NUTTALL, WILLIAM HENRY, Urmston, warehouseman. Sept. 14. Ct. Salford. RIDAL, EDWIN JAMES, and PRESTON, SIDNEY, Sheffield, hay dealers. Ct. Sheffield. Sept. 14. STONE, THOMAS HENRY, Bexley Heath, commercial traveller. Ct. THOMAS, JOHN, Ebbw Vale, insurance agent. Ct. Tredegar. Sept. 14. WILLARD, GEORGE HENRY, Bradford, innkeeper. Ct. Bradford. Sept. 12. Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette, July 30. VANE, SIR FRANCIS, late New Bond-st, baronet. Ct. High Court. July 18. Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette, Sept 13. DUBBIN, HARRY, Watford, motor mechanic. Ct. St. Albane. Sept. 9. ADJUDICATIONS GAZETTE, SEPT. 13. AMOS, MAJOR HARRY JOEL, Wisbech, potato merchant. Ct. King's Lynn. BULL, ARTHUR THOMAS, Leicester, credit draper. Ct. Leicester. Sept. 9. Cox, ELI,, Wigan, hay dealer. Ct. Wigan. Sept. 7. DUBBIN, HARRY, Watford, motor mechanic. Ct. St. Albans Sept. 9. FESTOPSEY, ISAAC (commonly known as A. Milman), and FESTOPSEY, HOE, EDWARD, Great Grimsby, house painter. Ct. Great Grimsby. HURRELL, GEORGE, Great Yarmouth, upholsterer. Ct. Great Yarmouth. Sept. 9. KAUFMAN, ELIZABETH, Middlesbrough, boot dealer. Ct. Middlesbrough. Sept. 11. KIRBY, W. R., Forest Hill, captain in the South African Constabulary. Ct. Greenwich. Sept. 10. LEWIS, DANIEL, Penygraig, miner. Ct. Pontypridd, Ystradyfodwg, and LEWIS, MARY ANNE, Barry, grocer, widow. Ct. Cardiff. Sept. 10. PERKINS, ERNEST ALBERT, Bridgend, greengrocer. Ct. Cardiff. Sept. 10. SALTER, ALFRED JOHN, Tonypandy, carpenter. Ct. Pontypridd, Ystradyfodwg, and Porth. Sept. 10. SANDERS, SYDNEY, and SANDERS, JOSEPH WALTER (trading as S. and W. Sanders), Luton, builders. Ct. Luton. Sept. 11. SCARBOROUGH, PERCY CHARLES, Potters Bar, ironmonger. Sept. 10. Ct. Barnet. SIMPSON, WILLIAM FOREMAN, and SIMPSON, FREDERIC, Newmarket St. Mary, builders. Ct. Cambridge. Sept. 10. SMITH, CHARLES BLYTHE, Willes-rd, Kentish Town. Ct. High Court. Sept. 7. TRUSWELL, ERNEST (trading as H. Truswell and Co), Manchester, boot dealer. Ct. Salford. Sept. 10. WADSWORTH, CHARLES (trading as Holt and Co.), Manchester, grey cloth agent. Ct. Manchester. Sept. 10. Sept. 13. DAFT, Sept. 13. ERNEST CHARLES, Newport, Mon. CORNTHWAITE, EDWARD, Rochdale, plumber. Ct. Rochdale. Sept. 13. Cheltenham, fruiterer. Ct. Cheltenham. DELAHUNTY, PHILIP JOHN, Norwich, general shopkeeper. Ct. Norwich. Sept. 14. EVANS, JOHN (late trading as Evans Brothers), Bedwas, late builder Ct. Newport, Mon. Sept. 13. FITT, GEORGE, Lowestoft, gentleman. Ct. Great Yarmouth. Sept. 14. FUDGE, FRANCIS ELLIS (late trading as Fudge and Co.), late Blackwood, fruiterer. Ct. Tredegar. Sept. 11. FUNNELL, AMOS, Great Grimsby, late fish merchant. Ct. Great Grimsby. Sept. 14. GRAY, WILLIAM HENRY GEORGE, Bath-st, Poplar, late railway station master. Ct. High Court. Sept. 12. GREENWOOD, JAMES, Keighley, fine art dealer. Ct. Bradford. Sept. 12. Sept. 12. HOLMES, MAUDE ROSALIE HAMILTON, Ryde, proprietress of nursing home. Ct. Newport and Ryde. Sept. 13. HOPKINS, JAMES, jun., Framfield, builder. Ct. Lewes and Eastbourne. Sept. 13. ISAACS, MORRIS, Three Colt-la, Bethnal Green, public-house manager. Ct. High Court. Sept. 13. i Moss, JOHN HENRY (trading as J. and J. Moss), Ogmore Vale, builder. PECK, BERTIE (late trading as B. Peck and Co.), late Upper-st, Islington, RIDAL, EDWIN JAMES, and PRESTON, SIDNEY, Sheffield, hay dealers. Ct. THOMAS, JOHN, Ebbw Vale, insurance agent. Ct. Tredegar. Sept. 14. WILLARD, GEORGE HENRY, Bradford, innkeeper. Ct. Bradford. Sept. 12. Sept. 14. CLIFTON, JOSHUA, Saltoun-rd, Brixton, music hall artiste. Ct. High GAZETTE, SEPT. 17. BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR, LONDON. Sept. 28, 1912. THE LAWS OF ENGLAND." By the EARL of HALSBURY and a Distinguished Body of Lawyers. Managing Editor: T. WILLES CHITTY, Esq. Vol. XXIII. Ready October 3rd. TITLES. Powers SOME OF THE AUTHORS. The Rt. Hon. Sir GEORGE FAR- Practice and Pro- T. WILLES CHITTY, Esq. cedure Press and Printing Prisons Sir FREDERICK Low, K.C., M.P. Prize Law and The Rt. Hon. LORD MERSEY OF Public Authorities Sir JOHN MACDONELL, LL.D. Public Health and W. H. DUMSDAY, Esq. Railways & Canals H. W. DISNEY, Esq., B.A. BUTTERWORTH & CO., BELL YARD, TEMPLE BAR, LONDON. To Readers and Correspondents. All communications must be authenticated by the name and address of the writer, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee of good faith. Anonymous communications are invariably rejected. All communications intended for the Editorial Department should, in order to prevent delay, be addressed to the "EDITOR OF THE LAW TIMES." 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GREENWICH UNION ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE (resps.).-Rating - Railway-Link line-Annual loss in working......... 126 LEADING ARTICLES, &c. 101 104 TO READERS AND CORRESPONDENTS 471 106 .... 471 474 THE CONVEYANCER.-Precedents...... 474 LAW LIBRARY 475 COUNTY COURTS.-Sittings of the Courts ........... 475 MR. C. L. SAMSON in his presidential address delivered this week at Cardiff divided his observations into two portions. First, he dealt with several points contained in the annual report of the council, and with his comments on the recent legislation promoted by the society and on land transfer and on the notorious Land Registry circular we entirely agree. We are also glad to note that there is to be an appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal in Scott v. Scott on the question of contempt of court, for we have already expressed our opinion as to the correctness of this decision. The Position of the Profession. Ir is the second portion of Mr. SAMSON's address that will doubtless give rise to much general discussion and criticism. In that he considered the position of the Profession, the prospect of the Profession, and whether anything can be done to improve that position and prospect. With a great deal that he said we agree, but it is a matter for much regret that he should have gone out of his way to make a quite unwarranted attack upon the other branch of the Profession. Recriminations of this kind do little good, and to attribute the increase of the cost of litigation merely to court fees, counsel's fees, and fees of expert witnesses is not in accordance with fact. We do not for one moment deny that the fees of eminent counsel have increased, but so have the fees paid to the leading men in every profession. It is all a question of supply and demand, and where it is desired to retain the best talent available, whether barrister, solicitor, surgeon, or engineer, the services rendered by such men are worth what they will fetch, and competition to obtain those services naturally raises their monetary value. Cost of Litigation. DELAY and uncertainty have done much to increase the cost of litigation. Owing to the lack of judicial strength, causes are subjected to interminable delays, and, as we have often pointed out in these columns, cases after being in the paper for some days, with the witnesses and parties in attendance, have to be postponed to some future date owing to the services of the judge being required in some other place. Mr. SAMSON is quite right that the proposal to appoint only one additional judge for the King's Bench Division is simply playing with the matter, for the experience of recent years has conclusively shown that two additional judges are absolutely necessary. Modern business methods have also added considerably to the cost of litigation, as the amount of documentary evidence forthcoming in nearly every case, owing to the typewriter and the shorthand writer, has increased expenses in all directions. Some Suggested Amendments. SEVERAL other matters upon which the president dwelt well merit the attention of those in authority, and as to these some distinct change in the law and practice is eminently necessary. The first of these is the "ridiculous disparity" between taxed costs and solicitor and cleint costs, for in litigation-apart from costs incurred through over-caution and extravagance-there ought to be a practical indemnity. Again, the present system of bills is, as Mr. SAMSON truly describes it, "a relic of barbarism," while complete freedom of action to contract as to charges in both contentious as well as in noncontentious matters ought to be permitted between solicitors and their clients so long as, again to quote the president, "the parties are sui juris, of competent understanding, when there is no fraud or duress, and when ample opportunity of revising a bargain is referred to the court." Women and the Legal Profession. Ir is not surprising that the proposals of Mr. EDWARD A. BELL, contained in his paper on the admission of women into the Legal Profession, were considered somewhat premature by some of the speakers at the meeting, and that a motion in favour of the previous question was carried. Whether or not in the future women will be admitted to the practice of the law in this country, time alone will show, but, apart from those earnest persons who consider that in all cases and in all circumstances to use the words of the Interpretation Act-"words importing the masculine gender shall include females," there are many and serious objections to "the removal of the existing archaic and unjust restraint upon the admission of qualified and competent women into the ranks of the Legal Profession," as Mr. BELL describes the present position. The Long Vacation. WE are sorry that the president ruled out of order the motion of Mr. MAGGS with reference to the Long Vacation, presumably upon the ground that the subject had not been referred to in his address. It seems a great pity that a matter of such importance should not have been fully discussed. There is little doubt that the general public and a large body of professional opinion is strongly in favour of a curtailment of the summer vacation, and, as we pointed out nearly two years ago, in matters of this kind the interest of the public is paramount. Of course the legal machinery must have some considerable and consecutive period of vacation, but, as we have already stated, two months' recess is amply sufficient for rest and recuperation. The present agitation is due to two causes, the first of which is the steady accumulation of arrears, and the other the determination of those whose duty it is to deal with "Vacation work to narrow persistently the scope of those words. The arguments in favour of a Long Vacation beginning on the 1st Aug. and ending on the 30th Sept. are overwhelming. Forgotten Sections of Statutes. A CORRESPONDENT writes : Nothing is more curious than the fact that sections of Acts of Parliament of great interest to lawyers are at times all but forgotten by the Legal Profession. When some years ago the fact that the undermanning of the judiciary had become pre judicial to the public interest, a section in the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 providing for the appointment of additional judges was brought to the notice of the Government by Mr. Cave, K.C., and its discovery was a revelation to many persons learned in the law, not only at the Bar, but on the Bench. A correspondent in a lay paper calls attention to the existence of what he terms a long-forgotten section (sect. 75) of the Judicature Act 1873. This section provides that "a council of the judges of the Supreme Court, of which due notice shall be given to all the said judges, shall assemble once at least in every year on such day or days as shall be fixed by the Lord Chancellor for the purpose of inquiring and examining into any defects which may appear to exist in the administration of the law in the High Court," and directs that the council "shall report annually to one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State which, if any, amendments or alterations it would in their judgment be expedient to make in this Act or otherwise relating to the administration of justice." Some five years ago, according to the correspondent, it was elicited in the House of Commons that successive Lord Chancellors had disregarded these provisions, and that a council of judges had only reported on three occasions since the passing of the Act. FRAUD BY AN AGENT. THE rule for deciding whether a principal is liable for the fraud of his agent is laid down clearly in the text-books. For instance, Bowstead on Agency states that every principal is civilly liable for every fraud committed by his agent in the ordinary course of his employment, and for the benefit of his principal, though he did not authorise it, and even if he had expressly forbidden it. There are plenty of authorities for that proposition, but they apparently have their origin in the interpretation of the decision in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank (16 L. T. Rep. 461; L. Rep. 2 Ex. 259). There the plaintiff had been in the habit of supplying a customer of the defendants with oats on credit, upon the defendants' guarantee. He demanded a better guarantee, and the defendants' manager thereupon gave him a written guarantee that the customer's cheque to the plaintiff should be paid in priority to any other payment" except to the bank." The customer was in fact indebted to the bank to the extent of £12,000, but this fact was not known by the plaintiff. The latter then supplied the customer with oats to the value of £1227 for carrying out a Government contract, and a cheque for £2676 was sent to the customer by the Government in payment of this and other consignments. This cheque was paid by the customer into his account, but the customer's cheque in favour of the plaintiff was dishonoured by the defendants, who claimed to retain the whole sum in payment of their debt. Mr. Justice Willes said: 66 The plaintiff brought an action against the bank for false representation. Baron Martin ruled that there was no evidence to go to the jury in support of the plaintiff's case, and directed a non-suit. The plaintiff appealed, and, in directing a new trial, The general rule is that the master is answerable for every such wrong of the servant or agent as is committed in the course of the service and for the master's benefit, though no express command or privity of the master be proved." He goes on to cite instances, as where owners of ships I have been held liable in trespass for the acts of masters abroad t of supp dit, qu uarante ten ga ld be p The c £120 improperly selling the cargo; then he says: In all these cases it may be said, as it was said here, that the master has not authorised the act. It is true he has not authorised the particular act, but he has put the agent in his place to do that class of acts, and he must be answerable for the manner in which the agent has conducted himself in doing the business which it was. the act of his master to place him in." The words are not very clear, but they have always been interpreted to mean that if an agent committed a fraudulent act for his own private ends, even though it belonged to a class of acts which he was authorised to do in his master's service, his master would not be liable. Thus in British Mutual Banking Company v. Charnwood Forest Railway Company (57 L. T. Rep. 833; 18 Q. B. Div. 714) the secretary of a company answered certain questions which were put to him as to the validity of certain debenture stock of the company. The answers were untrue, and were fraudulently made by the secretary for his own benefit, the fact being that the secretary had fraudulently issued the debentures in question in excess of the amount which the company was authorised to issue. The plaintiffs in consequence of these answers lent money upon the stock and found afterwards that it was valueless. They then sued the company for the fraud of their secretary. The company had reaped no benefit from that fraud, and the Court of Appeal (Lord Esher, M.R. and Lords Justices Bowen and Fry), reversing the decision of the Queen's Bench Division, held that the company was not liable. 66 case. Lord Justice Bowen in his judgment refers with approval to the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Willes in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank (ubi sup.) and distinguishes that "In that case," he says, the act done, though not expressly authorised, was done for the master's benefit. With respect to acts of that description, it was doubtless correct to say that the agent was placed there to do acts of 'that class.' Transferred to a case like the present, the expression that the secretary was placed in his office to do acts of 'that class,' begs the very question at issue, for the defendant's proposition is, on the contrary, that an act done not for the employer's benefit, but for the servant's own private ends, is not an act of the class which the secretary either was or could possibly be authorised to do." A somewhat similar case was Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated (95 L. T. Rep. 214; (1906) A. C. 439). There the secretary of the company had borrowed money upon the security of a share certificate which he had fraudulently issued to the plaintiffs, having affixed the company's seal without authority and forged the signatures of the two directors. The company refused to register the plaintiffs as owners of the shares, and the plaintiffs claimed damages. It was held that the secretary had no authority to do anything more than the ministerial act of delivering the share certificates, when duly made, to the owners, and that the company were not responsible for his wrongful act outside the scope of his authority. Lord Davey, in his judgment in that case in the House of Lords, says that where a secretary is acting fraudulently for his own illegal purposes, no representation by him relating to the matter will bind his employers. He adds: The reason for the qualification is that a representation made under such circumstances, whether express or implied, is also part of the same fraud, and cannot rightly be considered to be made by the servant as agent or on behalf of his master." This aspect of the law of principal and agent was recently reviewed by the House of Lords in Lloyd v. Grace, Smith, and Co., reported in the Court of Appeal, 104 L. T. Rep. 789; (1911) 2 K. B. 489. The facts were as follows: Mrs. Lloyd, who owned two freehold cottages and a mortgage for £450, was dissatisfied with the income which she received from her property. Accordingly she called on the respondent firm and had an interview with their conveyancing clerk, Sandles, who conducted that branch of the business without supervision. Acting on his advice, she brought the deeds relating to the property with her next day and then signed two documents which he put before her. One was a transfer of the mortgage and the other an absolute conveyance of the cottages to Sandles himself. She did not read them, but signed without demur, and Sandles gave her a receipt for the deeds in his own name and afterwards, at her Second Sheet request, in the name of the firm. Sandles then called in the mortgage and misappropriated the proceeds, and mortgaged the cottages to secure a private debt of his own. Mrs. Lloyd sought to recover against the firm in the King's Bench Division; the jury found that Sandles professed to act as conveyancing manager for the firm, and added that in their opinion the plaintiff believed that she was dealing with the firm. Mr. Justice Scrutton upon these findings gave judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants appealed, and, upon the authority of Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank (ubi sup.), the Court of Appeal (Lords Justices Farwell and Kennedy) reversed the decision in the court below Lord, Justice Vaughan Williams being of opinion there should be a new trial on the question of estoppel. Mrs. Lloyd then appealed to the House of Lords, and her appeal was allowed by the House (Earl Loreburn, the Earl of Halsbury, Lord Macnaghten, Lord Atkinson, and Lord Shaw of Dunfermline). That court expressed their opinion that the language of Mr. Justice Willes in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank had been misunderstood, and that that case was not an authority for the proposition that a master was not liable for the wrong of his servant or agent committed in the course of his service, if it were not committed for the master's benefit. They stated the true principle to be that a principal is liable for the act of his agent in the course of his employment, whether he is acting for the benefit of his principal or not. In this they dissented from the dicta of Lord Bowen in British Mutual Banking Company v. Charnwood Forest Railway Company (ubi sup.) and of Lord Davey in Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated (ubi sup.). This decision of the House of Lords affirms the view taken by Mr. Justice Quain of the decision in Barwick v. London Joint Stock Bank (ubi sup.) in Swift v. Winterbotham (28 L. T. Rep. 339; L. Rep. 8 Q. B. 244)—that is to say, provided only that the agent's fraud is committed in carrying out one of the "class of acts" which his principal employs him to do, the principal is liable; and the fact that the principal reaps no benefit from the agent's fraud has no effect on that liability. THE PARLIAMENTARY RECORD. ON reassembling for the continuation of its legislative programme, Parliament will find itself confronted with a task of immense difficulty unless it is content to jettison some of its weightier burdens. The list of Acts which thus far have, amid the special preoccupations of Parliament, reached the statute-book is not a long one, and we will now deal with them in their capitular order. Cap. 1 is entitled the Consolidated Fund (No. 1) Act. It is a formal measure applying certain sums to the service of the year, but it involved some rather animated debate, for the rules of the House enabled the discussion to travel along somewhat devious paths. Consequently there was debate not only on financial transactions, but also by way of protest against the decision of the Attorney-General to institute proceedings against the parties responsible for the " open letter in the Syndicalist and the arrest of Mr. Tom Mann. After these questions had been disposed of, the Bill passed through its stages with no further difficulty. The Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act forms cap. 2. The history of the industrial upheaval which brought this measure into existence is one, of course, within the memory of all. It was introduced by the Government with reluctance, and only because in their opinion all hope of an agreed settlement had passed away. The Act makes it an implied term of every contract for the employment of a workman underground in a coal mine that the employer is to pay him wages at not less than the minimum rate settled under the Act and applicable to that workman. This is subject, however, to a certificate that the workman is a person ́excluded under the district rules from the operation of this provision, and subject, moreover, to the workman not having forfeited his right to the minimum wages by reason of his failure to comply with the conditions with respect to the regularity or efficiency of the work to be performed by workmen laid down by those rules. Any agreement for the payment of wages in so far as it contravenes these provisions is void. "District rules mean rules made by a joint district board under the Act. These rules lay down conditions in regard to their appropriate districts as to the exclusion from the right to wages at the minimum rate so far as concerns aged workmen and infirm workmen, amongst whom are included men partially disabled by illness or accident. They deal also with conditions respecting the regularity and efficiency of the work to be performed, and with respect to the time for which a man is to be paid in the event of interruption due to an emergency. They provide that a workman is to forfeit the right to wages at the minimum rate if he does not comply with the conditions as to regularity and efficiency of work, except where his failure is due to some cause over which he has no control. Furthermore, these district rules are designed to provide for the machinery whereby the settlement of questions is to be The decided, and for a certificate being given of the decision. rules, therefore, must provide for the persons by whom and the mode in which questions are to be determined; whether a workman in the district is one to whom the minimum rate is applicable or whether he has complied with the conditions, or whether, if he has not complied, he has forfeited his rights. These provisions as to the minimum wage operated from the date of the passing of the Act (the 29th March). The scheme of the Act is to set out a number of districts, specified in a schedule. Where a mine geographically in one area has for industrial purposes been customarily dealt with in the same manner as a mine in an adjoining district, the Act treats it as situate in that latter district if the joint district boards of the two districts so agree. By sect. 2 it is contemplated that there must be seperate settlements of minimum wages and district rates in respect of the several areas by joint district boards recognised by the Board of Trade. The board can recognise any body of persons which in their opinion fairly and adequately represent the local coal miners and their employers and having an independent chairman, and they may impose, as a condition of recognition, a rule providing for equality of voting power and a casting vote for the chairman in case of difference where the rules of the body put before them for recognition do not provide in this direction. The general duties of these joint district boards form the subject-matter of the third and subsequent sub-sections of sect. 2, and it will be seen that they cover an area bristling with difficulties of all sorts and kinds. Sect.3 provides for the revision of minimum rates and district rules. A variation can be made at any time by agreement between masters and men, and after one year has elapsed since the rate or rules were last settled or varied on an application being made (with three months' notice after the expiration of the year) by any workmen or employers which appears to the joint district board to represent any considerable body of opinion amongst either masters or men concerned. Sect. 4 is a set of provisions for bringing the Act into operation. The Act in applying to coal mines includes mines of stratified ironstone. This matter was made the subject of a special protest by Mr. Chamberlain. "Workman' is a term of somewhat ambiguous meaning. So far as this Act is concerned, it refers to a person employed below ground other than (a) a man employed casually or occasionally, or (b) a person employed solely in surveying or measuring, or (c) mechanics, or (d) managers or under-managers, or (e) any other official of the mine whose position is recognised by the joint district board as are different from that of a workman. A curious arrangement is made whereby the office of chairman can be put into commission and a majority of three persons may be deemed to be the chairman. Finally, it has to be noted that the Act is recognised as experimental, and it is to continue for three years only from its passing unless Parliament should otherwise determine. (To be continued.) opposite building, they are to be limited to the depreciation in the value of the dominant tenement caused by the obstruction of light to it or are to be extended to the diminution in value of the whole of the premises considered as one building site. The Court of Appeal came to the conclusion, affirming the decision of Mr. Justice Neville, that the diminution in value of the whole site might be taken into account in assessing the loss to the owner of the property. The contention that the plaintiff was only entitled to damages which would compensate him for the loss to the dominant tenement itself, and that damages for diminution in site value were too remote, was regarded as untenable. In the judgment of Lord Esher in Re London, Tilbury, and Southend Railway Company and Trustees of Gower's Walk Schools (62 L. T. Rep. 306, at p. 307; 24 Q. B. Div. 326, at p. 329), there is a statement that, where a plaintiff has a cause of action for a wrongful, act of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for all the damage caused which was the direct consequence of the wrongful act. Allowing that that was a mere obiter dictum, inasmuch as the railway company there were not in the ordinary position of owners of land, but were affected by sections of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, yet it was approved and adopted by Lord Justice Buckley in the later case of Horton v. Colwyn Bay and Colwyn Urban District Council (98 L. T. Rep. 547, at p. 554; (1908) 1 K. B. 327, at p. 341). Whatever may be said concerning Lord Esher's statement, it is, as the Master of the Rolls (Cozens-Hardy) pointed out in Griffith's case (ubi sup.), impossible to treat Lord Justice Buckley's observation as a mere dictum, because in saying what he did in reference to the legal proposition involved in the earlier case, he treated the same as one of the grounds for his decision. Lord Esher's statement was certainly treated as the ground for the decision in Griffith's case (ubi sup.). The direction to the jury in Moore v. Hall (38 L. T. Rep. 419; 3 Q.B. Div. 178, at p. 180), which, on appeal, was held to be a right direction, was to the effect that it must be considered whether the plaintiff's premises were rendered by the obstruction of ancient lights less available for the purposes of occupation or business, to which they were then or might thereafter be made applicable. The decision in Martin v. Goble (1 Camp. 320) was there dissented from. The decision in Moore v. Hall (ubi sup.), therefore, no less than what was laid down in the two other authorities to which we have referred, appears to assist somewhat in the momentous decision pronounced in the present case. It was not, however, come to without the necessity for traversing as is seen from our report, some extremely forcible arguments in favour of an opposite conclusion. Those arguments demonstrate in the most effectual manner how far-reaching are the consequences of a judicial difference therefrom. In particular may be mentioned that, notwithstanding that the dominant tenement was a house containing certain windows, obstruction of light to which alone caused damage to the plaintiff, he becomes by the present decision entitled to a vastly wider relief. COMMENTS ON CASES. Obstruction of Ancient Lights. THE question that was raised in the recent case of Griffith v. Richard Clay and Sons Limited (106 L. T. Rep. 963) does not appear to have ever been previously brought before the courts in the precise form in which it was there presented. At any rate, no earlier reported decision on the subject is contained in the books. And a matter of such importance is scarcely likely to have been overlooked by those whose duty it is to see that it shall not. The famous case of Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores Limited (90 L. T. Rep. 687; (1904) A. C. 179), which is, of course, invariably cited in all cases relating to interference with ancient lights, dealt with the question of the nuisance thereby occasioned. It has no bearing on the question of the measure of damages to be awarded when such lights have been obstructed. That, however, was what Mr. Justice Neville, in the court of first instance, and subsequently the Court of Appeal were called upon to determine in Griffith's case (ubi sup.). The question, stated briefly, was this: Whether in assessing the damages recoverable by the owner of a house, the windows in which are admittedly ancient lights that have been obstructed by the erection of an THE CONVEYANCER. The Effect of the Conveyancing Act 1911 upon WHEN new Acts of Parliament affecting conveyancing first Sect. 4 will be very useful in the case of mortgages of building land or mineral property. It will render it unnecessary to insert in such mortgages power to sell subject to restrictive covenants, or to sell the mines and minerals apart from the surface, or to grant or reserve easements connected with building or other purposes, or to except mines and minerals with or without powers of working the same, or to sell with or without covenants by the purchaser to expend money on the lands sold. Sect. 5 (2) will render it unnecessary to insert in a mortgage This it does by the usual mortgagee's indemnity. clause. |