there came reconsideration and a renewal of vigorous and confident exposition on this time-honoured line: it was reshaped and enlarged by the incorporation of the results gained by the new light, and by the extension and enrichment of knowledge From among those who have restated and

through the sciences.

more or less reconstructed the Demonstrative scheme I take some representative names.

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MOZLEY: Essays, 1878; University Sermons, 1876; Bampton Lectures, 1865

There are points in Mozley both of method and temperament which recall to mind a thinker who preceded him by nearly two hundred years, Samuel Clarke, to a degree which makes it doubtful whether Clarke should not be dealt with immediately before him. But, as will be seen, there is reason against placing Clarke in the Demonstrative School at all, while Mozley, in spite of those affinities, is within it.

Mozley's main pillar is Causality; but he relies also upon an à priori conception of Infinity as itself entitled to assent. Infinity is an idea which arises out of our own minds': and it corresponds to a reality: but how an idea arising out of our own mind is known to correspond with reality-which seems to be regarded as something not so arising-he does not show: he assumes it; he is a Realist. In illustrating his notion of Infinity he refers to Space; but when he comes to use it in reference to Causality it is Infinity of Time; and one cannot refrain from wondering whether if he had referred more closely to Infinity of Time at the outset, he would have had equal confidence in asserting that there is a 'reality' corresponding to our notion of Infinity. He acknowledges that Infinity is at times so difficult to grasp as to lead to scepticism, but with others it is a stay of Belief, and he instances Pascal as revelling in it in the latter sense.

This,

In Causation, he insists on the element of necessity. he points out, is supplied by the intellect: observation shows us only antecedence. Explanations of this necessary element may differ among those who accept it: Mozley takes it as primary, axiomatic. In cases where voluntary action is concerned the Cause becomes personal, is designated an Agent. A true cause is, he considers, an uncaused cause; any other is secondary: "the very idea of cause implies a stop, and wherever we stop is

the cause"; an infinite regress deals only with movement towards a cause, it does not touch the requirement to stop. He accepts this visible world as a sufficiently good startingpoint from which the application of Causality may be made, and the issue in God as Cause is demonstrative, i.e. he opposes to Kantian criticism the view that from the contingent reality of the world Intellect passes by Causality to transcendent truth.

With the Causal argument Mozley's proof of the existence of the Divine Being both begins and ends. This accomplished, he turns again to the world to seek for indications of Attributes.

The necessity for an adequate conception yields belief in Intelligence and Goodness: i.e. Personality. And from the presence of ideality in ourselves, we infer Perfection in Him.

Teleology now joins in: a subject to which Mozley devoted a scrutiny which was close and penetrating, but, unfortunately, incomplete. He insists that the Argument from Design is not invented or coined: adaptation, system, are part of what is observed; they adhere to the facts.' And, further, he will not accept the way of stating the argument merely as an inference by Analogy: it is direct and valid in itself: even if man had made nothing we should legitimately infer that some Purposive Agent made the world we see. But as he acknowledges that in the vast realm of the Plant-world he sees no 'End' except in relation to Animal life, nor in that except in relation to Man, we have a sufficiently empirical teleology. He recognises irregularities and anomalies, but claims that there is sufficient order in nature to refuse elimination and to give a backbone to teleology. As he does not himself require teleology as an argument for the existence of the Deity, this limited use of it affects only our inference as to His character, of course. the objection that if God be Infinite no adaptive design could be necessary he has a fine passage. With regard to Darwinism he is not unwilling to accept it and work it in as a substitute for previous presentations of the plan, provided that it be remembered that it does not displace plan' itself. Mozley's great defect is the absence of allowance for intrinsic ends, subordinate to the general plan; all ends except those of Man are represented by him as extrinsic, not only physical but also vegetable and animal: nature is regarded as mechanical apart from spirit. And yet it is expressly because teleology can interpret Nature

On

that he uses it to establish the Personality of the Supreme Cause.

But if Mozley's teleology is defective, a large credit must be given him for his restoring to high place the Argument from Beauty: a restoration all the more notable from his position in the very School which had most neglected it, and does so still. Beauty cannot be referred to the nature of the thing which has it, it is extrinsic to it, implying a mind which regards it and is impressed by it: it therefore carries contemplation away from the thing to its Creator: it is a potent factor in the Teleological argument, for him.

Taken as a whole, Mozley's contribution to Theism is disappointing. He writes with an appearance of rigour and a tone of assurance which again recall Clarke. But he makes serious mistakes e.g. Kant's position is quite misrepresented when he assimilates him to Clarke on Causality, and omits to record Kant's insistance that the application of Causality would only lead to antinomies.

In spite, too, of his apparent definiteness he is not quite easy about the absolute cogency of 'Demonstrative reasoning' for Theism. The confidence of Locke that no truth was more certainly demonstrated is not shared by one who attributes a still higher force to Mathematics. So that we are not surprised, after all, when we find that the conclusion is so stupendous that Reason is not wholly adequate to it, and some resort must be made to Faith. The fact is, Mozley himself was strongly affected by a consideration for which the Demonstrative School has never succeeded in making articulate provision, having indeed but seldom appreciated the call to do so, namely, that the Theism which Theology is concerned to justify must include Infinity. His contributions were, however, fragmentary. Had he devoted himself to the construction of a regular Theism he had gifts which might have enabled him to produce the representative nineteenth century scheme of this type.

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FLINT, R.: Theism, Baird Lectures, 1876

A course of lectures delivered by Dr. Flint has come into wide vogue which aims at being a general exposition rather than an original investigation like Mozley's, although original

thinking is not absent and the whole has been passed through the mind of the writer and is no mere compilation. But as a general exposition it has some obvious defects; it is far from comprehensive; it is not well balanced; and at some crucial points it is hesitating. Still, it is of interest as a late nineteenth century contribution to the Traditional scheme.

Dr. Flint takes up formally the composite source of Theological belief. Indeed here he improves upon Dr. Barry: better than the metaphor of the manifold cord of Dr. Barry is the organic unity' of Dr. Flint, each part separate and yet each contributing to the common result.

Yet the predominant note of Dr. Flint is the necessity for intellectual conviction. He rises to a rigour of demand for this which it would not be easy to match in recent years. If Feeling and Will are used without the Intellectual factor we are in sad case: "Unless there be such an object and unless it can be known"—this is the point-" all the feeling and willing involved in religion must be delusive"; and he sides wholly with Reason in its protest that independent operations of feeling and willing "must be of a kind which reason and duty command us to resist and suppress." This is a strong line as against the followers of Schleiermacher for example, and against those who insist on the Will-element as rightly leading us far beyond where Reason can take us. But Dr. Flint is uncompromising, "if God cannot be known, religion is merely a delusion or mental disease-its history is merely the history of a delusion or disease, and any science of it possible is merely a part of mental pathology."2 A penalty has to be paid for this preliminary exaggeration, however, as we shall find later on.

Dr. Flint had promised to appeal to the whole nature of man in 'organic unity-but as matter of fact we find the Esthetic basis omitted, and the Moral so treated as to leave a marked Intellectual colour over his whole scheme; which therefore reduces itself to the traditional Cosmology plus Teleology, and the Moral argument. In his exposition of Cosmology he meets the charge of abstractness brought against it by insisting on attention to the demonstration that the physical world has unmistakable marks of being an event, an effect, and by holding that the resort to an uncaused cause is necessitated by this aspect of the world and is not a supererogatory production of

abstraction-forming minds. He then turns to the mental world, and in the fact of personal Will he finds exemplified a kind of originating cause, and from this rises to the conception of a Personal First Cause as the only conception which men who themselves possess personal will are ever likely to be satisfied with placing at the head of all things. But the usual defect of this method appears here; it cannot be said that Dr. Flint does really accomplish more than conduct us to a First Cause in the old Deistic way.

Dr. Flint's treatment of Teleology agrees almost completely with Mozley's. He rejects the analogy form of the argument and fixes himself in the facts of order and adjustment and adaptations as his data. He will not allow purpose or design to be in the data; the argument is not from design but to it, he says. But from the ordered character of the world to an intelligence with purposes there is a direct inference, the only one which is rational. To knowledge of ultimate ends he makes no claim; such instances as we can find are too scanty to make it other than hazardous to set out a scheme; but he has a clear account of the assistance given by the advances of natural science in enlarging the orderly character of the universe. Dr. Flint's treatment will be regarded as an abandonment of the Teleological Argument by those who think that the absence of ends is not compensated for by insistance on order, and that his condemnation of analogy takes away what mankind in general

mean.

The Moral argument he states inferentially. Morality gives a concrete field yielded by observation, and supplying a basis for direct inference. He thinks it can be stated so as to suit any Ethical theory, but his own view, the Intuitional, of course lends itself most easily to his treatment. Moral Law, Duty, Responsibility, Crime, Guilt: these are concrete disclosures to human reason: then arises the question, Whose law is it? Where is the authority? Then laying down Butler's position that morality is a normal attribute of human life, and that the normal tendency of human affairs is to moral good, he defends Theism against objections arising from the fact that the tendency is often obstructed, or even is not evident at all.

The Arguments from Beauty and Feeling are not worked into the scheme.

Is there anything about à priori argument? A whole