has long since been dispensed with by the statute 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, s. 9.

Where the term is to commence in futuro without reference to any former lease.]-If the term is made to commence at some future day without reference to any pre-existing lease, it will then be reversionary, and confer no greater interest on the grantee than an interesse termini, until the day appointed from the commencement of the term actually arrives. So, a term which is to commence after the expiration or sooner determination of one existing, will be a lease in reversion: (Dean and Chapter of Westminster's case, Carth. 14.)

2. Certainty of Duration.

Notwithstanding the duration of the term must be certain, it is not necessary that such certainty should be limited in express terms only; as for example, to A. for a term of seven, fourteen, twenty-one, or any other number of years; for it may be defined by reference to some other certainty by which the duration of the term is to be ascertained; for if it has reference to an express certainty it will be sufficient; and hence it has been held that if a man, having a rent of 208. a-year issuing out of land, grant the same to another until he shall have received thereout the sum of 217., the grantee will have the rent for twenty-one years, which exact term it will require to produce the sum of 211. out of a yearly rent of 20s.: (Bishop of Bath's case, 6 Co. 35b.) And in like manner, if lands are leased to A. during the minority of B., the lease will be good for so many years as B. shall remain a minor; so that if B., at the date of the lease, be ten years old, the lease will be good for a term of eleven years, if B. shall so long live, whose minority would determine as well by his death as by his attaining his majority: (Boraston's case, 3 Co. 19 b.)

Term uncertain in the beginning may be rendered certain by matters ex post facto.]-A term, although uncertain in duration in the beginning, may nevertheless be rendered certain by matter ex post facto; as where a lease is granted for so many years as B. shall name, this term, although uncertain at the beginning, may be rendered certain by B. naming the years (Bishop of Bath's case, supra); still, this can only be done in the lifetime both of the lessor and lessee (ib.; and see Say v. Smith, Plow. 273); consequently, a

lease for so many years as the lessor's executors should name would be void, because no interest can pass out of the lessor during his lifetime, and after his death the naming of the years will come too late: (Savill v. Cordell, Godb. 24; Parry v. Allen, Cro. Eliz. 173.)

Where the term is limited for seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years.]-A term limited for seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years, as the lessee shall think proper, is not void for uncertainty, for it will operate as a certain lease for seven years at least, whatever may be its validity as to the other two eventual terms of fourteen and twenty-one years; and it seems that if the lessee continues in possession after the expiration of the seven years, the lease will then become good for the fourteen years, at the end of which time, should he still continue the possession, it will be good for the twenty-one years: (Ferguson v. Cornish, 2 Bur. 1032.)

3. Certainty of termination.

What will be a sufficient certainty of termination of term.] -The certainty of the termination of the term, like its commencement and duration, will be sufficient, whether it be positively certain, or be capable of being reduced to a certainty by some collateral determination before its expiration by effluxion of time; as, in the case of lands being leased to A. for a term of ninety-nine years, if B., or any other persons therein mentioned, should so long live; or for a term of seven, fourteen, or twenty-one years, upon either the lessor or the lessee giving the other six months', or some other previous, notice of an intention to determine the tenancy.

Practical suggestions.]-If the term is to commence from the date of the lease, the usual plan is to limit the premises to the lessee "henceforth" for the term thereby expressed to be granted: (see the form 1 Con. Prec., Part III., Section II., No. VI., clause 3, p. 498, 2nd edit.) If to commence from a day past, as the 29th day of September last, for instance, from that day for the full end and term to be thereby granted: (see the form 1 Con. Prec., Part III., Section II., No. V., clause 3, p. 494, 2nd edit.)

Where the term is determinable on lives.]-If a term of years is to be made determinable on lives, it must be granted for a stated number of years, as ninety-nine years, for in[P. C. vol. ii.]

2 z

stance, provided one or more persons therein named shall so long live; for there the utmost limit for which the term can endure is marked out with certainty, although it may be determined before by the happening of a collateral event, namely, the death of the lives before its regular expiration by effluxion of time, and consequently the limitation is good, upon the principle certum est quod certum reddi potest; but a term cannot be granted for so many years as A. B. may live, because, in the latter case, there is no certain limit to either its duration or termination: (Co. Litt. 45 b; Shep. Touch. 275.) In limiting a term of years determinable on lives, the limitation should be extended to the survivors and survivor of them, so as to prevent the possibility of any questions arising as to whether the term was only to endure during the joint lives of all the persons named, and to determine on the dropping of any one of such lives: (see the form 2 Con. Prec., Part III., Section II., No. VII., clause 3, p. 502.)

Where the term is limited for a life or lives, and afterwards for a term of years.]—It is a common practice in some parts of England, and also in the principality of Wales, to grant leases for lives with remainder to the same parties for a term of years (see a form of this kind, 1 Con. Prec., Part III., Section II., No. VII., p. 501, 2nd edit.) One of the objects in granting leases in this form has been to give the lessees a right of voting at the election of county members, which the freehold interest they take during the existence of the lives will confer upon them, whilst the term running at the same time gives them a certain and permanent interest in the lands; for it must be remembered that the term of years, although a lesser estate, will not merge in the freehold, in cases where the term is the more remote estate; for, in order that the merger may take place, the reversionary estate must, in contemplation of the law, be the larger one; hence, although an estate for years, however long in point of duration, will merge in a more remote estate for life, yet, if an estate for life be limited to one, with remainder to him for years, or if one who has an estate for life purchases a long term of years in the same property, the term will not become merged in the freehold, because, notwithstanding the estate for life is the larger one in legal contemplation, it is the preceding estate, and therefore both may well subsist together in the same person: (1 Hughes Pract. Sales, 407, 2nd edit.)

Where the lessor takes a limited or uncertain interest in the

premises.]-If the lessor takes a limited or uncertain interest in the demised premises, so that his estate therein may possibly determine before the expiration of the term in the lease by effluxion of time, as in the case of a lease for years granted by a tenant for life, the limitation of the term to the lessee should be qualified by inserting at the end of the clause, "provided the estate and interest of the said lessor in the said premises shall so long continue."

Where an underlease only is granted.]-Where an underlease only is granted, it is a common practice to limit the term to commence at a day earlier than the term created by the original lease, so that it may expire a day earlier, and thus leave a reversion in the present lessor: (see the form 1 Con. Prec., Part III., Section II., No. VIII., clause 5, p. 506, 2nd edit.)

How term may be limited so as to avoid a forfeiture of copyholds.]-When a copyholder, desirous of granting a lease, is unable to procure the lord's licence for that purpose, then, in order to carry out his intent as far as circumstances will permit, the practice has been to limit the copyhold premises to the lessee from thenceforth for the term of one year, and (if the custom, or the lord will grant a licence for the same to be so demised, and so that the same premises shall not become liable to be forfeited, but not otherwise) thenceforth from year to year for the term of seven years, or for what other term the premises were intended to be granted: (see the form 1 Con. Prec., Part III., Section II., No. XI., clause 3, p. 516.)

V. REDDENDUM.

Of the reddendum clause.]-It is important that the reddendum clause should be correctly penned, as an error in the reservation of the rent may cause it to become altogether inoperative, or partially to fail of effect. Hence, if a lessor, having a freehold interest, was to reserve the rent to himself and his executors (Sacheverall v. Frogate, 2 Wms. Saund. 361), or, being possessed of a term of years, was to make the reservation to himself and his heirs (Drake v. Monday, 1 Cro. Car. 207), without limiting it during the term, in either of these cases the rent would determine with his death; for the executors in the first case cannot have the rent, although they be named, not being the representatives of the lessor quoad the reversion to which the rent is annexed; and the

heirs cannot have it, because they are not named at all. In the second instance, the heir cannot claim it because he cannot succeed to the reversion, which is only a chattel; and the executors cannot have it, because there are no words to carry it to them. But if, in either case, the rent had been made payable during the term, it would then have devolved upon the party actually entitled to the reversion; and although, in the first instance, the executors could not have taken the rent, it would nevertheless have devolved upon the heir as incidental to his reversion; and, in the second instance, although the heir could not have had the rent, it must have accrued to the lessor's personal representatives as incidental to their reversionary interests. The safest plan, therefore, seems to be to reserve the rent generally during the term, without reserving it to any one in particular, in which case it will accrue to the persons, whoever they may be, who are entitled to the immediate reversion expectant thereon (see the form 1 Con. Prec., Part III., Section II., No. I., clause 4, p. 469.)

Where the lease is by mortgagor and mortgagee.]-But if the lease is granted by mortgagee and mortgagor, the latter being permitted to remain in possession of the mortgaged premises, a variation in the usual form of reddendum will become necessary, and the rent must be made payable to the mortgagee, his heirs or assigns, or his executors or administrators, according to the nature of the estate he takes in the premises, subject to such equity of redemption in such premises as the same are then liable to; and, in case of the redemption thereof, then rendering the said rents yearly and every year during the residue of the said term unto the said mortgagor, his heirs and assigns; and that subject to the proviso thereinafter contained with respect to the intermediate payment of such rent, and until determined by notice in manner thereinafter mentioned, the said rents shall be payable to the mortgagor: (see the form 1 Con. Prec., Part III., Section II., No. IX., clause 6, pp. 511, 512, 2nd edit.) To the above clause should then be added a proviso that the mortgagor shall receive rents until mortgagee shall give notice to the contrary to the tenants; followed by a declaration that the mortgagor's receipt shall be a sufficient discharge for such rent: (see the forms 1 Con. Prec., Part III., Section II., No. IX., clauses 6 and 7, p. 512, 2nd edit.) It will also be necessary to give the mortgagor a power to distrain for the rent which, for want of privity of estate between himself and the lessee, he would not otherwise possess: