fome degree, of holiness or fin, of happiness or mifery.

4. Every moral agent is the fubject of a decretive neceffity of the event; that is, every thing but moral evil, (which cannot poffibly from its very nature, be the object of any decretive act of GoD) relating to the moral agent, his natural endowments and valuable moral qualities, must be the neceffary effect of the divine decree. What was once in the clafs of poffibles only (as were the things just mentioned) becomes by a decree certainly future, and therefore neceffary. - Nearly akin to this is,

5. That neceffity, or certainty* as fome choose to call it, which is oppofed to abfolute contingence. To GOD nothing is contingent or fortuitous, though many things are fo to us. Contingence is a relative idea; the fame thing may be contingent

to

* C Metaphyfical or philofophical neceffity is nothing different from certainty. I fpeak not now of the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty there is in things themfelves, which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge of them; or that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the propofition which affirms them. Philofophical neceffity is really nothing elfe than the full and fixed connection between the things fignified by the fubject and predicate of a propofition, which affirms fomething to be truc. When there is fuch a connection, then the thing affirmed in the propofition is necessary, in a philosophical sense; whether any oppofition, or contrary effort be fuppofed, or supposable in the cafe, or no. When the fubject and predicate of a propofition, which affirms the exiftence of any thing, either fubftance, quality, act, or circumstance, have a full or certain connection, then the exiflence or being of that thing is faid to be neceflary in a metaphyfical fenfe." EDWARDS's Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will, p. 22. Lond. 1775.

to one being which is not fo at all to another. It would be infinitely degrading to GOD to fuppofe that any thing is contingent to him. While we foresee nothing as infallibly certain, except upon a divine teftimony; God's previfion is fo abfolute, and fo univerfal as to comprehend every thing. Hence if two effects are not precifely the fame, we may be sure there was a reafon of the difference, though not by us perceiveable. Whereas if there be an effect perfectly contingent to God, it must be an effect without any affignable cause whatever; and then we may as well fay, that the univerfe exifts without a cause. The confequence of this would be, an impoffibility to demonftrate a firft caufe; which is both abfurd and impious to imagine.

Having defined and explained the principal controverted terms relating to our fubject, we now proceed to take a view of the moral government of God.

СНАР.

CHA P. II.

Containing a View of the moral Government of GOD with respect to mankind.

SECT. I.

Of MAN, the subject of moral

government.

§ 1. That man is a fubject of moral government, taken for granted. § 2. Man was made upright. §3. His prefent ftate is very different. § 4. The State of the intellect. § 5. And of the will. § 6. Wherein confift man's defects and duty, explained and illuftrated. § 7. His defects not excufable. § 8. How this ftate is to be accounted for. $9. Obligations of perfection are proportionable to means. § 10. But fince the means afforded are mifimproved, ali men are found guilty.

SI.

WE

E fhall here take it for granted that man is a fubject of God's moral government, and therefore accountable for his actions, propenfities, and difpofitions. To confute the denial of this pofition would lead us to combat Atheism; which is an abfurdity fo monftrous that a formal refutation of it is a compliment which it does not deferve. (Introd. § 1.)

§ 2. It

§ 2. It has been obferved before, (ch. i. § 3, 8.) that a fubject of moral government is poffeffed of a CAPACITY for enjoying the chief good, which capacity includes intellect, will, and freedom; and if perfect, he actually enjoys the chief good, and every inferior good in a regular fubordination to that higher end. This is the character of every moral agent in a state of original probation. But fuch an agent has also a fuitablenefs and fufficiency of MEANS to preserve that enjoyment; and, if he have not tranfgreffed the line of perfect moral rectitude, not one of the means, however numerous, has been abused; not one object internal or external, paft, prefent, or future, has been over-valued or undervalued; every difpofition, inclination, thought, defire, volition, and action, is exactly as it ought to be. And, finally, fuch an agent is poffeffed of FREEDOM, or a power to fin, and not to fin; the former, because accountable; the latter, because not impelled to fin, or to the finfulness of any act, by any appointment, inftrument, or immediate concourse of the first cause, whofe ever-acting uninterrupted energy produces all good, and only good continually. This was the state of Adam and Eve before their tranfgreffion. God made man UPRIGHT. And God faw every thing that he had made, and behold, it was

VERY GOOD.

§3. But is this the prefent ftate of man? Sad experience, I believe, proves the contrary. Let us · observe this matter with the most calm attention and the most impartial difcernment in our power.

The

The outward actions of men are the beft evidences of their difpofitions. If therefore it be found, in fact, that the chief good is neglected or undervalued, the line of moral uprightness is tranfgreffed. And if this be found an univerfal fact, refpecting every perfon from earliest life, it forms undeniable proof that all men are degenerate. But how fhall we investigate and afcertain this interesting fact? If we appeal to infpired narratives and documents, the verdict is, that all have finned, and that there is none righteous, no not one; but as we are treating of God's moral government, it may be thought neceffary to inquire into the reafons, the righteous grounds of the fact.

§ 4. We daily find, by growing indubitable experience, that, in the prefent ftate of things, the human intellect does not reprefent all the objects by which the mind might be beft modified, and thereby the will moved. It does not resemble the light of open day, the unclouded fun at noon, which illuminates all reflecting furfaces around us; but ferves only as a torch or candle to conduct our wandering feet in a dark night. And this mental power, properly speaking, makes but a mere representation of objects, having no active influence on the will; and therefore, this representation, small as it is, does not enfure the beft ufe of the good fo reprefented. Thus we fee, that as far as the intellect is concerned, the objects are but few, and thofe few but merely reprefented.

§ 5. Let us now see how the mind, in its present ftate, is qualified to improve this good, in virtue of

its