certain limits (except, of course, in cases where the death sentence is the only legal sentence), to the discretion of the judge or other person who presides over the tribunal by which the prisoner is tried. In order to exercise this discretion, it has therefore been customary to take into consideration the career and the antecedents of the prisoner-to admit evidence both in mitigation and in aggravation of the sentence. The practice on this point has never been very definitely settled-that is to say, it has never been exhaustively argued or decided as to what matters the judge may or may not take into consideration. Evidence in aid of determining the appropriate punishment may in some cases be taken upon affidavit, although it is usual to take it vivâ voce: (Rex v. Cox, 4 C. & P. 540). In cases of felony the Court of King's Bench held that an affidavit was inadmissible to prove circumstances in aggravation of sentence: (Rex v. Ellis, 6 B. & C. 148). Such evidence must be adduced before the judgment of the court has been entered on the record, for after that has been done the court cannot alter its sentence or judgment.

THE CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1898. SINCE and even before the establishment of the Court of Criminal Appeal the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 has naturally been the subject of many decisions. These have mostly had relation to technical points arising on the construction of its different sections, but the Act itself has now been in force for a period of years sufficient to justify a short consideration of its general effect. Introduced and passed as an act of tardy justice to accused persons, it is extremely doubtful if on the whole it has been for their benefit, although the increased probability of conviction of guilty prisoners which experience would seem to attribute to it is a matter of possible congratulation from the point of view of the State. The reasons for this increased probability are in practice of some interest, and possibly were not or could not have been present to the minds of those who framed the Act.

In consonance with the great principles which call on the prosecution to prove a case beyond reasonable doubt and do not call compulsorily for an explanation from the accused, the Act made the evidence of the prisoner voluntary and forbade comment on his absence from the witness-box by the prosecution. For a year or two this was a real benefit, although it cut away the ancient plea under which counsel for the defence reminded the jury" that one person alone can give a truthful account of what has taken place and his mouth is closed." Given the latitude allowed to the defence in suggestion and argument on the facts, this plea was remarkably useful, although no statistics do or could exist as to the numbers of guilty men and women who were acquitted thereunder. Another consideration has now practically nullified the protection which the Act sought to afford. Since 1898, jurymen in large numbers have been summoned to try criminal cases. Some of them have been summoned twice or even thrice, and to them, if not to all the world, it is common knowledge that a prisoner can, if he so chooses, give evidence. It is probably within the experience of most members of the Bar practising in criminal courts to have heard a juryman at the close of a case ask why the prisoner did not go into the witness-box, and to have sympathised with the judge or chairman in the momentary difficulty of giving an answer which would not wholly remove any chance of acquittal.

These are matters which are not generally present to the mind of the undefended prisoner unless he be one who from many previous trials has learnt a bitter experience. In this connection occurs a criticism of the Act in that no form of caution is provided to be administered to the prisoner when the somewhat momentous choice of himself giving evidence or not is to be made. It has been left for the Court of Criminal Appeal to decide that he ought to be distinctly told that he has a right to give evidence. Experience again tells us that this telling is seldom distinct in the sense of being comprehensible by an uneducated prisoner; that the election to which he is entitled is seldom clearly explained to him; that sometimes he is warned of possible crossexamination by the prosecution and sometimes not; while it must be admitted that the mention of cross-examination without

further explanation conveys little or nothing to most prisoners. This want of uniformity is only natural where no specific caution is provided, but its possibility to work injustice is quite sufficiently shown to justify the introduction of some form analogous to those used in the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, which would, in as simple language as possible, explain his position to the prisoner.

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Let us assume that the prisoner has, without in the least realising the consequences, elected to give evidence on his own behalf. Subject to certain protections afforded by the Act, he is liable to cross-examination. Whether such cross-examination be fairly conducted or not, the average prisoner seldom makes a good impression on the jury during this process. The word "average" is advisedly used since it requires more than average ability in a prisoner, placed as he is in a position of extreme anxiety, to face even a moderately skilful cross-examination. In fact, the deplorable but not uncommon practice of putting the evidence of the different witnesses for the prosecution to the prisoner, obtaining doubtful admissions from him that they are liars, and then asking him whether he can suggest any motive for their making untruthful statements, usually reduces him to silence or evokes an exasperated attack charging the prosecution, and particularly the police, with conspiracy. Quite apart from any question as to whether such answers involve imputations on the prosecution, it is from experience obvious that his attitude often unnecessarily discredits his case or at times assists the prosecution to complete their case.

On the question of cross-examination to character the Act sought to be fair, but in one or two respects, which have not seldom been exemplified in actual cases, it has had an unfair result. A hypothetical but not improbable case will serve to illustrate one of these. A prisoner is of indifferent character with some previous convictions recorded against him which are not for offences of specifically the same nature as that with which he is charged. One of the witnesses for the prosecution is a person of indifferent character without actual convictions, but is so important a witness that it is vital for the defence to test his credibility. Cross-examination involving an attack on the character of this witness will naturally open a similar attack on the prisoner. Scarcely a jury exists which would not be prejudiced by details of the prisoner's previous convictions or would not allow the same to turn the scale in a case of doubt, and careful directions as to irrelevance and cautions as to the weight of such disclosures would be powerless to avoid this effect. Some may object that it is only fair on a question of credibility that this rough balance should be struck, but in such a case the scale is against the prisoner. In fact, some discretion in the matter might have been left to the judge or chairman.

One great blot on this part of the Act exists, which it is almost impossible to explain away. In the case of a prisoner of indifferent character, the witnesses for the prosecution are protected from attack in the sense that except for a very good reason it is bad policy for the defence to make imputations against their character. No similar protection is afforded to witnesses for the defence, who after the close of the prosecution, when retaliation is impossible, may be attacked mercilessly. It sometimes happens that the past history of witnesses on both sides will not bear too close a scrutiny, and in such a case the prisoner or his counsel is put in the dilemma of deciding whether his character shall or shall not be put in issue, with the knowledge that, whichever course is decided upon, his own witnesses will probably be discredited in the eyes of the jury. Jurymen are only human, and few of them can put away the impression that previous convictions, even for totally different offences, make for the probability that the prisoner is guilty of the offence charged.

The foregoing remarks and criticisms have omitted one consideration of importance. The possibility of a really innocent man being able to give evidence on his own behalf is undoubtedly, notwithstanding the dangers of cross-examination, of real benefit to him. It is also a consolation to think that of the total number of prisoners committed for trial a very small percentage are innocent. E. H. T. A.

The scene at the assizes in Monmouth on the 22nd inst., which Mr. Justice Phillimore, the presiding judge, declared to be without a precedent in his experience, where a prisoner on being

sentenced on conviction for perjury to three years' penal servitude savagely assaulted a young woman as he was leaving the dock, will call attention to the common law punishment still in existence for a crime of this character. Striking or other outrage in the superior courts of justice or at the assizes is highly penal. Indeed, by the ancient common law before the Conquest, striking in the King's courts of justice or drawing a sword therein was a capital felony, and our modern law retained so much of the ancient severity as the loss of the offending limb. Striking in the superior courts or at the assizes, whether blood be drawn or not, or assaulting a judge sitting in court by drawing a weapon, even without any blow struck, is punishable with the loss of the right hand and imprisonment for life, as Mr. Justice Gibson a short time ago at the Cork Assizes took occasion to observe when one of the parties in a case at hearing before him struck a witness in court: (see Blackstone's Commentaries, iv., pp. 310-311). Striking in the King's actual presence, as distinguished from striking in his presence as represented by judges, was not punishable so severely, for this offence was not punishable with the loss of hand unless some blood was drawn. The solemn execution of this sentence is prescribed at length by a statute of Henry VIII. (33 Hen. 8, c. 12), but by a statute of George IV. (9 Geo. 4, c. 31) the part of this Act by which this mutilation was inflicted is repealed. The offence of striking in a court of justice recalls a very sensational incident in the State trials. In May 1798, Arthur O'Connor, a leader in the United Irish movement, who had been arrested at Margate on his way to France, was tried at Maidstone on a charge of high treason and was acquitted. The scene that followed is thus described by the late Right Hon. James Whiteside, who was Lord Chief Justice of Ireland: "Arthur O'Connor had a numerous assembly of friends in the court-house, and they, being apprehensive he would be arrested again, made arrangements to hustle him out of court in order that he might escape. Being an athletic, supple man, after the verdict of not guilty he bounded over the dock, the lights were extinguished, and in the darkness and confusion there was a scuffle and conflict. The officers of the law prevailed, crushed the tumult, and O'Connor was again thrust into the dock. The judge, who had left the Bench, returned and assured Mr. O'Connor that he had acted improperly, and that he could not discharge himself, but must be discharged by the court.” Two of the defendants who were prosecuted by an information filed by the AttorneyGeneral for this riot were found guilty generally. first three counts charged that the defendants (inter alia) did riotously make an assault on one J. R., and did then and there beat, bruise, and wound the said J. R. in the presence of the commissioners. When the defendants were brought up for justice, Lord Kenyon expressed doubts whether upon this information the court was not bound to pronounce the judgment of amputation of the right hand, &c., as required in a prosecution expressly for striking in a court of justice. In consequence of these doubts the Attorney-General entered a nolle prosequi upon the first three counts, and the court pronounced judgment of fine and imprisonment as for a common riot: (see R. v. Lord Thanet and others, 27 State Trials, p. 822).

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LEGISLATION.

Electoral Reform in the Past.

WHAT may be the ultimate fate of the new Franchise and Registration Bill it is not easy to determine, but, at any rate, it is impossible to peruse its fourth schedule without gaining a compendious insight into some very stormy periods of national history. After all the legislative efforts to bring some sort of simplicity into the law, it is remarkable that the new Bill will, if passed as it stands, begin in its repealing powers to affect measures passed in the time of Henry VI. Including that Act, there are nearly eighty Acts, coming down to the year 1908, which will be in a greater or lesser degree repealed. Not only has Parliament got upon its records this great accumulation of electoral law, but there are to be found, in addition, considerable numbers of motions, resolutions, and Bills which have failed to ripen into statutory shape. The Bill of 1831 was defeated in the Lords, and a temporary defeat in the Lords over the Act of 1832 led to the resignation of the Ministry, a national crisis, and the resumption of office with a power to create peers as an ultimate resort. Reform was again undertaken in 1854, but the Russian War caused its withdrawal. Again in 1859, 1860, 1864, 1865, and 1866 there were abortive efforts. In 1867 there was a successful struggle,

The

and, after considerable compromises, there was passed the Act which profoundly modified the law relating to representation in the year 1884, and redistribution followed in 1885. In 1905 further efforts of a fruitless nature were made on the subject of redistribution with a view to lessening the number of Irish seats. The New Bill.

THE Parliamentary franchise is by clause 1 given to every male who is entitled to be registered, if qualified for registration, and while registered he can vote in his constituency, "but a person shall not be registered or vote for more than one constituency." Qualification entails a residence or occupation of land or premises in a constituency for a continuous period of at least six months. The local government franchise forms the subject of the second clause as read in connection with the first schedule. Voters are not to be able to vote in more than one ward of the same borough and in more than one division of the same county. A woman in England is not to be entitled to registration or to vote at a local government election by virtue of the ownership of land or occupation as a lodger, but she is not disqualified by marriage for registration or voting in local government matters, provided that a married woman is not to vote as a local government elector for the purpose of county council elections (other than the London County Council) or for the purposes of a municipal borough council, not including, however, the metropolitan borough councils. Furthermore, husbands and wives cannot both be registered or vote in respect of the same property. Subject to these provisions, the Bill contemplates that every person who has occupied land or premises, otherwise than as a lodger, for a continuous period of six months shall be eligible for a vote in local government elections, and every person who is an owner of land or an occupier as a lodger and has been an owner or lodger for a continuous period of six months is to be able to vote for all local government elections in his area except a county council (other than the London County Council) and a municipal borough council election (not including a metropolitan borough council). A continuous registration system for Parliamentary and local government electors is proposed, and a long and most complex schedule sets out a series of forty-one rules which it would be quite impossible to adequately compress into the limited space permissible.

Alternative and Successive Qualifications.

CLAUSE 4 deals with the crux of the subject-matter of these proposals. A person qualified for registration as a Parliamentary elector in more than one constituency, or in more than one ward or county division where the local government register is concerned, is not, while so qualified, to be entitled to be registered in one of those areas in succession to another until a period of six months has elapsed after an application to be so registered. A person registered in one constituency is to be entitled to continue to be so registered for six months after he has ceased to reside or occupy land or premises therein if he shows that he is residing or occupying land or premises in some other constituency for a less period than six months. Penalties are imposed in respect of plural voting. The remaining provisions comprise a removal of the disability attaching to a peer to be registered as a Parliamentary voter, and the disfranchisement of the universities or groups of universities. The first register to be made by virtue of these provisions is only to come into force at such later date as may be fixed by His Majesty in Council, and the existing register is to remain in force until then.

Unsubstantial Interest of Tenant for Life.

THE very great importance of the new Settled Land Bill will justify us in alluding to some more amendments of the existing law which have long been recognised as needed by practitioners. As it stands to-day, a tenant for life remains vested with statutory powers although he becomes a bankrupt, and unless there are some outside inducements, either the sentiment resulting from issue or the temptation of some bribe, the estate suffers because he no longer feels much interest in it. The Bill intends to get over this by providing that where the court is satisfied that a tenant for life, or a person clothed with his powers, has ceased to possess any substantial interest through

bankruptcy, assignment, incumbrance, or otherwise, and unreasonably refuses to exercise his powers, the court is able, on application by any interested person, to authorise the trustees of the settlement, or some other appointee, to exercise them instead, either generally or in particular instances. During the validity of such an order the tenant for life is debarred from exercising any of these powers. Persons dealing with the tenant for life are not affected by the order until it has been registered as a lis pendens.

Land Acquired by Purchase or Exchange.

SECT. 24 of the Act of 1882 enacts in sub-sect. 3 that copyholds or leaseholds acquired as above are to be vested in trustees on trusts as nearly as possible corresponding to those on which freehold land is to be conveyed according to the preceding subsection, and this is done to avoid difficulties. The sub-section, however, goes on to say that the beneficial interest in land held by a lease for years is not to vest absolutely in a person who by the settlement is made by purchase tenant in tail and who dies under twenty-one, "but shall, on the death of that person under that age, go as freehold land conveyed as aforesaid would go." This touches the case of tenants in tail by purchase, but not those by descent. The Bill substitutes for the words "but shall" et s t seq. the following phrase: "Who dies before he becomes entitled to the actual possession or the receipt of the income of the leasehold land, or before he would have become so entitled but for the trusts of any term created by or under the settlement or under any statutory power or who dies before the end of twenty-one years from the determination of all estates for life preceding his estate in tail, or in tail male or in tail female, without, in any of the above-mentioned events, having with the consent of the protector (if any) of the settlement either barred the entail in the freehold land comprised in the settlement, or declared by deed with the like consent of such protector (if any) that the said leasehold land should, without prejudice to any prior estate, interest, or charge, vest in him absolutely, but shall, on the death of that person before attaining an absolutely vested interest, in manner aforesaid, in the leasehold land, go as freehold land conveyed as aforesaid would go."

Protection of Trustees.

The

SECT. 42 of the Settled Land Act 1882 places on trustees of settlements the duty of seeing that conveyances purport to convey land properly, but the protection is not very wide, for it narrows itself down to consents, neglecting to take action, adopting contracts made by the tenant for life, and in respect of other dealings. The section does not touch upon the other responsibilities consequential upon Settled Land Act arrangements. Bill steps in here and proposes that where the tenant for life directs investments of capital on any authorised security, the trustees are not to be liable for the acts of any agent employed by the tenant for life, or for not employing a separate agent in the valuation of the security or in investigations of title, or for the disposition of the security if it purports to vest the same in the trustees in the ordinary way. In the case also of sales and mortgages by the tenant for life, the trustees are not to be liable for consenting to the application of the money for any authorised purpose, nor for documents of title placed in the hands of the tenant for life for custody.

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BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE.

Effect of Reduction of Judgment Debt.

THE one and only ground upon which, as it appeared to us when commenting (ante, p. 86) upon the decision of the Divisional Court in the recent case of Re A Debtor; Er parte Judgment Creditors v. The Debtor (132 L. T. Jour. 606), the Court of Appeal might possibly see their way to granting relief to the judgment creditors has met with no success. The learned judges there (see ante, p. 205) took the same view as did those in the court below: Whether the registrar was right or wrong in accepting the money which was paid into court by the judgment debtor it was unnecessary to determine. He had done so, and the judgment debt was thereby reduced below the sum of £50. They declined to interfere in the course which had been adopted. The object of a part payment being generally so palpable-that of defeating the creditor to whom it is duethe result of the decision in the present case should, in the future, have a beneficial consequence. It ought to bring forcibly to the attention of the registrars of County Courts that, notwithstanding the provisions of rule 13 of Order XXIII. of the County Court Rules, they must not, if it can be avoided, place a if he judgment creditor in a worse position than he would occupy himself were sought to be the recipient of a part payment. It would, indeed, be a singular sort of creditor who would consent to receive a trifling payment on account of a debt that is owing to him when the effect of so doing would be against his interest. Voluntarily to put it out of his power to present a bankruptcy petition, because the amount of his debt would then be less than £50, could be the act alone of one entirely ignorant of his rights. The liberty of a defendant, under rule 13 of Order XXIII., to pay into court any portion of what is due under a judgment produces strangely anomalous results if the registrar is compelled to allow the creditor for whose supposed benefit the payment is made to be thereby frustrated. The obligation of the creditor is to acquiesce in the registrar becoming his agent in regard to the receipt of money paid into court. But inasmuch as execution will not issue for more than appears in the ledger account, and the creditor has personally no hand in the matter, justice requires that County Court officials should not permit him to be prejudiced by any proceeding of theirs. And, in the event of some amendment of the rules being necessitated by the state of affairs which has now been brought to light, it ought to be promptly forthcoming. As to the ground upon which the present case was actually decided, we did not for a moment anticipate that the Court of Appeal would tamper with the ruling of Justices Vaughan Williams and Collins in Re Child; Ex parte Child (66 L. T. Rep. 204; (1892) 2 Q. B. 77). It was upon the authority of that case that the Divisional Court in the present one decided as they did. Not only has it stood unchallenged in the books for twenty years, as we remarked in our former comment, but also it met with the express approval of the Court of Appeal in Re Raymond; Ex parte Raymond (66 L. T. Rep. 400) very shortly after the decision was pronounced. A creditor who has obtained a final judgment against a debtor not being, according to that decision, entitled to serve a bankruptcy notice for any larger amount than that for which he is entitled to issue execution, it follows inevitably that a bankruptcy notice can only be served for the balance remaining due after deducting any part payment made. For execution could not issue for more than that balance, and it is merely in respect of such an amount as for which execution may issue that a bankruptcy notice can be served: (see sect. 1 (g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52). In the present the bankruptcy notice that was served by the judgment creditors was founded on the original judgment debt, instead of on the amount thereof as reduced by the payment in court. Re Child; Ex parte Child (ubi sup.), however, directly in point, the error of that course is plainly manifested.

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OCCASIONAL NOTES.

In Appeal Court II. appeals from the County Palatine Court of Lancaster (final list) will be in the list for hearing on Thursday, the 4th July. Appeals from the Probate and Divorce Division (final and new trial list), in the printed list for these sittings, will be in the paper for hearing after the appeals in the Chancery general list (Trinity Sittings) have been disposed of, after which Workmen's Compensation appeals will be taken.

In the King's Bench Division non-jury actions will not be taken again before Tuesday, the 16th July.

In the Railway and Canal Commission Court judgment will be given in Dublin and Manchester Steamship Company v. London and North-Western Railway Company on Tuesday next at 10.30. Undefended divorce causes will be taken in Court II. to day (Saturday).

Mr. Justice Bankes and Mr. Justice Avory will be the Vacation judges during the Long Vacation. Mr. Justice Bankes will serve during the first half of the vacation.

Mr. Justice Pickford having finished the business at Bristol, on the Western Circuit, last Wednesday returned to town and took his seat in court on the following day, proceeding with the special jury list. He will now remain in London until the end of the present sittings.

Mr. Justice Coleridge will open the commission at Nottingham, on the Midland Circuit, on Monday next. When the business at this town is finished he will return to London, remaining until the end of the present sittings.

Mr. Justice Darling and Mr. Justice Bucknill will leave London on Monday next for Manchester, on the Northern Circuit, and will open the commission on the following day.

Mr. Justice Horridge will leave London on Wednesday next for Stafford, on the Western Circuit, to join Mr. Justice Phillimore, and will open the commission on the following day. When the business at this town is finished Mr. Justice Phillimore will return to town, remaining until the end of the sittings, and Mr. Justice Horridge will continue the circuit, going on to Birmingham to join Mr. Justice Avory on Wednesday, the 10th prox.

Mr. Justice Avory will leave London on Thursday next for Warwick, on the Midland Circuit, and will open the commission on the following day.

Mr. Justice Ridley and Mr. Justice Lush will leave London on Friday next for Chester, on the second part of the North and South Wales Circuit, and will open the commission on the following day. It will not be possible for these judges to return to town before the Long Vacation, as the commission day for Swansea, being the last town on the circuit, is fixed for Thursday, the 11th prox., and it is understood that the calendar is heavy and the cause list substantial.

The first July Session at the Central Criminal Court will commence on Tuesday next at 10.30. Mr. Justice Ridley, Mr. Justice Bucknill, and Mr. Justice Pickford are on the rota to attend, but it is understood that Mr. Justice Pickford will be the presiding judge.

The Midsummer Quarter Sessions for cases arising in the county of Middlesex will be opened on Saturday next at the Caxton Hall, Caxton-street, Westminster, at 10.30.

In consequence of a slight chill Mr. Justice Darling was unable to take his seat in court on Thursday last.

Mr. Arthur Denman, who is now the 'Clerk of 'Assize on the South-Eastern Circuit, has been an officer on that circuit for twenty-five years.

Mr. O'Brien, who has been appointed Attorney-General for Ireland, was appointed Solicitor-General for Ireland last October. He is a Roman Catholic and a Nationalist, and was formerly a member of the reporting staff of the Freeman's Journal. Having been called to the Irish Bar in 1881, he obtained a good practice, and took silk in 1899, becoming a Bencher of the King's-inns in 1907.

On Friday, the 21st inst., being the Grand Day of Trinity Term at Gray's-inn, the Treasurer (Mr. Arthur E. Gill) and the Masters of the Bench entertained at dinner the following guests: The Earl of Desart, Viscount Knutsford, Lord Barnard, the Home Secretary, the Master of the Rolls, Mr. Justice Neville, Sir Edwin Durning-Lawrence, Sir Alfred Pearce Gould, Canon Henson, Mr. C. F. Gill, K.C., and Mr. John Walter. The Benchers present in addition to the Treasurer were: Mr. Henry Griffith, Sir Arthur Collins, K.C., Mr. Lewis Coward, K.C., Mr. C. A. Russell, K.C., Mr. Herbert F. Manisty, K.C., Mr. Edward Clayton, K.C., Mr Vesey Knox, K.C., Mr. J. R. Atkin, K.C., Sir William Byrne, C.B., Mr. Montagu Sharpe, Mr. F. A. Greer, K.C., Mr. T. M. Healy, K.C., M.P., with the Preacher (the Rev. R. J. Fletcher, D.D.).

The annual general meeting of the Union Society of London' was held at 3, King's Bench-walk (North), on Wednesday, the 26th inst. The report and balance-sheet were adopted, and the following officers were elected for the session 1912-13: President. Mr. George F. Kingham; vice-president, Mr. J. Guy Baker; treasurer, Mr. W. S. Jones; secretary, Mr. M. P. Fitzgerald; committee, Messrs. A. A. Eustace, Aubrey Davies, L. H. Kenny, and H. J. Cape.

The twentieth annual meeting of the Society of City and Borough Clerks of the Peace was held at Grimsby on the 18th inst., Mr. Barker (Grimsby), president, in the chair. Numerous points of practice were discussed. The following officers were elected for the ensuing year: President, Mr. Stallard (Worcester); vice-president, Mr. Routlidge (Pontefract); treasurer, Mr. Copson Peake (Leeds); hon. sec., Mr. Francis Ogden (Manchester); committee, Mr. Barker (Grimsby), Mr. Binney (Sheffield), Mr. Brevitt (Wolverhampton), Mr. Duignan (Walsall), Mr. Harris (Nottingham), and Dr. Woodhouse (Hull).

The annual general meeting of the Society of Public Teachers of Law will be held this year, by permission of the Treasurer and Masters of the Bench of the Middle Temple, in the Parliament Chamber of the latter Inn on Friday, the 5th July, at 3.30 p.m. The proceedings will include a paper by Professor P. F. Girard (University of Paris), an honorary member of the society, on L'enseignement du droit romain en 1912. The Treasurer and Bench will in the evening entertain the members attending the meeting at dinner in the Middle Temple Hall. Sir Edward Fry and Mr. Arthur Cohen have recently accepted invitations to become honorary members of the society.

The attainment by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales of the age of eighteen renders him qualified to full succession to the throne, and the Regency Act of 1910, in its provision for the government of the realm in the event of the infancy of the Sovereign, becomes, so far as His Royal Highness is concerned, inoperative. The fiction of law is that the King must always be in the full maturity of intellectual power, and accordingly exempt from the ordinary disabilities and immunities of infancy. In our early history the case of an infant Sovereign was variously met sometimes by the nomination by the barons, sometimes by Parliament, sometimes by the King himself, and Protectors of the Realm with councils, or of Councils of Regency. The Privy Council made Richard of Gloucester Protector of the Realm during the brief reign of Edward V. In the reign of Henry VIII. we come upon the first Regency Act, and the only one of the kind that ever took effect (28 Hen. 8, c. 7, s. 23). On other occasions since the reign of Henry VIII. Regency Acts have been passed nominating, or giving to the King the power of nominating, a Regent or a Council, notably the Act (1 Will. 4, c. 2) for the establishment of a Regency in the event of the death of William IV. in the minority of the Princess (Queen) Victoria, and the Act (3 & 4 Vict. c. 22) making provision for a Regency in the event of any child of Her Majesty Queen Victoria succeeding to the throne before the age of eighteen. The duties of Royalty have, however, never since the reign of Edward VI. been discharged by a Regent in consequence of the infancy of the Sovereign.

PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Increase of the Cabinet.

THE increase, by reason of recent changes, in the number of the members of the Cabinet to one-and-twenty would be received with amazement by statesmen of fifty years ago. The number, of Cabinet Ministers is indefinite and variable, for it is competent to the statesman who is charged with the formation of a particular Ministry, with the consent of the Sovereign, to determine the number of Ministers who shall have seats in the Cabinet. In 1770, on the first formation of his Ministry, Lord North introduced seven persons only into the Cabinet. The Marquis of Rockingham's Cabinet in 1782 consisted of nine or ten persons; that of Earl Shelburne in the following year of eleven. In 1783 Mr. Pitt's Cabinet was limited to seven members, all of whom, except himself, had seats in the House of Lords. After the death of Mr. Pitt it became customary for the Cabinet to consist of from ten to sixteen individuals. In 1835 Sir Robert Peel expressed the opinion that the executive Government of this country would be infinitely better conducted by a Cabinet composed of only nine members than by

Reform Acts and Dissolution.

THE date fixed for the coming into operation of the Bill for the extension of the Parliamentary franchise, which was introduced in the House of Commons on the 17th inst. by Mr. Pease on behalf of the Government, has been evidently selected with the view of preventing this measure, if it be placed on the statute-book, from affecting the existence or duration of the present Parliament. In accordance with the principles of constitutional morality in its recent development, Reform Acts have been followed by the dissolution of Parliament in order to give the new electorate the opportunity of the exercise of their power by the return of representatives of their own choice; and these Reform Acts have either included provisions for the redistribution of seats or have been accompanied with Redistribution Acts. In days gone by there have been large extensions of the Parliamentary franchise, as distinct from a redistribution of seats, which have not been followed by immediate dissolutions. In Ireland, Roman Catholics were admitted to the Parliamentary franchise in 1793 by a Parliament which was elected in 1790 and not dissolved till 1797. In this country a dissolution was not the result of the passing of the Catholic Emancipation Act in 1829 without a redistribution of seats. The dissolution of 1830 resulted from the demise of the Crown on the death of George IV.

Parliamentary Obstruction.

On the 14th inst. and again on the 21st inst. the whole of the time allotted to the consideration after Whitsuntide of the Bills of unofficial members was spent on the report stage of the Municipal Corporations (Qualification of Clergymen) Bill, the operative clause of which consists of five lines only. On the 14th inst. this Bill, by the putting down of pages of amendments, was discussed at length with a view to the postponement of the Plural Voting Abolition Bill, which was favoured by the Liberal Party. On the 21st inst. this Bill was again discussed at inordinate length by the putting down of a great number of amendments, not, as in the previous week, by Unionists, but by Liberal members, with a view to the postponement of the Housing Bill, which is a measure favoured by the Unionist Party. This instance of the waste of Parliamentary time in reference to the same Bill, in one week by Unionists, in the week following by their opponents, with a view to the obstruction of other measures presents an object lesson of a species of Parliamentary tactics of which Mr. Lecky, writing in 1899 with a House of Commons experience of some years, thus philosophically enunciates: "We have to consider the great part which obstruction plays in Parliamentary government. It constantly happens that a measure to which scarcely anyone objects is debated at inordinate length for no other reason than to prevent a measure which is much objected to from being discussed. Measures may be opposed by hostile votes, but they are often much more efficaciously opposed by calculated delays, by multiplied amendments, or speeches, or by some of the many devices that can be employed to clog the legislative machine. The utilising of one Bill to prevent the progress of another is a custom which might well be honoured by every political party more in the breach than in the observance."

PARLIAMENTARY SUMMARY.

In the House of Commons, on the 20th inst., Mr. Shirley Benn asked the Home Secretary if he would state how many aliens were recommended for deportation during the six years ended the 31st Dec. 1911, and in how many cases the recommendation was carried out.-Mr. McKenna: During the six years in question 2378 aliens were recommended for expulsion by the courts which convicted them, and in 2173 cases expulsion orders were made. Of the remaining 205 cases eighty-eight were under sentences of

imprisonment or penal servitude which were unexpired on the 31st Dec., and in 117 expulsion orders were not made for reasons which are indicated in the annual statements as to expulsion.

In the House of Commons, on Tuesday, on the consideration of the Bankruptcy Bill on report, a number of amendments were made, on the motion of the Earl of Granard, to meet points of criticism at previous stages of the Bill. These included one making it clear that gambling was only to be a criminal offence when it was not connected with a person's trade or business.

In the House of Commons, on Wednesday, Mr. Watt asked the Prime Minister whether he was aware that Lords of Appeal were called upon to arbitrate in important cases in the country for which they received fees; and whether, in view of the fact that it was proposed to increase the number of Lords of Appeal in order to overtake arrears of work, he would make it a condition in future appointments that no remunerated arbitration work should be undertaken by them.-Mr. Asquith, who was received with cheers, said: I am not aware that Lords of Appeal are called upon to arbitrate in important cases for which they receive fees, nor do I see any reason for making any conditions on the subject.

The Criminal Law Amendment (White Slave Traffic) Bill came before Standing Committee C of the House of Commons on Monday for consideration in detail of the clauses. The first operative clause gives power to a constable to arrest without a warrant any person whom he should have good cause to suspect of having committed, or being about to commit, any offence against sect. 2 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, which relates to procuration. Mr. Lee proposed an amendment to limit the powers to a constable" who is not below the rank of sergeant and is detailed for special duty under the Act." He explained that he had put down this amendment after consultation with the police authorities of Scotland Yard. The amendment was agreed to, together with some verbal additions suggested by Mr. Ellis Griffith.-Mr. Lynch proposed to strike out from the clause the words 66 or being about to commit."-After discussion a division was taken on the question of inserting the words or attempting to commit" instead of "being about to commit." The words as amended were carried by twenty-one to thirteen.-On Wednesday the Bill was further considered. Clause 1, as amended, was added to the Bill. On the second clause, which relates to the suppression of brothels, and applies the penalties of sect. 13 of the principal Act to the person in charge who knowingly permits the premises to be used as a disorderly house or for habitual prostitution, Sir Frederick Banbury moved to omit sub-sect. Í of the clause. On a division Sir F. Banbury's amend ment to omit the sub-section was defeated by twenty-three to fifteen. The committee afterwards adjourned.

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IRISH NOTES.

66

The

It is curious how the personal element interests people beyond everything else. One can hardly recall an incident which occasioned so much interest at the Four Courts as the speech of the Lord Mayor of Belfast in the House of Commons the other day when he alluded to the action " of a well-known Dublin barrister who had renewed the lease of his house with the condition that it should lapse within six months of the establishment of Home Rule in Ireland." Moreover, the barrister was an eminent supporter of the Government, and renders great help professionally to the Irish law officers of the Crown. reference was very specific, and there could hardly be a doubt about the gentleman alluded to. Promptly, however, upon the appearance of the statement Mr. H. Macdermot, son of a former Liberal Attorney-General, and counsel to the AttorneyGeneral who was made Master of the Rolls a couple of weeks ago, came forward and related the whole story of the granting of the lease of his present residence, and pledged himself that neither in the lease nor in the negotiations which led up to it was the subject of Home Rule ever mentioned. There is, however, in the lease a proviso of surrender on six months' notice-a not very unusual thing in Ireland.

AN interesting point arises under the section of the Local Government Act which relates to the disqualification of members of corporate bodies who have been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment with hard labour. The provision in the Irish code on this point is a reprint of sect. 46 (1) (c) of the English Local Government Act of 1894, and attaches the disqualification