Registration of Moneylenders.

is digestion. Taking the 250 subjects, the Doctors MacAuliffe found that 121 of them responded to the muscular, those which the Parisian public roughly designate under the name of costeau; forty-nine to the type musculo digestif; twenty-six undefined; twenty-one to the type musculo respiratoire; six to the type cérébro musculaire; six to the type cérébro digestif; four to the type digestif; three to the type respiratoire; two to the type cérébro respiratoire; and two to the type cérébral. The asymmetries are frequent. In the 250 cases under review, sixty-three showed a predominance of the right (hand) and a predominance of the left (hand) forty-eight times. En résumé: (1) the assassin is recruited from the type m usculaire; (2) a great number of assassins undergo a developpement massif during the period of growth; (3) a great number of assassins offer a mixture of the type musculaire and of the type digestif.

LEGISLATION.

Trade Unions (No. 2).

THIS measure has been chiefly commented upon in its aspect as legislation designed to modify the "Osborne" judgment. The first two clauses are somewhat more general than clause 3 et seq., which expressly deals with the restrictions placed on the application of trade union funds for certain political purposes. The first clause seeks to amend the law as to the objects and powers of trade unions. It is laid down that a combination is not to be other than a trade union for the purposes of the Acts of 1871 to 1906 by reason of the fact that it has under its constitution objects or powers, other than statutory objects under the new Bill, so long as the combination is a trade union according to the definition in the Bill. Subject to the special provisions, in reference to political objects, any trade union can apply its funds "for any lawful objects or purposes for the time being authorised under its constitution." The phrase "statutory objects" means those set out in the amending trade union legislation of 1876 (sect. 16)—namely, "the regulation of the relations between workmen and masters, or between workmen and workmen, or between masters and masters, or the imposing of restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or bus iness and also the provision of benefits to members."

A CONSIDERED decision recently given by a metropolitan stipendiary magistrate under sect. 2 (b) of the Moneylenders wh Act 1900 raises a point which many will hope to see authoritatively decided. Sect. 2 makes it an offence under the Act if a moneylender, as defined by the Act, does not comply with the provisions of that section. Sub-sect. (b) of sect. 2 enacts that such moneylender "shall carry on the moneylending business in his registered name, and in no other name, and under no other description, and at his registered address or addresses, and at no other address." A moneylender who had duly registered his name and address in accordance with the Act, was JU summoned for that "he carried on a moneylending business in a name other than his registered name," and that "he carried on such business at an address other than his registered address.' He had formed and was managing director of a limited company bearing a name other than his registered name, and held all the ne shares therein except one. It was contended on his behalf that, being only a shareholder in and managing director of such company, the moneylender had not committed any offence within the sub-section quoted. The learned magistrate did not accept this view and convicted him, holding that he formed the company merely for the purpose of hiding his identity, and so defeating bethe purpose for which the section in question was passed. The point raised by the case, as to whether a moneylender who thus trades under the cover of a limited liability company does himself carry on business at the address of such company within the purview of the Moneylenders Act 1900, is one of considerfable importance, and one in respect of which a decision of the High Court will be welcomed.

At a recent meeting of the French Academy of Sciences, M. Edmond Perrier communicated some of the features of an ammportant work by Drs. Leon and Marie MacAuliffe upon the Physionomie des assassins. They have been enabled, through the Courtesy of the service anthropométrique of the Prefecture of Police, to study the metric photographs of 250 individuals condemned for murder, and the conclusions of the doctors not without interest. Some of the criminals possess rectangular faces, while others are lozenge-shaped. Another category is pyramidical, and some have faces en toupie, presumably in the form of a spinning top. As there are some technical expressions used in the classifications of the Doctors MacAuliffe, it may be observed that it is inexact to describe human morphology as a new science as was done by a lay contemporary recently in dealing with these subjects. The doctors divide their subjects into four types-the cerebral, the muscular, the respiratory, and the digestive. The cerebral are those who find their energy in visual or sonorous excitements; those who are indifferent to the joys that stimulate the digestive, and care for neither movement, the table, nor adventure. The muscular are those who find health and happiness in great exertion. The respiratory subject gets his sustenance from the air, while the digestive is one who finds his sustenance in solid food. The term was applied by Oken to sundry low organisations, whose chief or only obvious physiological activity

HAVING thus defined "statutory objects," the Bill explains what is meant by a "trade union" by the statement that the any combination, whether temporary or permanent, the principal objects of which are under its constitution statutory objects, provided that any combination which is for the time being registered as a trade union shall be deemed to be a trade union as defined by this [Bill] so long as it continues to be so registered." This obviously throws a heavy responsibility on the registration authorities, and a subsequent sub-clause requires the Registrar of Friendly Societies to register only on being satisfied that the principal objects are statutory, and he can withdraw his certificate if a constitution is altered contrary to these requirements, or if, in his opinion, a trade union is no longer being carried on as such in good faith. There is given a right of appeal against his decision to "any person aggrieved" by appeal to the High Court on conditions to be laid down by rules of court.

Compulsory Characters.

THE Bill which seeks to make it compulsory to give a character note to servants leaving an employer's service is one which has been brought to the attention of Parliament in previous sessions. It is intended to operate whether the service is terminated by dismissal or otherwise, and the certificate which the servant is to demand is to be in writing and to speak for his or her general conduct and competence." Moreover, it is proposed that a servant is to be given an exact copy of a testimonial or character note" relating to him which the employer may send to any other employer. A further clause imposes a penalty on an employer who refuses to give a character note, and who wilfully and maliciously makes false statements respecting the servant's character or competence. There is much reason for thinking that these proposals would be detrimental to the interests of employés, and that one