rents were sold and the proceeds reinvested in Consols, a larger sum being obtained than if the Consols had never been sold, owing to the depreciation of Consols. The applicant consulted a solicitor in 1906, independent accountants furnished accounts from 1899 to 1906, and her solicitors stated they were satisfied. With all this information the applicant applied to the Public Trustee for an investigation and audit of the trust account under the Public Trustee Act 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 55), s. 13. Having regard to all the circumstances, the Public Trustee came to the conclusion that the applicant acted unreasonably, and he therefore directed that she should bear the costs of the audit and investigation. Swinfen Eady, J. Solicitors: Parkin; Held, that the Public Trustee was right. [Re Utley; Russell v. Cubitt. Ch. Div.: May 4.-Counsel: Willis; Morton Smith. George Thatcher.] Revenue-Reversion Duty-Increment Value Duty-Provisional Valuation-Costs of checking Valuation-Rights of Remainderman-Duty of Trustees-Duty of Tenant for Life-Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 (10 Edw. 7, c. 8), ss. 1, 26, 27, 39 (1). This was a summons to determine whether capital moneys might be expended in paying various duties and charges arising under the Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 in respect of a settled estate at Broxbourne which was in process of being developed. It was contended that it was very desirable in such a case as this for the advantage of the estate that the valuations made under the Act should be checked by somebody, and that under such circumstances the costs of such checking of valuations should be paid out of capital. Counsel referred to the recent case of Re Knolly's Settlement; Saunders v. Haslam (106 L. T. Rep. 421) as laying it down that there is no general duty imposed upon trustees by the Act to check these valuations, and contended that they should be checked by the tenant for life, and that the tenant for life was liable to pay the costs of such checking. The tenant for life contended that such costs ought to be paid out of capital. Parker, J. said that, while he had not sufficient material on which to lay down any definite principle of general application he would express his opinion that increment value duty and reversion duty chargeable under the Act might be paid out of capital, and in this particular case he gave the trustees liberty to take such steps as are advisable and reasonable to test the valuations, and expressed the opinion that in the circumstances of this particular estate it was a proper case for the trustees to intervene. [Re Smith-Bosanquet's Settled Estates; Re Settled Land Acts 1882 to 1890. Ch. Div.: Parker, J. May 8.-Counsel: Northcote; Dighton Pollock; Ashworth James. Solicitors: Trower, Still, and Co.; Thorowgood, Tabor, and Hardcastle.] KING'S BENCH DIVISION, IN BANKRUPTCY. Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Notice- "In Accordance with the Terms of the Judgment-Sum claimed correct-Not invalidated by necessary Variation of Terms-Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 4, sub-s. 1 (g). On the 12th Sept. 1908 the debtor was sued by E. and Co. for £41 3s. 11d., and on the 14th Sept. he paid £22 on account of this sum. On the 3rd Oct. E. and Co. obtained judgment by default against him for £23 18s. 11d., balance of debt and costs, together with the sum of £1 2s. further costs. On the 23rd Oct. the debtor paid to E. and Co. a further sum of £5 in respect of this debt. On the 10th Feb. 1912 a bankruptcy notice was served upon the debtor by E. and Co. for the balance of £21 18s. 11d., and in the margin of the notice this sum was said to be arrived at in the following manner: Balance of debt, £14 38. 11d.; costs, £5 17s. ; interest, £1 18s. Within the time. limited by the notice the debtor tendered the sum of £16 11s. 11d. (being the amount claimed less the sum of £5 17s. for costs) in satisfaction, but this was refused, and on the 5th March three creditors, of whom E. and Co. were one, filed a bankruptcy petition alleging as an act of bankruptcy non-compliance with the notice of the 10th Feb., and on this petition a receiving order was made in the St. Albans County Court on the 2nd April. Against this order the debtor appealed, on the ground that the bankruptcy notice was invalid, in that it did not comply with the terms of the judgment, and that the analysis of the claim in the margin of the notice was calculated to embarrass and mislead him. Held, that, as a creditor may lawfully accept part payment of a judgment debt and then serve a bankruptcy notice for the balance due, E. and Co. must be deemed to have served a good bankruptcy notice within the meaning of sect. 4, subsect. 1 (g), since the amount claimed in the notice was not in excess of the amount still owing to them under the judgment, and the variation from the terms of the judgment to be found in the notice did not mislead or embarrass the debtor. [Re A Debtor; Ex parte The Debtor v. The Petitioning Creditors and the Official Receiver. K. B. Div. in Bank. : Phillimore and Bray, JJ. May 7.-Counsel: J. Brooke Little; G. C. Rankin. Solicitors: A. R. and H. Steele; Elvy Robb and Co.] Bankruptcy-Petition dismissed by Court of First_InstanceReceiving Order subsequently made and antedated by Court of Appeal-Payments by Bankrupt into his Banking Account during Interval-Protected Transactions—Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 49. H. G. T. carried on business as a solicitor in Leeds. During 1909 he became involved in expensive litigation with his wife, and on the 11th May 1910 Mrs. T. obtained judgment against him for £118 0s. 11d. A bankruptcy notice was subsequently served upon him in respect of this judgment, and, upon his failure to comply therewith before the 27th May, a bankruptcy petition was filed against him by Mrs. T. on the 3rd June. On the 22nd July Mrs. T.'s petition was dismissed, but on the 24th Oct. the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and directed the receiving order to be dated back to the 22nd July. Adjudication followed on the 8th Dec., and on the 10th Dec. H. G. B. was appointed trustee. Between the 22nd July and the 24th Oct. H. G. T. continued in practice and paid various sums into his account at the U. of L. and S. Bank in Leeds. These sums amounted to £210, and the bank honoured his cheques drawn on this account to the amount of £349. The bank had no notice of the commission of an act of bankruptcy nor of the making of a receiving order against their client until the 25th Nov. On. the 25th March 1912 the trustee applied in the Leeds County Court for an order entitling him to recover the sum of £210 from the bank, on the ground that the payments by the bankrupt after the date of the receiving order were not protected transactions, and that the sum of £210 formed part of the bankrupt's estate. The application was dismissed by His Honour Judge Graham, K.C., and the trustee thereupon appealed. On behalf of the trustee it was argued that the transactions, having taken place between the date of the receiving order, as fixed by the Court of Appeal, 'and adjudication, were not pro tected either by sect. 49 or by the doctrine in Cohen v. Mitchell (63 L. T. Rep. 206; 25 Q. B. Div. 262). For the respondents it was contended that the bank had no notice of any act of bankruptcy, and could not be adversely affected by the dating back of the order. Held, that the antedating of the receiving order could not adversely affect dealings between the bankrupt and innocent third parties in the interval of time between the date when the order ought to have been and the date when it actually was made, and that therefore the trustee was not entitled to recover the sums paid into the bank. Appeal dismissed. Leave to appeal granted. [Re H. G. Teale; Ex parte H. G. Blackburn, Trustee v. Union of London and Smiths Bank Limited. K. B. Div. in Bank. : Phillimore and Bray, JJ. April 24 and May 7.-Counsel : Hansell; Compston. Solicitors: Rossiter and Odell, for Postlethwaite and Rutherford, Leeds; Warren, Murton, and Co., for Dunning, Kay, and Armstrong, Leeds.] LAW LIBRARY. Voluntary liquidators in the Transvaal will find a practical guide in Mr. J. P. Earnshaw's Voluntary Liquidation of Companies in the Transvaal, published by Messrs. Jordan and Sons. This is an adaptation of the author's book on the English Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 to the law of the Transvaal. It includes notes on reconstructions, amalgamations, and windings-up under supervision, besides a complete set of forms. NEW EDITION. Messrs. Stevens and Sons have brought out a second edition of Mr. G. F. Assinder's Legal Position of Trade Unions. The book has been enlarged, among the additions being a full examination of the case of Mogul Steamship Company v. McGregor, Gow, and Co., and some observations on trade unionism in other countries. The Stock Exchanges Ten-Year Record, No. 6, 1912, is compiled and published by Messrs. Frederic C. Mathieson and Sons. An alphabetical index guides one at once to any particular company or corporation about which one is seeking details. The book should be useful to would-be investors. The Law Magazine and Review for May contains articles on The Increase of Railway Rates, by A. Longdale Whittaker; Irishmen at the Inns of Court, by C. E. A. Bedwell, Librarian to the Hon. Society of the Middle Temple; Concerning Riots, by Harold S. Stowe; and Medieval Industrial Courts, by Kenelm D. Cotes. BOOKS RECEIVED. Jones' Solicitors' Forms. Vol. 1. Third Edition. Effingham Wilson, 54, Threadneedle-street, E.C. Price 5s. net. Glen's Local Government Case Law 1911. Vol. 2. Local Government Review Limited, Maxwell House, Arundel-street, W.C. Commercial Lews of the World. Vol. 21 (France and Monaco). Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancery-lane. Price 42s. net. Chitty's Statutes. Vol. 7. Sixth Edition. Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancery-lane; Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancery-lane. Price 21s. net. Sweet and Maxwell Bowstead on Agency. Fifth Edition. Limited, 3, Chancery lane. Price 18s. Brice on Misrepresentation in relation to Limited Liability Companies. Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancery-lane. Price 5s. net. AN interesting point as to the power of a County Court judge to grant a new trial on the ground of misconduct of the jury was decided in Biggs v. Evans and another (132 L. T. Jour. 606). It was obvious, if reference be made to the facts, that counsel for the defendant was misled by the untimely intimation of the jury that they had heard enough of his evidence on the facts of the case, and by their request that he should forthwith tender his expert evidence. From such an intimation from a defendant's point of view, the only inference that could possibly be drawn was that the jury were, as far as the facts were concerned, satisfied that the defendant had at that time destroyed the case made out by the plaintiff. From this consideration it appears that the grant of a new trial made by the County Court judge and affirmed by the Divisional Court was the only remedy for a state of affairs which, after such conduct by the jury, resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. As a matter of law, the granting of a new trial is in the discretion of the County Court judge, and the case above referred to was rightly dealt with by the Divisional Court on the basis that there existed on the facts proper material on which the County Court judge could exercise that discretion. Not long since the question of this exercise of discretion was taken to the House of Lords for decision in the case of Brown v. Dean (102 L. T. Rep. 661; (1910) A. C. 373). In that case, upon the application for a new trial in the County Court, affidavit evidence had been adduced before the judge which threw some doubt on the successful plaintiff's evidence given in the action. The grant of a new trial was reversed on appeal, and finally in the House of Lords, mainly on the principle that when fresh evidence is so adduced it must at least be such as is presumably to be believed, and, if believed, would be conclusive in favour of the party applying. The case, however, is important as finally settling the principle that the materials on which the discretion can be exercised are the same in the County Court as in the High Court. In the case of mistake or misconduct by a jury, perhaps the greatest onus lies on the applicant when he complains of excessive or minute damages. On the question of misconduct only, the principles are so well put in Chitty's Arch 66 bold, 14th edit., at p. 737, that it is worth while to quote the passage verbatim : For the misconduct of the jury, also, the court will in general grant a new trial if the misconduct be such as to satisfy the court that the verdict has been determined on without that grave and serious deliberation, that right exercise of judgment, and that total absence of all partiality, so necessary to the proper execution of the important duties of jurymen." Variance between Verdict and Judgment. THE result of the action appearing in the case of Cresswell v. Jones and another (noted ante, p. 10), where a verdict for the plaintiff for £110 was returned, was somewhat peculiar, the plaintiff having only claimed £100. The entry of judgment for £100 made by the County Court judge and upheld in the Divisional Court seems to be perfectly logical, although it was argued contra that the verdict was, owing to the limit of jurisdiction, a nullity. The determination of this limit is under the County Courts Act 1888 generally settled by consideration of the amount claimed, except in actions relating to land and equitable actions where the value of the subject-matter is regarded. In this respect, therefore, the action as it stood for trial was regular in form, and it would be a hardship on a plaintiff in a similar position if the fact of over-assessment of damages by a jury should nullify the proceedings. The County Courts Act 1888 is silent as to the duties of a judge in entering judgment after the verdict of a jury, the only reference to such verdict being contained in sect. 102, where it is required to be unanimous. It seems also that the limit to the amount recoverable by such verdict and the consequent judgment is a matter of inference, since those sections which deal with the entry of judgment do not specifically limit the amount for which judgment may be entered, and in practice, as the costs are added to the amount recovered, the actual order drawn up often adjudges that the plaintiff do recover against the defendant a sum which exceeds the limit of the jurisdiction. In the High Court a variance similar to that in the case noted above is dealt with by an amendment of the claim to the larger amount on application to the judge before entry of judgment, but this is clearly impossible in the County Court in cases where such an amendment would nullify the effect of the statute. 66 Payment into Court after Judgment. IN sect. 105 of the County Courts Act 1888 there is a general provision ordering all money payable under a judgment to be paid into court. In practice, small amounts are so received whether they satisfy the whole of the judgment debt outstanding or are merely small payments in reduction of the debt, and there seems to be no rule which prevents the acceptance by the court officials of such small payments. In fact, it appears from Order XXIII., r. 13, of the County Court Rules that such a practice is contemplated. This is one of the features of a system which renders the County Court extremely useful to the trader as a debt-collecting machine. It seems, however, to have had an unfortunate effect in the case of Re A Debtor (noted 132 L. T. Jour. 606), where a payment, made in this way, of £10 in reduction of a judgment debt of £57 5s. 6d. invalidated a subse quent bankruptcy notice for the whole amount. It is stated in the facts that the creditors repudiated this payment and refused to recognise the registrar as their agent for the receipt of the money. The position is somewhat peculiar, for, as general rule, the creditor is thankful for the small mercy of receiving these payments on account, and is not in the habit of instructing the officials to receive the whole debt or nothing. The debtor, by virtue of the section, is not safe in paying his creditor direct unless he can get an undertaking that the creditor will put matters right with the court officials; and, further, in the absence of provisions to the contrary, there seems no reason why he cannot insist on the acceptance of any such payment by the court in order to minimise the consequences of his indebtedness. If this be the result of the rules, the wary debtor, who may by the amount of his debt be in danger of that effective form of execution—namely, a bankruptcy notice-will probably realise the advisability of immediate payment into court of an amount which would, by a suitable reduction of his debt, avoid that possibility. a SITTINGS OF THE COURTS. FOR THE WEEK ENDING SATURDAY, MAY 18. Aberayron, Thursday Aberdare, Monday Ashby-de-la-Zouch,* Thursday, at 11 Axbridge, Wednesday, at 10 Banbury, Wednesday (R. By), at 10 Barnard Castle, Monday, at 9.30 Barnsley, Thursday and Friday Barry, Tuesday, at 10 Bath, Thursday (By at 11), at 10 Bideford, Wednesday, at 10.30 Birkenhead, Friday Birmingham, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday (B. & W.C.A.), and Friday, at 10 Bishop Auckland, Tuesday and Wednesday, at 10 Bishop's Stortford, Friday, at 10 Blackburn, Monday, at 9.30 Blackpool, Wednesday, at 10 Blaenau Festiniog, Thursday, at 10 Bloomsbury, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday Boston, Friday, at 10 Bourne, Saturday, at 10.30 Bow, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday Brackley, Tuesday, at 12 Bradford (Yorks), Tuesday, at 10 Brighton, Friday (J.S. at 11.30), at 10 Burnley, Thursday and Friday, at 10 Burslem, Thursday, at 9.30 Burton, Wednesday, at 9; Thursday, at 11 Bury St. Edmunds, Tuesday Calne, Friday, at 11 Cardiff, Monday, at 11; Wednes day, Thursday, Friday, Saturday, at 10 Chapel-en-le-Frith, 10.30 and Monday, at Chelmsford, Monday, at 10 Cheltenham, Thursday and Friday Chester, Thursday Chesterfield, Friday (R. By at 2.30), at 9.30 Chichester, Wednesday Clerkenwell, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday Congleton,* Tuesday, at 10 Croydon, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday Darlington, Wednesday, at 9 Great Grimsby, Tuesday and Wed- Halifax, Friday (R. By at 10.30), at 9.30 Hastings, Monday Hereford. Tuesday, at 10 Holmfirth. Friday Horsham, Tuesday, at 11 Huddersfield, Monday, Tuesday (JS. at 9.30). Wednesday, and Thursday Hyde, Wednesday. at 10 Ilford, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday (By at 10.30), and Friday (J.S.), at 10 Lambeth, Tuesday (Reg. at 9.30), Wednesday, Thursday, Friday (Reg. at 9.30), and Saturday, at 10.30 Lampeter, Wednesday Launceston, Tuesday, at 10 Leeds, Monday (J.S. & A.O.), Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10 Leicester, Wednesday, at 10 Leominster, Monday, at 10 Llandilo, Tuesday Longton, Tuesday, at 9.30 Macclesfield, Thursday, at 10 Morpeth, Monday, at 10 Newcastle-on-Tyne, Thursday (R. Northallerton, Saturday, at 11 Nottingham, Wednesday, and Friday (E.L.), at 10 Nuneaton.* Friday, at 9 Otley, Wednesday, at 9.45 Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10 Pocklington, Monday Poole, Monday, at 10 Portmadoc Wednesday, at 10 Portsmouth, Thursday, at 10.30 Pwllheli, Tuesday, at 10 Richmond (Yorks), Thursday, at 10 Rochdaie, Monday, at 9.30 Rochester, Tuesday, Wednesday, Runcorn,* Tuesday St. Neots, Wednesday, at 11 South Shields, Thursday, at 10 Sunderland, Thursday (R. By) Westbromwich, Friday (J.S.) Weston-super-Mare, Monday, at 10 Winchester, Monday (R. By), at 11; Woodstock, Saturday (Reg.), at Woolwich, Wednesday, at 10.30 Worcester, Wednesday and Friday, at 10 Wrexham, Tuesday and Wednesday. Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary. WHERE SHALL I SEND MY Boy?-See "Public Schools at a Glance." Best and fullest information ever published. 2s. 6d. post free.Association of Standardised Knowledge, Ltd., 15, Buckinghamstreet, Adelphi, London, W.C.-[ADVT.] A CURIOUS decision was given recently by a metropolitan police magistrate upon a summons under the Merchandise Marks Act 1887, s. 2 (2). That section enacts that: "Every person who sells. any goods or things to which any false trade description is applied. shall be guilty of an offence under the Act." The facts of the case were, that a purchaser entered the defendant's shop and asked for a certain quantity of soda. The defendant then gave the purchaser a quantity of what purported to be soda in a paper bag, for which the purchaser paid. The substance so sold was not in fact soda. The magistrate held that an offence had been committed within the above section, but stated a case for the opinion of the High Court. Before the Divisional Court it was argued on behalf of the respondent (the purchaser) that a verbal description was within the statute, and that upon the facts proved the appellant (the seller) had applied a false description to the goods, although the bag in which they were sold was of plain paper and bore neither the name or any description of the article contained in it. The Divisional Court quashed the conviction on the ground that a verbal trade description was not within the meaning of the Act, and that the appellant in fact applied no trade description to the goods in question. In Coppen v. Moore (78 L. T. Rep. 520; (1898) 2 Q. B. 300) Mr. Justice Wright delivered a judgment, in which Mr. Justice Darling concurred, on the above-quoted section. The learned judge said that the Merchandise Marks Act did not apply to trade descriptions purely and entirely verbal, and that the whole of the These Act, except sect. 20 thereof, showed this to be the case. remarks were obiter dicta as far as that case was concerned, in that the court there decided that an invoice containing a description of the goods in written characters came within the section. In Langley v. Bombay Tea Company (83 L. T. Rep. 175; (1900) 2 Q. B. 460) Justices Grantham and Channell followed the above dictum of Mr. Justice Wright. There the appellant had gone into the respondents' shop and asked for two half-pounds of tea. The respondents' salesman had handed him two packets of tea, for which he paid, the packets respectively containing less than half a pound of tea. It was contended that the respondents' salesman, in merely handing over the two packets in response to the request of the appellant, had tacitly represented that each packet contained half a pound of tea, and that he had Mr. thus applied a false trade description to the goods. Justice Grantham held that his conduct did not amount to an application of any trade description, whilst Mr. Justice Channell based his judgment on the ground that a verbal description could not in any case be within the statute, saying that he followed the dictum of Mr. Justice Wright. In the case lately before the Divisional Court, it was suggested that Mr. Justice Channell's decision in the last-mentioned case was also obiter, but the court refused to incline to that view, inasmuch as the learned judge's reasons were sufficient to dispose of the appellant's contention in that case, and were conclusive against him. It was further pointed out, as had already been suggested by Mr. Justice Wright in Coppen v. Moore (sup.), that the whole scheme of the Act contemplates marks or other signs, apart from oral descriptions, which are fixed to or connected with goods. Unlawful Gaming. THE recent decision affecting the right to hold public some consternation in the whist drives will doubtless cause minds of laymen. The court upheld the conviction of the promoter of one of these contests on the ground that he used the premises, where the whist drive was held, for the purpose of unlawful gaming within sect. 4 of the Suppression of Gaming Houses Act 1854. That section provides that 'any person, being the owner or occupier, or having the use of any house, room, or place, who shall open, keep, or use the same for the purpose of unlawful gaming being carried on therein may, on summary conviction thereof before any two justices of the peace, be adjudged by such justices to forfeit and such penalty not exceeding £500 as to such justices shall seem fit. The first statute passed to deal with the user of premises for gaming was that of 1541, generally known as the Bill for maintaining artillery and debarring of unlawful games Sect. 3 thereof enacted that "no manner of person or persons, of what degree, quality, or condition soever he or they be, from the feast of the Nativity of St. John Baptist now next ensuing, shall for his or their gain, lucre, or living, keep, have, hold, occupy, exercise, or maintain any common house, alley, or place of dicing, table, or carding, or any other manner of game prohibited by any estatute heretofore made, or any unlawful game now invented or made, or any other unlawful new game hereafter to be invented, found, had, or made. Sect. 1 of the Gaming Act 1845 excepted certain games of skill from the operation of the statute of Henry VIII. The test applied in order to ascertain whether a particular game is unlawful for the purposes of sect. 4 of the Act of 1854 is whether it is a game of chance as distinguished from a game of skill. In Jenks v. Turpin (50 L. T. Rep. 808; 13 Q. B. Div. 505) the statutes and authorities dealing with this question were exhaustively reviewed by Mr. Justice Hawkins, who said: “The unlawful games, then, now are-ace of hearts, pharaoh, basset, hazard, passage, roulet, every game of dice except backgammon, and every game of cards which is not a game of mere skill; and, I incline to add, any other game of mere chance." The Divisional Court, in the case before them, held that "progressive whist" was an unlawful game within the test above stated, in that whilst it might be described as a game of chance or skill, the element of skill was so slight that it might almost be disregarded. も Sampling Milk on Delivery. AN ingenious attempt has been made to avoid the consequences of a conviction under sect. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act 1875. It will be remembered that that section makes it an offence to sell to the prejudice of the purchaser any food or drug which is not of the nature, substance, and quality of the article demanded by the purchaser. The appellant was under contract to supply a large quantity of milk at stated intervals to a local authority, and, on testing one delivery, a large percentage thereof was found to be adulterated. Sect. 14 of the above Act provides that the purchaser shall forthwith after the purchase has been completed notify the seller of his intention to have the article analysed by the public analyst, if such be his intention. This section was found to be useless in cases like that which we are quoting. Machinery was therefore provided by sect. 3 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Amendment Act 1879 whereby the article could be tested and a sample thereof taken for the purposes of analysis at the place of delivery. That section enacts that " any medical officer of health, inspector of nuisances, or inspector of weights and measures, or any inspector of a market, or any police-constable under the direction and at the cost of the local authority, appointing such officer, inspector, or constable, or charged with the execution of this Act, may procure at the place of delivery any sample of any milk in course of delivery to the purchaser or consignee in pursuance of any contract for the sale to such purchaser or consignee of such milk. The appellant contended that this section created a new offence, and that no proceedings could be taken against him under sect. 6 of the Act of 1875, as sect. 14 of that Act had not been complied with. This contention was, however, overruled by the court, who held that the proceedings were in order, and that sect. 3 of the amending Act created no offence, but was merely passed to provide an alternative method to that prescribed by sect. 14 of the principal Act. can now be FIXED INCOMES.-Houses and Residential Flats Furnished on a new system of Deferred Payments especially adapted for those with fixed incomes who do not wish to disturb investments. Selection from the largest stock in the world. Everything legibly marked in plain figures. Maple and Co. Ltd., Tottenham Court-road, London, W.-[ADVT.] SANITARY ASSURANCE.-Before renting or purchasing a house it is Jadvisable to obtain an independent report on the condition of the Drains, Sanitary Fittings, and Water Supply. Moderate fees for Sanitary Inspections on application to the Sanitary Engineering Company, 115, Victoria-street, Westminster. 'Phone, 4316 Victoria. "Sanitation," London. [ADVT.] LEGISLATION. Public-house Improvement. A BILL supported by Mr. Chamberlain, Mr. F. E. Smith, K.C., Sir A. Cripps, K.C., and other responsible promoters is brought forward with the object of removing some of the diffi. culties of the moderate reformers. The intention is to level up the public-house to something of the standard reached in the continental café, and to discourage the maintenance of premises existing solely as drinking shops. In so doing, the Bill does not modify the existing powers of police supervision, nor does it increase drink facilities. The line of action is to require the licensing justices to give all reasonable facilities for, and to impose no restrictions on, certain improvements when they are exercising their powers in the grant of permission to effect structural alterations or extensions in the case of premises to which there is attached an existing on-licence. These improvements cover the supply of food, space, comfort, cleanliness, sanitary conveniences, the provision of chairs and tables wholly or partly in lieu of bars, and the accommodation for lawful games, papers, music, gardens, and any other means of reasonable recreation. No alteration is to be permitted the chief effect of which would be, in the opinion of the justices, to increase the sale of intoxicants. An important indulgence is contemplated in regard to children. Sect. 120 of the Children Act 1908 is not to affect places which are not merely intended for the supply of liquors, but are adequately provided for the supply of food and are reasonably open, airy, commodious, cleanly, and comfortable, with good sanitary accommodation. Premises of this character can be certified by the justices, at the instance of the licence-holder, and this certificate shall give the exemption mentioned above, pro vided that the children taken upon the premises are accompanied by, and in charge of, an adult person. The Government of India. THE Bill on this subject is presented by the India Office, and its proposals are consequential upon the appointment of the separate Governor of Fort William and the number of other administrative changes made in Indian local government. It should not therefore be expected that its progress will present any special difficulties. It sets out the powers of that Governor, and makes it lawful for the Governor-General in Council to extend the provision of the Indian Councils Acts 1861 to 1909 touching the making of laws and regulations for the peace and good government of provinces under Lieutenant-Governors (including the creation of Legislative Councils) to territories for the time being under a Chief Commissioner. Control of Clubs. SEVERAL references have been made in these columns of late to attempts of various descriptions which are being made to secure some amendments in the law relating to licensing. Whilst the exigencies of legislation during this session must make the fate of every Bill depend on circumstances difficult to forecast, the benevolent attitude of the Government towards Sir A. Gelder's Bill indicates that it will not be subjected to official opposition. The Bill aims at three cardinal points-viz.: (1) Fair treatment for the publican as against the club; (2) carrying into effect as regards clubs the spirit of the earlier legislation; and (3) discouraging the promotion of drinking clubs by private individuals. The Bill is not retrospective, and clubs existing before its passage are untouched. The Bill originally contained two controversial and doubtful sub-sections. A club could be struck off the register if used mainly as a drinking club and if the premises were unsuitable. In response to representations, both these sub-sections will be dropped as setting up ambiguous standards. The experience of Leeds in connection with the expenditure of a large sum of money in extinction of a licence being neutralised by the immediate formation of a club, which, being struck off the register, reopened next day under a new name, is only that derivable in other large centres. Licensing Authorities' Demands. It is not calculated to advance the better interests of moderate reform to find justices without any power to refuse registration T 1 to clubs on payment of 5s., and the police practically without right of entry. Neither is it satisfactory to find that, while licensed premises are subject to closing hours, the club is able to compete against such premises unfairly, not only being free from the stringency of time limits, but also free from heavy duties and restrictions in respect of entertainments. Yet again the clubs are not subjected to the structural requirements laid down in the case of licensed premises. The Home Office have received copies of a very considerable number of resolutions passed by licensing authorities asking for power to deal with these anomalies, and especially to be able to deal with hours of closing, and the police have backed up these representations. When we find that the decrease of on-licences is being accompanied by a considerable augmentation in clubs, it is apparent that the Legislature must, unless its previous efforts are to be stultified, consider the position as critical. The Bill is admittedly a small one, but it secured for its second reading a majority of 141 and a benevolent speech from an Under-Secretary of State. Compensation for Taxi-Drivers. SOME two years ago the Court of Appeal decided in Doggett v. Waterloo Taxicab Company (102 L. T. Rep. 874; (1910) 2 K. B. 336) that a taxi-driver was not a "workman" within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906, on the ground that the facts disclosed justified the view that the parties stood in the relationship not so much of master and man as that of bailor and bailee, or possibly that of co-adventurers. A Bill has now been introduced to get over this decision, and it proposes to amend sect. 13 of the Act mentioned in the following manner: That section defines the term "workman," and it is proposed to include within the definition any person who hires or takes any hackney carriage from any other person. "Person" is used in a general sense so as to include persons, co-partnership company, or body of persons whether corporate or unincorporate. purpose of the hiring or taking must be plying for hire. We do not quite gather whether there is any special significance in the expression plying" so that only the normal employment of short journeys is contemplated, or whether, on the other hand, a man who is engaged driving a passenger for a day or a week-end. would also be considered to be "plying for hire with such hackney cab." The Bill expressly applies to daily or other wage, and whether or not the driver takes a percentage or portion of the cab's takings or whether there are coupled with these matters other conditions. Agricultural Holdings. The LORD LUCAS has introduced in the Lords a highly important measure which will amend the existing law relating to notices to determine tenancies. The main result would be to empower a tenant, when a landlord gives notice to quit “in connection with the sale or offering for sale of the holding," to give a counter-notice within two months. This counter-notice is to claim that the notice to quit shall not be operative until a year from its date. Upon this there are grafted a couple of provisos. If two months before the expiration of the landlord's notice a council agrees under the Small Holdings and Allotments Act 1908 to buy and notifies this to the tenant, then (a) the counter-notice ceases to operate, and (b) the landlord's notice is to be treated as having been given at the council's request with a view to the use of the land for the provision of small holdings. A notice to determine a year-to-year tenancy on a date earlier than one year from the service of the notice is to be bad, but this is not to apply to notices to end the tenancy of an allotment under sect. 30 of the Act of 1908 already mentioned.. The Bill, however, does not contemplate application to notices to quit where (a) the object is to build, or (b) the purpose is such as those specified in the Agricultural Holdings Act 1908, s. 23, or "any other industrial purpose," or (c) the tenant has committed some breach of the contract of tenancy, or (d) where there is a receiving order against the tenant. The notice must, however, state that it is so given and specify the purpose for which the land is required, and then the notice must be in length such as would nave been requisite apart from this measure. Questions arising are referred to arbitration under the Agricultural Holdings Act 1908. Trade Union Amalgamation. THE Trade Union Act 1876 contains certain provisions in regard to amalgamation which it is the object of a Bill just introduced in the House of Commons to supersede. It is suggested that any two or more of these bodies may fuse together, whether or not they choose to dissolve or divide their funds. It is, however, necessary to obtain a two-thirds majority of members voting, and it is further expressly contemplated that the decision shall be reached by a ballot after fourteen days' notice of the taking of the same and the question to be resolved thereby. The ballot is, however, to be held at the central or branch offices of the unions, and in accordance with regulations to be formulated by the executive councils of the unions. BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE. Appeal by "Person Aggrieved ”—Bankrupt's Discharge. 66 WE would refer the reader to two points of bankruptcy practice of considerable interest which were recently reported by us: (see 106 L. T. Rep. 344, 345). The first arose in the case of Re A Debtor; Ex parte a Person aggrieved; and an application of the procedure adopted by the Court of Appeal in Ex parte Tucker; Re Tucker (12 Ch. Diy. 308) was considered by the Divisional Court, consisting of Justices Phillimore and Avory, to be a feasible course to pursue. A third person who objected to an adjudication in bankruptcy was the party who appealed there, as occurred in Ex parte Tucker; Re Tucker (ubi sup.). The 'person aggrieved" was the grantee 'of a bill of sale, but was not a party to bankruptcy proceedings in the County Court when a receiving order was made against the grantor of the bill. The giving thereof constituted, it was alleged, a fraudulent conveyance, and was one of two separate acts of bankruptcy committed by him. In the result, the receiving order was ordered to be amended by striking out all reference to the finding complained of-viz., that particular act of bankruptcy-and the trustee was required to give notice of motion in the County Court to set aside the bill of sale. It is noticeable that in Ex parte Tucker; Re Tucker (ubi sup.), the application was for leave to appeal, and the applicant was held to be entitled, ex debito justitiæ, to an extension of the time for appealing. In the present case, there was a substantive appeal before the court. This circumstance, however, did not preclude the application of the earlier authority. Turning to the second point of practice to which we are now calling attention, it was in the case of Re Thomas Shields; Ex parte the Bankrupt that it arose, and the same learned judges were required to deal with it. The bankrupt there applied in the County Court for his discharge. It was refused on the ground that his assets were not of a value equal to 10s. in the pound on the amount of his unsecured liabilities, in accordance with sect. 8, sub-sect. 3 (a), of the Bankruptcy Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 71). That was the only fact, seemingly, that was proved against the bankrupt. The contention, therefore, was that the learned County Court judge was wrong in law in refusing to grant the discharge. It appeared, however, that the bankrupt had lived beyond his means and his conduct had been unsatisfactory; and, in the opinion of the Divisional Court, the judge of the County Court had ample material for deciding as he did. In brief, he took into consideration, as he was justified in doing, other facts than those disclosed by the official receiver's report: (see Ex parte Constable; Re Barker, 62 L. T. Rap. 370; 25 Q. B. Div. 285, at p. 292). A subsequent application to the judge to review, rescind, or vary his original order would, of course, be available to the bankrupt under sect. 104 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883: (see Re Tobias; Ex parte Tobias, 64 L. T. Rep. 115). And as Mr. Justice Phillimore remarked, the County Court judge would, in all probability, then come to the conclusion that lapse of time, coupled with good conduct on the part of the bankrupt, were such new material as would entitle the judge to review his decision. In other words, the punishment which, in the interests of society, must be inflicted on a bankrupt ought to be remitted when the necessity for it is shown to have ceased. |