in Essex by an extraordinary high tide, and, on reference, the facts in this case will also be found to be typical of what may occur any day at the seaside. A. and B. were occupier and owner of adjacent pieces of land fronting a creek. A sea wall, which ran in front of their and other property, was a necessary protection against the high tides for each piece of land; and when the wall wore down and a tide rose to the top of it, it was the habit for each owner to "top" that part of the wall in front of his property by the addition of suitable material. B., however, neglected to so top" the part of the wall in front of his land, and, in consequence, one day the water flowed over the wall on to his land, and so on to A.'s land, doing, as may be readily understood, considerable damage. But both the Queen's Bench Division and the Court of Appeal could find no redress for A.: (Hudson v. Tabor, 36 L. T. Rep. 492; 2 Q. B. Div. 290).

66

For, when the facts are more closely examined, it will appear that there is no tort by A., howsoever unneighbourly his conduct in not maintaining the barrier as his neighbours did may have been. Apart from prescription, the common law casts no liability on a frontager, as such, to maintain the barrier. That, as we have already remarked, is a public duty of imperfect obligation incumbent on the Crown. Then the mere repair of a man's fence for his own benefit, however often done and for however long a period of time, will not per se impose upon him a duty to continue such repair for his neighbour's benefit if and whenever he ceases to care to do it for his own. Again the mere facts that each frontager had always maintained the wall in front of his piece of land, and that no owner had ever thought it necessary to erect a barrier to protect his land from any water which might come from his neighbour's land, are insufficient evidence of a prescriptive liability to maintain the wall for a neighbour's protection. We must, therefore, reach the conclusion that while a person in the position of O. F. or B. is under no obligation whatever to keep the sea out, he may not do any act which will let the sea in.

COMMENTS ON CASES.

Similarity of Companies' Names.

as

IN cases where there has been a barefaced imitation of the trading name of an existing individual, firm, or company-and likewise in "passing-off" cases-the object of the artifice of the rival trader is so grossly palpable as sometimes to render difficult of comprehension the reluctance of the courts to grant relief to the complaining parties. Their proneness to refuse to interpose may doubtless be actuated, and properly enough, by a dislike to permit an unfair monopoly to be acquired by the parties claiming relief. Nevertheless, the consequence of this apparent repugnance to interfere is that imitation is not discountenanced to such an extent as effectually to check its being attempted. And companies in particular are constantly finding themselves under the necessity of taking proceedings to obtain an injunction to restrain a new company from carrying on business under a name similar to that of the plaintiffs. In an article which appeared in these columns a short while ago (see 131 L. T. Jour. 50), dealing with the similarity of the names of companies, we discussed the modern authorities relating to that subject, pointing out that, if such similarity is not detected by the registrar of companies, or is leniently regarded," and a name is thus allowed to pass as unobjectionable, then, after registration thereof, the matter depends on common law rights. But it is far more satisfactory that the registrar should vigilantly and stringently exercise the power conferred upon him by sect. 8, sub-sect. 1, of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (8 Edw. 7, c. 69)—a re-enactment of the provisions contained in sect. 20 of the Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89)-and ever decline to register a company" by a name identical with that by which a company in existence is already registered, or so nearly resembling the same to be calculated to deceive." The decision of the Divisional Court, consisting of Lord Alverstone, C.J. and Justices Pickford and Avory, in the recent case of Rex v. Registrar of Companies; Ex parte Paul and others (107 L. T. Rep. 62) should do much to strengthen the hands of the registrar in this respect. As appears from our report, the registrar in that case refused to register a company under the name of Water Softening Materials Company (Sofnol) Limited" upon the ground that the name so resembled that of an existing registered company called "Water Softeners Limited" as to be calculated to deceive. In supporting the conclusion arrived at by the registrar, the learned Lord Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Pickford were content to hold that, as the court was unable to find as a fact that the proposed name of the new company was not calculated to deceive, they could not say that the registrar was wrong in his refusal. Mr. Justice Avory went further, adopting a somewhat broader ground for his; decision. His Lordship gave it as his opinion that the registrar in granting or refusing registration was not performing a merely ministerial duty, but had a certain discretion under the statute; and, having exercised his discretion in a certain way, the court would not by mandamus interfere with such exercise. Whichever may be the right view of the matter, the result remains equally for the benefit of existing companies threatened with the business opposition of a newly established competitive concern. An existing company, as was said by Lord Watson in the well-known case of North Cheshire and Manchester Brewery Company Limited v. Manchester Brewery Company Limited (79 L. T. Rep. 645, at p. 647 ; (1899) A. C. 83, at p. 87), "are exposed to every possible inconvenience which can arise to their trade from the fact of a rival company starting afresh in the same trade in the same locality, and under substantially the same name with themselves.". Let the registrar, by his refusal to register, frustrate in limine any such machinations.

We commend these two cases as suitable for serious perusal and analysis by every student of the law, because they illustrate, in an attractive setting, problems in the law of torts which, for the purposes of everyday practice, it is of importance to clearly apprehend and thoroughly grasp. The task set Sir Edward Fry was a difficult one excellently done.

There is another old doctrine which should be borne in mindviz., that the encroachment of the sea is a common enemy against which a landowner may reasonably safeguard his property without having respect for the effect thereof on neighbouring lands: (Rex v. Commissioners of Pagham, 8 B. & C. 355). Let us consider a practical effect of this doctrine. If a man sustain any damage by the act of another, two things must concur to entitle him to a remedy-damage to himself and a wrong committed by another. As has been already recalled, that he has sustained damage is not of itself sufficient. Should then the owner of land situated adjoining the foreshore protect his property from the incursions of the sea by constructing any necessary barrier-e.g., a groyne or sea wall-and should this act cause the sea to afterwards flow with greater violence against and damage the land of an adjoining owner, the latter's counsel would be in this difficulty-that, while he could prove damage to his client, he would, on the principle just stated, fail to prove a concurrent wrong committed by the defendant. The result, therefore, is that the right each landowner on the sea coast has is to reasonably protect his land, and not to be protected by his neighbour unless he can establish a right to the contrary by prescription. That the rule is an exceptional one limited as we have mentioned, is clear from the fact that the proposition that it applied also to the case of land adjacent to a tidal river has been disallowed: (Attorney-General v. Earl of Lonsdale, 20 L. T. Rep. 64; L. Rep. 7 Eq. 377).

SANITARY ASSURANCE.-Before renting or purchasing a house it is advisable to obtain an independent report on the condition of the Drains, Sanitary Fittings, and Water Supply. Moderate fees for Sanitary Inspections on application to the Sanitary Engineering Company, 115, Victoria-street, Westminster. 'Phone, 4316 Victoria Telegrams: "Sanitation," London.-[ADVT.]

“Unreasonable Delay " in Seeking Divorce.

66

THE decisions in the two cases turning upon the provisior s of sect. 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), which appeared in a recent issue of our reports, form useful additions to earlier authorities upon the language of that important sec' on. In the first-namely, Pears v. Pears (107 L.. T. Rep. 26)-the meaning of the phrase in the section "unreasonable delay in presenting cr prosecuting such petition" required cor

Her

sideration. A wife petitioned for a divorce from her husband nearly twenty years after he had given her cause to do so. reason for thus acting was to enable him to marry a woman with whom he was cohabiting after having deserted his wife. That lapse of time, as was said by Lord Justice Lindley, as he then was, in Beauclerk v. Beauclerk (64 L. T. Rep. 35; (1891) P. 189, at p. 200), “is primâ facie a delay which is utterly unreasonable." The statutory words have, it is true, not been applied to a delay that has lasted for that lengthy period in two cases which were cited and relied upon in the course of the argument-Davies v. Davies and Hughes (8 L. T. Rep. 703; 3 Sw. & Tr. 221) and Harrison v. Harrison (10 L. T. Rep. 138; 3 Sw. & Tr. 362). Moreover, in Newman v. Newman (22 L. T. Rep. 452; L. Rep. 2 P. & D. 57), it was held that, although the petitioner had been guilty of unreasonable delay, it was not of such a character as to deprive her of her right to a decree. What has, however, always to be regarded is comprised in the questions that were formulated in Brougham v. Brougham (1895) P. 288). Seeing that the object of the petitioner in Pears v. Pears (ubi sup.) was to leave her husband free to marry the woman with whom he preferred to live rather than his lawful wife, it might be thought that a point in her favour should have been stretched. On the other hand, that was a collateral purpose for which she had instituted proceedings for a divorce, a purpose of the kind that was condemned in Beauclerk v. Beauclerk (ubi sup.). It was not, as was pointed out by the learned President, Sir S. T. Evans, as if she had brought "the suit to protect herself or get relief from the tie of matrimony." The case of Short v. Short and Bolwell (L. Rep. 3 P. & D. 193) shows how extremely disinclined the court is to grant a divorce where the delay in presenting a petition to obtain it has been unduly prolonged. Even such a short delay as two years necessitates that sufficient -reason for the same shall be forthcoming: (Nicholson v. Nicholson, 29 L. T. Rep. 108; L. Rep. 3 P. & D. 53). Circumstances such as occurred in Johnson v. Johnson (84 L. T. Rep. 725; (1901) P. 193) are more of the nature to account satisfactorily for a delay that would otherwise be "unreasonable."

Guilty Petitioner Seeking Divorce.

THE learned President's inquiry in the second case to which we are referring, namely, Woltereck v. Woltereck and Walters (107 L. T. Rep, 27)-whether there is "any case where a petitioner, guilty of adultery and cruelty, has been granted a decree "-met with no affirmative response. The pertinence of that question arises from the words of the section under consideration that the court shall not be bound to pronounce a decree "if it shall find that the petitioner has during the marriage been guilty of adultery." But even if no reported case exists in which, notwithstanding the petitioner's own guilt, the result of the petition for divorce has been successful, his Lordship seems to have had excellent grounds for creating a precedent in the present case. It appeared that, shortly before a husband petitioned for a divorce from his wife because of her adultery, she had completely condoned certain past offences of which he himself had been guilty, and had resumed cohabitation with him. The learned judge was of opinion that he was 'acting justly and in accord with the discretion which the law has given" in pronouncing a decree nisi in favour of the petitioner. That there is no fixed rule that the judicial discretion cannot be exercised for the benefit of a guilty petitioner is demonstrated by what was said by Sir James Hannen, P. in Story v. Story and O'Connor (57 L. T. Rep. 536; 12 P. Div. 196). The decision of the court must depend in each case upon the particular circumstances of that case, as his Lordship there remarked, after having carefully examined the principles upon which his predecessors had acted. The discretion to grant or withhold a decree is conferred upon the court in order to allow of its dealing with cases in which petitioners do not come before it with clean hands. Where the adultery of the husband has contributed to a similar fault on the part of the wife, manifestly it would be wrong to give him relief against her. In a case like the present, however, the circumstances apparently sufficed to convince the learned President that no such lapse as the wife was guilty of was attributable to the husband's prior delinquencies.

THE CONVEYANCER.

Concurrent Terms.

THIS abstruse and rarely occurring subject was dealt with in a former article in this journal of the 12th Nov. 1910, p. 28, and the recent decision of Mr. Justice Joyce in Re Moore and Hulme's Contract (106 L. T. Rep. 330; (1912) 2 Ch. 105) again calls attention to it. In that case leaseholds were mortgaged by sub-demise for the residue of the original term of ninety-nine years except the last day. The following day by another mortgage they were sub-demised to a second mortgagee for the residue of the original term except the last day, subject to the first mortgage. The second mortgage was paid off during the continuance of the first mortgage, and the second mortgage deed was handed back to the mortgagor, and subsequently a receipt was indorsed thereon for all principal money and interest secured thereby. A purchaser of the leasehold property from the mortgagor declined to complete without a formal surrender of the term created by the second mortgage; and it was held that he was entitled to such a surrender. There were two points involved-namely, (1) whether the second mortgage created a legal term, and (2) whether the Satisfied Terms Act 1845 applies to terms created out of leasehold interests; and the court decided that the second mortgage did create a legal term, and that the Satisfied Terms Act did not apply, and though the points may be technical, and may give rise to some seeming anomalies, the decision seems to be quite justified by authority. If the second mortgage had been merely an equitable one, it is generally considered that a receipt alone would have been sufficient to discharge it. If a concurrent lease is granted by deed to any person other than the original lessee, it passes an actual reversion and consequently an estate: (see Sheppard's Touchstone, vol. 2, p. 305, 7th edit.; and Neale v. Mackenzie, 1 M. & W. 747). In that case the prior lease was for a term extending beyond the duration of the latter or concurrent lease, and as the latter was by parol, it was wholly void as to so much of the land as was comprised in the former lease, but if the concurrent lease had been by deed it would not have been void. In Ecclesiastical Commissioners for Ireland v. O'Connor (9 Ir. C. L. 242) a lease was granted under seal for three lives, and a concurrent term of 999 years, at a yearly rent of £400, and two roods of the land comprised in such lease were subject to a prior demise; and it was held that it was a lease in possession of all the land of which the lessors had the possession at the time of the demise, and that in point of law it was a lease of the reversion of that part of the land of which the lessors had not the possession. The court said: "When a person has only a reversion expectant on a lease with a rent incident thereto, he may make a lease by deed of that reversion for any term and reserve rent thereout; he may deal with it as if it were an interest in possession, and he cannot be said not to have a title to such rent. He cannot, it is true, recover it by ejectment, and there may be a difficulty in his distraining for it." It is this latter point-namely, the inability to bring ejectment-which seems to create the greatest difficulty in holding that the term created by the second mortgage is a legal one. It depends upon the meaning of that expression. In Moore and Hulme's Contract it was not necessary to decide that the concurrent term was a legal term with all the attributes of the original term, but only that the concurrent term did not create a mere equitable mortgage, which could be discharged by a simple receipt. It would be difficult to define precisely the nature of the estate which the second [mortgagee took in that case. The language of Mr. Justice Joyce in the course of his judgment appears to describe it as accurately as may be. He said: "I think that a legal estate or interest did pass to the second mortgagee. I think that Worrell acquired a legal reversion upon term created by the first mortgage. I think that he got a legal term under his mortgage. If the money secured by the earlier mortgage had been paid to the first mortgagee on the date fixed for payment, I think that the second mortgagee would have had a right to the actual possession of the leasehold premises, and if the lease granted by the first mortgage had been terminated in any manner during the continuance of the second mortgage, the second mortgagee would have been entitled to possession for the rest of

the

the term created by the mortgage": (see, further, Mr. Redman's Work on Landlord and Tenant, 6th edit., p. 31; and Woodfall on the same subject, 18th edit., p. 241). With regard to the second point, it has generally been considered that the Satisfied Terms Act (8 & 9 Vict. c. 12) does not extend to leaseholds, where a term is created by underlease. The subject is discussed in the earlier editions of Davidson's Concise Precedents. The decision in Re Moore and Hulme's Contract is of considerable practical importance as second mortgages of leaseholds by demise are of frequent

Occurrence.

MISCELLANEOUS PRECEDENTS (continued).

Agreement for the Supply of Water.

day of

AN AGREEMENT made the 19 BETWEEN A. B. of in the county of of the first part the Rural District Council of (hereinafter called "the council") of the second part and C. D. of in the county of (hereinafter called "the consumer") of the third part. WHEREAS the consumer is the owner or tenant of certain premises being NOW THEREFORE THESE PRESENTS WITNESS that the said A. B. (in pursuance of an agreement in that behalf entered into by him with the council as water authority for their district) doth hereby so far as this agreement is to be performed by him agree with the consumer and the consumer doth hereby so far as this agreement is to be performed by him agree with the said A. B. and also as a separate agreement with the council as follows namely:

1. The said A. B. shall during the continuance of this agreement provide a constant supply of good and wholesome water to the consumer's premises for the purposes hereinafter mentioned at a uniform pressure sufficient to carry the same to the highest part of the consumer's present buildings.

2. The said A. B. shall make the necessary connection between the consumer's premises and the main and provide fit and maintain a meter for measuring the water supplied under this agreement and provide and fit all such other pipes cisterns taps and fittings (if any) as have been agreed between the said A. B.'s agent and the consumer to be provided and fitted by the said A. B.

3. The consumer shall repay to the said A. B. on demand the amount of all moneys expended and all cost incurred by the said A. B. in pursuance of the last preceding clause of these presents except the cost of providing and maintaining the said meter.

4. The consumer shall be at liberty forthwith at his own cost to connect his said premises with the main but such connection shall be made under the supervision of the said A. B.'s agent and shall be made according to the same specification as shall be adopted by the said A. B. in case of connections made by him or according to such other specification (if any) as shall have been previously approved in writing by the said agent.

5. The consumer shall pay to the said A. B. a fixed rent of per annum in respect of the meter to be so provided as aforesaid and the water rent of for every one thousand gallons of water supplied under this agreement and the said ronts shall be payable quarterly on the four usual quarter days and each instalment of water rent shall include all water supplied during the quarterly period next preceding the quarter day upon which such instalment shall become payable.

6. The said meter shall (except to the extent of any proved error) be conclusive between the parties as to the quantity of water supplied under this agreement.

7. The water to be supplied under this agreement shall be used for household and domestic purposes only and not for watering gardens or agricultural or trade or business purposes.

8. The consumer shall not give away or sell or permit to be given away or sold any water supplied under this agreement and shall not waste or permit any waste of the said water.

9. The consumer shall keep the connections with the mains and all the internal pipes cisterns taps and fittings in good repair and condition and the same shall be of such kind as shall be reasonably required by the said A. B. for the purpose of preventing waste or pollution of water and in case of any breach of this clause it shall be lawful for the said A. B. to do any work or provide any fittings that may be necessary and to recover the cost from the consumer as a debt.

10. It shall be lawful for the agents of the said A1 B. at all reasonable times to enter upon the consumer's premises for the purpose of inspecting the said meter pipes cisterns taps and fittings and preventing waste of water and doing any work authorised by this agreement.

11. The said A. B. shall not be held liable for any deficiency interruption or defect in the water supply due to frost unusual drought storms or other accidents not arising from the default of the said A. B. or his agents.

12. If at any time the rents payable under these presents or any part thereof shall be unpaid for twenty-one days after the same shall have become payable under these presents it shall be lawful for the said A. B. to cut off the supply of water under these presents (without prejudice to the consumer's liability for the meter rent payable under these presents during the continuance of such severance) until all arrears of the rents payable under these presents shall have been fully paid.

13. In addition to the rights and remedies expressly given to the said A. B. by these presents the said A. B. and the council shall have respectively all such rights and remedies in respect of the said rents and water supply and generally as are by virtue of the Waterworks Clauses Acts 1847 and the Public Health Act 1875 respectively vested in undertakers and local sanitary authorities respectively in respect of the supply of water under the said Acts respectively.

14. The said A. B. shall be at liberty to terminate this agreement on three calendar months' notice but only in case of permanent failure of his water supply or in case he shall lose control of the sources thereof or in case of the expiration or determination of his said agreement with the council.

15. The liability of the consumer to pay the rents reserved by these presents shall continue either until the said A. B. shall have terminated this agreement under the last preceding clause or the consumer shall have ceased to be tenant or owner of the said premises and the obligations of the consumer under this agreement shall have been validly assumed by the succeeding tenant or owner thereof or the consumer shall have given to the said A. B. three calendar months' notice to terminate this agree ment and shall have paid all rents down to the expiration of such notice and shall have delivered up the meter and all other materials and fittings (if any) belonging to the said A. B. and shall have repaid to the said A. B. the cost incurred by him under these presents of and incidental to connecting the consumer's premises with the main.

16. This agreement shall extend to the successors in title and assigns of the said A. B. and the heirs executors administrators and assigns of the consumer respectively. IN WITNESS &C,

Bakewell, Tuesday, at 10

Barnard Castle Monday, at 9.30
Barnstaple, Tuesday, at 10
Barton-on-Humber, Saturday, at 10
Bedford, Thursday, at 10
Bideford, Thursday, at 10.30
Birkenhead,* Tuesday and Friday
Birmingham, Monday, Wednesday,
Thursday (B. & W.C.A.), and
Friday, at 10

Bishop Auckland, Tuesday and
Wednesday, at 10
Blandford Friday, at 10
Bodmin, Monday, at 10
Bolton, Wednesday, at 9.30
Bow, Monday, Tuesday, Wednes-
day, Thursday, and Friday
Brentford, Wednesday, at 10; Fri-
day, at 10.80

Brighton, Thursday (R. By &
J.S. at 11) and Friday, at 10
Bristol, Monday, Tuesday, Wednes-

day, and Thursday, at 10; Friday (By), at 11 Burnley, Thursday and Friday, at 10

Burton, Wednesday, at 9; Thurs day, at 11

Bury St. Edmunds, Tuesday
Camelford, Thursday, at 11.30
Carlisle, Tuesday, at 9.30

Cheltenham, Thursday and Friday
Chepstow, Monday, at 10.30
Chester, Thursday

Chesterfield, Friday (R, By at 2.30), at 9.30

Thursday,

Clerkenwell, Monday, Tuesday (J.S.), Wednesday, and Friday, at 10.30 Cockermouth, Thursday at 9.30 Colne, Tuesday, at 9.45 Congleton, Tuesday, at 10 Crediton, Tuesday, at 10.30

Darlington, Wednesday, at 9

Denbigh, Tuesday

Dereham, Thursday, at 12
Dewsbury, Monday and Tuesday.
Durham, Tuesday (R. By)
East Grinstead, Wednesday
Exeter, Monday, Wednesday, and
Thursday, at 10
Faversham, Friday, at 10.30
Fordingbridge, Tuesday, at 10
Glossop, Wednesday, at 10
Grays Thurrock, Tuesday, at 11
Great Malvern, Friday, at 10
Greenwich, Friday, at 10.30
Guisborough, Friday, at 10

Keswick, Monday, at 2
Kettering, Tuesday, at 10
Kingston-on-Thames, Tuesday
Lambeth, Tuesday (Reg. at 9.30)
Wednesday, Thursday, Friday
(Reg. at 9.30). and Saturday, at
10,30
Launceston,* Wednesday, at 10
Ledbury, Thursday, at 10

Leeds, Monday (J.S. & A.O.),
Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday
(J.S. & A.O.), and Friday, at 10
Leicester, Wednesday, at 10
Leominster,* Monday, at 10
Lewes, Tuesday

Liverpool, Monday (By at 11), Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday (B., A., & W.C.), at

10

Llanidloes, Monday, at 2
Longton, Tuesday, at 9.30
Loughborough,* Tuesday, at 9.30
Louth, Friday, at 10
Ludlow, Wednesday, at 10
Lutterworth,* Monday, at 2
Lynn, Friday, at 10

Macclesfield, Thursday, at 10
Machynlleth, Tuesday, at 10
Maidenhead, Tuesday, at 10
Malmesbury, Tuesday
Manchester,

Monday, Tuesday,

Wednesday. Thursday, and Friday, at 10

Mansfield, Monday, at 10

March, Tuesday, at 10

Marylebone.

Monday.

Tuesday,

Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, at 10.30.

Millom, Friday, at 11.45

Newbury, Wednesday (R. By at 2).

at 10

Newcastle-on-Tyne, Thursday (R. By), at 10

New Malton, Friday

New Mills, Monday, at 10.30
Newnham, Wednesday

Newport (Mon.), Thursday and
Friday, at 10.30

Newton Abbot, Friday, at 10.30 Northallerton, Saturday, at 11 North Shields, Thursday, at 10 Nottingham, Wednesday, Thursday (J.S.), and Friday (E.L.). at 10 Oldham, Thursday, at 9.30; Friday (By), at 11

Oswestry, Friday at 10

Peterborough, Tuesday, at 9.30
Petersfield, Monday, at 10.15
Pontypool, Wednesday, at 10.30
Poole, Monday, at 10

Portsmouth, Thursday, at 10.30
Reading, Thursday and Friday
Rhayader, Monday, at 10
Richmond (Yorks), Thursday, at 10
Rochdale, Monday, at 9.30
Rochester, Tuesday, Wednesday,
and Thursday, at 9.30
Rotherham, Tuesday and Friday,
at 10

St. Albans, Monday, at 10
St. Helens, Wednesday
Salford, Monday, Wednesday, and
Thursday

Salisbury, Thursday, at 10
Scarborough, Wednesday
Shaftesbury, Wednesday, at 10
Sheffield, Thursday (By at 2), at 10
Shipston-on-Stour, Thursday, at 10
Shoreditch, Tuesday, Thursday,
and Friday

Skipton, Wednesday, at 9.45
Southam, Saturday, at 10
Southampton, Tuesday, at 10
Southend, Thursday, Friday, and
Saturday, at 10.30

Southmolton, Monday, at 11.30
Southport, Tuesday, at 10
South Shields, Thursday, at 10
Southwark, Monday, Tuesday, and
Thursday, at 10.30

Spalding, Wednesday, at 10
Spilsby, Thursday, at 10
Stockton-on-Tees, Tuesday, at 9.30
Stoke, Wednesday, at 9.30
Sudbury, Monday

Sunderland, Thursday (R By)
Swansea, Monday. Tuesday, and
Wednesday

Tenterden, Monday, at 1
Todmorden. Friday

Tonbridge, Monday, at 10
Torquay, Saturday, at 10.30
Torrington, Wednesday, at 10.30
Uxbridge, Wednesday, at 10
Walsall, Wednesday (J.S.)
Thursday

and

Wandsworth, Monday
Warwick, Friday, at 10
Wellingborough, Monday, at 10
Welshpool, Thursday, at 10
Westbromwich, Tuesday, and Fri-
day (J.S.)

West Hartlepool, Friday, at 9.30
Westminster, Monday, Tuesday,
Wednesday. Thursday, and Fri-
day

Whitby, Thursday

Wigan, Tuesday (R. By at 2.30), at 9

Wigton, Wednesday, at 11
Wisbech, Monday, at 10
Wolverhampton, Monday (J.S.)
Woolwich, Wednesday, at 10.30
Worksop, Tuesday, at 10.

No return from Circuit 52.

Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary.

National Insurance.

Ir will be remembered that two sections of the National Insurance Act 1911-viz., sects. 66 and 68-confer new jurisdictions on the County Court. Under the former section the County Court judge has to decide appeals from the commissioners on questions of mixed fact and law as to whether any employment is to be held employment under Part 1 of the Act and whether a person is entitled to become a voluntary contributor under the Act. Under the latter section the County Court registrar is given exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a medical certificate of exemption from process in the nature of distress or execution may be cancelled or modified and to determine disputes as to the sufficiency of the security which the creditor can demand from an insured person who has obtained such a certificate. To deal with the procedure under these sections, a new Order XLIIA has been added to the general body of County Court Rules. Although the Act of Parliament in question is admittedly not free from complication, the new procedure is commendably simple. The method of appeal to the judge is by way of petition which must be filed within one month from the date of the decision appealed against, and the petition must contain the specific facts and contentions of law upon which the petitioner relies to upset the finding of the commissioners. A general application of Order XLII. rr. 16-24, 26 and 27, is made to the procedure following the service of the petition (rule 5). The rules of that order were introduced in 1911 to deal with appeals under the Finance (1909-1910) Act 1910, and they provide a procedure for mutual admission of facts, notices of contentions of law to be

relied on, and mutual discovery and inspection in such a way as to reduce costs as far as possible.. The only criticism that might be made of this part of the new order is the absence of an official form of petition. The heading is provided for by rule 4, but, if reference be made to the general body of County Court forms, the only precedent to be found for a petition is form 340, and that sets out an example of an equity petition relating to the distribution of trust funds which have been paid into court under sect. 70 of the County Courts Act. Naturally, the facts and contentions of law would need to be drafted to suit each particular case, but a skeleton form would have been acceptable and in consonance with the policy of the Rule Committee in providing a complete set of forms for the multifarious proceedings arising in the County Court.

The Registrar's Jurisdiction.

THE medical certificate that distress, or execution, or ejectment will endanger the life of the insured person as soon as notice thereof is sent to the registrar operates as a stay of those proceedings, subject to the notification to the creditor desiring to enforce such process that the certificate has been given or renewed: (rule 6). It remains to be seen how many certificates under this remarkable section will be forthcoming, as the extreme unwillingness of the medical profession to assist the working of the Act may possibly extend to the giving of such certificates. Applications to the registrar to modify or cancel the certificate or to determine disputes as to the sufficiency of the security offered by the insured person may be made in or out of court upon notice in writing according to a prescribed form, and the insured person must be served with a copy of the notice two clear days at least before the hearing: (rules 7, 8, forms 449, 452). In either case the registrar may hear evidence on oath or affidavit; his decision is final, and he is specifically given a discretion as to the costs of the proceedings. Excluding merely formal matters, these appear to be the main provisions for procedure, and again they are commendably simple. One aspect of applications under this section and rule may strike the observer as likely to require further provision in the future. According to present arrangements, the creditor is at a disadvantage, since presumably he cannot insist upon a medical examination of the insured person by his own expert-at least the new rules, wisely perhaps, do not touch upon this contingency. If this be the fact, he may find some difficulty, except in a case of obvious fraud, in producing evidence to contradict the certificate. As a matter of conjecture only, this omission may involve small use being made of this part of the new procedure.

CRIMINAL LAW AND THE JURISDICTION OF MAGISTRATES.

BOROUGH QUARTER SESSIONS.

Abingdon, Thursday, Oct. 24
Bedford, Tuesday, Oct. 15
Blackburn, Friday, Oct. 18
Bridgnorth, Wednesday, Oct. 16
Brighton, Monday, Oct. 14
Bury St. Edmunds, Monday,
Oct. 21, et 11

Carlisle, Wednesday, Oct. 16
Chester, Wednesday, Oct. 16
Chichester, Tuesday, Oct. 22
Derby, Thursday, Oct. 17, at 10.30
Devonport, Saturday, Oct. 12
Gloucester, Friday, Oct. 25, at
10.30

Great Yarmouth, Monday, Oct. 14,
at 10.30.

Grimsby, Tuesday, Oct. 29
Hastings, Friday, Oct. 25
Hythe, Saturday, Oct. 12
Ipswich, Saturday, Oct. 19
King's Lynn, Thursday, Oct. 24

Kingston upon Hull, Oct. 24

Thursday,

Lincoln, Saturday, Oct. 19, at 10 Leicester, Monday, Oct. 14

Maidstone, Saturday, Oct. 19, at

10.45

Oswestry, Friday, Oct 18

Penzance, Friday, Oct. 18

Pontefract, Wednesday, Oct. 23

Rotherham, Thursday, Oct. 24

Scarborough, Tuesday, Oct. 15

Shrewsbury, Saturday, Oct. 12, at

Southampton, Monday, Oct. 21 Stamford, Tuesday, Oct. 22 Stoke-on-Trent, Tuesday, Oct. 29 Sudbury. Friday, Oct. 25 Tewkesbury, Wednesday, Oct. 23 Tiverton, Wednesday, Oct. 16 Walsall, Monday, Oct. 14. Wenlock, Friday, Oct. 18, at 10.30 Worcester, Monday, Oct. 21.

Magistrates' Powers over Inebriates.

By the Bill which is now under consideration in the House of Commons, considerable alterations and extensions are proposed with regard to the power of justices to deal with inebriates. It will be remembered that the Inebriates Act 1898, amending the Habitual Drunkards Act 1879, dealt with the question of

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the detention of habitual drunkards in suitable institutions, giving power to a court of summary jurisdiction in certain cases to order their admission to such institutions. This order could only be made upon the requisition of the inebriate, whereas the Bill now before Parliament provides that “ any relative or friend of the alleged inebriate may make a private application by petition to a judicial authority for an order appointing a judicial guardian or committing him to a retreat.” A “judicial authority" under the Bill, as at present framed, may be any stipendiary magistrate, or specially appointed justice. who is a judicial authority for the purposes of the Lunacy Act 1890. Provision is made for the voluntary action of an inebriate, who may bind himself by an undertaking to abstain from intoxicants, the breach of which renders him liable to be committed to a retreat by a judicial authority. Considerable latitude of action is given to the judicial authority, who shall endeavour to persuade the inebriate to take advantage of the voluntary provisions of the Bill in the first instance. There are other clauses which deal with the administration of the measure, but it will be seen from those which we have mentioned that the Bill will throw a large amount of extra work on certain courts of summary jurisdiction, many of which are already sufficiently occupied in administering the heavy burden of judicial work which has been placed upon them.

The National Insurance Act.

THE Conviction this week of an employer for obstructing an inspector, appointed under the National Insurance Act 1911, in the course of his duty draws attention to sect. 112 of that Act. This section provides for the appointment of inspectors, and gives them power of entry into any premises other than a private dwelling-house not used as a workshop, to make any examination and exercise any powers necessary for carrying the Act into effect. In fact, the section is so general in its words that it is somewhat difficult to define the limits of the powers of such inspectors. Any person is liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £5 who "wilfully delays or obstructs an inspector in the exercise of any power under this section.

It

will be seen that nice questions may arise, in cases where an inspector is obstructed in the exercise of his powers under the section, as to whether the inspector was acting within the scope of his duties and powers. It is somewhat remarkable that a penal section should be left so widely worded, and that no definition should have been inserted limiting the powers of the inspectors, and so defining what would constitute an offence under the section.

an advanced age without having broken the law in any particular, and may have yielded to circumstances of such a kind that they are not likely to recur and at the same time may fairly be regarded as greatly extenuating his offence; or again the offender's mental condition may have been such that though he cannot be certified insane he ought not to be regarded as fully responsible for his acts. 3. The statutory provisions for dealing with such cases and others which will readily suggest themselves were repealed and re-enacted in an amended form by the Probation of Offenders Act 1907. It is of importance that the exact provisions of this Act should be carefully borne in mind. In the first place the court has to consider whether the trivial nature of the offence proved or the extenuating circumstances in which it was committed on the one hand, or, on the other hand, the character, antecedents, age, health, or mental condition of the offender are sufficient to justify his being dismissed without punishment. The court may then either dismiss the charge unconditionally or may bind the offender over to appear for conviction and sentence if called on within any period not longer than three years from the date of the hearing. When magistrates have decided on the latter course they may further make a probation order putting the offender under the supervision of a named probation officer. This provision is of very great value, and the Secretary of State is inclined to doubt whether sufficient advantage has yet been taken of it by courts of summary jurisdiction. He believes that in any case where an offence not of a specially grave character is committed by a person of respectable antecedents, the magistrates should address their minds to the question whether the ends of justice will not be sufficiently met by postponing the sentence to which the offender has made himself liable, so that if he conducts himself well for a stated period it need not be imposed at all, and that if this is done the proportion of such cases will be found to be larger than is commonly supposed. In these cases and specially where juveniles are concerned, the ends of justice will often be best secured by making a probation order.

4. On the other hand, the Secretary of State would strongly urge on the magistrates that no such order should be made unless there is a clear probability that such supervision as the probation officer is able to give will be of real benefit to the offender, and for the purpose of ascertaining this the court should have as full information as can be obtained with regard to the antecedents and circumstances of the offender. In the case, for instance, of a person' in respectable circumstances who has yielded to special temptation, supervision by a probation officer is not likely to be required : while in the case of a juvenile offender whose previous appearance in court shows him to be of a persistently criminal disposition, it is not likely to be effective, especially if on any previous occasion it has been tried and has failed. In the latter case the court should carefully consider whether they should commit the offender to a reformatory or industrial school, or, if he is over sixteen and the offence charged is an indictable one, commit him to quarter sessions with a view to his detention in a Borstal Institution. It should always be borne in mind that the discipline enforced in such institutions is more likely to have a beneficial effect upon the offender if he is put under it early than if it is used only as a last resort after he has been repeatedly before the courts and repeatedly discharged without punishment or with a merely nominal punishment. Cases occur in which an offender has been put on probation three or even four times. This appears to the Secretary of State to be a misuse of the Act: and, while he is ready to admit there may be many exceptions, he is inclined to think that as a general rule a probation officer is not likely to do good in the case of an offender who has already been put on probation and has proved unworthy of the leniency shown him.

5. Further, the Secretary of State would urge on you that before putting an offender on probation you should be satisfied that this will secure for him such supervision and kindly assistance as may be effective in restraining him from further breaches of the law. He is far from thinking that the value of a probation officer's work in this respect can fairly be judged by his written reports; but undoubtedly among the reports lodged in this office there are some which create the impression that they represent work of a merely formal and mechanical kind. He desires to impress on you that the supervision of probation officers is useless unless it is actually effective in restraining the probationer from breaches of the law and helping him to live an honest and orderly life. The magistrate who puts an offender on probation is responsible for seeing that the supervision thereby entailed is satisfactorily enforced, and unless he believes that good results are likely to result from it, it will be better either to impose appropriate punishment or to make an order under sect. 1 of the Probation Act discharging the offender without punishment. In order that the magistrates may inform themselves of the actual results of probation the Secretary of State thinks that the probation officers' reports should show whether a probationer continues in the same employment as before or whether he has found fresh employment, what wages he is earning, and so on. - Again, it is, in the Secretary of State's opinion, most desirable to encourage in every way possible co-operation