punishment is not the misery of the offender, but the general good. Its design is to express displeasure against disobedience: and where punishment is inflicted according to the desert of the offence, there justice is satisfied. In other words, such an expression of displeasure is uttered by the lawgiver, that, in it, every subject of his empire may read what are his views of the evil which he forbids, and what are his determinations in regard to its punishment. If sinners had received in their own persons the reward of their iniquity, justice would in that way have been satisfied and if the infinitely blessed God, whose ways are higher than our ways, and whose thoughts are higher than our thoughts, has devised an expedient for our salvation, though he may not confine himself to a hiteral conformity to those rules of justice which he has marked out for us, yet he will be certain not to depart from the spirit of them. Justice must be satisfied even in that way. An atonement made by a substitute, in any case, requires that the same end be answered by it, as if the guilty party had actually suffered It is necessary that the displeasure of the offended should be expressed in as strong terms, or in away adapted to make as strong an impression upon all concerned, as if the law had taken its course: otherwise, atonement is not made, and mercy triumphs at the expense of righteousness.

Let it be inquired, then, whether this great end of moral government could have been answered by the sufferings of a mere creature? Some who deny the divinity of Christ, appear to be apprehensive that it could not; and have therefore supposed that God, in order, it should seem, to bring it within the compass of a creature's grasp, required less of his Son than our sins deserved.

It is true, indeed, if Christ be only a creature, it must be less, infinitely less, that was accepted, than what was strictly deserved. In the atonement of Christ, God is said to have SET HIM FORTH lo be a propitiation—to DECLARE HIS RIGHTEOUSNESS, for the remission of sins. Now this, as well as the nature of things, implies, That one who makes an atonement, must be of so much account in the scale of being, as to attract the general attention. But the sufferings of a mere man, whose obedience could be no more than duty, or whose humiliation contained in it no condescension below

the place that became him, would be no more adapted to excite the general attention of the intelligent creation, than the sufferings of an insect would be to attract the attention of a nation. It were as rational to talk of the king of Great Britain setting forth a worm, tortured on the point of a needle, to DECLARE his regard to righteousness, while he pardoned the deluded votaries of the Pretender; as to talk of a mere creature being set forth as a propitiation for the DECLARATION of the righteousnesss of God in the remission of human guilt.

To suppose, because humanity only is capable of suffering, that therefore humanity only is necessary to make atonement, is to render dignity of character of no account. When Zaleucus, one of the Grecian kings, made a law against adultery, that whoever was guilty of this crime should lose both his eyes, his own son is said to have been the first transgressor. To preserve the honour of the law and at the same time to save his own son from total blindness, the father had recourse to an expedient of losing one of his own eyes, and his son one of his. This expedient, though it did not conform to the letter of the law, yet was well adapted to preserve the spirit of it; as it served to evince to the nation the determination of the king to punish adultery, as much, perhaps more, than if the sentence had literally been put into execution against the offender. But if, instead of this, he had appointed that one eye of an animal should be put out, in order to save that of his son; or if a common subject had offered to lose an eye, would either have answered the purpose? The animal, or the subject, were each possessed of an eye, as well as the sovereign. It might be added too, that it was mere bodily pain; and seeing that it was in the body only that this penalty could be endured, would be equally capable of enduring it. True, they might endure it but would their suffering have answered the same end? Would it have satisfied justice? Would it have had the same effect upon the nation, or tended equally to restore the tone of injured authority?

Some have placed all the virtue of the atonement in the appointment of God. But, if so, why was it NOT POSSIBLE that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin? It does not accord

:

with the divine proceedings to be prodigal of blood, especially in a superior character, where one far inferior might answer the same end. When, in order to try Abraham, Isaac was bound, and ready to be sacrificed, a lamb was found for a burnt-offering and if any gift from the divine Father, short of that of his only-begotten Son, would have answered the great purposes of moral government, there is no reason to think that he would have made Him a sacrifice; but would have spared him, and not freely have delivered him up for us all.

It has been objected against the necessity of Christ's being a divine person in order to his making atonement, that if he who makes atonement be infinite, it must needs be followed by the salvation of the whole human race. But this objection supposes that the number of the saved is to be proportioned to the ability of the Saviour and then it would seem, that Christ being a mere man, he saved all that his finite merit would extend to. With just as much propriety might it be alleged, that the power by which we were created could not be infinite; for if it had, there must then have been an infinite number of worlds in existence. And the wisdom and goodness by which we are saved cannot be infinite; for if so, all the world, and the fallen angels too, would be interested in that salvation.

It short, the deity and atonement of Christ have always, among thinking people, stood or fallen together; and with them almost every other important doctrine of the gospel. The person of Christ is the foundation-stone on which the church is built. An error therefore on this subject affects the whole of our preaching, and the whole of our religion. In the esteem of the apostle Paul, that which nullified the death of Christ, was accounted to be another gospel; and he expressed his wish that those who propagated it, and so troubled the churches, were cut off. The principle maintained by the Galatians, it is true, did not consist in a denial of the deity of Christ; but the consequence is the same. They taught that justification was by the works of the law, from whence the apostle justly inferred that Christ is dead in vain. And he who teaches that Christ is a mere creature, holds a doctrine which renders his sufferings of none effect. If the deity of

Christ be a divine truth, it cannot reasonably be denied that it is of equal importance with the doctrine of justification by his righteousness. If therefore a rejection of the latter was deemed a perversion of the gospel, nothing less can be ascribed to the rejection of the former.

ON CREEDS AND SUBSRCIPTIONS.

It has been very common, among a certain class of writers, to exclaim against creeds and systems in religion, as inconsistent with Christian liberty and the rights of conscience: but surely they must be understood as objecting to those creeds only which they dislike, and not to creeds in general; for no doubt, unless they be worse than the worst of beings, they have a creed of their own. The man who has no creed, has no belief; which is the same thing as being an unbeliever: and he whose belief is not formed into a system, has only a few loose, unconnected thoughts, without entering into the harmony and glory of the gospel. Every wellinformed and consistent believer, therefore, must have a creed, a system which he supposes to contain the leading principles of divine revelation.

It may be pleaded that the objection does not lie so much against our having creeds or systems, as against our imposing them on others, as the condition of Christian fellowship. If, indeed, a subscription to articles of faith were required without examination, or enforced by civil penalties, it would be an unwarrantable imposition on the rights of conscience: but if an explicit agreement in what may be deemed fundamental principles be judged

essential to fellowship, this is only requiring that a man appear to be a Christian before he can have a right to be treated as such. Suppose it were required of a Jew or an infidel, before he is admitted to the Lord's supper, (which either might be disposed to solicit for some worldly purpose,) that he must previously become a believer; should we thereby impose Christianity upon him? He might claim the right of private judgment, and deem such a requisition, incompatible with its admission: but it is evident he could not be entitled to Christian regard, and that while he exclaimed against the imposition of creeds and systems, he himself would be guilty of an imposition of the grossest kind, utterly inconsistent with the rights of voluntary and social compact, as well as of Christian liberty.

In order to be a little more explicit on the subject, it may be necessary to offer the following remarks.

First: It is admitted that no society has a right to make laws where Christ has made none. Whoever attempts this, whether in an individual or social capacity, is guilty of substituting for doctrines the commandments of men, and making void the law of God by their traditions.

:

Secondly The fallibility of all human judgment is fully allowed. A Christian society, as well as an individual, is liable to err in judging what are the doctrines and precepts of Christ. Whatever articles of faith and practice, therefore, are introduced into a community, they ought, no doubt, to be open to correction or amendment, whenever those who subscribe them shall perceive their inconsistency with the will of Christ.

:

Thirdly Whatever may be said on the propriety of human systems of faith, they are not to be considered as the proper ground on which to rest our religious sentiments.-The word of God, and that alone, ought to be the ground of both faith and practice. But all this does not prove that it would be wrong for an individual to judge of the meaning of the divine word, nor for a number of individuals who agree in their judgments, to express that agreement in explicit terms, and consider themselves as bound to walk by the same rule,