F.C. 1899 In re TWOPENNY. should be taxed upon the percentage as set forth in the schedule to the Act for that amount. (His Honor read sec. 25.) It has been contended that this settlement ought to be charged with duty in respect of the total amount which, if the total amount of the policies should be kept up, and the premiums Holroyd, J. regularly paid, would ultimately become due upon those policies. We think that that contention is erroneous. The Act does not say that the settlement is to be charged in respect of the amount of those moneys; it does not say it is to be charged on the amount of those moneys, but with ad valorem duty in respect of such moneys. What is the ad valorem duty? It is duty according to the worth of these moneys. Ad valorem duty is duty imposed upon property, and the value of property varies, and it is according to the value of the property that it is charged. We have to read instead of "money," "property," for money is property. What is it that has to be paid? The 8th schedule to the Act, referring to settlements or deeds of gift, and prescribing the percentage which has to be paid according to the value, says-" Where the value of the property does not exceed 1000l. 10s. per cent.; where the value of the property exceeds 1000l. and does not exceed 5000l. 15s. per cent.," and so on. What is the property which is passed by this settlement? I assume now that the transfer is an actual transfer by which the policies transferred form part of the settlement, for there is only one duty to be paid. The "property" is the right to receive a certain sum or sums of money at an unfixed time-viz., at the death of a particular person-on condition that in the meantime certain annual premiums are regularly paid. That is a thing quite uncertain. It so It so happens that in this particular settlement the settlor imposes on himself no obligation to pay the annual premiums, and he himself and the trustees are expressly exempted by covenant from any liability to see that these premiums are paid. The right is to receive a certain sum of money at a future time, the period being uncertain, and on a certain condition. What we have to find for the purpose of duty is the value of the property, the value of the right which has passed by the deed; that is what we have to find, and that is a matter of conjecture, but it is estimated by the companies F.C. 1899 In re TWOPENNY. Holroyd, J. under the surrender value of the policies, and that, according to Solicitors for appellant: Stawell & Nankivell. Solicitor for respondent: Guinness, Crown Solicitor. W. H. M. 1898 December 12. Madden, C.J. WILLIAMSON v. CALEDONIAN INSURANCE COMPANY. Insurance -Fire policy-Condition - Waiver - Assignment — Mortgagee — Absolute beneficial interest—Notice – Extent of local agen''s authority—Operation of law -Registration-Claim—Rejection—Authority of manager—Delegation—Power of attorney-Agent-District Agent. The district agent of an insurance company during the currency of a fire policy issued to him by the company on a building and on the furniture therein as mortgagee, sold and transferred all his interest in the mortgage, and on the same date indorsed on the policy a memorandum of transfer of his interest in the policy to the purchaser, from whom he asked and received the full amount of the premium. No notice of the transfer was given by the transferree directly to the head office of the company. The property comprised in the policy was, subsequently to the transfer, but during the currency of the policy, destroyed by fire. Condition 10 of the policy ran-"This policy ceases to be in force as to any property hereby insured the absolute beneficial ownership in which shall pass from the insured to any other person otherwise than by will or operation of law unless notice thereof be given to the company and the subsistence of the insurance in favour of such other person be declared by a memorandum indorsed hereon by or on behalf of the company." Held, that this was not an assignment by operation of law and the transferror had under this condition an absolute beneficial interest in the property insured, which interest he purported expressly to assign to the plaintiff, and that the notice necessary to be given under the condition was a notice to the manager of the company, and that the memorandum indorsed on the policy was insufficient to bind the company as a notice or as a memorandum under the condition. Condition 13 of a fire policy provided, inter alia-If the claim be not made within three months after the fire or if made and rejected an action or suit be not commenced within three months after such rejection all benefit under this policy is forfeited. 66 A claim was made within three months after the fire, but the acting manager of the insurance company refused to entertain' the claim. No action was instituted until more than three months after this refusal. The company was incorporated by Royal Charter and constituted under the provisions of certain English Acts of Parliament which authorized the appointment of a manager but gave no power to such manager to appoint a substitute. The manager in Victoria purported to appoint a substitute during his absence. Held, that a refusal to entertain a claim amounted to a rejection, and that the acting manager had power to reject. ACTION. By her statement of claim Mary Jane Williamson claimed from the Caledonian Insurance Company the sum of 75., the amount of a policy of fire insurance issued by the company to one J. H. Curnow on the 11th July 1895, from time to time renewed, and finally renewed by Curnow on the 27th June 1897 for twelve months. The plaintiff claimed as assignee and transferree of the policy by an absolute assignment in writing within the meaning of sec. 63, sub-sec. 6, of the Supreme Court Act 1890. It was alleged by the plaintiff that on the 4th November 1897 Curnow assigned to her the policy, and that express notice in writing of such assignment was given by the assignee to the defendant, and that a memorandum was, in accordance with the conditions of the policy, indorsed thereon by or on behalf of the defendant. It was also alleged by the plaintiff that she had an insurable interest in the property and effects insured under the policy, and that these were on the 11th January 1898 totally destroyed by fire, and that all necessary conditions (a) of the policy had been fulfilled by the plaintiff. (a) Conditions on back of Policy :"2. (Inter alia) if any property hereby insured be also insured in any other office or offices without the assent or sanction of the company signified by indorsement hereon the insurance as to the property affected thereby ceases to attach. If by reason of alteration of the risk or 1898 The Caledonian Insurance Company admitted the policy issued to Curnow, but denied the other facts alleged by the CALEDONIAN plaintiff. plaintiff. It also raised the following defences : WILLIAMSON v. INSURANCE Madden, C.J. (1.) That the provisions of paragraph 10 of the conditions. had not been fulfilled, inasmuch as the absolute beneficial ownership in the property insured had passed from the insured to the plaintiff, and no notice thereof was given to the defendant; and the subsistence of the insurance in favour of the plaintiff was not and had not been declared by a memorandum indorsed on the policy by or on behalf of the defendant. (2.) That paragraph 13 had not been complied with by reason of the fact that "if any claim under the policy was made, which the defendant does not admit, the same was rejected by the defendant through its acting manager, William Ivory, and no action or suit was commenced within three months after such rejection." In her reply the plaintiff joined issue, and alleged that the policy shall be terminated accordingly. 10. This policy ceases to be in force as to any property hereby insured the absolute beneficial ownership in which shall pass from the insured to any other person otherwise than by will or operation of law unless notice thereof be given to the company and the subsistence of the insurance in favour of such other person be declared by a memorandum indorsed hereon by or on behalf of the company. "11. On the happening of any loss or damage by fire to any of the property hereby insured the insured is forthwith to give notice in writing thereof to the company or its agent and within 15 days at latest to deliver to the company as particular an account as may be reasonably practicable of the several articles or matters damaged or destroyed by fire with the estimated value of each of them respectively having regard to their several values at the time of the fire and in support thereof to give all such vouchers proofs and explanations as may be reasonably required together with if required a statutory declaration of the truth of the account and in default thereof no claim in respect of such loss or damage shall be payable until such notice account proofs and explanations respectively shall have been given and produced and such statutory declaration if required shall have been made. "13. If the claim be in any respect fraudulent or if any statement or statutory declaration made in support thereof be false or if the fire was occasioned by or through the wilful act procurement or connivance of the insured or any claimant or if the claim be not made within 3 months after the fire or if made and rejected an action or suit be not commenced within 3 months after such rejection all benefit under this policy is forfeited." defendant had waived its right to rely upon the non-fulfilment of conditions 10 and 13 by reason of certain facts more particularly referred to in the judgment of Madden, C.J. R. Hodgson Cole for the plaintiff. W. Campbell Guest for the defendant. MADDEN, C.J. This appears to be a somewhat simple case. Before I go into the matter I think it right to say that the company who defended the action might have been more magnanimous. There may be, however, something else, something suspected by it which in the opinion of its officers warranted them in insisting upon their full legal rights. The company is entitled to insist upon such rights as it possesses. It is true that a policy of insurance is a document which is to be construed strongly against those who have drawn up its conditions. But to the extent that the conditions are clear an insurance company has a right to insist upon them. There is no different law to be applied in the construction of insurance policies to that to be applied in construing any other contract. In the present case the matter stands thus:-One Curnow had as mortgagee insured a building and the furniture in it in the office of the defendant company. Subsequently Curnow sold his interest in the property to Mrs. Williamson, the plaintiff, and intended no doubt to transfer to her the remainder of the policy of fire insurance upon the property. It is said by the defendant that Curnow was the agent for the district round Bendigo, whose duties were to receive proposals and claims for insurance, and to forward these claims and proposals for the consideration of the company itself. When Curnow sold the property in question to Mrs. Williamson he indorsed on the policy these words:-" For valuable consideration I hereby transfer all my right, title, and interest in and to the within policy to Mary Jane Williamson, of Kangaroo Flat, married woman.-J. H. CURNOW." Condition 10 of the policy provides-(His Honor read it). It is now contended by the defendant company that, as a matter 1898 WILLIAMSON v. CALEDONIAN INSURANCE COMPANY. Madden, C.J. |