ADJUDICATIONS. GAZETTE, MAY 3. ATKINSON, ALBERT GEORGE HEBDEN, Middlesbrough, grocer. Ct. Middlesbrough. April 30. BOLSOVER, WILLIAM, late Sheffield, agent. Ct. Birkenhead. April 30. CHENETT, EDWARD, Stourbridge, plumber. Ct. Stourbridge. April 29. DAFT, JOHN, Nuneaton, fishmonger. Ct. Coventry. April 29 HAMILTON, EDWARD (trading as the Dayton Toy Company), Aldersgate-st. HARRISON, HERBERT, Birmingham, picture moulding manufacturer. Ct. HUMPHREY, ERNEST MARTIN (trading as Russell and Son), York, general draper. Ct. York. April 29. JENKIN, HERBERT JAMES, Newquay, contractor. Ct. Truro. April 27. LADDIN, HARRIS, Manchester, cabinet maker. Ct. Manchester. April 29. LEWY, MARCUS THEODORE, Morning-la, Hackney, boot manufacturer. High Court. May 1. Ct. LEYLAND, ALFRED, Ashton-in-Makerfield, wholesale general dealer. Ct. Wigan. April_30. MARTIN, GUSTAV LEWIS, late Mitcham-rd, Tooting. baker. Ct. High Court. May 1. MICHEL, FREIDRICH (described in the receiving order and trading as Fritz. Michel), High-rd, Leyton, baker. Ct High Court. May 1. MIDDLETON, JOHN, jun., Birmingham, electro plate manufacturer. Ct. Birmingham. May 1. MAUGHAN, EDWARD, late Preston, innkeeper. Ct. Newcastle-upon-Tyne. April 29. MEYER, HERMANN LEAR HARRY, Bournemouth, provision dealer. Ct. Poole. May 1. MOYSE, FREDERICK, Rochester, cart builder. Ct. Rochester. April 30. NICHOLAS, BENJAMIN, and NICHOLAS, WILLIAM (trading as Nicholas Brothers), Pontardulaie, builders. Ct. Swansea. May 1. PARRY, WILLIAM HENRY, Draycott, late carter. Ct. Derby and Long Eaton. April 29. PEARSON, ARTHUR, Arnold, farmer. Ct. Nottingham. April 29. RAWLING, SAMUEL (trading as Pearson and Ibbotson). Bradford, commission manufacturer. Ct. Bradford. April 29. ROCHE, THOMAS FRANCIS, Kingston-on-Thames, surgeon. Ct. Kingston, Surrey. April 29. REED, PERCY ALBERT, Llanfair Caereinion, grocer. Ct. Newtown. April 29. SOLOMON, SOUL, Commercial-st. Spitalfields, fur merchant. Ct. High Court. April 30. STATHAM, HARRY, Birmingham, butcher. Ct. Birmingham. May 1 STONE, WILLIAM LEIGH JAMES HENRY (described in the receiving order as TAYLOR, CYRIL, late Minehead, gentleman. Ct. Exeter. April 30. April 29. grocer. Ct. Middlesbrough. TYRRELL, HENRY WILLIAM JOHN, Norwich, commercial clerk. Ct. Norwich. April 29. WALKER, JAMES (trading as F. M. Walker), late Southend-on-Sea, export merchant. Ct. High Court. April 27. WURKER, CARL, and ALBERT, ROBERT (trading as P. Robinson and Evans), Aldersgate-st, merchants. Ct. High Court. May 1. WATKINS, JOHN, Llanharry, licensed victualler. Ct Cardiff. April 29. WALTON, WALTER, Tipton, licensed victualler. Ct. Dudley. May 1. WARE, ALBERT, Clyst Hydon, butcher. Ct. Exeter. April 30. WHITMORE, JOSEPH, Leicester, joiner. Ct. Leicester. April 29. WATKINS. FREDERICK DAVID, Bargoed, builder. April 29. Ct. Merthyr Tydfil. WHITTAKER, ALFRED (trading as Fred Whittaker), Wednesbury, butcher's outfitter. Ct. Walsall. April 29. Amended notice substituted for that published in Gazette, Nov. 28, 1911. Fox-PITT, ST. GEORGE WILLIAM LANE (described in the receiving order as St. George Lane Fox-Pitt), late Glebe-pl, Chelsea. Ct. High Court. Nov. 24. GAZETTE, MAY 7. ALLEN, RICHARD WILLIAM, Harley-st, doctor of medicine. Ct. High Court. BRIDGES, HENRY CUTHBERT (described in the receiving order as H. C. chester. May 2. Ct. Man BURSTON, JOHN, Tarporley, grocer. Ct. Nantwich and Crewe. May 2. BERRY, JOHN HODGSON, Malton, hotel keeper. Ct. Scarborough. May 2. DAVIES, RICHARD, Brynmawr, confectioner. Ct. Tredegar. May 3. FITZGERALD, EDWARD RAPHAEL, Greenford, gentleman. Ct. Brentford. May 2. JONES, JOHN, late Menai Bridge, carter. Ct. Bangor. May 4. MITCHELL-HEDGES, FREDERICK ALBERT (trading as Pembery, Robinson, and MOORES, CHARLES, Denton, grocer. Ct. Ashton-under-Lyne and Stalybridge. May 3. MURGATROYD, FRANK, Grasmere, hotel keeper. Ct. Kendal. May 3. May 4. Ct. Truro. PAYNE, EDWARD BURTON, Birmingham, patent agent. Ct. Birmingham. May 3. PATTISON, ALBERT EDWARD, Middlesbrough, hairdresser. Ct. Middlesbrough. May_2. READING, JOSEPH PAUL, Stourbridge, licensed victualler. Ct. Stourbridge. April 30. May 4. RIGDEN, EDWARD JOHN (described in the petition as Edward James WOOD, ARTHUR ERNEST, Westcliffe-on-Sea, builder Ct. Chelmsford. May 2. BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS. BIRTHS. BLACK. On the 19th ult., at Over Abingtown, Bearsden, the wife of DEATHS. ARATHOON. On the 24th ult., at Paddington, Arathoon Arathoon, Bar-, rister-at-law, Inner Temple, aged 62. CASTLE. On the 27th ult., at 89, Harcourt-ter, South Kensington, Edward James Castle, K.C. HEYGATE. On the 26th ult., at Wellingborough, James Heygate, Solicitor, aged 67. LAW. On the 25th ult., at Knockbridge. Icklesham, Sussex, Henry Towey Law, B.A., Barrister-at-law, in his fifty-sixth year. When are you taking this WorkThis Year or Next Year? Everyone seems to be using "The Laws of England" nowadays. 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Re ROBINSON'S SETTLEMENT; GANT v. HOBBS.-Moneylender-Want of registration-Transaction "in the course of his business as a money. lender"-Security void STEAMSHIP DEN OF AIRLIE COMPANY LIMITED V. MITSUI AND CO. LIMITED AND BRITISH OIL AND CAKE MILLS LIMITED.-Ship-Charter-partyBills of lading-Assignment HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. 443 Re HODGSON'S SETTLED ESTATES; CRIMINAL LAW! AND THE JURISDIOTION OF MAGISTRATES.-Topics...... LEGISLATION.-Topics GENERAL INTELLIGENCE. - Vendor and Purchaser Stipulations Limiting the Obligation of Vendors of Real Property to Show a Good Title- Heirs-at-Law and Next of Kin Appointments under the Joint Stock Winding-up Acts -Creditors under Estates in Cha ncery- Creditors under 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35 Oxfordshire Incorporated Law 67 Society Berks, Bucks, and 460 Society 70 KING'S BENCH DIVISION. ELSON v. CROOKES AND OTHERS. Insurance-Life-Contract-Illegal Absence of insurable interest-Recovery of premiums... 462 PROBATE, DIVORCE, AND ADMIRALTY DIVISION. DIVORCE BUSINESS. S. v. S. AND R.-Divorce-Practice- PROMOTIONS AND APPOINTMENTS LEGAL OBITUARY. Mr. William THE GAZETTES. 71 73 464 BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS..... 74 The Law and the Lawyers. Expulsion of Aliens. THE annual statement on this subject for the year 1911, issued by the Home Office, is designed to show, and, on the figures contained, does in fact prove, that if the Aliens Act 1905 has not proved as efficacious as it might, the courts, and not the department, are responsible therefor. In 1911, expulsion orders were made against 380 criminal aliens, and of this number 254 came from the metropolis, 107 from the rest of England and Wales, and nineteen from Scotland. There has been a decrease in the number of these orders during the last two years, the total for 1909 being 467 and 1910 414, the figure for 1911, however, still exceeding the average for the six years that the Act has been in operation—namely, 362. Effect on Alien Crime. It is truly pointed out that the power of the Secretary of State to make an order does not come into being except on a certificate from a court, and, further, that it rests with the court to make the expulsion effective by enforcing rigorously the penalty for the offence of being found in the United Kingdom in contravention of an expulsion order. The 380 orders to which we have referred were made out of 410 recommendations, and, of the thirty cases in which the orders were not made, ten prisoners were proved to be British subjects, one died in prison, and in three the Court of Criminal Appeal intervened. No less than 2194 convicted aliens were received into prison in 1911, and though, of course, not all of these were fit subjects for expulsion, the fact remains that in very many cases recommendations might be made without which the Secretary of State is powerless to act. Return of Expelled Aliens. No one will doubt that it is manifestly impossible that expelled aliens can be prevented from ever landing on these shores, and the only way in which the full value of expulsion can be obtained is by making it clear that such an alien found in the United Kingdom will be made to feel the full rigour of the law. As a matter of fact, although naturally not every such alien can be detected, the number found in this country in contravention of orders is not great. In 1911, but seventy-four were discovered, and of these twenty-one had offended similarly before and so were liable to twelve months' imprisonment at sessions. Only four of these received as much as six months' imprisonment, and it must be taken as beyond dispute that this offence has been dealt with far too leniently. As the statement truly points out, if a returned expelled alien finds himself sentenced to a considerable term of imprisonment, he may be less ready to again expose himself to that risk by reappearing in the United Kingdom. Unqualified Persons. How far the court will exercise its summary powers against an unqualified person who has purported to act as though he were a solicitor was again considered by Mr. Justice EVE in a recent case. The question in that case arose on a motion in a debenture-holder's action for an order that a certain person, not a party to the action, should within seven days lodge moneys in court stated to have been received by him with the knowledge that it was part of purchase morey ordered to be paid into court. On the facts the learned judge came to the conclusion that the person in question in the course of the action had, on his own admissions, "assumed the privileges of a solicitor and carried on legal proceedings as an officer of the court," and, although he had not obtained the money in that capacity, he had by his conduct rendered himself amenable to the summary jurisdiction. Exercise of Summary Powers. THE extent to which the court will intervene in such cases was considered in 1892 by Mr. Justice MATHEW and Mr. Justice COLLINS in the case of Re Hulme and Lewis (66 L. T. Rep. 683), where an unqualified person, who had acted as a solicitor and had been ordered by the master to render accounts and deliver up documents received by him in that capacity, sought to raise the defence that he was not a solicitor upon a motion for a writ of attachment against him for disobedience to the master's order. Mr. Justice COLLINS there pointed out that the unqualified person had enjoyed the privileges incident to being an officer of the court, and that he could not be allowed to be in a better position than if he had actually been a solicitor, and the court ordered the writ of attachment to issue. The case before Mr. Justice EVE perhaps on its facts goes somewhat further than Re Hulme and Lewis, but the principle that the court can deal summarily with an unqualified person who purports to act as a solicitor is involved in both decisions, and this seems to be both correct and necessary. Certified Inebriate Reformatories. FROM the report of the inspector under the Inebriates Acts it appears that the check in the number of committals to these establishments for 1908 owing to the restrictions that existed in the metropolitan district has ceased, and that the number of persons admitted has begun again to show a steady increase, this fact being practically due to the number of committals under sect. 2. During 1910, 327 persons sentenced to detention were admitted to reformatories, twenty-nine from courts of assize or quarter sessions under sect. 1 and 298 from petty sessional courts or from the higher courts on indictment under sect. 2. Committals under the Sections. We have from time to time pointed out the difficulties encountered by the courts in administering the provisions of these sections of the Inebriates Act. The reasons for the restricted use of sect. 1 are many, and the fact that but 502 persons only have been committed under its provisions demonstrates that its application to the extent intended by the Legislature is impracticable. Of these 502 cases, in 391 the offence committed was that of neglecting children. Equal difficulties have arisen with regard to the administration of sect. 2, and, although the committals under this section have increased since 1907 it has still been necessary to refuse admission to many male persons on account of dearth of accommodation. The report further lays stress again upon the absence of any obligation upon any authority or person to establish reformatories, but Mr. BRANTHWAITE, the inspector, is able to state that, whatever may be said about other phases of the work, all that relates to the practical side, the detention and treatment of inmates, is being well done. THROUGH BILLS OF LADING. As is well known, this term describes the practice in certain trades according to which, though goods have to pass through the hands of a series of carriers, yet all use a single bill of lading to regulate the whole transit. The carriers combine to facilitate the transport from the point of consignment to the destination. The carrier who grants the bill of lading is the first carrier, and the leading principle in the law of through bills of lading is that the carrier who makes a through contract is answerable for its complete performance-that is to say, the matter is regarded purely as one of contract. That being the law, in a through bill of lading care is always taken to provide that the first carrier is not to be liable for a breach of contract after the goods have left his care, and similarly through the whole series of carriers each is only to be liable for damage happening on his own portion of the journey. 66 The long and complicated House of Lords decision in Crawford and Law v. Allan Line (105 L. T. Rep. 964; (1912) A. C. 130) has explained and developed very considerably the law relating to the through bill of lading. Briefly the facts were as follows: A cargo of flour was purchased at Minneapolis and consigned to Glasgow by an inland carrying company to New York and thence by the Allan Line to Glasgow. A through bill of lading was granted at Minneapolis bearing that the flour was received there in apparent good order and condition "except as noted," and incorporating the usual form of the Allan Line bill of ladingThat form of bill of lading also began with the usual clause received in good order and condition." The through bill of lading also provided that no carrier was to be liable for loss or damage not occurring on his own portion of the journey. And the bill of lading declared that the shipment was subject to all the provisions of the familiar American statute, the Harter Act. Also there were the usual numerous exceptions. happened that the flour was loaded at New York in rain and on arrival in Glasgow a large number of bags of flour were found to be caked. The caking was admittedly caused by fresh water. Damages were claimed from the Allan Line. They said that the damage had been caused before the goods came into their hands. The pursuers pointed to the declaration in the bill of lading that the goods were received in good condition, and argued that it followed from that that the carrier must deliver them in the like condition. It so The Lord Ordinary held that the defenders failed to discharge the onus of proof, that the damage done arose while the goods were not in their custody, and therefore he found them liable in damages. The Second Division reversed this judgment, but the House of Lords has restored the judgment of the Lord Ordinary. The opinions given were extremely involved, each judge finding different reasons for the decision, but we shall try to enumerate the leading results. With regard to the clause of the bill of lading signed at Minneapolis, "received in good order except as noted,” the Court of Session held that this only applied to Minneapolis and could not apply to New York, but the House of Lords ruled that it did apply to New York in respect that the bill of lading was signed on behalf of all the carriers, and that it incorporated the usual form of ocean bill of lading which also began with the same words-in effect, the signing of such a bill of lading at Minneapolis was the same as if the ship's captain had signed the usual bill of lading at New York. By the Harter Act it is provided that the owner, master, or agent of every vessel transporting goods from an American port is bound to issue to the shippers a bill of lading containing a statement of the order and condition of the property. The judges of the House of Lords pointed out that, if the through bill of lading applied only to Minneapolis, such a decision would have the effect of enabling shipowners by the device of a through bill of lading to escape the operation of the American law. The most important point advanced by Lord Salvesen, who gave the opinion of the Inner House of the Court of Session, was that the inland carrier was the agent of the shipper, and when he offered the goods to the ship during rain this amounted to an implied consent by the shipper that they should be loaded in such weather. A ship cannot refuse goods when offered to her, if she is under contract to take them, no matter what the weather. This was the main point in Lord Salvesen's decision in favour of the shipowners, but the House of Lords pointed out that this was destroying the "through" nature of the contract. It was one contract with a combination of carriers, and the inland carrier was no more the agent of the shippers to see to the proper delivery of the goods than was the steamship company their agent to see to the proper reception of them. Both carriers had made a contract to work into each other's hands to see the goods to their destination. What, however, chiefly weighed with the court was the fact that the bill of lading acknowledged receipt in good order and condition "except as noted." The shipowners had made no intimation of any damage to the inland carrier so as to preserve the claim of the owner of the goods against that carrier. The result was that there was, on the documents, an unqualified admission that the shipowners had received the flour in good ́order, and, it having been discharged in a damaged state, the shipowners incurred the heavy burden of giving satisfactory proof that the damage had been caused before the flour reached their hands. Indeed, the court went further, and several judges stated that, even though it had been established that the damage had been done before the steamer took delivery, the shipowners would stil] be liable in respect that they had not notified to the inland carrier the damage that had been discovered and qualified the ship's receipts and bills of lading accordingly. A clear inference from the decision is that in the through bill of lading there is an onus heavier than usual on the last carrier. He must be careful to notify the preceding carrier of any defect in the goods before he takes delivery, and this involves a careful check. In the present case the fact seems to have been that the checking of the bags of flour at New York was done very hurriedly and during rain. It was not noticed that the bags were in a bad condition, and therefore it may rightly be said that the ship was responsible. It should be explained, however, that one of the provisions of the bill of lading was that the inland carrier was not to be liable for, among other things, wet, and therefore the consignees of the flour could not make good a claim against them. Had the shipowners noticed that the bags had been damaged by wet and refused to take them except on qualified bills of lading, what would be the position? The consignee would simply have to bear the loss. It Second Sheet. so happened, however, that, through the shipowners not notifying that the goods were damaged when they got delivery of them, the documents put on them a heavy onus which they failed to discharge, and thus they had to pay the damage. THE LAW OF DISTRESS AMENDMENT ACT 1908. THE recent conflicting decisions of the Divisional Court in London Furnishing Company Limited v. Solomon (106 L. T. Rep. 371) and Hackney Furnishing Company v. Watts (post, p. (0) confirm the view which we have before expressed (130 L. T. Jour. 358)—namely, that the Act is in parts difficult of construction. It was, no doubt, a well-meant effort to mitigate the rigour of the common law as to distress. The case of Challoner v. Robinson (98 L. T. Rep. 222; (1908) 1 Ch. 49) is a good illustration of the hardship which that law imposed on third parties. There the plaintiff was the proprietor of the United Arts Club; he was underlessee from year to year of the club premises, and he undertook all the liabilities of the club and received all the profits. One of the objects of the club was to exhibit pictures sent in by members, principally for sale. The club was managed by a committee, and the exhibitions were managed by a picture committee. The exhibitions were not open to the public on payment. The defendants, as superior landlords, put in a distress for rent due from the lessee, and seized certain pictures belonging to members on the club premises, which pictures had been sent in for exhibition and sale. The plaintiff, who was a member of the committee of the club, brought an action to restrain the defendants from proceeding with the distress, and it was held by the Court of Appeal (affirming Mr. Justice Neville) that the pictures were liable to distress. Mr. Justice Neville, who is always keenly alive to anything calculated to benefit the public generally, commenced his judgment with the following words: "Now this is the year 1907, and it seems to me extraordinary that it should be possible in a country which boasts of civilisation, which purports to protect the property of the law-abiding citizen, to raise such a question. But so it is." Sect. 1 of the above-mentioned Act protects the goods of undertenants and lodgers and of "any other person whatsoever, not being a tenant of the premises, or of any part thereof, and not having any beneficial interest in any tenancy of the premises, or of any part thereof," against distress by the superior landlord, by enacting, in effect, that if any superior landlord should levy or authorise to be levied a distress of any goods of any undertenant, lodger, or other person aforesaid, such tenant, lodger, or other person aforesaid may serve such landlord or the agent employed to levy such distress, with a declaration in writing made by such undertenant, lodger, or other person aforesaid, stating that such immediate tenant had no right of property or beneficial interest in the goods distrained, or threatened so to be, and that such goods were in the lawful possession of such undertenant, lodger, or other person aforesaid, and were not goods to which that Act was expressed not to apply, and, in the case of an undertenant or lodger or other person aforesaid, giving particulars of the rent due and to become due to his immediate landlord and an undertaking (to pay the same to the superior landlord until the arrears of rent in respect of which, the distress was levied had been paid off. And by sect. 2, if the superior landlord, after having been served with such declaration (and an inventory of the goods referred to therein), proceeds with the distress, he is to be deemed guilty of an illegal distress; and any such other person aforesaid may apply to a justice of the peace for an order for the restoration of the goods to him, and shall also be liable to an action by such person. Sect. 4 provides that the Act shall not apply to (among other things) "goods comprised in any hire-purchase agreement." In London Furnishing Company Limited v. Solomon the plaintiffs let certain furniture to one L. under a hire-purchase agreement by which she agreed to pay the rent and taxes of the house in which the furniture was, and to keep the same free from legal process. And it was thereby also provided that if the hirer did not duly perform and observe the agreement the owners might retake possession of the furniture. L. fell into arrear with her rent, and the plaintiffs thereupon wrote to inform her that in consequence of the non-compliance by her with the terms of the agreement they had decided to terminate the same. On the next day the plaintiffs sent a van for the goods, but the carman was told that rent was owing to L.'s landlord and the goods were not removed; the plaintiffs thereupon served a declaration on the landlord under sect. 1 of the said Act stating that L. had no beneficial interest in the goods. The landlord, however, put in a distress for the goods. In an action by the plaintiffs, who let the furniture, against the landlord to recover the same, or its value, the court held (reversing the decision of the County Court judge) that as the plaintiffs Lad determined the hiring agreement by notice, the hirer had no beneficial interest in the goods, and that they were not liable to seizure by the landlord for nonpayment of rent. Sect. 4 does not appear to have been referred to; and the reasons for the judgment are not as clear as they might be. At first sight it would certainly seem as if the furniture in question was comprised in a hiring agreement at the time of the distress, and, if so, the lenders of the furniture were not entitled to the benefit of the Act. But the court may have meant that the furniture was not comprised in the hiring agreement because it had been put an end to by notice before the distress was levied, and that may be a logical construction of sect. 4. If, however, the object of the Act was to prevent tenants from giving the appearance of a financial position which they do not possess (as seems to have been the view of the court in Hackney Furnishing Company v. Watts), the decision would seem calculated to defeat that object. Hackney Furnishing Company v. Watts was also a case of a hire-purchase agreement which entitled the owners of the goods to retake possession if the hirer made default. The hirer fell into arrear with some of the instalments, and thereupon the plaintiffs purported by letter to him to terminate the hiring agreement. Subsequently the plaintiffs sued him for detention of the goods. After the writ was issued the defendant, the landlord, distrained on the goods, which still remained on the premises. The plaintiffs thereupon served a declaration on the landlord under sect. 1 of the said Act. The defendant relied on sect. 4 above referred to. The court thought that the reason for sect. 4 was that the owner had voluntarily and for his own gain placed the goods where they were liable to distress, thereby tending to induce the landlord to give credit to the tenant, and that the tenant presumably under an agreement of the kind has an interest in the goods which ought to be available for the landlord and that if a mere demand of possession was sufficient to take the goods out of the hire-purchase agreement, there was no reason for the provision that the statute should not apply to goods in a hire-purchase agreement. The court accordingly held that a mere demand of possession was not sufficient to take the goods out of the hire-purchase agreement, and decided in favour of the defendant, the landlord. It is submitted that the view taken by the court in Hackney Furnishing Company v. Watts is the correct one, and will be followed in future in preference to the decision in London Furnishing Company Limited v. Solomon. COMMENTS ON CASES. Execution of Works Authorised by Statute. WHERE damage results from the execution of works authorised by the Legislature to be done, the remedy is not by an action at law, but is under the statute which legalises what would otherwise be a wrong: (see Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Gibbs, 14 L. T. Rep. 677; L. Rep. 1 E. & I. App. 93, at p. 112; and Hammersmith and City Railway Company v. Brand, 21 L. T. Rep. 238; L. Rep. 4 E. & I. App. 171, at p. 215). The general rule thus enunciated by Mr. Justice Blackburn and Lord Cairns respectively in those two cases is only applicable, however, to works carefully and skilfully executed. Should proper care and skill be lacking on the part of the persons by whom any work is executed, such negligence will give rise to an action for damages. The wide provisions of sect. 308 of the Public Health Act 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 55), and the absence of all reference therein to negligence or unreasonableness, might lead one to suppose that a person damnified by the exercise of any of the powers of that Act would not be put to the necessity of showing that the work done was improperly performed in order to entitle him to recover compensation. And such was the view sought to be maintained before the Divisional Court in the recent case of Lingke v. Christchurch Corporation (106 L. T. Rep. 376). Mr. Justice Darling, indeed, admitted that, if it had not been for the authorities which were cited to the court, he would have been very much inclined to adopt that view. For undoubtedly the language of the section, unqualified by any decisions to the contrary, would seem to entitle a person to recover compensation who has suffered damage and inconvenience by reason of the execution of works by a local authority-although in exercise of their statutory powers-without proof of negli gence or improper conduct. In Lingke's case (ubi sup.), the plaintiff's allegation was that the defendants, in executing certain drainage works, had thrown up a heap of rubbish in front of her shop, inconveniencing her in the business which she carried on there. No negligence or improper conduct on their part was proved; but the judgment of Lord Westbury in Ricket v. Metropolitan Railway Company (16 L. T. Rep. 542; L. Rep. 2 E. & I. App. 175) was regarded as sufficient to render any such proof unnecessary. The defendants, in opposition to the plaintiff's claim for damages, relied on several authorities. None of them turned upon the provisions of sect. 308 of the Act of 1875; they were nevertheless capable of being applied by analogy. Thus, the nearest, which was that of Herring v. Metropolitan Board of Works (19 C. B. N. S. 510), decided in the year 1865, was founded upon sects. 135 and 225 of the Metropolis Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120). It was there held that the mere temporary obstruction of access to premises, though it might cause some inconvenience and loss of business to the occupier, was not "damage in respect of which he was entitled to claim compensation under those sections. Again, the case of New River Company v. Johnson (2 Ell. & Ell. 435; 29 L. J. 93, M. C.), a passage from the judgment of Mr. Justice Cockburn in which was read by Mr. Justice Darling in the course of his judgment, was of much assistance in support of the defendants' contention. The decision there was that a person injured by the execution of works authorised by statute-in that case a local Act incor porating the Waterworks Clauses Act 1847 (10 & 11 Vict. c. 17) —is not entitled to compensation thereunder, unless the injury is such as, had the works been unauthorised, would have given a right of action. The Legislature must be presumed to have been aware of those decisions when passing the Act of 1875; and, despite the equivocal terms of sect. 308 thereof, it is highly improbable that any change in the law was intended to be thereby effected. Requisitioning Extraordinary General Meeting. ALTHOUGH the application of the provisions of sect. 66, sub-sect. 1, of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69) must be of everyday occurrence, they had not apparently been the subject of any reported decision until they were dealt with by Mr. Justice Warrington in the recent case of Fruit and Vegetable Growers Association Limited v. Kekewich (noted ante, p. 34). And yet it can scarcely be said that the sub-section is one that is entirely free from ambiguity. It is a re-enactment, in almost identical language, of sect. 13, sub-sect. 1, of the Companies Act 1900 (63 & 64 Vict. c. 48), the object of which was to give statutory effect for the first time to certain clauses that already found their place in all well-drawn articles of association. Simultaneously, any attempt to hinder the right of shareholders to cause an extraordinary general meeting of their company to be convened was frustrated. They acquired, under the sub-section, a power to direct their directors, whether the same was conferred upon them by the articles of association or not. Notwithstanding anything in such articles, the obligation was imposed on the directors of a company, on the requisition of the holders of not less than one-tenth of the issued share capital of the company upon which all calls or other sums then due have been paid," forthwith to proceed to convene an extraordinary general meeting 66 |