HOLLAND, ERNEST, Maidenhead, builder. Ct. Windsor. Aug. 17. LLOYD, J. F., Bishops Cleeve, gentleman. Ct. Cheltenham. Aug. 15. MUTTON, HERBERT EDWARD, Macclesfield, printer's compositor. Ct. Macclesfield. Aug. 16. NAYLER, JAMES, Brisley, farmer. Ct. Norwich Aug. 17. PAUL, ARTHUR JOHN, Portsmouth, boot retailer. Ct Portsmouth. Aug. 15. PERKIS, GEORGE WILLIAM, Bromley, compositor. Ct. Croydon. Aug. 16. RAMSDEN, SAM ODDY, Bradford, waste merchant. Ct. Bradford. Aug. 16. REES, JOHN, Williamstown, collier. Ct. Pontypridd, Ystradyfodwg, and Porth. Aug. 15. RICHARDSON, THOMAS ASTWOOD, Otley, confectioner. Ct. Leeds. Aug. 16. ROBERTS, WALTER CARLYLE, King's Lynn, tailor. Ct. King's Lynn. Aug. 15. ROBINSON, HENRY, Liverpool, cycle agent. Ct. Liverpool. Aug. 16. SCHOLES, ROBERT, Sandbach, master painter. Ct. Macclesfield. Aug. 14. TUCKER, HERBERT EDWARD, Wimborne, grocer. Ct. Poole. Aug. 16 YEMAN, ALBERT EDWARD, late Richmond, licensed victualler. Ct Wandsworth. Aug. 15. Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette, July 19. BERKOV, ABRAHAM (commonly known and trading as Alfred Burns), East Greenwich, jeweller. Ct. Greenwich July 16. ADJUDICATIONS. GAZETTE, AUG. 16. AMBLER, FREDERICK, Bradford, dining room suite manufacturer Ct. Bradford. Aug. 14. ATKINSON, HUGH CALEDON, Half Moon-st, Piccadilly, retired captain in the army. Ct. High Court Aug. 13. BRAUCKMANN, ALBERT, late Chapel-st, Milton-st, hardware merchant. Ct. BUSBY, HENRY, Penzance, pork butcher. Ct. Truro. Aug. 10. Aug. 14. COOPER, WILLIAM ARTHUR, Gillingham, florist Ct. Rochester. Aug. 13. GILLARD, HENRY JOHN, Barwick, wheelwright. Ct. Yeovil. Aug. 13. Ct. High HAYTON, JOHN EDWARD, Soulby, innkeeper. Ct. Kendal. Aug. 13. IRLAM, HERBERT ALDRED, Luton, chemist. Ct. Luton. Aug 14. LANE, EDWARD, Barnes. Ct. Wandsworth. Aug. 10. LARNER, GORDON DE LACY (described in the receiving order as Gordon Larner, and trading as G. Larner and Co.), Penn-rd-villas, Holloway. Ct. High Court. Aug. 10. LAVEY, ERNEST HEREFORD, late Upper Saint Martin's-la, motor-car salesman. Ct. High Court. Aug. 14. MITCHELL, JAMES, Urswick, engine fitter. Ct. Barrow-in-Furness and Ulverston. Aug. 12. MORGAN, GEORGE JAMES, Merthyr Tydfil, cycle dealer Ct. Merthyr MUSGRAVE, BERNARD, late Astley Bridge, director of a limited company. Tydfil. Aug. 12. Ct. Bolton. Aug. 10. ONION, ARTHUR. Loughborough, tobacconist. Ct. Leicester. Aug. 12. QUELCH, HENRY, Limesford-rd, Nunhead, editor of a newspaper. High Court. Aug. 13. Ct. SANDERSON, WILLIAM, Mirfield, joiner. Ct. Dewsbury. Aug. 14. SMITH, EDWARD. Brixton, baker. Ct. Wandsworth. Aug. 13. WHEATCROFT, FREDERICK WILLIAM, Salford, milliner. Ct. Aug. 12. Salford. WISKER, JOHN FOSTER, Kingston-upon-Hull, grocer. Ct. Kingston-uponHull. Aug. 12. GAZETTE, AUG. 20. ANDREWS, JOHN PERCY, and DALE, MARY (trading as J. P. Andrews and Morgan), Bromyard, builders. Ct. Worcester. Aug 16. CLAYTON, JOHN WILLIAM, Chorley, licensed victualler. Ct. Bolton. Aug. 17. COATES, SIMON, late Richmond, solicitor's managing clerk. Ct. York. Aug. 16. DAVIES, ALBERT J., late Wandsworth Common, butcher Ct. Wandsworth. Aug. 15. EVANS, HANNAH (trading as Edith Glynn and H. Glynn Evans, late as GREAVES, WILLIAM, Walton, farm labourer. Ct. York. Aug. 17. HILL, E. F., Clapham, tobacconist. Ct. Wandsworth. Aug. 15. LAWTON, PETER, and LAWTON, SAMUEL (trading as Samuel Lawton and MARSHALL, FRANCIS DENHAM, and THOMSON, JOHN BODEN MONTGOMERY, East India-av. Ct. High Court. Aug. 14. MORETON, ALFRED, New Malden, turf commission agent. Ct. Kingston, MAY, WILLIAM JAMES, Bristol, dairyman. Ct. Bristol. Aug. 17. Surrey. Aug. 17. MUTTON, HERBERT EDWARD, Macclesfield, printer's compositor clesfield. Aug. 16. NAYLER, JAMES, Brisley, farmer. Ct. Norwich. Aug. 17. Ct. Mac Ct. Portsmouth. PAUL, ARTHUR JOHN, Portsmouth, boot retailer. RAMSAY, MARY ELIZABETH. Whitley Bay, letter of apartments. Ct. Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Aug. 15. RAMSDEN, SAM ODDY, Bradford, waste merchant. Ct. Bradford. Aug. 16. Aug. 15. ORDER FOR ADJUDICATION OF BANKRUPTCY AND ANNUL MENT OF COMPOSITION. GAZETTE, AUG. 16. DELLAR, WILLIAM JAMES; DELLAR, FRANK ERNEST; DELLAR BROTHERS, Staines, plumbers. Ct. Kingston, Surrey. Aug. 2. BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS. BIRTH. EMANUEL.-On the 12th inst., at the Grand Hotel, Eastbourne, the wife of Saml. H. Emanuel, Barrister-at-law, prematurely, of a son-stillborn. MARRIAGES. ROPER STEARN.-On the 14th inst., at Christ Church, Mayfair, Henry Charles Roper, of 7, New-sq, Lincoln's-inn, to Hilda Ke Marguerite Collen Stearn, eldest daughter of Alfred John Stearn, of Blythe Church, Cambridge. SPEAR-BAUDERT.-On the 8th inst., at the British Consulate, Amsterdam, and the German Moravian Church, Zeist, George Frederick Spear, of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-law, to Meta Elisabeth Baudert, daughter of the late Rev. Samuel Baudert, of Baziya, Cape Colony, and of Mrs. Baudert, Zeist, Holland. 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HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. CHANCERY DIVISION. Re FRY; FRY v. FRY.-Will-Construction-Rentcharges on mortgaged property-Property insuffi. cient to satisfy mortgages and rentcharges... TOTTENHAM URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL v. ROWLEY.-HighwayDedication-Roadway not made up to full width-Unmade strip... 1000 Re WALTER LEACH; LEACH v. LEACH. -Will-Construction - Gift of realty-"Die without leaving a male heir" Re SEARLE; RYDER v. Bond.Lunatic Administration of estate-Alteration of character of 1023 COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL. REX v. CASTIGLIONE AND PORTEOUS. - Perjury Affidavit - Judicial proceeding Commissioners for Daths Act 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 10), s. 6..... REX v. SARAH JONES.-Procuration -Indictment-Omission of words "under twenty-one years of age -Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. c. 69), s. 2 (1)... 1024 " LEADING ARTICLES, &c. TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS 401 401 WE have on various occasions referred to the mischief that is done by bogus legal aid societies, and are in entire sympathy with the remarks made by a contemporary upon the difficulty of suppressing them without the intervention of statutory assistance. It is true, as has been observed by many eminent judges and others, that there is nothing ethically or professionally wrong in a solicitor acting for a client in an action who can only afford to pay for his services if the result is favourable. This, in itself, is unobjectionable, as it affords the sole opportunity in some cases for a poor litigant to assert or obtain his legal rights. The evils consequent upon countenancing such a practice arise, almost invariably, from the attendant circumstances, such as the terms of the retainer. In the case of the majority of many so-called legal aid societies, the circumstances under which the retainer is obtained—or, generally, sought-accentuate the possible evil and inconvenience of "speculative" actions. Generally, all the persons involved, except possibly the lay client, are not of the highest standing or reputation in their respective professions. Out-of-pocket expenses, often of a nominal amount in relation to the amount claimed or the issue involved, are incurred in the hope of a share in the proceeds of the verdict or judgment. Undoubtedly, such arrangements as must be made to secure this end involve the persons engaged in legal and criminal liabilitity for champerty or maintenance. Under the present state of the law, the difficulty of fixing that liability upon the proper shoulders, owing to the necessities of evidence, and the reticence of the successful lay client of the legal aid society, is undeniable. In the interests of the community at large, as well as of the Legal Profession, some legislative provision, involvSecond Sheet wwww under deeds of arrangement is the smallest yet recorded, and the number of failures under the Bankruptcy Acts the smallest since the year 1884. As usual, the greatest increase in insolvency is shown in the case of directors and promoters of public companies and finarcial enterprises, and in the building trades. Those trades provide the largest proportion of failures for large amounts, and in the case of each liabilities to creditors considerably exceeding half a million were involved. A striking decrease is shown in the number of women who came under the Bankruptcy Laws. The failure in 1910 of the Charing Cross Bank with liabilities exceeding two millions accounts for the fact that, while the number of failures under the Bankruptcy Acts in 1911 with unsecured liabilities of £20,000 and upwards shows an increase of twenty-one over the corresponding period of 1910, the liabilities show a decrease of over one and a half millions. 1,308,849 1,270,853 12,763 2,376 384 1,221,656 12,718 2,326 360 Actions above 1:50. THAT Suitors show no disposition to avail themselves of the facilities afforded by the extended jurisdiction given by the County Courts Act of the last decade is shown by the steady decrease in the figures relating to these actions. In 1905, 2521 plaints were entered for amounts between £50 and £100, and 582 for above £100, but year by year the numbers have decreased. This state of affairs affords a good index as to the accuracy of the allegations of those who desire a further extension of the jurisdiction-namely, that suitors are anxious to take all their disputes to the local County Courts. Proceedings after Judgment. ALTHOUGH business commenced has shown such a diminution, the same cannot be said of judgment summonses and warrants of commitment. No less than 387,644 judgment summonses were issued in 1911, as compared with 375,254 in 1909; while 142,899 warrants were issued, the total two years ago being 136,630. We are glad to see, however, that the number of debtors imprisoned has again decreased, the figure of 7681 for 1911 comparing favourably with that of 8904 in 1909 and the enormous total of 11,986 in 1906. Executions against goods and sales made thereunder are considerably less than in 1909 and 1910, while the number of days upon which the courts sat has been practically constant during the past three years. Next week we shall consider these statistics as they affect particular County Courts. The Bankruptcy Report. THE annual report by the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy on the working of the Act during the year 1911 shows a decrease of 552 in the total number of cases of bankruptcy and deeds of arrangement in England and Wales, as compared with the previous year. The estimated loss to creditors was £8,870,487a decrease of £673,940. The number of failures NOTEWORTHY DECISIONS OF THE JUDICIAL YEAR. (Continued from page 386.) Upon the subject of MORTGAGES there have been several decisions of no small moment. In Public Trustee v. Laurence (106 L. T. Rep. 791: (1912) 1 Ch. 789) the case largely turned on the Conveyancing Act 1881, s. 18 (11), which provides that mortgagor in possession, upon whom are conferred certain powers of leasing, must within a month after the lease was made deliver to the mortgagee a counterpart of the lease, but the lessee is not concerned to see that this is done. By sub sect. 14 the deed may confer other powers of leasing exercisable as if conferred by the Act, "unless a contrary intention is expressed in the mortgage deed." In the deed in this case an extension of the statutory power was given by permitting leases for 999 years. Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady held that the provision that the mortgagee should not be concerned about the counterpart would apply both to statutory and extended powers of leasing. The result of not delivering the counterpart was not fatal to the lease, although it caused the statutory power of sale to become immediately exercisable under sect. 20 (iii.) of the Act. Mr. Justice Joy in Re Moore and Hulme's Contract (106 L. T. Rep. 330; (1912) 2 Ch. 105) had a case which raised a good many curious points, and amongst these we pick out one on the Satisfied Terms Act 1845. It is held that this Act does not apply to a mortgage term created by the sub-demise of leaseholds. A House of Lords decision on "clogging" the equity of redemption should be noted De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited v. British South Africa Company (105 L. T. Rep. 683; (1912) A. C. 52). There an agree ment had been made by the parties setting out that the plaintiffs were about to issue some mortgage debentures, and the defendants agreed that an advance made by them to the plaintiffs should remain outstanding until the issue of the debentures, nd that debentures should be accepted in satisfaction of the debt. There was to be a floating charge, and the defendants wereto make further advances on debentures for the amount. In return for all this the plaintiffs were to grant the defendants exclusive rights to work in perpetuity all the diamondiferous land in the plaintiffs' territory. The debentures were issued and paid off, but the defendants insisted on their mining rights. These were impeached by the plaintiffs on the footing that they were in effect a clog. The House of Lords held that it was not so, because the plaintiffs had an immediate and absolute duty to grant the licence, but no such duty to issue the debentures, and it was questioned whether the doctrine as to clogging had any application where it concerned debentures secured by floating charges. Webb v. Crosse (105 L. T. Rep. 867; (1912) 1 Ch. 323) sedemption, and the plaintiff asked that in taking the was decided by Mr. Justice Parker. It was a mortgagor's action accounts the mortgagees might not be allowed interest after the date of an alleged tender. The first point was the validity of the tender. The defendants C. and G. had lent £1000 to the plaintif on a mortgage in fee of some houses, and later on a further loan was made. The money formed to all parties' knowledge a portion of the estate of W., deceased. The defendant G. absconded, and th C. appointed the defendant W. W. to be a trustee in the place of G. This appointment contained a vesting declaration which vested the mortgage money in the defendants C. and W. W., but left the legal estate still vested in C. and G. C. and W. W., in order to be able to exercise their power of sale, gave the plaintiff notice to pay off the mortgage, and threatened to sell if payment were not made in three months. an order would be necessary to get in The plaintiff pointed out that it ogging red lease me in I. Just G., who had, as already mentioned, absconded. The tender in question upon which reliance was placed was one of principal and interest with three guineas for reconveyance, with an undertaking to pay any further costs in this matter, but excluding any costs of the necessary vesting order. Mr. Justice Parker held that these proceedings did not constitute such a tender as would prevent interest being thereafter charged in ascertaining the sum on payment of which the mortgagor could redeem. The principle laid down is, however, that it need not necessarily be such a tender as would afford a defence to an action at law. Where, however, the tender is conditional on the execution of a reconveyance, time must be left for obtaining the execution of the deed, especially when the persons to whom the tender is made are not the conveying persons. The costs of obtaining a vesting the order of land where the legal estate is in an absconded trusteemortgagee fall under the general rule whereby costs of reconveyance have to be met by the mortgagor. to apply in a case of an action for damages unless the claim does not exceed £100. Sect. 3-the material dispute turned on this section-calls for a notice of claim and particulars of damage. The plaintiff sustained loss to the extent of £60 by some barley being fired from a cinder falling from the defendants' engine. He had sent to the defendants a letter giving particulars of the date, the subject-matter of the fire, and the acreage of damage, but he did not say anything as to the money value. The defendant company seized on this omission and urged that it was material, because they desired to know whether the plaintiff claimed under the Act in respect of an amount of less than £100, or whether he was claiming a larger sum under the common law. The latter would involve an inquiry into the negligence of the company in not providing the necessary apparatus to arrest sparks. Mr. Justice Channell, after entertaining considerable doubt, acceded to this argument, holding that the particulars of damage contemplated in the Act must contain a financial estimate of the loss sustained. Another case turning on an alleged neglect on the part of a railway company may be cited. Clark v. North British Railway Company (1912, S. C. 1) was a case where shunting operations were going on inside a private dock owned by a railway company. A sailor entered into the dock through an open gate and walked between two waggons. While so doing they were moved and he was injured. It was held that the company had not been neglectful in omitting to shut the gate or to give warning before shunting, for there was no duty imposed on the company to do either the one or the other. Yet another Scottish case is worthy of attention, for it deals with a useful point connected with mines and miners. Symington v. Caledonian Railway Company (106 L. T. Rep. 193; (1912) A. C. 87) was a case in which the Court of Session had practically held that in no circumstances was it possible for freestone to be a mineral within the Railways Clauses Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1845. On appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Loreburn held that this was purely a question of fact. It is only seldom that freestone is likely to be regarded as a mineral, but it is a question to be decided the facts of each case. Among PARTNERSHIP cases a small but distinctly practica nd decision should be duly noted in that of Mr. Justice Neville in or Pocock v. Carter (106 L. T. Rep. 423; (1912) 1 Ch. 663). The business premises belonged to S. P., one partner, and the partnership deed contained no material clause as to the tenancy, except such as could be spelt out of a general direction that all rent, rates, and taxes were to be paid out of profits. In fact the rent was paid by the partnership. The learned judge seemed at one time rather disposed to infer a tenancy at will or one from year to year, but eventually decided that the tenancy was one intended Tee last during the continuance of the partnership. The former iew would have entailed the undesirable result that a partner who chanced to own the premises could, by giving notice, have germinated the agreement before the end of the partnership, and phus would turn the other partner out. The tenancy in this case vas held to last during the partnership, and to terminate at its alissolution. stee.. cer the le 14 the d onfere in the of the s PATENT cases have not resulted in any decisions of paramount mportance during the past year of judicial labour, but a useful ase was heard by Mr. Justice Parker in Re Taylor's Patent (106 T. Rep. 600; (1912) 1 Ch. 635), where sect. 27 of the Patents nd Designs Act 1907 was considered. Sub-sect. 2 gives power o the comptroller on certain conditions (and especially subject o proof of manufacture in the United Kingdom or satisfactory appeasons for default of manufacture here) to revoke a patent. The The reacts need not be entered into exhaustively, for the dispute esolved itself into the question whether the threat of an action or infringement was or was not a satisfactory reason for the on-manufacture of the patented article in the United Kingdom. Rep. The comptroller held that it was not, but Mr. Justice Parker, on ppeal, considered that it might be so, without laying down, owever, any general rule on the subject. Under the circumtances of the case the learned judge held that a satisfactory eason" had been proved, and no revocation order was permitted. At the same time, the learned judge held the door open for uture application for a revocation should the circumstances Thelter and there continued to be a neglect to work the invention hat within the jurisdiction. fied a more House d houlde ish Su and to the isfacti defen Among the list of cases decided on the law relating to RATES, we find in Margate Corporation v. Pettman (106 L. T. Rep. 104; 28 Times L. Rep. 192) a decision by the Divisional Court relating to a demise of the sole right of user of the foreshore for bathing purposes and for chairs and seats. There were covenants against the use for other purposes of the foreshore, and to yield possession when the term of years expired. The corporation also reserved to themselves the right of re-entry on breach of covenants. Under these circumstances the defendant was summoned for nonpayment of a general district rate, and it was held by the Divisional Court that he was in exclusive rateable occupation of the whole of the sands of the foreshore notwithstanding that the public used them as well. Metropolitan Electric Tramways Limited v. Tottenham Urban District Council (106 L. T. Rep. 398; (1912) 2 K.B. 216) may be usefully referred to in connection with doubts entertained as to the meaning of sect. 211 of the Public Health Act 1875, where the phrase "land used as a railway" is introduced. The Court of Appeal have held that land is so used, and that rateability attached to it in the proportion of one fourth part of its net annual value when the occupation was that of a highway upon which ran a connected system of trams and light railways. Another Court of Appeal decision worth comment is that of Wixon v. Thomas (106 L. T. Rep. 312; (1912) 1 K. B.690). The question was as to the rateability of premises occupied by non-commissioned officers of the Regulars employed for instruction of the Territorials. The houses had been acquired by a county association, under the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907, for these purposes, and the premises were held on short leases for three years. It was compulsory for these men to reside in the houses, but they could be shifted and were liable at any time to military inspection. The Divisional Court held that they were occupied for Crown purposes and were exempt from rates. The Court of Appeal agreed in this, and held that these men were servants of the Crown in the plainest possible manner, and that the whole proceeding was not ultra vires of the association. The latter were empowered to take such a lease and to use the premises bona fide for the purposes of the Territorials under their charge. This case is not one of those in which the undoubted ancient common law rule as to the servants of the Crown not being liable to be rated in respect of the premises they occupy in that character has descended and become applicable under analogous public conditions, but is a case of undoubted servants of the Crown occupying premises by command of the Crown and for the purposes of the Crown. The occupants had no tenure or right of occupation, but were there in pursuance of a duty. A POWER OF APPOINTMENT decision, turning on words in a vill differing from those in cited cases, may be referred to at this the point-Re Sanderson; Sanderson v. Sanderson (106 L. T. Rep. 26; 1912) W. N. 54). One E. T. had died in 1861, devising all er realty to A. C. for life, and then to A. S. (wife of J. S.) the or life. There was a special power to A. S. to appoint among the her children by will, with a gift over to the children equally n default of appointment. A. C. died in 1878, and she devised her realty to A. S. for life and after her death to J. S. for life, and after both their deaths to such uses for the benefit of all hat the children or other issue of J. and A. S. (being born in her lifetime) as she should by will appoint. There was a gift bol over. Born prior to 1867, the children of A. S. were three ebent in number, and were all living and had issue. A. S. made a will in 1900, devised and bequeathed all her property to trustees, "including all property over which I have a power of appointment," and the trusts, after conversion and sale and investment, &c., were for the husband for life, and afterwards for all her children equally. A. S. died in 1905 and J. S. in 1908, and now tee the question was raised whether her will exercised the special powers of appointment by the general reference therein contained, to there being no other powers exercisable by her. Mr. Justice Neville held that the case fell outside the authorities, but, gathering the intention as best could be done from the general tone of the will, the learned judge decided that there had been no intention of exercising the special power. 1991 V. Peek (106 L. T. Rep. 630; (1912) 2 K. B. 192) claimed a declaration that on the death of one or other of two baronets, interested successively, estate duty was payable on the proceeds of sale of certain advowsons, and that settlement estate duty was also payable. Upon the particular facts of this case it seems immaterial to discuss upon which death the liability was to be alleged to accrue. Mr. Justice Hamilton unkindly pointed out that sect. 15 of the Finance Act 1894 was not subject to a grammatical construction, and, as taxing Acts have to be construed strictly, and the Legislature does not seem to have fortified itself in its exaction of revenue, held that neither estate duty nor settlement estate duty could be claimed on the principal value of an advowson or upon the proceeds of its sale. Re Charlesworth's Trusts; Tew v. Briggs (105 L. T. Rep. 817; (1912) 1 Ch. 319) was decided by Mr. Justice Joyce. There a trust fund had been settled on the settlor for life and then for his wife for life, and after the survivor's death there was a trust as regards £10,000 for such persons as the wife should appoint. The rest of the fund was to go to the settlor's residuary estate. The settlor died in 1908, and estate duty was paid on the fund. In 1911 the wife died, having appointed the £10,000, and Mr. Justice Joyce held the estate duty payable on the settlor's death should be borne rateably by the wife's appointee and the settlor's residuary legatees. Re Consuelo, Dowager Duchess of Manchester; Duncannon v. Manchester (106 L. T. Rep. 332; (1912) 1 Ch. 540) raised a series of difficult questions as to estate duty and settlement estate duty where personal property situate abroad was concerned. The dowager duchess at her death possessed property in this country and in the United States of America. Her will appointed two Englishmen as general executors and three Americans as executors as to property for which probate might be necessary abroad. English and American assets were charged respectively with the payment of the English and American legacies, and the ultimate trusts of both were identical, giving the duke a protected life interest with discretionary trusts of the customary character. The two sets of executors proved the estates as worth about half a million. The question was now raised by the English executors whether estate duty and settlement estate duty were payable in respect of the American property, and whether the English executors were liable. The point was a new one, and Mr. Justice Swinfen Eady held that they were liable to the extent of the assets in their hands for the duties on foreign personalty, although it was expressly bequeathed to the American executors and remained under their sole control. Among the INCOME TAX cases there is an important decision in American Thread Company v. Joyce (106 L. T. Rep. 171), in which the Court of Appeal affirmed Mr. Justice Hamilton, who laid down the principle that a finding of the commissioners, that a company registered abroad is resident in this country for income tax purposes on the ground that it is controlled and directed from here, is conclusive if there is evidence to support it. Sun Insurance Office v. Clark (106 L. T. Rep. 438; (1912) A. C. 443) should be referred to in connection with income tax where fire insurance companies are concerned. Deductions for unexpired risks had been made, and the company's estimates of profits were challenged. The House of Lords laid down the very important, principle that it was impossible for these companies, receiving premiums in advance in respect of contracts made all through the year, to state precisely their gains or losses in any given financial year. The method of arriving at the company's figures was approved as approximately right, and it was held that no method of estimating is right or wrong in itself; the only true rule of law was to ascertain the real gains as accurately as possible. Another insurance case cropped up in Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Company v. Bennett (106 L. T. Rep. 323; (1912) 2 K. B. 41). The company carried on its undertaking at home and abroad. Its management was conducted in this country. Certain foreign countries required that the company should deposit, as a condition of carrying on its business, with the Government certain sums of money, and in consequence the company had considerable sums of foreign investments. In addition, certain accumulated profits were invested abroad. interest on these sums was in neither class of investment sent home, but was received by the company in its foreign offices. The Court of Appeal held, however, that these were gains accruing from the business carried on and were assessable to income tax. Another case on different lines was heard by the Court of Appeal in Brown v. Burt (105 L. T. Rep. 420). There an American citizen had for twenty years lived on a yacht anchored in tidal and navigable water off the East Coast, obtaining food and other necessaries from the nearest village. The yacht was always manned and ready to go to sea at any time. The Court of Appeal held that the owner resided in the United Kingdom and was liable to income tax. Mr. Justice Hamilton in Carlisle and Silloth Golf Club v. Smith (106 L. T. Rep. 573; (1912) 2 K. B. 177) had to consider an appeal from a claim that the club was assessable on visitors' green fees. The club was a mere unincor The porated association and the links were held on lease, the covenants being more important than the rent, for the owners were a railway company desirous of pressing indirectly their advantages. With this object the club was obliged by a rule to allow non-members to play for 1s. 6d. a day, 5s. a week, or 10s. a month. The profits on these admissions to the club amounted in 1908 to nearly £230. It was held that the club was carrying on an enterprise beyond its ordinary functions and separate accounts could be kept of these fees in order to ascertain whether there was any profit. If such profits there were, the same were taxable. The system by which the commissioners sought to establish liability was overruled. The assessable profits have to be the real profits, the net profite, and their amount can only be arrived at by ascertaining whether there is not something to come off the gross before arriving at the net sum. The learned judge gave a broad hint to the parties that the questions involved in this were nice ones, and some settlement by agreement was hinted at on workable, if not strictly logical, lines. Duke of Beaufort v. Inland Revenue (106 L. T. Rep. 733; (1912) 2 K. B. 281) raised a totally different character of dispute turning upon some rather obscure provisions in the Finance (1909-10) Act 1910 in regard to the duty on mineral rights. By sect. 20 such duty is charged on the rental value of all rights to work minerals, and, where that right is the subject of a lease, the rental value is the amount paid by the working lessee in the last working year in respect of that right. The appellant had granted a mining lease at a rent of £500 per annum, and in the last working year (1909) he got from his lessees £375 in respect of arrears for 1907, less tax. The question was whether those arrears had to be brought into assessment or not. Mr. Justice Hamilton held that the amount of £356 (being the sum of £375 less the tax) was to be included, but not the whole sum of £375. It was further held, on another point arising upon the super-tax, that the amount of that tax was not to be deducted from the £356 in order to arrive at the rental value of the mineral rights. The case of Bowles v. Attorney-General (105 L. T. Rep. 870; (1912) 1 Ch. 123) raised the whole question of super-tax imposition in an important form. Mr. Justice Parker held that the super tax is an additional income tax within the words "duties of income tax in the Customs and Inland Revenue Act 1890, s. 30, and returns in respect of it can be demanded, although no Act of the financial year has been passed imposing it, if an Act as to collection was in force. It is doubtful, however, whether there is authority to assess it and call for payment before the Act imposing it has been duly made law. (To be continued.) 191 BETWEEN of the first part C. D. of the second part and E. F. of the third part. WHEREAS X. Y. duly made his will dated the day of 1888 and thereby appointed his daughter G. H. and I. J. K. L. and M. N. executrix and executors and appointed the said I. J. K. L. and M. N. to be his trustees and the testator devised his freehold estates in the county of P. on failure of the limitations contained in his daughter's marriage settlement prior to the ultimate limitations in his own favour to such uses as his daughter should by will or codicil appoint and in default of and subject to any such appointment to the uses thereinafter declared of his residuary real estates thereinafter devised and the testator devised and appointed All his freehold estates not otherwise disposed of (except his Q. estate and his R. estate in the county of G. (both thereinafter referred to as his Q. estate) his T. estate in the county of W. and his U. estate and his Y. and his X. estate respectively in the county of Z.) dis charged from a principal sum secured on part thereof as therein mentioned (which he directed to be paid so far as it remained due at his death out of his residuary personal estate) to the use of his said daughter during her life with remainder to the use of the said I. J. during his life with remainders to the use of the children of his said daughter in tail male and in tail as therein mentioned with remainder to the uses thereinafter limited of his said T. U. Y. and X. estates and he devised his said Q. estate (from and immediately after his death) to the use of his said daughter during her life with remainder to the use of the said I. J. during his life with remainder (subject to a limited power of appointment given to his daughter but afterwards revoked by a second codicil) to uses afterwards revoked by the said first codicil as hereinafter mentioned and he devised his said T. U. Y. and X. estates (from |