zal pros formi ng or all estate - intesta future i wapp Any rest in rt from further pyhold eneral to cu ds and BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE. Final Judgment, how Constituted. NON-COMPLIANCE with a bankruptcy notice served on a debtor by a creditor, pursuant to sect. 4, sub-sect. 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), is an act of bankruptcy. But the same being limited to a case where the creditor has obtained a final judgment against the debtor, and execution thereon has not been stayed, it is most essential to be certain that such "final judgment" is in existence. Decisions innumerable have been pronounced on this important point, as was only to be expected. The definition, however, of Lord Esher, M.R., in Re Riddell; Ex parte Earl of Strathmore (58 L. T. Rep. 838; 20 Q. B. Div. 512, at p. 516) appears to be universally accepted as affording the most trustworthy guide as to what answers the requirements of the sub-section. The learned judge was not content to rely on his own view of the true construction thereof. He carefully scrutinised what had been laid down by learned judges in the two earlier cases of Ex parte Chinery; Re Chinery (50 L. T. Rep. 342; 12 Q. B. Div. 342) and Ex parte Moore; Re Faithfull (52 L. T. Rep. 376; 14 Q. B. Div. 627). The result of his investigation was formulated in these lucid terms: "A 'final judgment' means a judgment obtained in an action by which the question whether there was a pre-existing right of the plaintiff against the defendant is finally determined, in favour either of the plaintiff or of the defendant." In the recent case of Re A Debtor (No. 837 of 1912) (noted ante, p. 205), an illustration of such a final determination of a pre-existing right, constituting a final judgment within the meaning of the sub-section, was furnished in a somewhat exceptional fashion. An order for specific performance of a contract to purchase land in the usual form, coupled with the master's certificate on the inquiry as to title, was held to be a final judgment upon which a bankruptcy notice could be issued. The certificate rendered complete what was previously inchoate. in Part Something in the guise of authority for this decision-if any such legal eritance were really wanted-was obtainable from that of the Divisional Court, composed of Justices Cave and Smith, in Re Poole; Ex ry fr parte Twisaday (63 L. T. Rep. 321). In that case, two orders were ill. W tatives ame mar admitte of the che de al pers r his d Co gired concer Fo be deals Meath D gly able disposit be incur as his k made. The first was against two trustees for breach of trust in respect of an improper investment, and one of the trustees was thereby ordered to indemnify the other. By a subsequent order, the amount of the indemnity was fixed. The two orders together had all the elements of a final judgment, said Mr. Justice Cave, an opinion in which his learned brother concurred. It is not indispensable, therefore, that a "final judgment" should consist of a single instrument. So long as there is a final adjudication of the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant, in favour of the one or the other of them, all the requisites of the statutory expression are fully satisfied. "Execution thereon not having been stayed." IN the same case of Re A Debtor (ubi sup.), the meaning of this phrase in sub-sect. 1 (g) of sect. 4 of the Act called for consideration. It implies that immediate execution, as referred to in sub-sect. 1 (e) of the same section, is capable of being issued of by the judgment creditor: (see Ex parte Woodall; Re Woodall, point and resentatie redempt 50 L. T. Rep. 747; 13 Q. B. Div. 479; Re Ide; Ex parte Ide, 17 Q. B. Div. 755; and Re Ford; Ex parte Ford, 56 L. T. Rep. 166; 18 Q. B. Div. 369). The right to proceed under the subsection is arrested if there has been any stay of execution, and for obvious reasons. As stated in our note, the order for specific performance was made on the 17th Feb. 1911. It directed the defendant to pay the purchase money to the plaintiffs; but such payment was not to be made " before the 6th July 1911." Was this equivalent to a stay of execution? The decision of the OCCASIONAL NOTES. In Appeal Court I. judgment will be delivered to-day (Saturday) in Scott (otherwise Morgan) v. Scott. Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady will deliver judgment on Monday next in Re W. Caudery (deceased); London Joint Stock Bank Limited v. Wightman. Non-jury actions will not be taken again before Tuesday, the 16th inst. Appeals from County Courts will be heard by a divisional court, sitting in Bankruptcy, on Monday, the 15th inst. Bankruptcy motions will be heard by the Hon. Mr. Justice Phillimore on Monday, the 15th, after the Divisional Court appeals in Bankruptcy, and continued on Tuesday, the 16th inst. (f necessary). Common jury divorce cases will be taken on Tuesday next, the 9th inst., and will be continued up to and including Tuesday, the 16th inst. Mr. Justice Channell, having finished business at Bristol on the Western Circuit last Monday, returned to town and sat in Judges' Chambers. He will now remain in London until the end of the present sittings. In consequence of the pressure of business at Derby on the Midland Circuit, Mr. Justice Coleridge was unable to proceed to Nottingham on Monday last to open the commission. Mr. Justice Bray presided in his place, and in charging the jury referred to the arrears of work in London and on circuit, and the great need of immediately increasing the number of the King's Bench judges. Mr. Justice Bucknill opened the commission at Manchester, on the Northern Circuit, last Tuesday. Mr. Justice Ridley and Mr. Justice Lush will to-day (Saturday) open the commission at Chester on the North and South Wales Circuit, and on Friday next they will open the commission at Swansea. It will be impossible for these judges to return to London this side of the Long Vacation. Mr. Justice Avory and Mr. Justice Horridge will open the commission at Birmingham on Thursday next. When the business at this town is finished they will return to London, remaining until the end of the present sittings. The Lord Chief Justice will open the commission at Lewes, on the South-Eastern Circuit, next Friday. When the business at this town is finished he will return to London, remaining until the end of the present sittings. In consequence of the illness of Mr. Justice Darling civil business at Manchester will not be taken until the criminal business has been disposed of by Mr. Justice Bucknill. The first July Sessions of the Central Criminal Court were opened by the Lord Mayor at the Old Bailey Sessions-house on Wednesday. The number of persons for trial was sixty-three, among the offences alleged being three charges of murder and four of attempted murder. The July Quarter and General Sessions for cases arising on the north and south side of the Thames will commence on Tuesday next, the 9th inst., at the Sessions House, Newington, at 10.30 The General Sessions appeals will be heard on the following Friday, the 12th inst. at 10.30. The Midsummer Quarter Sessions for cases arising in the county of Middlesex will commence to-day (Saturday), at the Caxton Hall, Caxton-street, Westminster, at 10.30. The July sitting at the Mayor's Court will commence on Monday, the 29th inst., at eleven o'clock. The Midsummer General Quarter Sessions, holden in and for the city and county of Kingston-upon-Hull, is fixed for Wednesday, the 24th inst., at 10.30. Owing to the indisposition of the Lord Chief Justice the remainder of the Kent Assize cases are being dealt with at Guildford as we go to press. Mr. Justice Darling is making great progress towards recovery from his recent indisposition, and it is expected that he will be able to return to his judicial duties next week. Mr. Henry Crawford, solicitor, of Belfast, who died on the 1st May, left personal estate in the United Kingdom valued at £158,987, of which the personal estate in England amounts to £92,189. Mr. William Lethbridge Lethbridge, of Wood, South Tawton, Devon, solicitor, who died on the 12th April, aged fifty-five, left estate of the gross value of £106,771, of which the net personalty has been sworn at £103,976. On Thursday last week Mr. Balfour unveiled the statue of Bacon which has been erected in front of the hall of Gray's-inn. The ceremony was preceded by a garden party held in the gardens of the Inn, which Bacon himself laid out three centuries ago. Mr. A. E. Gill, treasurer of Gray's-inn, received the guests. A dance was given in the hall of the Middle Temple by the Treasurer and Masters of the Bench and members of the society on the 27th ult. Among those present, in addition to the Treasurer, Mr. Balfour Browne, K.Ĉ., and Mrs. Balfour Browne, were the Raj Rana of Jhalawar, Lord and Lady Mersey, Lord Justice and Lady Buckley, Lord Justice and Lady Kennedy, Mr. Lindsay, K.C., and Lady Harriet Lindsay, Sir Rufus and Lady Isaacs, Sir Samuel and Lady Evans, Sir James and Lady Crichton-Browne, Sir Thomas and Lady Horridge, the Hon. Mrs. Muir-Mackenzie, and Mrs. Tennyson d'Eyncourt. The guests numbered about 350 and included several parties brought by the Masters of the Bench and members. The band of the Coldstream Guards played in the Minstrels' Gallery, and supper was served in the Benchers' rooms and in a marquee in the gardens. The appointment of Mr. Serjeant Molony to the position of Solicitor-General for Ireland creates a vacancy among the members of the Order of the Coif, which is in existence in Ireland, although the number of its members is confined to three. In Ireland there were serjeants-at-law certainly as early aз the thirteenth century, for the Ordinance of 1302, pro statu tribuniæ, speaks of the servientes in nostris curiis ibidem placitantes as if of old standing, and from the entry in the patent roll it would seem there was appointed a chief or King's serjeant for every county. A petition to Parliament in 1320 seems further to show that the selection of judges was obliged to be from that class, and in an Act of Parliament in 1413 the Irish serjeants and apprentices at law are as a class made the subjects of special reference. The serjeants-at-law in Ireland are at this day appointed by letters patent and have precedence over all the Bar except the Attorney or Solicitor General. The serjeants-at-law in Ireland deemed to hold an office under the Crown, but in the letters patent the person appointed is called usually serjeant-at-law. are At the weekly meeting of the London County Council on Tuesday, Lord Cheylesmore (chairman) presiding, Mr. Meinertzhagen, chairman of the Local Government Committee, brought up a report from that committee recommending the erection of a new court-house on the site of the existing courthouse at Newington, and on adjoining land belonging to the Council, at an estimated gross cost of £100,000. Referring to the negotiations with the City Corporation for the merging of all the criminal business of London at the Central Criminal Court, he expressed the hope that that question would not be reopened, as it offered very little prospect of success and would mean a very great delay; while the matter did not admit of delay. The Newington site was not ideal, but the selection of a site in the centre of London would involve an extra expenditure of at least £100,000, and the Newington site had the advantage of being in their possession, so that they could begin building at once. Mr. P. Harris moved an amendment declaring that it was desirable that all the criminal business of Quarter Sessions for the County of London should be merged in the Central Criminal Court. Mr. Gillett seconded the amendment. Sir John Benn, in supporting the amendment, said he was prepared to join with the Moderates in refusing to spend the money on this unnecessary building, and in throwing the onus upon the Liberal Home Secretary. Ultimately the amendment was rejected by fortynine votes to twenty-seven and the committee's recommendation was adopted. Mr. Justice Bray, addressing the grand jury at the opening of the Midland Assizes at Nottingham on Tuesday, apologised for the inconvenience caused through the postponement of the opening of the commission, and explained that it was due to the fact that Lord Coleridge had been detained at Derby through the large number of civil cases. He himself had had to come down from London to take these assizes. This would have a most unfortunate effect on the business in London, where the arrears, already considerable at the beginning of the sittings, were accumulating very fast. The position would soon be So. serious, and the reason was not far to seek. Although the death of Mr. Justice Grantham and the retirement of Mr. Justice Lawrance occurred some months ago, he was sorry to 8ay that no steps had been taken to fill the vacancies. It was not the fault of the judges, who had strongly represented the absolute necessity of filling the places of those two learned judges, and the Government had incurred grave responsibility in not doing It might be that when all the judges were well, and there were no extraordinary duties or pressure of business, they could get on for a time, but the moment any of the judges became ill -and most of them were over sixty years of age and got ill like other people-business was thrown into confusion. This was especially the case when so many judges were away on circuit, and suitors were most anxious to get their cases tried before the Long Vacation. He appealed to any of the grand jury who had influence with the Government to urge the appointment of two additional judges in the King's Bench Division. There would first have to be an address from both Houses of Parliament, but it was within the power of the Government to procure that at any time. PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Powers of the Speaker. THE authority exercised by the Speaker for the maintenance of order in the House of Commons by requesting Mr. Lansbury, on the 25th ult., to withdraw from the House for the remainder of that day's sitting is of recent origin, and has been conferred by Standing Order No. 20, Session 1888, which empowers a Speaker or Chairman to order a member whose conduct is grossly disorderly to withdraw immediately from the House during the remainder of that day's sittings. Formerly the Speaker was unable to put in force at least proprio motu, and directly, an order of a punitive character against a member. It would have been his duty to name such member to the House for disregarding the authority of the Chair or abusing the rules of the House by persistent or wilful obstruction or otherwise, with a view to the institution of a motion for his censure or his suspension from the service of the House or his commitment as the House may adjudge; and such course is still open to the Speaker if he thinks the power conferred on him of ordering the immediate withdrawal of the offending member from the House to be insufficient. The suspension of members from the service of the House is a familiar method for the enforcement of the particular jurisdiction appertaining to that assembly. During nearly two centuries, however, this form of punishment was left in abeyance, no case of suspension having occurred between 1692 and 1877, when it was revived at the sug gestion of the Speaker. By the Standing Order of the 28th Feb. 1880 suspension was adopted for the punishment of offences such as disregard of the authority of the Chair or obstruction, and has been imposed in numerous since cases. The doctrine that the House of Commons is the sole judge of offences committed within its walls was the argument in behalf of Holles and Valentine, but it was admitted in the debate on the subject in 1667 that their plea to the jurisdiction of the King's Bench would not be supported as to the imputed riot in detaining the Speaker in the chair, though the judgment was erroneous in extending to words uttered in Parliament. "It is obvious," writes Mr. Hallam, "that the House could inflict no adequate punishment in the possible case of treason or felony committed within its walls, nor if its power of imprisonment be limited to the session in that of many smaller offences." The Place Acts. THE necessity under which Colonel Seely, on his promotion from the office of Under-Secretary of State for War to that of Secretary of State for War, lay to submit himself for re-election to his constituency, although, on his appointment to the UnderSecretaryship, his sitting as a member of the House of Commons was unaffected, is an interesting object lesson in the intricacies of the Place Acts. Under-Secretaries of State are not made ineligible for a seat in the House of Commons by the 25th section of the Statute of Anne (6 Anne, c. 7), inasmuch as these offices are not "new," and therefore do not dis use f rules wise, sure a open of ord mber f me qualify; they are not appointed directly by the Crown, and therefore do not come within the scope of the 26th section of that Act requiring the vacation of the seat upon the first appointment to a non-disqualifying office. Moreover, the Act 15 Geo. 2, c. 22, s. 3, which was framed for excluding therefrom all "deputies or clerks" in the principal departments of State, contains a proviso that this Act shall not be construed so as to prevent the Secretaries of the Treasury, of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and of the Admiralty, or the Under-Secretaries to the Principal Secretaries of State from sitting and voting in the House of Commons. Owing to the forms of appointment, any one of these offices may be conferred upon a member of the House of Commons without vacating his seat. For an Under-Secretary is not appointed by the Crown, but both in form and substance by a Secretary of State, a First Lord of the Treasury, or other Minister of a corresponding position. He therefore, in a technical sense, does not hold office under or from the Crown, and does not come within the operation of that section in the Statute of Anne which vacates the seats of all persons who shall accept an office of profit from the Crown, that is to say, an office conferred by a Minister in the distribution of Crown patronage. Ministers in the Lords. moners. commoners. offices between the two Houses of Parliament. Lord Lansdowne's statement that in five of the great departments the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the Indian Office, War Office, and the Admiralty—it had been an almost unbroken practice that the head or secretary of the departments should be a member of the House of Lords, is subject to the qualification that in 1876 the Lord Privy Seal represented the Admiralty in the House of Lords. IRISH NOTES. THE new Master of the Rolls was entertained to dinner last week by his colleagues of the Connaught Circuit in recognition of his appointment to the high office which he now so worthily fills. Mr. O'Connor's work lay so much in the Chancery Division, which is independent of circuits, and it is so long since he travelled the western counties with his brethren, that people had forgotten that he was a member of the Connaught Bar until the announcement of this celebration was made. THE circuits have commenced this week, but it is expected that all the judges, except the two on the North-East, will be back in Dublin in three weeks' time. The appeals from the County Court judges are fewer than usual, and the number of records less than one-half the average of recent years. THE death of Mr. Edward Greer last week removes from the ranks of the Irish Bar an interesting personalty, a man who had witnessed incidents in the '48 movement, and an old personal friend of Lord Russell of Killowen. Mr. Greer was a solicitor in Newry, and on the passing of the Land Act of 1881, through the influence of the late Chief Justice, he was appointed a legal sub-commissioner, which position he held until he retired, sixteen years ago, under the sixty-five rule. Thereupon he at once joined the Bar, and for a considerable period had a large practice in the Land Courts. He never took silk, and remained a hardworking junior to the end of his life. ONE of the most delicate and difficult problems which come before the courts is the decision of the question whether certain contracts were made in Ireland or in Great Britain, and as a consequence whether the plaintiff can sue in this country or whether he must commence proceedings on the other side of St. George's Channel. This nearly always arises in actions against insurance companies. The chief office of all the big companies is in London or the great provincial centres, with offices in Dublin, and the assured makes a proposal and answers queries at the Dublin office, where the contract is prepared and sent to the directors in England to be signed and sealed, when it is transmitted to the assured person by post. Where, under such circumstances. was the contract made? THE Complaint made by Lord Lansdowne in the House of Lords on the 27th ult. that there are now only four Cabinet Ministers out of a total of one-and-twenty, with one UnderSecretary and one Parliamentary Secretary, in the House of Lords, whereas in the Premiership of Sir Henry CampbellBannerman there were no fewer than six Cabinet Ministers and two Under-Secretaries in the House of Lords, will direct attention to the development in constitutional practice in the relative proportion of Cabinet Ministers in the two Houses of Parliament a change which is a striking indication of the growth of power on the part of the House of Commons. The first Cabinet of George III., in 1760, consisted of fourteen persons, of whom thirteen were peers and but one a member of the House of Commons. At the commencement of Mr. Pitt's first Administration, in 1783, he was the sole Cabinet Minister in the House of Commons. Mr. Addington's Cabinet in 1801 consisted of nine persons, five of whom were peers and the remainder comWhen Mr. Pitt returned to office in 1804 his Cabinet consisted of twelve persons, of whom but one besides himself (Lord Castlereagh) was a member of the House of Commons. The Grenville Ministry, after the death of Mr. Pitt in 1806, known as "The Ministry of all the Talents," consisted of eleven members, of whom seven were peers and four members of the House of Commons. Mr. Perceval's Cabinet consisted of ten members, of whom six were peers and four were Lord Liverpool's Cabinet in 1812 consisted of twelve members, of whom ten were peers and only two were commoners. The first Cabinet assembled under the presidency of Earl Grey, the Prime Minister of the Reform period, consisted of thirteen members, of whom eleven were peers or sons of peers and two commoners. Since the Reform Bill it has been customary to apportion leading members of the Government more equally between the two Houses. It is only in later years in the House of Commons that there has been a decided predominance of Ministers. On the 18th April 1864 Mr. Disraeli, as Leader of the Opposition, in deprecating the predominance in the number of Ministers in the House of Lords, gave it as his opinion that the following Ministers ought to find seats in the House of Commons-the heads of the two great departments of public expenditure, the Army and Navy a decided majority of the Secretaries of State, and on the whole the great majority of administrative officers. He showed, moreover, that the Constitution has practically provided for the adequate representation of the Government in the House of Lords by allowing but four out of the five Secretaries of State to sit in the Commons and by requiring the Lord Chancellor, the Lord President of the Council, and the Lord Privy Seal to be chosen from amongst the peers. Mr. Disraeli, speaking in the House of Commons as Prime Minister on the 15th June 1874, reiterated the enunciation of this general doctrine in regard to the distribution of Cabinet of MR. JUSTICE BARTON in the Chancery Division had a crux this character before him the other day. In a case of O'Leary v. Law Integrity Insurance Company the facts were as above stated, and in addition the first and other premiums were paid in Dublin. The policy-holder claimed that the company had no power to enter into life assurance business and commenced an action in Ireland for a declaration to that effect. The company contended that the action would have to be commenced in England, and moved to set aside the order for service out of the jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Barton, after reciting the facts, held that there was no completed contract until the deed was delivered to the policy-holder, and as this clearly took place in Ireland the contract was made in this country, and the motion was refused. THE King's Bench Division has delivered an important judgment in the case of Whaley v. The Great Northern Railway Company which settles the law upon a vexed question with most Irish urban councils. The case was referred to in this column three months ago. The defendant company were rated and assessed at the full rate by the local authority for several hereditaments connected with their undertaking, under the decision in the case of the London and North-Western Railway Company v. Llandudno Improvement Commissioners (75 L. T. 695; (1897) 1 Q. B. 287), but no appeal was lodged against either the valuation of the Commissioner or against the rate of the urban council, as there was power to enter. But the railway company claimed to raise the defect by way of defence to an action for the rates. The Lord Chief Baron and Mr. Justice Kenny held that SYDNEY, N.S.W., May 27. THE Pure Food Act of N.S.W. prohibits the sale of adulterated food, and the Board of Health is empowered to make regulations prescribing standards for the purity and quality of food and drugs Sect. 5 provides that an article of food is adulterated if it " does not comply with the standard therefor prescribed by any regulation." A milk-seller sold milk as taken from his cow, and on analysis this milk was found to be below the standard, as for butter fat, prescribed for milk by the Board of Health. On a prosecution under the Pure Food Act for selling adulterated milk, it was contended on behalf of the defendant that he had not added to or taken from the milk, but had sold it as direct from the cow, and so could not be accused of adulteration. It was decided that he was liable under the Act. This is unquestionably right, as ignorance of the scientific fact that his milk was deficient in nutriment was likely to produce as much mischief as if he had deliberately committed a breach of his moral obligation not to wilfully move in the direction of adulterating the food. This decision should make it worth looking a second time into the decision on butter adulteration by the magistrate at the Tower Bridge Police Court recently noticed in the pages of the LAW TIMES, and gives an opening to doubt the accuracy and completeness of what constitutes adulteration of food as laid down in Fitzpatrick v. Kelly (L. Rep. 8 Q. B. 337). The new factor in our social life-aviation-which has asserted itself of late, will, no doubt, be the futile source of much special law, and this law will not be the same in Australia as in England, owing to the different local conditions which mark each part of the Empire. Before the law dealing with airmen and aeroplanes is fixed there will have to be additions made to the Statute-book, a revision of the laws of real property will have to be effected, and laws of tort will also be modified. America, no doubt, will be the first to evolve a law of the air, and England will follow. The practice of flying has not yet been followed to any extent in Australia; nor is it likely to be until its economic use is proved. There is one bold local flyer who has shown much enterprise in his efforts, but who has, at the outset of career, met with a check at the hands of a dairyman. This dairyman sued Mr. Hart, an airman, for trespass, not for damages, alleging that the defendant flew over his paddocks, that the noise of the machine stampeded his cows to their injury and his loss. The judge was of opinion that a trespass to the land was not committed by the aeroplane travelling over it. As to the damage done the cows the evidence was contradictory as to the height at which the airman flew. The paddocks were in an outside suburb of Sydney, there were telegraph and telephone wires about, so that the airman must have been at a height of at least 40ft. He stated that he flew much higher, about 200ft., while the plaintiff brought evidence that he flew as low as 10ft. However, the judge was satisfied that the noise from the machine did stampede the cows, and was the cause of the damage to them, and gave a verdict to the plaintiff. Not much is added by this decision to the knowledge of an airman on the point of what is a careful use of his machine when in the air, and though the judge was of opinion that there was no trespass committed, still being the judgment of an inferior court, this statement of the law is subject to revision. In this country of legislative experiment for the regulation of the social and economic relations of men, there are various Acts of Parliament regulating industrial disputes, and providing machinery for the governance of industrial unions which must be formed and registered for the purpose of collective bargaining and adjustment of disputes under them. These unions are different from trade i nions, though in most instances are composed of members of trade unions. For the purpose of the administration of the statutes, an Industrial Court has been set up, with a judge thereof, before whom all branches of rules made under the Act come. The proceedings in this court are necessarily of such a character as are not familiar in England, and points decided therein should be of interest seeing that the organi sation of the workers, with the object of obtaining better terms of employment, is going on apace in Britain. The local Act makes it penal to aid in a strike-the statute having been passed in order to substitute arbitration for the strike. There is also a provision enabling the registered unions to regulate their membership and their proceedings, and to make rules to enable their working to be easy and sure, to raise revenue for the purposes of their unions, and to fine their members who may be recalcitrant, and recover fines, penalties, and subscriptions. The administration of the Act in relation to these matters was challenged recently, when a union made an attempt to compel its members to indirectly aid a strike by assisting from the union funds the wives and children of the members of another union that had gone on strike. The issue was placed before the judge by the secretary of the union suing a member for the amount of his share of a levy made on behalf of the wives and children of the striking Newcastle coalminers. The judge held that, though the levy might have been primarily innocent, the defendant, if compelled to pay, would be forced to aid a strike, as the destination of the levy in its secondary character made it illegal. But as the objects of the Furniture Trades Union, of which the defendant was a member, were not for the purpose of contributing to charitable purposes, the levy itself was illegal, though perhaps innocent. If the levy were for charitable purposes the union had no power to make it; if it were for strike purposes it was illegal. It could not be construed as a "fine, penalty, or subscription," and so could not be enforced under the provisions of the Act. This case goes to show that, although the workers may say they prefer arbitration to a strike, they are always ready to have recourse to the latter, if they think that they will be benefited by it. The attempt to get higher wages in spite of economic laws, which will be made by the stronger unions by force, must always weaken our reliance upon the efficacy of arbitration in all cases. The weak union, like the weak man, will not be able to fight, but will rely upon compromise. 66 A soft goods warehouseman in Australia is really a distributor of goods received in bulk, and in his warehouse employees are engaged in unpacking, labelling, and repacking for distribution in smaller packages the goods so received. It occurred to one of such employees who claimed compensation for injuries received in a lift accident on the premises, that the warehouse was a factory within the Factories Act, and so would enable him to claim benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act of New South Wales. The third section of this latter Act gives the protection of the Act to those employed in-among many places a "factory" and a workshop," and the Factories Act of 1896 defined a "factory to be a place in which four or more persons were engaged in preparing or manufacturing articles for trade or sale." It is not too much effort to see that the question for the High Court was to decide whether or not the unpacking, labelling, and repacking of the goods in the warehouse was in fact preparing articles for sale. Now, although the principles of English law are recognised in Australia, and English precedents are quoted and accepted as making our common law, yet where a comparison of Australian with English statutes on the same subject shows that similar words are not used in both, and when Australian or English meanings of the same word are dissimilar, then must an interpretation be given by the court as on a case of first impression. The court could not use the English cases offered to interpret the English provision, "adapting articles for sale," so its decision in the case before it decided what "preparing articles for sale meant. It held that "preparing" meant doing something to an article so as to alter its character so as to make it fit or fitter for sale-which altered its original character. The work done in the soft goods warehouse in the way of packing, labelling, and repacking goods did not mean "preparing" goods for sale so as to make the place where such work was done a factory within the meaning given by the Factories Act or the Workmen's Compensation Act, was it a "workshop" within the same Acts. Here in the High Court was thus made an Australian precedent, a small brick in the edifice of Australian law. The And in connection with the Workmen's Compensation Act it has recently been shown that the lifting complete of English statutes and placing them in Australian statute-books is not always satisfactory. Australian judicial interpretation of them does not always follow the interpretation of them given by British judges. The Scottish decision, Fagan v. Murdoch, has been refused recognition as binding by an Australian judge, and the intention of the statute which altered that decision in 1906 has been accepted and read into the Australian Act. question for decision arose under the second schedule of the Australian Workmen's Compensation Act of 1910, and raised the point as to whether partial dependants on an injured work man can claim compensation while there are in existence persons wholly dependent upon him. The wording of the English (1897) schedule, which has been lifted into the Australian Act (1910), makes it appear that partial dependants have no claim so long as persons wholly dependent are alive. So it was recorded in the Scotch Court of Session. But the fact that a statute was subsequently or in eware enable ion A r Act! mong ctories hich gor too = Dart repacki cles fo passed to override the Scottish decision showed that the intention espoused by the words of the schedule was not the intention of the Act. No doubt, assuming what was done in Britain ought and would be done in New South Wales, the Australian judge, refusing to be bound by the Scottish case, decided in an opposite manner, thus again making an Australian precedent, relying on his own opinion only. We are now awaiting the settlement of the point either by a higher court or by legislation. The proper drafting and revision of Bills should be a matter of great care, and greater should be the care of the responsible officer to see that when an English statute is lifted bodily from the Eastern Atlantic to the South Seas, it should be so treated that the change of environment will mean a change in its terms to suit the place of its new home. It is hard on a private individual to be subject to the expense of litigation in order to find out the meaning of a statute which should have been framed in such clear terms as to be understood by layman as well as lawyer. EVERARD DIGBY. Scotland has given some eminent judges to England. Of these, when every point is considered, Lord Mansfield is easily the greatest. It would require more than a paragraph or two to do Justice to what he was. From the beginning he applied his remarkable mental powers to the acquisition of a broad and thorough learning, seeking to liberalise and to strengthen his mind by gaining a real acquaintance with history, literature, philosophy, and the classics, and by association with men of literary attainments and culture. In his study of law itself he did not tread merely in the narrowest circle of professional learning, but sought out and made his own the Roman civil law, international law, and the systems of modern European countries other than England. These habits of study he continued throughout a long life, covering nearly the whole of the eighteenth century; and so when at fifty-one, after many years of experience at the head of the English Bar and in Parliamentary life, he was called to preside as Chief Justice of the King's Bench, he was fitted as few have been at any time to fill so important a post. But his attainments, his rare mental powers, would not alone have made him, as some have thought him, the greatest of English judges. Lord Mansfield loved justice, he felt his obligation as a servant of the public, he was unflinching in his courage and independence, and he had in marked degree that somewhat rare combination of qualities which make up what may be called the judicial faculty-something capable of no exact definition, heaven born, perhaps, and certainly, by some, not to be acquired. The administration of his court was beyond criticism, and he presided with a dignity and consideration unsurpassed even by Lord Hardwicke. Čoke, Holt, perhaps others, were more deeply learned in the common law, had greater reverence for it, and are more thoroughly identified with it. But Lord Mansfield's accomplishments for jurisprudence went much beyond the work of any of these. With a breadth of vision impossible for men whose only learning was the common law, he saw the need of something more expansive to apply to changing commercial conditions, and, building on other systems with which his extensive studies had given him familiarity, he instituted, and in large measure perfected, a new system of law for the world of trade and business. Judicial history has few instances of opportunity so admirably embraced. He well deserves to be charactised, in the terms so often used of him, as "The Great Lord Mansfield." ecognis accept of Aust that a or ust an timp Ex to inter o its de les for ething t or fitte k done i abelling or sale y with n's Co ta. He an Lord Camden is hardly to be placed among England's greatest judges, but there is a charm about him that some greater names do not possess. It is the attraction of noble character, always nobly exerted, rather than of uncommon powers. While Attorney-General, he thus expressed his conception of his duty as public prosecutor in important capital case before the House of Lords: "My Lords," he said, "as I never thought it my duty in any case to attempt at eloquence where a prisoner stood upon trial for his life, much less shall I think of doing it before your Lordships: give me leave, therefore, to proceed to a narrative of the facts." Living long, as most of the noted English judges did, he was true always to this spirit of justice and moderation; and in all his conduct, both as judge and legislator, he acted on the belief that he was charged with an obligation to aid in making the law the servant of truth and freedom. Indeed, there was about him, as one of his contemporaries has recorded, a "kind of benevolent solicitude for the discovery of truth." Approaching his duties in this spirit, when called to fill the highest judicial office in England, and possessing much more than ordinary powers and attainments, he did not need the more brilliant qualities of some of his greater contemporaries to make of him the trusted and respected judge that he became. If we may trust Lord Campbell's narrative, Lord Thurlow enjoyed a reputation as a great judge that he did not deserve. His immense self-confidence, his overbearing and often threatening manner, his oracular and contemptuous method of speech, awed those who came in contact with him and impressed them with a belief in his possession of powers which a critical consideration of his acts and utterances does not support. Yet even Lord Campbell, who, whether in the spirit of the impartial historian or for some other reason, finds little to praise in Lord Thurlow, admits the native vigour of his intellect and the influence which he could exert over the minds of men. And it could not well be that the man, alone of all others, of whom Dr. Johnson admitted that when he had to meet him " he should wish to know a day before," was otherwise than the remarkable being which, in his own day, he was certainly thought to be. But purely in his character as a judge and it is this aspect that we are concerned with him-Lord Thurlow suffers by comparison with others. He had the opportunity of practice both before Lord Hardwicke and Lord Mansfield, but apparently the admirable example of judicial propriety which they set failed to impress him. Unusually fitted by nature to preside with dignity and to incite respect, he often failed to do either; and though the trespass of his undisciplined nature on the rules of strict decorum sometimes excites amusement, it transcends all notions of what should be expected from the first magistrate of a great country. It was hardly possible that so vigorous a mind and forceful a character should not have been reflected in judgments that command respect, but there is little to indicate that he imitated his great contemporaries in their ambitious efforts to fit themselves for their important work and to improve the systems of law which they administered. He was careless and immethodical and, if current report spoke the truth, he was even sometimes content to deputise the writing of his opinions. No taint or sus. picion of corruption ever rested upon him, but impartial consideration of his conduct forces the conclusion that to Lord Thurlow the holding of his high office was more important than its efficient and useful administration. It is not often that from one family come two such men as the brothers, William and John Scott. Both won great reputations as judges and both lived to extreme old age. The elder, Lord Stowell, died past ninety, and was hardly less honoured for his charming and cultivated personality than for the soundness and learning of his judgments in Admiralty and international law. John Scott, familiar to every lawyer as Lord Eldon, almost reached his brother's years, for he died in 1838, in his eightyseventh year. Although his judicial life had closed ten years earlier, for more than twenty years prior to his relinquishment of the Great Seal he had sat continuously in the Court of Chancery, a longer tenure of that high office than any Chancellor enjoyed except Lord Hardwicke. Lord Campbell has thought fit to call attention to many serious defects that Lord Eldon possessed as a judge, and it is certain that he was dilatory in the discharge of judicial business and was of that turn of mind which abhors all change and opposes reform intended for the correction of exist ing abuses. But difference of political views, and the sharp antagonism that this frequently brought about, may explain much of Lord Campbell's unfavourable comment. It is well to remember also that the latter's trustworthiness as a biographer has been severely questioned. Even the somewhat hostile atmoɛphere of the Lord Chancellors" does not becloud the great qualities that marked Lord Eldon's judicial career, and that explain the reverence in which his name is held. Probably no one has surpassed him in that characteristic which a judge ought to acquire, if he does not possess it by nature, of courteous and patient consideration for the counsel who appear before him. His complete knowledge and understanding of the law which he administered, the soundnesss of his application, and his desire to do justice, which never yielded to any other motive, ensured a right judgment in every case. In the clearer light of later years some faults he had are more apparent, but all who seek judicial excellence would do well to study his life on the Bench and, in large measure, to follow the path by which he passed to tle great eminence that he reached. The year 1750 is the birth year of two noted Er glish lawyers— Erskine and Ellenborough. The first, the foremost advocate of his own and perhaps of any time, was also Lord Chancellor, nd the other became Chief Justice of the King's Bench, and as such enjoyed an ascendency that few judges have had. Erskine's enthusiastic, gifted, and intrepid nature fitted better into the stress and excitement of life at the Bar, and the administration of the dry doctrines of the Court of Chancery, with which his previous experience had not made him familiar, added nothing to his reputation during his short term of office. But Lord Ellen. |