The entitled to one moiety of the trust estate, was not a party, the learned judge at the trial held, on the 5th July 1911, that the defendants" are or will be liable" upon or "from the determination of the life estate of Miss E. M. N." to make good to the capital of the trust a moiety of the loss to the trust occasioned by the investment upon specified mortgages. By the order as drawn up, an inquiry as to damage to capital by reason of such investments was directed, but the judgment was to be without prejudice to questions between Miss E. M. N. and the defendants; and it was declared that the defendant trustees and each of them "are liable as from the determination of the life interest of Miss E. M. N." to make good a moiety of the loss to the capital trust funds. The master subsequently certified the amount of such loss. proposed minutes of the order on further consideration provided for payment within fourteen days of a sum representing such certified loss to a moiety of the trust capital and for payment of the interest on such sum by the plaintiffs to the defendants during the life of Miss E. M. N., she having been a party to the breach of trust. Miss E. M. N. had a power to appoint a life interest to a husband surviving her and, in default of issue, a general testamentary power of appointment over the moiety in question. It was argued that any liability under the order was a future liability of the defendants to pay from the determination of the life estate which, from the limitations to which the fund was liable, might never arise, and Fletcher v. Collis (92 L. T. Rep. 749; (1905) 2 Ch. 24) was relied on. Held, that the order in effect was the same as that in Re Somerset; Somerset v. Earl Poulett (69 L. T. Rep. 744; (1894) 1 Ch. 231; Seton on Judgments, vol. 2, p. 1144, 6th edit.), the liability to recoup the trust estate was an immediate liability, and the proposed minutes were in substance correct. [Re Newen; Smiles v. Carruthers. Ch. Div.: Eve, J. Oct. 22. -Counsel: Lawrence, K.C. and Edward F. Spence; Jessel, K.C. and J. Rutherford. Solicitors: Smiles and Co.; Alexander J. Carruthers, agent for Carruthers and Collinson, Liverpool.] Settlement-Construction-"Eldest Son "-Portions for younger Children-Period of vesting-Younger Son attaining Twenty-one -Afterwards becoming eldest Son-Entitled to Share. By settlement, dated the 19th June 1828, upon the marriage of H. C. W. the elder and H. W. (then H. S.) real estate was limited to trustees for 1000 years and subject thereto to H. C. W. the elder for life and after his death to the first and other sons of the marriage in tail male. The trusts declared of the term were, in case there should be issue of the marriage an eldest or only son and only one other child or an only daughter, to raise £6000" for the portion of such child, not being an eldest or only son," as H. C. W. the elder should appoint, and in default to pay the same to such son at twenty-one, but in the event of such attainment of twenty-one happening in the life of H. C. W. the elder to be vested at such age and to be paid immediately after the death of H. C. W. the elder, and in case there should be issue of the marriage an eldest or only son and three or more other children (which event happened) to raise £12,000 for the portions of such children (other than an eldest or only son) and to pay the same to the children (other than as aforesaid) as H. C. W. the elder should appoint and in default in equal shares, the shares of sons to be paid at twenty-one, but if such attainment of twenty-one should happen in H. C. W. the elder's lifetime to be vested at such time as aforesaid and to be paid immediately after his death, provided that if any son should die under twenty-one, "or, before attaining such age, shall become an eldest or only son and should be in actual possession of the thereby settled estates, the share of such son should go to the survivors of the children who should have lived to attain twenty-one and not have become an eldest or only son. There were eight children of the marriage, six sons and two daughters. G. W., the second son of the marriage, attained twenty-one in 1851 in the lifetime of his eldest brother (H. C. W. the younger) and succeeded to the settled estates, H. C. W. the younger dying, after attaining twenty-one in 1850, in the year 1854 in the lifetime of their father, H. C. W. the elder, who died in 1883, at which last date the estate of G. W. became an estate in tail male in possession. At the death of H. C. W. the elder, G. W. and A. W. were the only children surviving of his marriage with H. W. G. W. died in 1888 and A. W. in 1912. The question was raised whether in these circumstances G. W. was entitled to share in the portions fund. Re Bayley's Settlement (22 L. T. Rep. 195; L. Rep. 9 Eq. 491, 494; 25 L. T. Rep. 249; 6 Ch. 590, 593) was cited. Held, that the same reasoning as was applicable to the settlement of 1781 in Windham v. Graham (1 Russ. 331, 334) ought to be applied to the present case, and accordingly the character of G. W.'s interest fell to be determined at the time when the portion vested-viz., in 1851-and, as a younger son, he was entitled to participate in the fund. [Re Wise; Smith v. Waller. Ch. Div.: Eve, J. Oct. 16.Counsel: F. E. Farrer; Jessel, K.C. and Bryan Farrer; Ingpen, K.C. and T. K. Crossfield; H. S. Preston; Lawrence, K.C. and A. L. Ellis. Solicitors: Stow, Preston, and Lyttelton, agents for Campbell, Brown, and Ledbrook, Warwick; Cain and Tompkins; Dawson, Bennett, and Co.] Settlement-Life Estate determinable on Alienation-Advancement out of unappointed and appointed Shares-Release of Life Estate in advanced Fund-No Forfeiture. A marriage settlement made in 1865 gave the income in part of the trust funds to the husband for life or till he should do or suffer something whereby the same or some part thereof would through his act or default or by operation or process of law or otherwise if belonging absolutely to him become vested in or payable to some other person, and subject to the life estate of the husband and wife the trust funds went to such of the issue with such provisions for their respective advancement as the husband and wife or the survivor should appoint, and in default of appointment for the children equally. And the trustees were empowered with the consent in writing of the husband and wife to advance half of the expectant or presumptive or vested share of any child. The husband and wife appointed to child A. absolutely one ninth share, which was worth more than £8000, and in writing "authorised and requested" the trustees to raise and pay £4000 to A. The trustees acted on this document. Shortly after, the husband and wife, for the purpose of compounding duty, released their life estates in this sum. A similar appointment was made to child B., and £4000 was raised and paid to him, although no written or verbal request or consent could be proved. But the husband and wife had shortly after released their life estate in the sum. An appointment of £4000 was made to child C., and the husband and wife "authorised and requested the trustees to pay the whole of the sum to C.; but only £2750 had actually been so paid. By a subsequent revocable appointment the unappointed balance was appointed to child D. " Held, that the power of advancement extended to one-half the unappointed as well as the appointed shares of children; that it must be presumed that the power of advancement had been properly exercised by the trustees; and that no alienation of the husband's interest that was merely to give effect to the power of advancement created a forfeiture of his life estate. [Re Hodgson; Weston v. Hodgson. Ch. Div.: Neville, J. Oct. 18.-Counsel: Jenkins, K.C. and Vaisey; Peterson, K.C. and D. Pollock; Butcher, K.C. and Harman; J. G. Wood. Solicitors: Harold R. Wilson; E. Lydekker.] Will-Joint Tenancy-Severance-Equitable Assignment of Share. Under the will of a testator who died in 1854 A. was entitled to a reversionary share in the estate expectant upon the death of a tenant for life, but only as joint tenant with others. A. and B. were the executors. In 1859 part of the trust money was advanced to A. by himself and his co-executor, and A. signed the following document: "Six months after notice I promise to pay B. and A., the executors of the testator, the sum of £193 value received. I also promise to pay interest halfyearly at 5 per cent. per annum. In default of such payment of principal or interest, the same to be deducted from my rever sionary interest under the testator's will." Reference was made to Leak v. M'Dowall (1862, 32 B. 28) and Re Hewett (70 L. T. Rep. 393; (1894) 1 Ch. 362. Held, that it could not have been the intention of the parties that the security should be void if A. should predecease any of his co-owners, and that therefore the assignment operated to create a severance. [Re Sharer; Abbott v. Sharer. Ch. Div.: Neville, J. Oct. 17.-Counsel: L. Chubb; L. Byrne; D. Pollock; O. R. A. Simpkin; Tyldesley Jones. Solicitors: Herbert E. Adams; F. J. Abbott; Hair and Co.; Beaumont and Sons; J. N. Mason and Co.] KING'S BENCH DIVISION. Extradition-Norway-Obtaining Money by False Pretences Gaming Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict. c. 45), s. 17-No Offence disclosed according to English Law-Refusal to extradite. Rule nisi for a habeas corpus. The applicants were com mitted for extradition to Norway for obtaining money by false pretences there. It was alleged by the prosecutor, K., a farmer, that on the 7th June last he went to Christiania in order to draw 3200 kroner from his bank. Before he entered, M.,.one of the accused, spoke to him and ascertained what he was going to do. On coming out of the bank M. again spoke to him, saying he did not know the town and proposed that they should join company, to which the prosecutor assented. Shortly afterwards S., the other accused person, met them as if he were a stranger to both, and asked where the castle was. M. proposed a drink, and all three went into a confectioner's shop, but they drank nothing. S. said that he had lost money to some Americans at cards on the previous day. M. asked him if he still had some cards with him, whereupon he produced four, all black at the back, three of them white on the other side, while on the fourth there were some figures. The borders of all four were turned in. M. and S. began to play. S. laid the four cards on the table, first showing their faces so that it could be seen where the figured card was. He then, when they were lying face downwards, changed their position four or five times. M. staked a certain sum beforehand, it being agreed that if he righty indicated the position of the figured card he should win. They played for ten kroner stakes, and once for 100 kroners, M. frequently winning. Finally, they all adjourned to a wood and played on the stump of a tree. The prosecutor joined in, and as a result lost the 3200 kroner he had drawn out. The prosecutor said that M. seemed to side with him against S. and appeared to be much provoked when he lost to S. At the end of the game S. was standing with his back to the others; whereupon M. drew the prosecutor's attention to the fact that some banknotes were sticking out of his pocket and nodded to him. He took this to be an invitation to take them, and finally did so, and he and M. ran away. The notes turned out to be worth ninety-five kroner only. M. seemed to be very much afraid that he and the prosecutor would be arrested, and shortly afterwards went away. By the Gaming Act 1845, s. 17, every person who shall, by any fraud, or unlawful device, or ill-practice in playing at or with cards, dice, tables, or other game, or in bearing a part in the stakes, wagers, or adventures, or in betting on the sides or hands of them that do play, or in wagering on the event of any game, sport, pastime, or exercise, win from any other person to himself, or any other or others, any sum of money or valuable thing, shall be deemed guilty of obtaining such money or valuable thing from such other person by a false pretence, with intent to cheat or defraud such person of the same, and, being convicted thereof, shall be punished accordingly. Held (making the rule absolute), that extradition should be refused on the ground that no offence was disclosed within the Gaming Act 1845, s. 17, and that there was no evidence of obtaining money by false pretences such as would justify a committal for trial for that offence in England. [Rex v. Governor of Brixton Prison; Ex parte Sjoland and Metzler. K. B. Div.: Lord Alverstone, C.J., Channell and Avory, JJ. Oct. 18.-Counsel: R. D. Muir; Herbert Smith. Solicitors: Director of Public Prosecutions; Official Solicitor.] Licensing-Mandamus-Certiorari-Licensing (Consolidation) Act 1910 (10 Edw. 7 & 1 Geo. 5, c. 24), s. 14 (1)—Jurisdiction of Licensing Justices to attach Conditions to Grant of Off-licence. Rule nisi directed to the licensing justices for the county borough of the city of B. calling upon them to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue commanding them to hearand determine according to law an application by one H. for a new off-licence (beer), on the ground that under sect. 14 (1) of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act 1910 there was no power to attach conditions to the grant of a beer off-licence without the consent of the applicant and of all persons opposing the proposed grant. A rule nisi had also been obtained for a writ of certiorari to remove an order of the justices (granted subject to certain conditions) into the High Court that it might there be quashed. It appeared from the affidavits used on the hearing that on the application by H. for the grant of a new retail beer off-licence the licensing justices desired him to undertake (1) the surrender of two on-licences; (2) not to sell beer before noon or after ten o'clock p.m.; and (3) not to carry on any other business except the sale of mineral waters and tobacco. Counsel for the applicant was unable to 'state positively whether his client would be willing to give an undertaking to carry out the second condition. The applicant stated in his affidavit that he consented to the condition, and did not object to the third undertaking. The chairman stated in his affidavit that in order that the application might not be rendered abortive if upon consultation with the owners the applicant was willing to give the undertaking, the justices decided to grant the application accordingly. By this the chairman stated they meant that if the applicant gave the undertaking the application was to be deemed to have been granted, but if he did not give the undertaking it was to be deemed to have been refused. The chairman added that if the applicant had stated at the time that he would not or could not give such an undertaking, the justices would thereupon have refused the application, and that in the opinion of the licensing justices the three conditions were inseparablethat was to say, they would have refused the application if the applicant had refused to give the undertaking with regard to any one of the conditions. Held, that the rule for a certiorari must be discharged as there was no order or judgment which could be removed into the High Court, but that the rule for a mandamus should be made absolute, on the ground that the justices had no jurisdiction to make the alleged order, even though they might refuse to grant the licence, unless the undertaking were given. Rex v. Licensing Justices of Birmingham. K. B. Div.: Lord Alverstone, C.J., Channell and Avory, JJ. Oct. 15.Counsel: Danckwerts, K.C. and R. M. Montgomery; Hugo Young, K.C. and H. H. Joy. Solicitors: Sharpe, Pritchard, and Co., for C. A. Carter, Birmingham; Godden, Son, and Holme, for A. Caddick, Birmingham.] IN BANKRUPTCY. Bankruptcy-Person trading under Partnership Name-Service of Petition upon Person having Control or Management of Business insufficient-Bankruptcy Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 115— Bankruptcy Rule 260-Order XLVIII.A, rr. 3, 11. Appeal from the Wandsworth County Court. H. and Co. Limited and G. F. and Co. Limited on the 9th May 1912 filed a bankruptcy petition against H. G., trading as J. and M. P., and served it upon F. M. G. at the debtor's place of business. On the hearing of the petition on the 1st Aug., the registrar held that F. M. G. was not the person" having at the time of service the control or management of the business there" within the meaning of Bankruptcy Rule 260, and that the service was therefore insufficient. The petitioning creditors appealed, and it was contended on their behalf that the registrar had refused to admit evidence in support of the service of the petition, and that the case ought to be remitted to the County Court for the hearing of such evidence. The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding the service of the petition to be insufficient on grounds other than those upon which the registrar had decided the point. In the opinion of the court, an individual trading under a partnership or firm name, whose identity is known to his creditors, is not a firm or partnership within the meaning of rule 260, and a bankruptcy petition to be valid must be served upon him personally, unless leave for substituted service has been obtained. [Re A Debtor (No. 21 of 1912). K. B. Div. in Bank.: Phillimore and Horridge, JJ. Oct. 21.-Counsel: Hansell and Ralph Sutton; Clayton, K.C. and Whately. Solicitors: Braby and Waller; Harston and Bennett.] By his petition H. A. J. asked for a decree of judicial separation on the ground of the alleged cruelty of his wife, A. J. By her answer A. J. denied the allegation and alleged that the petitioner had committed adultery with one M. M., and asked for a decree of judicial separation. On the 3rd May 1912 an order was made for the payment by the petitioner to the respondent or her solicitors within seven days from the service of the order of the sum of £28 18s., being the amount of the respondent's costs as taxed, and also within a like period to lodge in court a sum of £25, estimated by one of the registrars as sufficient to cover the costs and expenses of the respondent of and incidental to the hearing or trial of the cause, or give a bond under his hand and seal and of two sufficient sureties in the penal sum of £50 conditioned for the payment of such expenses of the respondent. The sum of £28 18s. was ultimately paid after execution had been levied against the petitioner's goods and effects, but he had failed to lodge in court the sum of £25 or give a bond. The respondent moved to issue a writ of attachment against the petitioner. By order of the court the petitioner attended and was crossexamined. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the case was on all fours with the case of Clarke v. Clarke (1891) P. 278), in which the court held that no order for attachment for non-compliance with a similar order could be made against a petitioner. Held, that the case cited was not binding on the court, and that the writ would issue, but would lie in office for ten days. Leave to appeal on solicitor's undertaking to bring £30 into court. : [Jones v. Jones. P. Div.: Bargrave Deane, J. Oct. 14 and 21-Counsel for the respondent, Bayford; for the petitioner, H. G. Rooth. Solicitors: P. Robinson and Co.; S. Y. Tilley.] Restitution of Conjugal Rights-Service out of the Jurisdiction without Leave-Decree. B. J. S. M. B. petitioned for restitution of conjugal rights. A sealed copy of the petition and a copy of the citation were served on the respondent, M. E. L. B., at Mallow, county Cork, where he was residing. No leave had been obtained for service out of the jurisdiction. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the service was good, notwithstanding Bateman v. Bateman (84 L. T. Rep. 331). Having heard evidence in support of the petition, which was undefended, Evans, P. pronounced a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights, to be obeyed, within fourteen days after service. [Buckley v. Buckley. P. Div.: Sir S. T. Evans, P. Oct. 19. -Counsel: J. H. Murphy. Solicitors: Rutherfords.] A second edition is to hand of Mr. Charles H. S Stephenson's Study of the Law of Mortgages (Effingham Wilson). The original scheme of the book has not been interfered with, but recent statutes and cases directly affecting the subject under consideration have been noticed in proportion with the scope of the book in its first edition The book has also been revised, the chapters relating to Registration, to Leaseholds and Copyholds, and to Valuations, respectively by Messrs. Chadwick, Margetts, and Brackett. LAW LIBRARY. The Cambridge University Press has published the first volume of a large work on the Constitution and Finance of English, Scottish, and Irish Joint Stock Companies to 1720, by Mr. William Robert Scott. In this first volume Mr. Scott deals with the general development of the joint stock system to 1720. The subject holds an important place in the study of economic progress, more especially in relation to capital. The second and third volumes of the book have already appeared, the first having been delayed on account of the number of paged references to the other two. NEW EDITIONS. That excellent vade mecum for the Common Law practitioner, Chitty's King's Bench Forms (Sweet and Maxwell Limited and Stevens and Sons Limited), has reached its fourteenth edition, the present editors being Master Willes Chitty and Messrs. E. H. Chapman and Philip Clark. All the forms and notes have been carefully revised and brought up to date, several new forms having been added and some new subjects introduced. In all matters relating to proceedings in the King's Bench and on appeal therefrom, it is difficult to conceive any form that may be required which will not be found in its pages. .. Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (Sweet and Maxwell Limited) now appears in its sixth edition, Mr. Wyatt Paine again being responsible for the present issue. Only three years have elapsed since the publication of the last edition, but the thorough and complete revision to which the work has been subjected, together with the additional matter which it has been necessary to include, has compelled Mr. Paine to increase the size of the volume. As we have stated before, we know of no better work on the law of torts. Messrs. Sweet and Maxwell Limited have also sent us the sixteenth edition of Chitty on Contracts, the editor also being Mr. Wyatt Paine. The whole treatise has been carefully revised, much extended (several thousands of additional cases being included), and it truly constitutes a compendious and thoroughly up-to-date disquisition upon the whole law of contractual obligations as regulated by statute and interpreted by judicial opinion. These two works form a complete statement of the various legal obligations arising ex contractu and ex delicto. That well-known volume, Kerr on Receivers (Sweet and Maxwell Limited), has reached its sixth edition, Mr. Frank C. Watmough being responsible for this issue. The subject of "Managers" having been dealt with in several important cases, the chapter in question has been rewritten and considerably enlarged, while the portions of the book dealing with receivers in debenture-holders' actions have been carefully revised. Although concise, the book is eminently comprehensive. Messrs. Sherratt and Hughes have brought out a sixth edition of Elliott's Workmen's Compensation Acts, this being rendered necessary owing to the large numbers of decisions in the appeal courts of the United Kingdom since it was last published in 1909. It gives a clear statement of the statute law as interpreted by judicial decisions, the old matter having been thoroughly revised, much of it rewritten, and the cases brought up to date. A new feature is the inclusion of precedents of costs in arbitration proceedings, the precedents having been compiled mainly from bills as actually taxed and allowed in one of the larger courts. ANNUAL. Messrs. Butterworth and Co. have just issued The Yearly Supreme Court Practice 1913-The Red Book-the editors being Mr. Muir Mackenzie and Master Chitty, assisted by Messrs. A. W. B. Welford and W. Tudor Roberts. All the notes have been carefully revised and the practice has been brought up to date in every respect, both clearness and conciseness having been always kept in view, though neither are sacrified to the other. The work appears both in one and two volumes. 66 The Elements of Child Protection, by Dr. Eden Paul, translated by Sigmund Engel (George Allen and Co.). This book contains a lucid and well-planned presentation of all the problems of child protection-problems the importance of which gained such a wide recognition at the end of last century that it has sometimes been called the century of the child." After an introduction on general lines, the author goes on to the department of civil law and individual rights, the department of local administrative activity, and, finally, the department of criminal law. Dr. Paul's dictuo that children with respect to whom medical science indicates that it is impossible for them ever to become useful members of society" should be quickly and painlessly destroyed" will hardly meet with widespread approval. The Law Quarterly Review for October (Stevens and Sons Limited) contains (inter alia): Private International Law, by A. V. Dicey, K.C.; Merger of Charges, by A. E. Randall; A Historical Study of Mohammedan Law, II., by Syed H. R. Abdul Majid; Judicial Legislation in Egypt, by Norman Bentwich; The Exemption of the Crown from Charges in Respect of Land, by W. W. Lucas; Legal Procedure in Anglo-German Cases, by Julius Hirschfeld; The Rescission of Executory Contracts for Partial Failure in Performance, I., by C. B. Morison; and A Short History of English Law, by Courtney Kenny. BOOKS RECEIVED. Pitman's Commercial Encyclopædia. Vol. 3. Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons Limited, 1, Amen-corner, E.C. Price (four vols.) 30s.net. Jenks' Digest of English Civil Law. Book 3: Law of Property (continued). Butterworth and Co., Bell-yard, Temple Bar. Inns of Court and of Chancery. Macmillan and Co. Limited, St. Martin's-street. Price 1s. Second Edition. Copnall on Highways. and Co. Limited, 227-239, Tooley-street, S.E. National Conference of Free Workers Report. Hamilton Brothers Limited, 20, Victoria-street, S.W. Charles Knight Ryde on Rating. Third Edition. Butterworth and Co., Bellyard, Temple Bar; Shaw and Sons, 7 and 8, Fetter-lane, E.C. Price 37s. 6d. Buckland on Roman Private Law. Cambridge University Press, Fetter-lane, E.C. Price 10s. 6d. net. Mews' Digest of English Case Law. October. Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancery-lane; Sweet and Maxwell Limited, 3, Chancery-lane. Price 5s. Palmer's Company Precedents. Eleventh Edition. Part 2 Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancery-lane. Price 34s. Seton's Forms of Judgments and Orders. Seventh Edition. Three vols. Stevens and Sons Limited, 119 and 120, Chancerylane. Price £6. SANITARY ASSURANCE.-Before renting or purchasing a house it is advisable to obtain an independent report on the condition of the Drains, Sanitary Fittings, and Water Supply. Moderate fees for Sanitary Inspections on application to the Sanitary Engineering Company, 115, Victoria-street, Westminster. 'Phone, 4316 Victoria. Telegrams: "Sanitation," London.-[ADVT.] Cheltenham, Friday Chesham, Tuesday, at 10 book on blems d Chesterfield, Monday (if sary), at 9.30 neces Chippenham, Tuesday, at 10.15 Clerkenwell, Monday, Tuesday (JS.), and Wednesday, at 10.30 Colchester, Tuesday and Wednesday, at 10 Daventry, Tuesday, at 10 Durham, Tuesday (R. By) Gainsborough, Wednesday, at 10. Kingston-on-Thames, Tuesday Leigh, Friday Lincoln, Tuesday, at 10 10 Llandovery, Saturday Monmouth, Tuesday, at 10 Northampton, Tuesday (Reg.), at 10 Northleach, Saturday Nottingham, Wednesday, and Fri day (J.S.), at 10 Oldham, Thursday, at 9.30 Portsmouth, Monday (R. By), at 11 Rochdale, Friday (J.S.), at 9.30 St. Helens, Wednesday Salford, Wednesday and Thursday Sheffield, Wednesday, Thursday (By at), and Friday, at 10 Shoreditch, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday Sleaford, Thursday, at 10 Sunderland, Thursday (R. By) Swindon, Wednesday (By at 11), at 10.30 Todmorden. Friday Ulverston, Thursday, at 9.30 Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday Widnes, Friday Wigan, Tuesday, at 9 * Other sittings are specially fixed if necessary. RECENT DECISIONS. MEAD V. COLEMAN. Replevin-Impounding Heifer-Damage. HIS HONOUR JUDGE MULLIGAN, K.C., delivered judgment in the Norwich County Court on the 8th Oct. in this case. Edmund Reeve appeared for the plaintiff, and A. W. F. Bagge for the defendant. The facts and arguments appear in the judgment. His HONOUR.-This is an unusual claim. It is the first of its kind that has come before me for trial. On the 10th of last month some of the plaintiff's cattle, including a heifer which was in calf, broke in the defendant's garden and injured some plants and an apple tree. The defendant seized the heifer and shut her up in an outhouse. So far he was within his rights. The plaintiff went and asked the defendant to let him have the heifer, he undertaking to pay for the damage. The defendant refused. The plaintiff had the damage valued and tendered to the defendant £2 10s. and 6s. for the keep of the heifer. The defendant again refused. The plaintiff thereupon deposited £35 in court as security that he would commence and prosecute this action and return the heifer if so ordered. A warrant of replevin was then issued and the heifer was restored to the plaintiff, but in a depreciated condition Owing to the prolonged detention. This plaint was afterwards issued by the owner claiming £9 3s. 6d. by way of damages. The defendant counter-claimed £6 178. 6d. for the trespass. plaintiff paid the £2 10s. and the 6s. into court, and the dispute came on for decision. Now, it was very annoying for the defendant to see an inroad made into his garden by his neighbour's cattle, and he was entitled to compensation for the trespass. There are lawful means of ascertaining and recovering the proper amount. Means that are not lawful are sometimes used to extort more than is just for a slight trespass. That is what was attempted here. It seems that the plaintiff's cattle went upon the defendant's land on some former occasion, and, when thes plaintiff's valuer was investigating the damage on the present occasion, the defendant said to him: "They kidded me to take £1 last time, but this time I'm going to have it right. I'm going to The have £7 10s. or sell the heifer." He had no right to sell the Solicitors for the plaintiff, Mills and Reeve. GODFREY V. DIVETT. “Workman ”—Work of casual Nature-Workmen's Compensation Act 1906. IN the Newton Abbot County Court, on the 18th inst., His Honour Judge Lush Wilson, K.C., delivered the following judgment: His HONOUR.-This was a claim for compensation by reason of an accident resulting in the loss of an eye to the applicant whilst breaking stones on the property of the respondent. It was proved in evidence that the applicant was employed by the steward of the respondent to break certain stones at 1s. 4d. per yard which were required for the purpose of repairing roads on the respondent's estate, which roads as between the respondent and her farm tenants she was under liability to keep in repair. There was a conflict of evidence between the applicant and the steward as to whether or not a conversation took place between them with regard to the respondent having insured against accidents to casual labourers employed by her. I am not satisfied that any such conversation as sworn to by the applicant did in fact take place between them. It was proved that the applicant brought a man named Pike to work with him. The steward swore that, having agreed to pay the applicant 1s. 4d. a yard, he was surprised, but did not object, when he found that the applicant brought another man with him, and he further stated that the respondent was paying other men daily wages to quarry. the stone which was to be broken, and, further, that he agreed to pay the applicant so much a yard instead of daily wages because he thought they could get it done cheaper. It was proved that in the course of the work the steward desired the applicant to break the stones smaller and to put the heaps higher. No arrangement was made as to the hours of work. During the last two days of work the applicant worked alone. On the last day of working, a stone went through the applicant's goggles and injured an eye which had eventually to be and was removed. The applicant had no work for eight weeks after the accident, and he swore that he has since earned on the average about 78. a week and finds that people will not employ him as before on account of the loss of his eye. It was proved that previously to the employment of the respondent the applicant's average earnings were about 25s. to 30s. a week as a breaker of stones for a road contractor. The question I have to decide is whether or not the applicant was a "workman "within the definition of sect. 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act 1906. Was the applicant a person whose employment was of a casual nature and who was employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's business? It is immaterial that the employment should have been of a casual nature provided the purposes were those of the employer's business. In this case I entertain no doubt that, inasmuch as the leases provided for the performance of a correlative duty or obligation on the part of the respondent towards the tenants to repair the farm roads and the applicant was employed in relation thereto, the employment was for the purposes of the respondent's business. Was the applicant an independent contractor, or was he working under a contract of service ? The principal test for distinguishing between these two forms of contract is whether or not the applicant whilst performing his work was under the control of the respondent's steward. This case appears to me to be very near the line. I do not say that the interference of the steward with the applicant's work was inconsistent with the theory that the applicant was an independent contractor. But, having regard to the steward's admission that he did direct the applicant to break the stones smaller and that he paid by measurement instead of daily wages because he thought they could get it done cheaper, whilst the quarrymen were paid daily wages, I have arrived at the conclusion that the contract was one of service, and that therefore the applicant is within the Act and entitled to recover. The only remaining question is that of the amount of compensation to which he is entitled. He still possesses one eye and can work, although I have no doubt that employers of labour are disinclined to employ injured workmen, and that therefore, for this reason alone, the earning capacity of the applicant has been permanently diminished or affected. It is, however, within the power of the applicant to obtain a glass eye. I think, so far as I am able to estimate it, the fair weekly compensation should be 78. a week, and I award half wages, the amount having been agreed, from the date of the accident to the date of the hearing, and this amount afterwards to the applicant. RUTHVEN (app.) v. EDITH GENT (a married woman, formerly The marriage of a parlourmaid does not of itself suspend or His HONOUR.-This is an application by the ex-employer to review. The respondent was parlourmaid in the employment of the applicant. On the 3rd of last February she slipped on the stairs and fell and injured one of her legs so badly that it is still painful and becomes greatly inflamed with ordinary exertion. At the time of the accident the respondent was engaged to be married. The marriage was delayed on account of the gravity of the injury, and an agreement was filed in May to pay her 8s. 3d. per week by way of compensation. The 8s. 3d. was paid until the 3rd July, when the marriage took place, the respondent being then able to walk short distances. She can now do some light intermittent work. But her labour, as the result of the accident and apart altogether from the effect of the marriage, would not fetch half what she sold it for prior and up to the 3rd Feb. 1912. To-day Mr. Dodson has for the applicant contended that upon the marriage Mrs. Gent ceased to belong to the wage-earning class and therefore ceased to be entitled to compensation, and cited a number of cases. Mr. Bagge, for the respondent, has contended that Mrs. Gent had not ceased to belong to the wage-earning class; that married women in her position do work and earn wages. I shall not refer to the cases cited. They are at most far-fetched illustrations. Each case depends on its own facts. The facts here are altogether novel. There can be no doubt that the status of employer and workman was ascertained and fixed, finally fixed, by the filed agreement. The payments under that agreement, whether they be made weekly or whether they be redeemed for a lump sum, are compensation for an ascertained injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment of Edith Gent by C. H. V. Ruthven-out of the status which existed at the time of the fall on the stairs. There is not any dum sola limitation in the Act or in the agreement, and I altogether decline to interpolate or to add any such limitation. I award compensation at the rate of 88. 3d. per week until now and at the rate of 78. a week hereafter, and the respondent must be paid her costs on scale B. In the course of a judgment delivered in the Accrington County Court, His Honour Judge Hans Hamilton made the following trenchant observations: "I hope the Legislature will at an early date make it illegal for insurance companies agents to canvass and worry people into taking out insurances on their lives and on the lives of their relations. The practice is that not only one but two servants of the company (the agent and the superintendent) come to the house of a person they in many instances never knew before, and they sit down, sometimes for hours, and worry and persuade until they succeed in "getting a life," as they call it, and secure their commission, which is their primary object. If a British subject wishes to insure his or her life or the life of a relation within the law, surely he or she might be permitted to go to the office of a company and not have his or her home besieged by agents. This practice has led and is leading honest people to gamble in human lives, and much harm is done." The case upon which we were there commenting was tried last week in the King's Bench Division, the indictment having been removed there by certiorari. The trial has resulted in an interesting decision on several points-amongst others, the liability of a corporation to be indicted under sect. 47 (3) of the Public Health (London) Act 1891. The indictment was laid under that sub-section which provides that "where it is shown that any article liable to be seized under this section, and found in the possession of any person, was purchased by him from another person for the food of man, and when purchased was in such a condition as to be liable to be seized and condemned under this section, the person who so sold the same shall be liable to the fine and imprisonment mentioned above [£50 and six months' imprisonment], unless he proves that at the time he sold the said article he did not know and had no reason to believe it was in such condition." At the trial in the King's Bench Division, counsel for the defence moved to quash the indictment on the ground that a corporation could not be guilty of mens rea, and that that was an essential part of the offence charged. The learned judge ruled, however, that the offence was complete without proof of intent on the part of the sellers, and that proof of the proviso at the end of the sub section was a defence open to a person charged with the offence created in the first part of the sub-section. A further point was taken-namely, that as the statute prescribed imprisonment as a punishment for the offence, if proved, it could not apply to a corporate body, which could not be imprisoned. Under the Interpretation Act 1889, s. 2 (1), " in the construction of every enactment relating to an offence punishable on indictment or summary conviction the expression 'person' shall, unless a contrary intention appears, include a body corporate." In Hawke v. Hulton (100 L. T. Rep. 905), in a prosecution under the Vagrancy Act 1824, it was held that a corporation could not be convicted as rogues and vagabonds. In Chater v. Freeth and Pocock Limited (105 L. T. Rep. 238) & corporation was held to be rightly convicted of an offence under sect. 20 of the Food and Drugs Act 1899. The learned judge followed this decision and refused to quash the indictment on the ground that imprisonment under sect. 47 of the Public Health (London) Act 1891 was alternative to the fine therein provided, and that the defendant corporation could be fined. WHAT IS A POLITICAL OFFENCE? IN a case at the Oxfordshire Autumn Assizes on Saturday last, the prisoner was convicted of being found armed with intent to break and enter Nuneham House and set fire thereto. She was what is known as a militant suffragist, and her counsel, before sentence, advanced the view that, as apolitical offender, she should be treated as a first class misdemeanant. Mr. Justice Ridley stated that the offence could not be regarded as a political one, and passed sentence of nine months' imprisonment with hard labour. In default of a successful appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal against the sentence the learned judge's view holds the field. As, however, there is a widespread confusion of ideas on the subject of what are called political offences, it may be well to examine shortly the position of such offences in the eye of the law. First of all, then, it may be stated broadly that the municipal law of England draws no hard-and-fast distinction between political offences and others as regards the measure of guilt and of consequent punishment. The one exception to the rule is the case of persons convicted of sedition or seditious libel, who by the Prison Act 1877 (s. 40) are to be treated as misdemeanants of the first division. Other offences against public order, such as high treason, treason-felony, unlawful assemblies, riots, and other unlawful acts directed to obtain a change in the law, are not placed by common law or statute in any privileged category of comparative immunity. A judge who has to fix the sentence has, of course, to consider all the surrounding circumstances of the crime, whether it has or has not a political com plexion, but the mere fact that the offence has been committed to attain some political object does not, and ought not to, give the offender any claim to exceptional lenit. |