possession only, the offence is LARCENY. Where the property is parted with, the offence is FALSE PRETENCES (see R. v. Moore, 1784, 1 Leach, 314; R. v. Russett, [1892] 2 Q. B. 312; R. v. Buckmaster, 1888, 20 Q. B. D. 182; R. v. Solomons, 1890, 17 Cox C. C. 93). Ringing the Changes consists in-(1) endeavouring by a trick to substitute a false coin for a genuine one tendered in payment (R. v. Franks, 1794, Leach, 644); (2) asking for change of a coin, and by appearing to alter one's mind, or by confusing the person giving the change, to get in change a larger amount than the coin or note actually given to be changed, or to get back the coin given to be changed and also to get the change. It is a form of larceny by a trick. See LARCENY. Rink. See PUBLIC ENTERTAINMENT. Riot.-"A riot" is a disturbance of the peace by three or more persons assembling together of their own authority with an intent mutually to assist one another against any who oppose them in the execution of some enterprise of a private nature, and afterwards actually execute the same in a violent and turbulent manner, to the terror of the people (R. v. Cunningham Graham, 1888, 16 Cox C. C. 420). It is immaterial whether the act done is unlawful or not, but there must be an act (R. v. Vincent, 1839, 9 Car. & P. 91; R. v. Neale, 1839, 9 Car. & P. 431). It differs (1) from an AFFRAY, which is merely a terrifying quarrel in a public place; (2) from an unlawful assembly, in that the latter may exist without any act (see ASSEMBLY, UNLAWFUL); (3) from a ROUT, in that the latter involves a mere commencement or setting out to do some unlawful act; and (4) from insurrection or levying war, which is TREASON. "When the rising or tumult is merely to accomplish some private purpose, e.g. the liberation of a particular prisoner, interesting only to those engaged in it, and not resisting or calling in question the King's authority or prerogative, the tumult, however numerous or outrageous the mob may be, is only a riot, and is not treason" (R. v. Hardie, 1820, 1 St. Tri. N. S. 623, 765; R. v. Gordon, 1781, 21 St. Tri. 644; R. v. Frost, 1839, 4 St. Tri. N. S. 98; and see TREASON). To constitute a riot five elements are necessary-(a) A number of persons not less than three; (b) a common purpose; (c) execution or inception of the execution of the common purpose; (d) an intent on the part of the number of persons to help one another by force if necessary against any person who may oppose them in the execution of the common purpose; (e) force or violence not merely used in and about the execution of the common purpose but displayed in such a manner as to alarm at least one person of reasonable firmness and courage (Field v. Receiver of Metropolitan Police, [1907] 2 K. B. 853). The common purpose, as already stated, must be "of a private nature" (vide ante). Riot is an indictable misdemeanor at common law, punishable by fine and imprisonment, with or without hard labour (3 Geo. IV. c. 114), or by requiring the offenders to give security for good behaviour, and to keep the peace. Under the Riot Act, 1716, 1 Geo. I. st. 2, c. 5, it is made felony for twelve or more persons who are unlawfully, riotously, and tumultuously assembled together to the disturbance of the public peace, so to continue together for an hour after being commanded to disperse by the sheriff or under-sheriff, or a justice, or the mayor of the borough, by reading correctly the following proclamation: Our sovereign lord the King chargeth and commandeth all persons being assembled immediately to disperse themselves, and peaceably to depart to their habitations or to their lawful business, upon the pains contained in the Act made in the first year of King George for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies. God Save the King. (1 Geo. I. st. 2, c. 5, ss. 1, 2; R. v. Child, 1830, 4 Car. & P. 442). The punishment is now penal servitude for life, or not less than three years, or imprisonment with or without hard labour for not over two years (54 & 55 Vict. c. 69, s. 1). Prosecutions under the Riot Act, 1716, must be within twelve (qu. lunar) months of the offence (1 Geo. I. st. 2, c. 5, s. 8). It is also a felony-(1) forcibly to prevent the reading of the Riot Proclamation; (2) to assemble after such prevention from reading the proclamation (1 Geo. I. st. 2, c. 5, s. 5); (3) riotously, unlawfully, and by force to demolish or begin to demolish a church or other building or machinery (24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 11; R. v. Howell, 1839, 3 St. Tri. N. S. 1087; Field v. Receiver of Metropolitan Police, ubi sup.). And it is a misdemeanor riotously to injure such buildings or machinery. Persons tried for the felony can be convicted of the misdemeanor (24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 12). There are also enactments prohibiting more than ten persons coming to present petitions to King or Parliament (13 Cha. II. st. 1, c. 5), and assemblies of more than fifty near the Houses of Parliament during the session (57 Geo. III. c. 19, s. 23). Certain provisions relating to riotous conduct by seamen and with reference to crews (11 Geo. II. c. 22; 33 Geo. III. c. 67; 36 Geo. III. c. 9) are now superseded by secs. 39, 40 of the Offences against the Person Act, 1861. See ASSAULT. The offence of riot is distinct from any other offences, such as assaults, theft, malicious damage, etc., committed in the course of the riot. The form of the Riot Act of 1716 has caused many persons to fall into the error of supposing that because the law allows one hour for the dispersion of a mob to whom the proclamation has been read by a magistrate, during that period the civil power and the King's subjects are bound to remain quiet and passive. The language of the Act does not warrant any such construction, nor could such have been the intention of the legislature. The civil authorities are left in possession of all the powers which the law had previously invested them; all peace officers may and ought to do all that in them lies towards the suppression of such meetings, and may command others to assist them; and by the common law, also, any private person may lawfully endeavour to oppose such disturbances by staying the persons engaged from executing their purpose, and by stopping others who are coming to join them; and all persons, even a private individual, may do anything, using force even to the last extremity, to prevent the commission of a felony. This statement of the law in a charge of Park, J., in 1831 (2 St. Tri. N. S. 1029), is supported by R. v. Gordon, 1781, 21 St. Tri. 485, and by a series of subsequent judicial rulings, especially in R. v. Pinney, 1832 3 St. Tri, N. S. 11. But the notion still persists, and led the Commissioners on the Featherstone Riots to recommend consolidation of the law in a clear form. Everyone is bound to aid in suppressing riotous assemblages. This, so far as the right of the citizen is concerned, is said to arise from the common law (case of Armes, 1597, Poph. 121; 79 E. R. 1227); but the obligation depends on statutes of 1411 (13 Hen. IV. c. 7) and 1414 (2 Hen. v. st. 1, c. 8). The degree of force which may be lawfully used in suppressing riots depends on the nature of each riot; for the force used must always be moderated and proportioned to the circumstances of the case, and to the end to be attained (but see 1 Geo. I. st. 2, c. 5, s. 4). The taking of life can only be justified-(1) by the necessity of protecting persons and property against various forms of violent crime; or (2) by the necessity of dispersing a riotous crowd which is dangerous unless dispersed; or (3) in the case of persons whose conduct has become felonious through disobedience to the provisions of the Riot Act, and who resist the attempt to disperse or apprehend them (Featherstone Inquiry Report, Parl. Pap. 1893-94, C. 7234). The jurisdiction and duties of justices over rioters rest upon the commissions of the peace and the statutes creating them (34 Edw. III. c. 1; 15 Rich. II. c. 2), and the Riot Act, 1716. The duties, etc., of the sheriffs, apart from questions of felony, rest on other early Acts (17 Rich. II. c. 8; 13 Hen. IV. c. 7; and 2 Hen. v. st. 1, c. 8). For failure in discharge of these duties the justices and sheriffs are indictable (13 Hen. IV. c. 7; 2 Hen. v. st. 1, c. 8; R. v. Pinney, 1832, 3 St. Tri. N. S. 11). With respect to persons under military law, the position appears to be thus correctly stated in the report on the Featherstone Riot (Parl. Pap. 1893-94, C. 7234):— "A soldier, for the purpose of establishing civil order, is only a citizen armed in a particular manner. He cannot, because he is a soldier, excuse himself, if, without necessity, he takes human life. A soldier can only act by using his arms. The weapons he carries are deadly. They cannot be employed at all without danger to life and limb, and in these days of improved rifles and perfected ammunition, without some risk of injuring distant and possibly innocent bystanders. To call for assistance against rioters from those who can only interfere on such grave conditions, ought, of course, to be the last expedient of the civil authorities; but when the call for help is made, and a necessity for assistance from the military has arisen, to refuse such assistance is in law a misdemeanor. The whole action of the military when once called in ought to be based on the principle of doing, and doing without fear, that which is absolutely necessary to prevent serious crime, and of exercising all care and skill with regard to what is done; and the presence of a magistrate, while expedient, is not in the least necessary to entitle the military to act, even by fire, to prevent felonious outrage or dangerous riot." The sheriffs and justices are entitled to call out the posse comitatus to suppress riots, or prevent apprehended riot, and special constables may be sworn in if required (1 & 2 Will. Iv. c. 41, s. 6). Provision is also made for obtaining the assistance of the regular army on requisition; or for calling out the local militia (52 Geo. III. c. 38, ss. 42, 92, 94), the reserve forces (44 & 45 Vict. c. 58, s. 176 (5)), or the yeomanry (44 Geo. III. c. 54, s. 23), and for adjourning poll at elections, or closing theatres (6 & 7 Vict. c. 68, s. 9) and public-houses (35 & 35 Vict. c. 93, ss. 23, 28), if a riot is feared or is proceeding. Under the Riot Damages Act, 1886, 59 & 60 Vict. c. 38, which superseded the old proceedings against the hundred, compensation may be obtained out of the local police rate (1) for injuries caused by rioters, and not covered by insurance, whether the riot takes place in a public place or on public grounds (Gunter v. Metropolitan Police Receiver, 1887, 53 J. P. 249. To recover under this Act it must be proved that a riot, in the full meaning of the term, took place (Field v. Receiver of Metropolitan Police, [1907] 2 K. B. 853). It is not necessary to prove felonious demolition as under the old law, see Drake v. Footit, 1881, 2 Q. B. D. 201); (2) for plundering, damaging, or destroying the hull or cargo of a ship in distress, wrecked, or stranded (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 515). The claims are preferred to the police authority for the district in accordance with Home Office Regulations (printed in the Metropolit an Police Guide, 4th ed. by Roberts, 1906, p. 139); and if not satisfactorily settled, may be recovered by action (49 & 50 Vict. c. 38). [Authorities.-Archb. Cr. Pl., 23rd ed.; Russell on Crimes, 6th ed.; Steph. Dig. Cr., 6th ed.; Featherstone Inquiry Report, 1893-94, C. 7234, Lord Bowen; Manual of Military Law (cxiii., by Lord Thring; Haycraft, Executive Powers of Police.] Riparian Owners.-The rights of riparian owners in rivers and streams are treated under the headings RIVERS, INTERNATIONAL; WATERWAY. Ritual primarily means a prescribed mode or order of conducting a religious service. The subjects in reference to which the term is used in English ecclesiastical law may be grouped as 1. The Decorations-(a) permanent, (b) temporary, of the Church. 2. The Ornaments of the Church. Here the word ornament has a technical sense. See ORNAMENTS RUBRIC. 3. The Ornaments of the Minister. This subject is treated separately under VESTMENTS. 4. Ceremonies. Sir R. Phillimore defines a ceremony as "a gesture or act preceding, accompanying, or following the utterance of words. 5. Rites. The same authority defines a rite as "a service expressed in words" (Martin v. Mackonochie, 1867, L. R. 2 Ad. & Ec. p. 116, at p. 135; In re Robinson, [1897] 1 Ch., at p. 96; Read v. Bishop of Lincoln, [1891] P., at p. 78). It is settled that the decisions of the Privy Council on questions of ritual, depending as they do upon the accuracy of conclusions as to historical facts, do not possess absolute finality, but are open to reconsideration on future occasions when further historical evidence has come to light (Read v. Bishop of Lincoln, [1892] A. C., at p. 655). Consequently it must be considered doubtful whether, if some of the points involved in the ritual decisions, and particularly those as to VESTMENTS, wafer bread, and INCENSE, hereinafter mentioned should again come up for consideration, the same result would be arrived at. 1. Permanent Decorations.-These include such things as sculptures, or paintings employed in decorating the pulpit, font or communion table, stained-glass windows, memorials of the dead. To legalise any addition to or alteration in the permanent fabric of a church, but not of a cathedral (Boyd v. Phillpotts, 1874, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec., at p. 351), a faculty is necessary, and a clergyman carrying out alterations on his own responsibility, or deviating from the plans sanctioned by a faculty, may involve himself in a criminal suit, and be made personally liable for the cost of the restoration of the church to its original or proper state (Lee v. Herne, 1892, Tristram Consistory, 217). However, if objects have been erected without a faculty, it is not competent for anyone to remove them on his own responsibility. A faculty for their removal must be obtained (Vincent v. Eyton, [1897] P. 1; Durst v. Masters, 1876, 1 P. D. 123, 373). A confirmatory faculty authorising the retention of objects erected without a faculty will sometimes be granted (Combe v. Edwards, 1877, 2 P. D. 354); [but it was said in Markham v. Shirebrook Overseers, [1906] P. 239, that an application for a confirmatory faculty for such a purpose cannot be regarded in any more favourable light than an application for a faculty for the first introduction into the church of the same objects; and further, that a confirmatory faculty will be refused unless there is sufficient evidence before the ordinary of a general desire on the part of the churchgoing parishioners for the retention of the ornaments in question]. The only restriction upon the employment of painting or sculpture for the decoration of the fabric appears to be that the objects represented must not necessarily inculcate an unlawful doctrine. But, inasmuch as the granting of a faculty is a matter of discretion and not of right, the Court may refuse it if there is a substantial danger of erroneous or superstitious views being fostered by the objects represented. Thus the introduction of the Cross architecturally, as distinguished from its ceremonial use, is lawful (Westerton v. Liddell, 1857, Moore's Special Rep., at pp. 161, 175; Bradford v. Fry, 1878, 4 P. D. 93), with the exception of crosses on the communion table (COMMUNION, HOLY). Similarly, images of saints, or sculptured representations, whether of personages or events, are not per se unlawful, nor is a crucifix unlawful if it is employed solely as an architectural decoration (Great Bardfield, [1897] P. 185; Barsham, [1896] P. 256). [See, however, Kensit v. Rector of St. Ethelburga, [1900] P. 80.] However, unless the ordinary is satisfied that there is no danger of superstitious reverence being paid to the figures represented (Art. 25), a faculty may be refused (St. Matthias, Richmond, [1897] P. 70; Timberhill, [1895] P. 71). The sanction is perhaps more easily obtained if what is proposed to be done is by way of restoration. On the other hand, it is more difficult to obtain sanction for decorations on a chancel screen or reredos than it would be for the same decorations elsewhere in the church. But see IMAGES IN CHURCHES. The principal cases on permanent decorations are Altar or Communion Table.-See COMMUNION, HOLY. Baldacchino held an unlawful ornament, and consequently illegal in White v. Bowron, 1873, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 207; but it seems doubtful whether it is an "ornament" at all. Chancel Gates.-Sanctioned in St. James, Norland, [1894] P. 526, and many other cases; refused in St. Andrew's, Romford, [1894] P. 220; St. Matthias, Richmond, [1897] P. 70, where most of the cases are collected. VOL. XIII. 2 |