No doctrine can be more suited to man, than this, which makes him acquainted with his twofold capacity of receiving and falling from grace, on account of the two-fold danger to which he is always exposed, either of despair on the one hand, or of pride on the other.

Philosophers never inspired men with sentiments proportioned to both these conditions. They either inculcated notions of unqualified dignity, which is not the true condition of man; or else of unqualified meanness, which is as little so as the former. We ought to feel a sense of our meanness, not as a character of our original nature, but the effect of repentance; not such as should lead us to continue in that meanness, but such as should make us aspire to greatness. We ought also to have a sense of our dignity, but of that which proceeds from grace, and not from merit, and which begins by humiliation,

No man is so happy as a real Christian; none so rational, so virtuous, so amiable. How little vanity does he feel when he believes himself united to God! How far is he from abjectness when he ranks himself with the worms of the earth!

Who then can refuse to believe or adore this heavenly light? For is it not clearer than the day, that we see and feel within ourselves indelible characters of excellence? And is it not

equally true, that we experience every hour the effects of our present deplorable condition? What else, therefore, does this chaos, this monstrous confusion in our nature proclaim, but the truth of this double state, and that with a voice so powerful, that it cannot be gainsaid.

IV.

IT IS NOT INCREDIBLE, THAT GOD SHOULD UNITE HIMSELF TO US.

THAT which renders men so reluctant to believe themselves capable of being united to God, is nothing else than a consciousness of their own degradation: yet, if this be sincere, let them pursue it as far as I have done; and let them confess, that our baseness is in reality such, as makes us unable, of ourselves, to discover whether his mercy can render us capable of an union with him or not. For I would gladly be informed, whence this creature, that acknowledges itself so weak, has obtained a right to limit the mercy of God, and to set such bounds to it as his fancy may suggest. Man knows so little of the divine essence, that he does not even know what he himself is; and yet, all confused as he is at the prospect of his

God cannot render him capable of communication with himself. But I would ask, whether God requires any thing of him except that he should know him, and love him; and why it is he believes God cannot make himself to be both known and loved by him, seeing he is naturally capable both of knowledge and love. [For no man can know otherwise than that he exists, and that there is something he loves. If, then, he sees any thing in his present state of darkness; and finds something on earth which engages his affection; why, if God should be pleased to impart some rays of his essence, should he be incapable of knowing and loving his divine Benefactor, according as he shall be pleased to reveal himself to him? There is, therefore, without doubt, an intolerable presumption in such reasonings as these, though founded on an apparent humility. But our humility can neither be rational, nor sincere, unless it makes us confess, that not knowing of ourselves what we are, we cannot learn it of any but God.]

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V.

THE PROPER SUBMISSION AND USE OF

REASON.

THE furthest stretch of reason is, to know that there is an infinite number of things which utterly surpass it; and it must be very feeble indeed, if it reach not so far as to know this.

It is fit we should know, how to doubt where we ought; to be confident where we ought; and to submit where we ought. He who is deficient in these respects, does not yet understand the powers of reason. Yet there are men who err against each of these principles: either, considering every thing as demonstrative, because they are unacquainted with the nature of demonstration; or, doubting of every thing, because they know not where they ought to submit; or, submitting to every thing, because they know not where they ought to judge.

If we oring down all things to reason, our religion will have nothing in it mysterious or supernatural. If we violate the principles of reason, our religion will be absurd and ridicu

Reason, says St. Austin, would never submit ; if it did not judge that, on some occasions, submission is its duty. It is but just therefore, that it should submit where it sees it ought to submit; and that it should not submit, where it judges upon good grounds it ought not to do it; but great care must be taken that we do not deceive ourselves.

Piety is different from superstition. To carry our piety to superstition is to destroy it. Heretical men reproach us with superstitious submission; and we should be guilty of the charge, if we required men to submit in things, which are not the proper matters for submission.

Nothing is so agreeable to reason, as disclaiming of reason in matters of faith: and nothing is so repugnant to reason, as the disuse of reason in things that are not matters of faith: the extremes are equally dangerous, whether we wholly exclude reason, or admit nothing but

reason.

Faith says many things, concerning which the senses are silent; but nothing, which the senses deny it is always above them, but never contrary to them.