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REG.

v.

TUFTS

AND OTHERS.

Forgery.

Evidence.

intention to defraud, for the prisoner was heir-at-law of the de-
ceased. [COLTMAN, J.-It did not appear whether the property
was realty or personalty; whether it was leasehold or freehold.
He might be anxious to get possession of some cottage rents.]
The presumption is, that the estate was in fee simple, until a less
interest is shown. If the property was personal, still the prisoner
who was convicted, and one of those who were acquitted, were the
only persons who would be entitled. [ROLFE, B.-The jury find
an intention to defraud some person unknown; that rather implies
that they supposed there had been a former will. COLTMAN, J.
-There was no evidence of that.] There was no suggestion of
any former will; but the learned judge directed the jury to infer
fraud from the improbability that such an act should have been
committed without any intention to defraud. That intention is
generally inferred from the consequence of the act; thus, passing
a forged acceptance implies an intention to defraud the acceptor in
consequence of the legal operation of the instrument; yet, gene-
rally, the real intention is not to defraud him, but some other
person. Here, however, there is no person who could be de-
frauded; and therefore there is no ground for the presumption.
[PARKE, B.-If there were any persons who had purchased any
of the property from the heir-at-law they might be defrauded.]
Nothing of the sort was proved. 2. The will was not admissible;
it was a privileged communication. [POLLOCK, C. B.-This point
has been quite recently decided in Reg. v. Farley (1 Den. C. C.
197; 2 Cox's Crim. Cas. 82.)] That case is distinguishable. The
witness in that case was not the prisoner's attorney. So in Reg. v.
Jones (1 Den. C. C. 166; S. C., nom. Reg. v. Hayward, 2 Cox's
Crim. Cas. 23), the prisoner sent the forged instrument, amongst
other papers, to his attorney, ostensibly for professional purposes,
but in truth, as the learned judge thought, that the attorney might
find it and act upon it; and the case was decided upon the ground
that the will was not put into the attorney's hands in professional
confidence. Wilson v. Rastall (4 T. R. 753), has no application to
this case.
R. v. Smith (1 Phil. Evid. 171), is an authority in
favour of the prisoner, and is distinguished by Mr. Philips from
R. v. Avery (8 Car. & P. 596), where Patteson, J. held R. v. Smith
not to be law. [PATTESON, J.-No sentence was passed in R. v.
Avery, because the prisoner pleaded guilty to another indictment;
but in that case I am reported to have said something too strong
about R. v. Smith, which is certainly distinguishable from R. v.
Avery.] So is this case.

PARKE, B.-Suppose it were given for the purpose of being shown to a tenant in possession, would it be privileged? And on the other hand, if title deeds are given to an attorney to be used for the benefit of the party giving them, can he be required to produce them against him?

WILDE. C. J.-If title deeds are entrusted to an attorney as an attorney, can it be doubted that he is not at liberty to produce them?

LORD DENMAN, C. J.-But if a forged and false instrument is given to an attorney, ought he not to take it to a magistrate? WILDE, C. J.-1 apprehend that the magistrate could not receive the statement.

Cur. adv. vult.

Afterwards the judges who heard the argument held that the conviction was wrong, on the ground that there was no evidence of any intention to defraud any person.

Conviction held bad.

REG.

v.

TUFTS AND OTHERS.

Forgery.

Evidence.

EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.

June 24.

(Error from the Queen's Bench.)

DOUGLAS V. THE QUEEN. (a)

Information under 33 Geo. 3, c. 52, s. 62-Form of judgment-Forfeiture-Imprisonment until payment.

An information against an officer of the East India Company for receiving gifts, under 33 Geo. 3, c. 52, s. 62, which follows the words of the statute, is sufficient after verdict, and it is unnecessary to allege the receipt of the money to have been extorsive or colore officii, or whose money was received, or (PLATT, B., dubitante), to negative that it was received for the use of the Queen.

The judgment for the offence was, that the defendant should pay a fine, and should forfeit a sum of money, being the full value of the gift, and that defendant should be imprisoned until he should have paid the fine and forfeiture. The gift consisted of rupees, and their value at the time of the receipt of them was found by the jury.

Held, first, that as the gift was money, there was no option to exercise, whether the gift or the value of it should be forfeited, and that therefore the judgment was right; secondly, that the value of the rupees was properly estimated at the time when the defendant received them; and, thirdly, that the forfeiture being part of the punishment, the court had power to order imprisonment until it was paid.

, and

DOUGLAS

v.

THE QUEEN

NFORMATION upon the 33 Geo. 3, c. 52, s. 62. The second count of the indictment stated that Archibald Douglas, Esq., late of, &c., being a British subject, on the 18th of Nov. 1839, for a long space of time then next following, to wit, until the 1st Misdemeanor. day of May, A.D. 1841, held and exercised [a certain office in the East Indies, under the East India Company, to wit, the office of Sale of office.

(a) Reported by A. BITTLESTON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

33 Geo. 3, c. 52,

DOUGLAS

v.

THE QUEEN. Misdemeanor.

Sale of office.

Information.

resident at Tanjore,](a) and during all that time resided in the East Indies aforesaid, to wit, at Tanjore aforesaid; and that the said Archibald Douglas, so being a British subject as aforesaid, whilst he held and exercised the said office of resident at Tanjore, in the East Indies aforesaid, as aforesaid, and whilst he resided in the East Indies as aforesaid, and within six years before the filing 33 Geo. 3, c. 52. of this information, that is to say, on the 1st day of January, A.D. 1840, in the East Indies aforesaid, to wit at Tanjore aforesaid, unlawfully did receive of and from a certain person, called Sevajee Rajah, in the East Indies aforesaid, a certain sum of money, that is to say, the sum of 8,000 rupees, being of the value of 800l., of, lawful money, &c., and against the statute in that case made and provided, whereby and by force of the said statute, the said Archibald Douglas was guilty of extortion and a misdemeanor, and by force of the said statute forfeited the said sum of 800l., of, &c., being the value of the said 8,000 rupees so received by the said Archibald Douglas aforesaid. There were many other counts in the information; but it is unnecessary to set them out. In last Michaelmas Term (Nov. 22nd), a nolle prosequi having been entered upon some of the counts, judgment was given against the defendant in the Court of Queen's Bench in the following form :— "That for the extortions and misdemeanors in the said second, third, fifth, eleventh, fourteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and thirty-seventh counts respectively mentioned, the said Archibald Douglas do pay certain fines (specifying them) to our said Lady the Queen, and be imprisoned in the Queen's prison for the space of twelve calendar months; and also, that the said Archibald Douglas, in pursuanee of the statute in that case made and provided, do forfeit to our said Lady the Queen the several sums (specifying them), being the full value of the gifts or presents in the said second, third, fifth, eleventh, fourteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, and thirty-seventh counts respectively mentioned; and that the said Archibald Douglas be imprisoned in the said prison, and there be kept until he shall have paid to our said Lady the Queen the said several fines and every of them respectively, and also the said several forfeitures and every of them respectively." The finding of the jury was set out on the record as follows:- "That the jurors say, upon their oath, that the said Archibald Douglas is guilty of the premises charged upon him in and by each of the second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, fourteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth, thirty-seventh, and forty-third counts respectively of the information above specified, in manner and form, &c. And the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, further say that the said Archibald Douglas is not guilty of so much of the said premises as are charged upon him in and by each of the said first, fourth, twelfth, thirteenth, sixteenth, twentieth, twenty-first, twentysecond, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth,

(a) The words in the brackets were in the first count, but incorporated into the second by the words" said office."

DOUGLAS

v.

THE QUEEN.

Sale of office.

twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, twenty-ninth, thirtieth, thirtyfirst, thirty-second, thirty-third, thirty-fourth, thirty-fifth, thirtysixth, thirty-eighth, thirty-ninth, fortieth, forty-first, forty-second, forty-third, forty-fourth, forty-fifth, forty-seventh, forty-eighth, Misdemeanor. forty-ninth, fiftieth, fifty-first, fifty-second, fifty-third, fifty-fourth, fifty-fifth, fifty-sixth, fifty-seventh, fifty-eighth, fifty-ninth, and sixtieth counts respectively of the information above specified, in 33 Geo. 3, c. 52. manner and form as the said Archibald Douglas hath, by pleading for himself, above alleged. [And the said jurors, upon their oath aforesaid, do further say, that the sum of money received by the said Archibald Douglas, as in the said second count mentioned, was the sum of 8,000 rupees; and that the said sum of 8,000 rupees, at the time of the receiving thereof by the said Archibald Douglas, was of the value of 766l. 13s. 4d. of lawful money of Great Britain, being at the rate of 1s. 11d. for each and every of the said rupees."] (a) There was a similar finding applicable to the other counts. The following (among others) were the errors assigned :-First, that the information is insufficient in law, and that the matters contained in the second, third, &c., counts of the said information respectively are not sufficient in law to warrant the judgment aforesaid against him the said Archibald Douglas, Information. upon those counts respectively, or upon either of them. Secondly, that the second, third, &c., counts do not, nor does any of them, show any offence against any statute, or against any of the laws of this realm. Thirdly, that judgment is given, that, for the extortions and misdemeanors in the said second, third, &c., counts respectively mentioned, the said Archibald Douglas do pay certain fines in the said judgment in that behalf particularly mentioned, to our Lady the Queen, and be imprisoned in the Queen's prison for the space of twelve calendar months; and also that the said A. D., in pursuance of the statute, &c., do forfeit to our said Lady the Queen, the several sums in the said judgment mentioned, being the full value of the gifts or presents in the said second, third, &c., counts respectively mentioned; and that the said A. D. beimprisoned in the said prison, and there be kept until he shall have paid to our Lady the Queen the said several fines and every of them respectively, and also the said several forfeitures and every of them respectively; whereas such judgment is not warranted or authorized by the laws of this realm. Fourthly, that the verdict of the jurors, so far as relates to the second, &c., counts is not sufficient in law, and is not sufficient in law to warrant the aforesaid judgment, so far as the same relates to those counts respectively, and each of them. Joinder in error.

(a) The passage between the brackets was an amendment made by consent during the argument.

DOUGLAS

V.

THE QUEEN. Misdemeanor.

Sale of Office.

Peacocock's argument.

June 19 and 23.

Before WILDE, C. J.; PARKE, B.; ALDERSON, B.; COLTMAN, MAULE, and CRESSWELL, JJ.; and PLATT, B., on the first day; and the same Judges, except WILDE, C. J., on the second.

Peacock, for the plaintiff, in error.-The first question is as to 33 Geo. 3, c. 52. the true construction of s. 62 of 33 Geo. 3, c. 52; and it is submitted that the mere receipt of a gift by a person holding an office is not an offence under that section, unless it be received in connexion with the office, that is, by virtue or under colour of the office; otherwise a gift from one brother to another, if the latter happened to hold office in India, would subject the latter to the penalties of this statute. This information, therefore, is fatally defective for want of an averment that the gift was received colore officii or extorsive, which is always found in indictments for extortion (Co. Lit. 368 b.) [PARKE, B.-But this is after verdict, and the information follows the words of the statute.] The 21st sect. of 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 64, does not apply. It applies to indictments or informations for felony or misdemeanor; but this is an information for forfeitures. [ALDERSON, B.-The offence is a misdemeanor, and the forfeiture is only part of the punishment.] That statute, at all events, applies only to felonies and misdemeanors committed in this country. [CRESSWELL, J.-Would it not to murder on the high seas? MAULE, J.-If the trial of the indictment or information is in England, the case is within the statute.] Peacock referred to ss. 140 and 141 of the 33 Geo. 3, c. 52, to show that the mode of proceeding in India is different from that adopted in England, and that this offence might have been prosecuted there. If the view taken by the Court of Queen's Bench is right, the statute would apply to presents from England if received in India. [ALDERSON, B.-Why is it to be restricted to presents in India?] They are alone contemplated by the statute; and if the words in the statute are so large as to comprehend cases clearly not within it, it is not sufficient in an indictment to follow the words of the statute: (Rexv. McGregor, 3 Bos. & P. 106.) Here the statute makes the receipt of certain gifts extortion; but it does not do away with the necessity of making the information a good information for extortion at common law. In Reg. v. Baynes (Salk. 680, 681), it is said that "a man cannot be charged with extortion without charging him with acting extorsive, and that extorsive et colore officii are words as necessary as "proditorie et felonie." [PARKE, B.-Would not the 62nd section apply to a gift to a judge; and yet that would not be extorsive? PLATT, B.-The words are, that the receipt of the gift shall be 'deemed and taken"" to be extortion. It is not extortion within the definition of that offence in Beawfage's case (10 Rep. 102 a.)] Fletcher v. Calthrop (6 Q. B. 880), is another authority to show that it is not sufficient to follow the words of the statute. (He also referred to Com. Dig. Extortion.) 2. The information is bad for not showing "for whose use" the gift was received. [PARKE, B.-The statute says, for

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