and Cake Mills (5 B. W. C. C. 405) considered. Appeal dismissed. [Edge v. J. Gorton Limited. Ct. of App.: Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Farwell and Kennedy, L.JJ. July 11 and 22.-Counsel: for the appellant, Horace Fenton; for the respondents, W. Shakespeare. Solicitors: for the appellant, A. E. Fenton, agent for T. A. Needham, Manchester; for the respondents, Busk, Mellor, and Norris, agents for Payne, Galloway, and Co., Manchester.] Fishing Rights-Interference with-Penalties-Action for Damages -Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96), s. 26-Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c. 71), s. 53. An action for damages and an injunction for interference with fishing rights was brought by the lessee of a dwellinghouse and premises in respect of the fishing rights belonging thereto, and the defendants were the occupiers of a mill on the stream in which the fishing rights were enjoyed. The plaintiff complained of the method adopted by the defendants in cleansing the stream and managing the sluices of the stream, and this method would be an offence under the Salmon Fishery Acts, punishable on summary conviction by justices sitting at petty sessions. An objection was taken that an action for damages for the injury to the fishery and for an injunction restraining the continuance or repetition of the acts complained of would not lie in view of the penalties imposed by the Salmon Fishery Acts. It was decided by Eve, J. (132 L. T. Jour. 417) that as the defendants' acts were acts of aggression and an invasion of the plaintiff's property, and the rights and privileges which he possessed apart from statutory provisions and which he was entitled to enjoy were seriously interfered with and sensibly curtailed by the defendants' acts, the additional fact that the doing of these acts might render the defendants liable to penalties under particular statutes did not preclude the plaintiff from claiming such relief as might be appropriate to secure to him the enjoyment of his property and rights. His Lordship followed Stevens v. Chown (84 L. T. Rep. 796; (1901) 1 Ch. 894). But the learned judge came to the conclusion, on the merits of the case, that the plaintiff had not been damaged by the obstruction even if it took place; and that the state of affairs complained of by the plaintiff was consistent with a perfectly legitimate exercise by the defendants of their control and user of their own property. The plaintiff's action therefore failed on all grounds. The plaintiff appealed. Held (dissentiente Farwell, L.J. on one point), that the Legislature had provided means for enforcing the prohibitions contained in the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1861, and that was the proper mode to deal with such a case as the present; that although an illegal act causing special and peculiar damage to the property of another person might justify an action to abate the mischief, it could not be said that any, and every, person having fishery rights on the river in question could maintain an action against the mill-owner, but some special and definite damage clearly attributable to the illegal act must be established. Held, also, that the plaintiff had failed in proving that any property right had been substantially interfered with. Appeal dismissed. [Fraser v. Fear. Ct. of App.: Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Farwell and Kennedy, L.JJ. July 1 and 27.-Counsel: for the appellant, Ernest Charles; for the respondents, R. B. D. Acland, K.C. and G. W. Ricketts. Solicitors: for the appellant, Faithfull and Owen; for the respondents, Whitehouse, Etherington, and Co., agents for Tylee, Mortimer, and Atlee, Romsey.] Practice-Particulars-False Imprisonment-Defence of reasonable and probable Cause-Particulars ordered of reasonable and probable Cause. Appeal from a decision of Bucknill, J. in chambers, affirming the master. The plaintiff was a railway guard, and the defendants G. and S. sworn constables in the employment of the G. N. Railway Company. The plaintiff alleged that G. and S. and the company by their servants or one of them had assaulted and falsely imprisoned him. The defendants pleaded that if the acts complained of had been done (which was denied) they were done by G. and S. in the execution of their duty as constables, they having reasonable and probable cause for suspicion that a felony had been in fact committed by the plaintiff, and if the plaintiff was imprisoned he was released as soon as the suspicions were shown to be mistaken. The plaintiff applied for particulars of (a) the reasonable and probable cause for suspecting the plaintiff of felony; (b) the felony alleged to have been suspected to have been committed by the plaintiff (1) as to the offence with full particulars; (2) the time and place of the commission of such offence. The answer to particulars (b), which were allowed, was as follows: "The felony referred to in the defence was the suspected theft by the plaintiff on the 20th Dec. 1911 of fish or vegetable produce at N. from the rear van of the G. N. R. train (of which the plaintiff was guard) which left G. at 7.25 a.m. and arrived at N. about 8.6 a.m." The master refused to order particulars (a), and was upheld on appeal by Bucknill, J. The plaintiff appealed. He did not ask for the names of any informants. It was argued for the plaintiff that he was entitled to the particulars as of right (Mure v. Kaye, 4 Taunt. 34) and the master had no discretion; and in any case the information would have to be given at the trial, and the plaintiff ought to be protected against surprise It was contended for the defendants that it was a matter for discretion, which had been rightly exercised on the grounds of public policy (Maass v. Gas Light and Coke Company, 104 L. T. Rep. 767; (1911) 2 K. B. 543), and that the defendants were not bound to disclose their evidence. Held (Buckley, L.J. dubitante), that the particulars of reasonable and probable cause for suspicion must be given one month before the commission day of the N. Assizes-names of witnesses not to be given. [Green v. Garbutt and others. Ct. of App.: Vaughan Williams, Fletcher Moulton, and Buckley, L.JJ. June 19 and July 26.-Counsel: for the appellant, Hugo Young, K.C. and Tinsley Lindley; for the respondents, McCardie. Solici tors: Pattinson and Brewer, for Fox and Manning, Nottingham; R. Hill Dawe.] Principal and Agent-Negligent Driving of Agent-Agent temporarily employed by Principal's Manager on Manager's private Business on Car appropriated exclusively to Use of a Customer -Agent bound to obey lawful Orders of Manager-Scope of Agent's Employment-Liability of Principal. Appeal from the decision of Pickford, J. with a jury. The plaintiff alleged that he had been injured by the negligent driving of a motor-car driven by the defendant company's servant, B. The defence was that B. at the time of the acci dent was not acting within the scope of his employment. It appeared that the car had been specially fitted by the defendants for G. H., and specially assigned under a subsisting agreement by them to his exclusive use, and at the time of the accident B. was driving A., the general manager of the defendants' yard, to some destination for A.'s own personal pleasure or convenience. It was B.'s duty to obey the rightful orders of A. B. had no knowledge that the order which A. gave him was an order which A. had no right to give. The jury awarded the plaintiff £350 as damages, and judgment was entered accordingly. The defendants appealed. Held, that the defence founded upon the car not being at the disposal of the defendants, because it was at the time of the accident by agreement appropriated exclusively to the use of G. H., failed. B., the servant of the defendants, by a direction given by A., the manager, whose directions it was B.'s duty to the defendants to obey, drove the car on the day of the acci dent. That did not prevent B. in driving being the servant of the defendants, since he drove in pursuance of the direction of A., whose directions B., by his duty to the defendants, was bound to carry out. The defendants were therefore liable. Appeal dismissed. [Irwin v. Waterloo Taxi-cab Company Limited. Ct. of App.: Vaughan Williams, Fletcher Moulton, and Buckley, L.JJ. June 25 and July 25.-Counsel: Shortt, K.C. and T. C. P. Gibbons; Clavell Salter, K.C. and Tindale Davis. Solicitors: Johnstone and Wiley; Simpson, Thomas, and Clarke.] Will-Construction-Annuitant-Remainder-" My then Next of Kin according to the Statutes" of Distribution-Time for ascer taining Class-Artificial Class-Domicil of Testator-Inquiry as .to. " A testator left all his property upon trust (inter alia) to pay an annuity to his brother and to accumulate income, with remainder after his brother's death "for such person or persons as shall upon the death of my said brother be my then next of kin according to the Statutes of Distribution. The testator's brother commenced an action for the purpose of determining (inter alia) who were entitled in remainder to himself. This point was not decided until after his death, when his trustees revived the action for the purpose of obtaining a decision. It was decided by Joyce, J. (129 L. T. Jour. 264), following Re Sturge and Great Western Railway Company (45 L. T. Rep. 787; 19 Ch. Div. 444), that the persons entitled in remainder were an artificial class composed of the person or persons who would have been the testator's next of kin according to the Statutes of Distribution if he had lived up to and died immediately after the death of his brother. The plaintiffs appealed. On the appeal coming on for hearing on the 8th Nov. 1910, the objection was taken that Joyce, J. was wrong in deciding the case according to English Law, but that the law which really governed the matter was Scottish law, inasmuch as the testator, it was contended, was domiciled in Scotland; and that the first question to be determined was where the testator was domiciled. Dicey's Conflict of Laws (1st edit., pp. 519, 635) was cited. An inquiry was accordingly directed by the Court of Appeal as to the domicil of the testator, and the appeal was ordered to stand over until that question had been determined. On the appeal being now restored to the list, the court was informed that a compromise of the rights of the parties had been come to which would render a decision on the points raised unnecessary. [Re McFee; McFee v. Toner; Edwards v. Toner. Ct. of App.: Cozens-Hardy, M.R., Farwell and Kennedy, L.JJ. Nov. 8, 1910, and July 30, 1912.-Counsel: Hughes, K.C. and Courthope Wilson; Grant, K.C. and Stuart Deacon; Younger, K.C. and R. W. Baxter; John Rutherford; Charles Bray. Solicitors: Donnison and Edwards, Liverpool; Simpson, North, Harley, and Co., Liverpool; Harling and Cook, Liverpool, agents for Armitage, Sykes, and Hinchcliffe, Huddersfield; Robin P. Hamp, agent for T. Smith, Sculcoates.] HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE.-CHANCERY DIVISION. Administration-Executor of Executor-Liability of one Estate to account to other-Right of Retainer-Creditor's Application to compel Exercise of Right. The defendant was the executor of the will of F., deceased, who had been executor and legal personal representative of M., deceased, and in that capacity had, as was alleged, received and got in assets of M.'s estate, which was insolvent at the time of M.'s death. The defendant, as executor of the will of F., from time to time received assets of F.'s estate. An order was made in a creditor's administration suit for the administration of M.'s estate, and a similar order for the administration of F.'s estate. This was an application in the latter suit by a creditor of M.'s estate for an order that the defendant be directed to exercise for the benefit of M.'s estate his right of retainer over the assets in his possession as executor of F. in respect of moneys belonging to the estate of M. which were in the hands of F. at the time of his death, or in respect of which he was then indebted or otherwise liable to account to the said estate. It was contended by the applicant that the defendant had constituted himself trustee of M.'s will and that as such he was entitled to exercise his right of retainer, and was bound so to do when called upon by creditors of M.'s estate. Re Ridley (91 L. T. Rep. 189; (1904) 2 Ch. 774), Re Benett (94 L. T. Rep. 72; (1906) 1 Ch. 216), Fox v. Garrett (1 L. T. Rep. 474; 28 Beav. 16), Re Faithfull (57 L. T. Rep. 14), Sander v. Heathfield (31 L. T. Rep. 400; L. Rep. 19 Eq. 21), and Re Morris (30 L. T. Rep. 596; L. Rep. 10 Ch. 68) were referred to. Held, that, there being no debt due from F.'s estate to M.'s estate, but a liability to account merely, the defendant could not be compelled to exercise his right of retainer in favour of the creditors of M.'s estate. [Re Funnell; Dyne v. Funnell. Ch. Div.: Joyce, J. July 4, 9, 17, and 18.-Counsel: for the applicant, H. S. Q. Henriques; for the plaintiff in the action, Rand; for the defendant, Owen Thompson. Solicitors: Walker and Rowe; Bird and Eldridge; Welfare and Welfare.] National Insurance-Compulsorily insurable Persons-Curates and Assistant Curates-Contract of Service or Contract for Services -National Insurance Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 55), s. 1 (1), (2); sched. 1, part 1 (a)—Pluralities Act 1838 (1 & 2 Vict. c. 106). Motion by Insurance Commissioners under sect. 66, subsect. 1 (iii.), of the National Insurance Act 1911 to have it determined by the court whether curates and assistant curates are compulsorily insurable persons under the Natioual Insurance Act. Since the Pluralities Act 1838 (1 & 2 Vict. c. 106), curates have received a licence from the bishop of the diocese to work in a parish in his diocese, the ordinary procedure being that the incumbent nominates the curate to the bishop and the bishop thereupon issues the licence. During the past nine years the bishops have by arrangement adopted the practice of issuing less formal licences not stamped or under seal, but in writing, appointing probationary curates for a period of three months." The question was whether either of these classes of curates were persons compulsorily insurable under the Act. Counsel for the Crown said that in order to come within the provisions of the National Insurance Act persons must be under a contract of service. This was a very different thing from a contract for services. On this point he referred to Sadler v. Henlock (4 E. & B. 570), Yewens v. Noakes (6 Q. B. Div. 530), and Simmons v. Heath Laundry Company (102 L. T. Rep. 210; (1910) 1 K. B. 543). Counsel for a vicar contended that there certainly could not be any relationship of master and servant between a vicar and his curate. The curate was appointed at the nomination of the vicar by the bishop to render assistance to the vicar. Counsel for a curate not fully licensed submitted that in his case, at any rate, the relation of master and servant did exist, because the vicar could dismiss him without the consent of the bishop. Held, that a curacy, whether held under a licence or under a temporary permission, was an ecclesiastical office, and that the rights and duties of curates were accordingly not defined by contract at all. If a vicar and curate were in the position of master and servant, a very serious common law liability might attach to the vicar from which he ought to be exempt, and which is evidently never intended by the relationship of the parties as at present constituted. Curates are accordingly not compulsorily insurable persons within the meaning of the National Insurance Act. [Re_Employment of Curates or Assistant Curates in the Church of England. Ch. Div.: Parker, J. July 27.-Counsel: The Attorney-General and Sargant; Romer, K.C. and AustenCartmell; Errington; Manning. Solicitors: Treasury Solicitor Light and Fulton; Paterson, Čandler, and Sykes.] National Insurance-Manual Labour-Dairyman's ForemanTailor's Cutter-National Insurance Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 55). By sect. 1 (1) of the National Insurance Act 1911 (1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 55), all persons of the age of sixteen and upwards who are employed must be insured, with certain exceptions. In the 2nd schedule (g), employment otherwise than by way of manual labour and at a rate of remuneration exceeding in value £160 a year is excepted. The commissioners under sect. 66 of the Act referred to the court the question whether dairymen's foremen and tailors' cutters who received more than £160 per annum were within the Act. Held, that, though dairymen's foremen might perform manual labour, the question was whether that was the real substantial employment for which they were engaged, or whether it was not incidental or accessory to it. Even if assisting to lift churns was incidental to the employment, such labour was not the labour for which they were substantially engaged, which was that of branch managers. Held, therefore, that dairymen's foremen were not within the Act. As to the tailor's cutter, the actual labour of cutting out cloth might be manual labour, but the position he really occupied was that of a manager of a business department. His duties were therefore substantially not those involving manual labour. Held, therefore, that tailors' cutters receiving more than £160 per annum are not within the Act. [Re National Insurance Act 1911. Swinfen Eady, J. July 30.-Counsel: The Attorney-General and Sargant; Russell, K.Č. and Stokes; Peck; M. Macnaghten. Solicitors: Solicitor to the Treasury; Dod, Longstaffe, and Co.] KING'S BENCH DIVISION. Extradition-Discharge of Prisoner owing to Error in ProcedureObtaining Money by cheating at Cards-Subsequent Application for Extradition on same Charge-Obtaining Cheque by false Pretences-Extradition Treaty with Germany of 1872, art. 4. Rule for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain the release of one S. (the applicant for the rule), who had been committed to prison for the purpose of being extradited to Germany on a charge of having in 1909 obtained money by false pretences from Lieutenant Von D., a German officer, by cheating at cards. It appeared from the affidavits that the applicant, under another name, was introduced to a young German officer named Von D. by another man named H. This introduction was followed by a luncheon party in Berlin, and after the luncheon, at which a considerable quantity of drink was consumed, the three men adjourned to an hotel where rouge et noir was played, the game consisting simply in turning up cards and betting whether they would be black or red. The lieutenant and the prisoner played against H., and in a very short time the lieutenant had lost £4000 (80,000 marks), for which he gave a bill of exchange. The allegation was that this sum had been obtained from him by cheating at cards, the prisoner and H. being supposed to be acting in concert. In Oct. 1910 a request was made to this country by the German Government for the extradition of the prisoner S., and between that date and March 1912 the prisoner was in India. An application was made for his extradition from India to Germany. The case came before the magistrate at Alipur, when the prisoner's counsel asked for an adjournment for the purpose of calling evidence from Europe. The magistrate refused to adjourn the case and committed the prisoner. The case then came before the High Court at Calcutta, under sect. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in a proceeding of the nature of habeas corpus." The High Court discharged the prisoner, being of opinion that, although a primâ facie case had been made out, the proceeding before the magistrate was irregular, as the prisoner was not given the opportunity of calling evidence on his' behalf, and 66 under the Indian law he was entitled to call such evidence. The prisoner came to England and he was arrested, and the present proceedings taken for his extradition upon the same facts as before. He was committed by the magistrate at Bowstreet for extradition. Sect. 5 of the Habeas Corpus Act 1679 (31 Car. 2, c. 2) provides that no person who has been set at large upon any habeas corpus shall be again imprisoned or committed for the same offence; and by art. 4 of the Extradition Treaty with Germany of 1872 extradition is not to take place if the person claimed has already been tried and discharged or punished for the crime for which his extradition is demanded. In support of the application it was pointed out that the proceedings were the same as those taken in India-namely, that there was no primâ facie case against the prisoner-and that as he had been discharged in India he could not be recommitted in England on the same charge (sect. 5 of the Habeas Corpus Act 1679), and that apart from sect. 5 the right to sue for a habeas corpus was granted at common law on the principle that no one ought to be twice vexed for the same offence, and that under art. 4 of the treaty the prisoner was entitled to his discharge, as he had been already "tried and discharged" in India for the crime for which his extradition was now demanded. Held, that the fact that the prisoner had been released in India owing entirely to an error in the proceedings and not upon the merits was not a trial and discharge of the prisoner within the meaning of the treaty, and was no answer to other proceedings in this country upon the same charge; that there was a prima facie case made out; and, further, that under sect. 17 of the Gaming Act 1845 by obtaining the cheque for the money the prisoner could have been indicted for obtaining money or a valuable thing by false pretences. Rule dis`charged. [Rex v. Governor of Brixton Prixon; Ex parte Stallmann. K. B. Div.: Lord Alverstone, C. J., Darling and Phillimore, JJ. July 25.-Counsel: The Attorney-General, the SolicitorGeneral, Rowlatt, and Bodkin; Danckwerts, K.C.. Elliott, K.C., Curtis Bennett, and St. John Hutchinson. Solicitors: Director of Public Prosecutions; C. F. Appleton.] Insurance (Marine)-Policy-Assignment of-Concealment-Innocent Assignee-Marine Insurance Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 41), s. 50 (2). The plaintiffs claimed in respect of a total loss under policies of marine insurance on the steamship British Standard which were subscribed by the defendants. The plaintiffs were shipbuilders at Sunderland, and on the 16th Sept. 1909 they made a contract with T. B. and Co., of Cardiff, to build a steamship for the sum of £32,500, of which £6000 was to be payable by instalments on or before delivery, and the balance by approved acceptances. By way of security the purchasers agreed to execute a mortgage of the vessel, and hand over an assignment of policies of insurance upon the steamer. T. B. and Co. then formed a company called the British Standard Steamship Company to acquire and work the steamer, of which they were the managing owners, and on the 16th April 1910 they executed a statutory mortgage of the steamer to the plaintiffs to secure the amount due to them, and also executed a deed of covenant to indorse and deliver to the mortgagees all and every policy of insurance effected upon and in respect of the steamer. The company instructed G. M. and Co. to effect various insurances in respect of the ship, and on the 22nd April 1910 a policy of marine insurance was subscribed by the L. Company for £1698 upon hull and materials valued at £20,000 and inachinery and boilers valued at £12,000, the usual perils being insured against. Another policy subscribed by the O. Company was in similar terms and for a like amount. Other policies on hull and machinery were effected to the total amount of £32,000. G. M. and Co. also effected on behalf of the company insurances for £8000 on freight, £5500 on dis. bursements, and £3300 on premiums, and these insurances were disclosed when the policies on hull and machinery were being effected. T. B. and Co. also effected other policies of insurance with clubs for £6500 on disbursements and management, but this fact was not disclosed when the policies in question were effected. On the 14th April 1910 G. M. and Co., at the request of the company, informed the plaintiffs that they held the policies at the plaintiffs' disposal. On the 25th May 1910 the British Standard was totally lost, and the company brought an action against the W. M. Company upon a policy subscribed by them. Hamilton J. held that the policy was voidable on the ground that B. and Co. had concealed the fact that they had effected other insurances on disbursements for £6500 in addition to those effected through G. M. and Co. It was contended in the present case on behalf of the plaintiffs that although a policy of marine insurance might be voidable against the original assured on the ground of concealment, it did not follow that it was voidable as against an innocent assignee of the policy, and that the defence did not arise "out of a contract" within the meaning of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, s. 50 (2). It was argued on behalf of the defendants that in all contracts of marine insurance it was an implied term that there should be full disclosure of material facts. Held, that the contract was voidable on the ground' of concealment of a material fact. [William Pickersgill and Sons Limited v. London and Provincial General Insurance Company Limited; Same v. Ocen Marine Insurance Company Limited. K. B. Div. Com. Ct: Hamilton, J. July 30.-Counsel: Bailhache, K.C. and Leck; Leslie Scott, K.C. and Mackinnon. Solicitors: Pritchard and Sons, for Simey and Iliff, Sunderland; Waltons and Co.] PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. DIVORCE BUSINESS. Divorce-Decree nisi granted to Husband Intervention by King's Proctor-Adultery by Petitioner proved-Discretion of Court invoked-Principles affecting Exercise of Discretion-Decree nisi rescinded. By his petition, dated the 2nd June 1910, A. E. M. prayed for a divorce by reason of the adultery of his wife E. M. with J. W. S. from about the 21st May 1910. The suit was undefended, and on the 14th Oct. 1910 a decree nisi was pronounced. The King's Proctor intervened, and by his plea, dated the 24th April 1911, alleged (inter alia) that the petitioner had himself committed adultery on or about the 4th and 5th July 1907. By his answer the petitioner pleaded (inter alia) a denial of the alleged adultery; alternatively, that if he com mitted adultery it had been condoned by his wife, who was a woman of drunken and dissolute habits who had repeatedly sold up homes he had provided for her and had frequently committed adultery since the 5th July 1907. The court, having found that the petitioner had committed adultery, was asked to exercise its discretion under sect. 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 in his favour notwithstanding. Held, that, where it was shown that the misconduct of the petitioner had been fully forgiven and completely condoned by the other party, the court ought to exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner unless there were special or aggravating circumstances in the case, or unless strong overriding public reasons existed for denying the relief; but in the present case, not being satisfied that the condonation by the wife had been established, and also that the petitioner had not disclosed the facts on the hearing of his petition and had denied on oath the adultery which was found proved, the court declined to exercise its discretion in his favour, and rescinded the decree nisi. [Munzer v. Munzer and Swain. P. Div.: Sir S. T. Evans, P. Feb. 2, July 19 and 29.-Counsel: for the King's Proctor, Rawlinson, K.C. and D. Cotes-Preedy; for the petitioner, W. H. Owen and Whitfield-Hayes. Solicitors: King's Proctor; Fisher and Stephens, for F. C. Payne, Hull.] LAW LIBRARY. Limited Liability Companies. By J. ASHTON CROSS. Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. Limited. In this book a full statement of the law and practice is first given with all the cases likely to be useful, and this is followed by fifty pages of precedents. The Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 is then given, and there is one full inclusive index. The book is so arranged as to appeal to all classes who may consult it-directors, secretaries, law students, and practising lawyers alike. The cases given-over 250-have been carefully selected, and usually only one is given on a particular point. The author has arranged to print a list of all necessary corrections and additions that will keep the work up to date in Oct. 1913, 1914, and 1915, and these will be sent free to all purchasers of the book. A Summary of the Law of Torts. By JOHN W. SALMOND. Stevens and Haynes. MR. SALMOND's large work on the Law of Torts is well known to students and practitioners. This abridgment is a concession to those readers who either have not time or lack the inclination to read the larger work, and Mr. Salmond has well summarised and digested the subject. Works of this description are of great value when properly used, and not merely considered as substitutes for the larger works. AD tion The Law Relating to Tithe Rentcharge. By PERCY WILLIAM MILLARD. Butterworth and Co.; Shaw and Sons. THIS book is a successful attempt to supply the need for a single work containing the law on this subject, and it gives the law as to tithe rentcharge and other payments in lieu of tithe in a clear and concise form. Hitherto those who wished to inform themselves on points in connection with it had to consult the numerous works through which the law is scattered. Each of the thirteen chapters of this book deals with a separate division of the subject, beginning with the nature and history of English tithes. There are tables of statutes and of cases, and the Tithe Act 1891 is given in an appendix, followed by rules and forms under this same Act. The Supreme Court and the Constitution. By CHarles A. BEARD. The Macmillan Company. 66 MR. BEARD, writing from Columbia University, treats of the ! United States Supreme Court, and his book is an expansion el of an article which appeared this year in the Political Science St Quarterly. Did the framers of the Federal Constitution intend that the Supreme Court should pass upon the Constitutionality of Congress?" is the text of his first chapter, high authorities having recently given the question an emphatic negative. Mr. Beard quotes largely from "the Fathers," and concludes with an account of the celebrate fer case of Marbury v. Madison. the atif We have received Mews' Digest of English Case Law, the quarterly issue for July, containing cases reported from the 1st Jan. to the 1st July. It is a joint publication by Stevens and Sons Limited and Sweet and Maxwell Limited. Messrs. Vacher and Sons Limited have sent us The Land Union's Handbook on Provisional Valuations. The genesis of this book was a MS. prepared by Mr. Ernest Watson, an assistant secretary of the Land Union, for private publication. The rights of publication were acquired by the executive committee of the Land Union, considerable additional matter was incorporated, and the whole subjected to revision by some members of the all legal committee. The book gives general advice to owners of land and house property in dealing with valuations under the Finance (1909-10) Act, as amended by the Revenue Act 1911. Statutes and forms are given in an appendix. ader Messrs. G. E. Brown and Alexander Mackie have written a useful little handbook on Photographic Copyright (Henry Greenwood and Co.). Having been closely connected with photography during the past four years, they have been continuously consulted on matters of photographic copyright, and their deductions with regard to the new Copyright Act are embodied in these pages. The Act is given in an appendix, likewise the unrepealed parts of the Copyright Act 1862. Parts 11 and 12 of vol. 7 of Mr. Herman Cohen's Criminal Appeal Cases (Stevens and Haynes) having appeared, that volume 18 now complete, containing the cases reported from Sept. 1911 to the 17th June of this year. Practitioners intending to subscribe to the new volume will save a small sum if they do so in advance. The International Law Directory for 1912, its twenty-first annual issue (Butterworth and Co.), established by Mr. Philip Graburn Kime, is a useful book of reference for the office table. It Commercial Laws of the World. Vol. 15. Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancery-lane. Price 42s. net. Chitty's Statutes of Practical Utility. Vol. 8. Sixth Edition. 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SITTINGS OF THE COURTS. FOR THE WEEK ENDING SATURDAY, AUG. 10. * Aberavon, Tuesday Bath, Thursday (By at 11), at 10 Burnley,* Thursday and Friday, at 10 Burton, Wednesday (R. By), at 11.30 Camelford, Thursday, at 11.30 Doncaster, Wednesday, at 10 Faringdon, Saturday, at 10 Halifax, Tuesday and Friday (R. at Jarrow, Tuesday, at 10 Lichfield, Tuesday (J.S.) Okehampton, 1uesday, at 10 Pontefract, Tuesday and Wednesday, at 10 Portsmouth, Thursday (By at 12), at 10.30 Rawtenstall, Tuesday, at 9 Reading, Thursday (R. By at 2) and Friday (R. By at 2), at 10 Redhill, Wednesday, at 10 Ripon, Saturday, at 9.30 Sheffield, Thursday (By at 2) and Shrewsbury,* Friday and Saturday, at 10 Skipton, Wednesday, at 9.45 Wellington (Salop),* Tuesday, at No return from Circuit 3. *Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary. RECENT DECISION. NATIONAL INSURANCE ACT AND JUDGMENT SUMMONSES. AT the Downham County Court, on the 18th July, His Honour Judge Mulligan, K.C., said : say, This is the first day of holding the court at Downham since the National Insurance Act came into operation. I have to consider its provisions here in relation to the judgment summonses now before me. With its political aspect, needless to I have nothing whatever to do. But it is, as all statutes are, the enacted wisdom of Parliament, and as such its provisions are binding on me. In this court they are the highest law. Now those provisions have drastic and far-reaching effects upon the work of County Courts. Under this Act most of those who appear as defendants-all, in fact, except perhaps the undischarged bankrupt are subjected to a new liability of from 2s. to 1s. per month, which constitutes a paramount charge upon their earnings. This charge in substance, though not in form, overrides judgments already given for payment by instalments. Take, for instance, the case of Bunting and Co. v. Anthony. There Anthony was ordered to pay a judgment by instalments of 28. a month on the footing that his free earnings remaining, after deducting what was essential to eke out a bare subsistence, amounted to 2s. a month and no more. If the free earnings had been more, the instalments would have been larger. Anthony is an agricultural labourer with a family, and under the Act has to contribute 3d. per week. Thus the Act takes away 1s. per month and reduces his free earnings by ls. a month. This reduction is an essential element, and must be taken into account when the court has to consider the " means" which a defendant has at his disposal for payment of the judgment debt before any just order for imprisonment can be made. Having regard to the altered circumstances, as he has only 1s. a month free, I commit him for ten days, suspended on payment of ls. per month. The alteration made by the Act must be considered not only on applications to commit, but in fixing hereafter the instalments by which judgment debts are to be paid. Where a labourer prior to the Act would have been ordered to pay 3s. a month, he may now be unable to pay more than 2s. To apply these observations to the other judgment summonses now before me. [The judge then dealt with the applications one by one.] His Honour, continuing, said: The result in these cases may well startle and astound the trade creditors. They are hit hard at present; but they can minimise such hardships hereafter. They need not give fresh credit. Hardships may or may not result to the employed. Whether the operation of the Act will open or whether it will shut the doors of bakers, grocers, coal dealers, and others at the approach of the needy workman in seasons of calamity, time alone can tell. Meanwhile I must give full effect to the Act. I must administer the law as I find it. and the grand jury. If a prisoner has once been tried for a particular offence upon certain evidence and has been acquitted, he cannot again be tried for that offence upon the same facts, even though the acquittal was in a summary proceeding before the magistrates: (Wemyss v. Hopkins, 33 L. T. Rep. 9; L. Rep. 10 Q. B. 378). It has often been pointed out that the plea of autrefois acquit is of no avail unless the prisoner can show that he was actually in peril of a conviction on the first trial, and that the conviction on the first trial would have been good in law. Again, the evidence necessary to support the indictment on the second trial must be such as would have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the indictment or charge preferred at the first trial: (Rex v. Clark, 1 B. & B. 473). The crime with which the prisoner is charged must be the same as that in connection with which he was put in peril on the first occasion, or so nearly the same that the same facts, if proved, would support the indictment or charge in each case: (Rex v. Vandercomb, 2 East P. C. 519). In fact, the decisions of the courts of late years have tended to show that the offences which are charged against the person pleading autrefois acquit must be identical. Thus in Reg. v. Miles (3 Crim. App. Rep. 13) the Court of Criminal Appeal held that a prisoner charged with an offence against sect. 7 of the Prevention of Crimes Act 1871 could not successfully plead autrefois acquit to the indictment on the ground that he had previously been acquitted on the same evidence on an indictment for larceny. This case seems to have gone somewhat further than the previous decisions. An acquittal of a person charged as a principal is no bar to a subsequent indictment of such person as an accessory after the fact (2 Hawk c. 35, s. 11); and under the ancient common law as an accessory before the fact. If the prisoner pleading autrefois acquit was not liable to be legally convicted at the first trial owing to a defect in the indictment or other irregularity, he was never in peril within the meaning of the common law rule above quoted and the plea will not avail him: (Reg. v. Green, 7 Cox C. C. 186). The same rules, mutatis mutandis, apply to the pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois attaint, which is, however, practially obsolete, as attainders for treason and felony were abolished in 1870. CRIMINAL LAW AND THE JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES. Pleas in Bar. AN interesting point was raised this week before the Divisional Court upon a rule nisi for a habeas corpus. The person on whose behalf the rule was obtained had been arrested in India and committed for extradition to Germany for an offence in connection with obtaining money by false pretences. The High Court in India had directed his discharge on the ground of some informality in the proceedings before the magistrate. On the arrival in England of the applicant, he was rearrested, and a requisition was made for his surrender to the foreign power upon the same charges as had been previously preferred against him. It was argued on his behalf that he was entitled to be discharged from custody, on the ground, amongst others, that he had already been acquitted of the charge, and was not liable to be retried or put in peril again for the same offence. It is an old-established rule of the common law that a man may not be put twice in peril for the same offence. This rule was rightly held to have no application in the case above referred to, inasmuch as a committal for extradition is in no sense a trial of the offence with which a prisoner is charged, so that the prisoner is not put in peril in the sense which the old common law rule contemplates. This is further illustrated by the fact that, as often occurs, a prisoner who has been committed for trial by a magistrate may be tried, although the grand jury find no true bill against him, on the coroner's inquisition, which has proceeded upon the same facts as were before the magistrate LEGISLATION. Cruelty to Animals. WITH a considerable backing, a Bill designed to amend the existing law protecting animals from pain commences its career at a late stage of the session. Doubtless its introduction now is designed to prepare for a more hopeful state of affairs at a later date. The scheme of the Bill, entitled the Veterinary Operations (Anaesthetics) Bill, is to schedule certain operations. One of the schedules refers to eight special operations upon horses, the second mentions two concerning dogs, and the third schedule again relates to horses. With regard to the operations concerned in scheds. 1 and 2, the animal must be during the whole of the operation under the influence of some general anesthetic of sufficient power to prevent it feeling pain. The operations set out in sched. 3 are not to be performed upon horses unless during the whole of it the animal is under some general or local anaesthetic of sufficient power to prevent it feeling pain. special sub-clause deals with castration of bulls or pigs. This is not to be allowable after the animal is six months old unless it is performed to cure or alleviate some disease or the effect of some accident. The Bill contains, however, no direct provision in favour of anesthetising bulls or pigs, nor does it touch in any way on the operations constantly performed on cats and cocks. Power is, however, given to the Board of Agriculture and Fisheries to add other operations to those specified in these schedules. This will make for elasticity as regards the oper tions, and it is possible for the board by order to extend any provision to any domestic animal to which it does not apply with such modifications and additions as may appear to the board to be necessary. There are sundry provisions as to the publication of a draft of such orders in order to safeguard against some A |