Scotland.-R. Campbell. [James Macdonald, of the Scotch Bar.]

Scrutiny.-G. H. B. Kenrick.

Sea Fisheries.-G. G. Phillimore.

Seaman.-G. G. Phillimore.

Searches.-Cecil C. M. Dale. [Geoffrey Ellis.]

Search Warrant.-W. F. Craies.

Secretary of State.-J. P. Wallis. [Geoffrey Ellis.]

Security for Costs.-E. A. Wurtzburg.

Sedition; Seditious Words.-W. Blake Odgers, K.C.

Seduction.-W. F. Craies.

Service and Delivery.-F. A. Stringer, of the Central Office.

Service out of the Jurisdiction.-C. Burney, one of the Masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Set-off.-W. Bowstead.

*Settled Land Acts and Powers in Real Property Settlements.-J. S. Vaizey. (Forms by C. Johnston Edwards.)

*Settlements; Settlements of Property.-J. S. Vaizey. (Forms by C. Johnston Edwards.) Sewers, Commissioners of.-S. H. Leonard.

Seychelles.-Alexander Pulling.

Sheriff.-W. F. Craies.

Shipping Inquiries and Courts.-G. G. Phillimore.

Ship; Shipowners.-G. G. Phillimore.

Shop; Shop Regulation Acts.-W. Blake Odgers, K.C., and E. J. Naldrett.

Shorthand Notes.-C. Burney, one of the Masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Siam.—Alexander Pulling.

Sickness.-Patrick Evans. [Geoffrey Ellis.]

Sierra Leone.-Alexander Pulling.

Slaughter-house.-J. V. Vesey FitzGerald, K.C.

Slave Trade.-Sir Thomas Barclay, Knt. [G. H. B. Kenrick.]

Solemnisation of Marriage.-W. F. Craies.

Solicitor.-W. Blake Odgers, K.C., and E. A. Wurtzburg.

South Australia.--Alexander Pulling.

Southern Nigeria.-Alexander Pulling.

Sovereign.-G. H. Knott. [A. Wood Renton, Puisne Justice of the Supreme Court of Ceylon, and J. S. Henderson.]

Spain.-Alexander Pulling.

Speaker of the House of Commons.-Geoffrey Ellis.

Speaker of the House of Lords.-Geoffrey Ellis.

Special Case.-C. Burney, one of the Masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Special Indorsement.-F. A. Stringer, of the Central Office.

Specific Performance.-W. D. Rawlins, K.C., with the assistance of the Right Hon. Sir Edward Fry, sometime a Lord Justice of Appeal. [W. D. Rawlins, K.C.] Stamps; Stamp Duties.-F. W. Kingdon.

State.-Sir Thomas Barclay, Knt. [G. H. B. Kenrick.]

Statutory Order; Statutory Rules and Orders.--Alexander Pulling.

Stay of Proceedings.-W. Blake Odgers, K.C.

Stock Exchange.-G. H. Stutfield.

Stop Orders.-C. Burney, one of the Masters of the Supreme Court of Judicature.

Stoppage in Transitu.-W. Bowstead.

Straits Settlements.-Alexander Pulling.

Street.-J. V. Vesey Fitzgerald, K.C.

Striking Out.-F. A. Stringer, of the Central Office.

Subpoena.-F. A. Stringer, of the Central Office.

Sudan.-E. Bonham Carter.

*Sugar Bounties.-Geoffrey Ellis.

Summary Judgment under Order 14.-F. A. Stringer, of the Central Office.

Summary Jurisdiction.-W. F. Craies.

Support.-J. Laybourn Goddard. [N. G. L. Child.]

Supreme Court.-T. Snow. [Geoffrey Ellis.]

*Surname.-Geoffrey Ellis.

Surrender.-Edgar Foà.

Sweden. Alexander Pulling.

Switzerland.-Alexander Pulling.

Tacking.-W. F. Phillpotts. [C. Johnston Edwards.]

Tasmania.-Alexander Pulling.

ADDENDA AND ERRATA.

Vol.

I. p. 202, 1. 5 from foot, for "77" read "771."

Vol.

Vol.

1. 3 from foot, for "1 Q. B.," read “2 Q. B." III. p. 224, 1. 26, for "15 Q. B. D.," read "15 Q. B."

p. 225, 1. 45, for "L. R. 1 C. P. 592," read "L. R. 7 C. P. 592; affirmed, L. R. 8 C. P. 527."

p. 227, 1. 11, for "6 Rep. 596 b," read "6 Rep. 59 b."

1. 33, for "6 Ch. 732," read "L. R. 6 Ch. 732."

IV. p. 683, 1. 12, for “Vol. III., p. 486," read "ante, p. 65."

Vol. XIII. p. 145, 1. 36, for “ 4 Edw. vII. c. 8, s. 3,” read “4 Edw. vII. c. 8, s. 13." p. 424, add to Publication of Banns, a reference to Naval Marriages Act, 1908, 8 Edw. VII. c. 26, which comes into force on January 1, 1909, and permits the publication of banns of marriage of an officer, seaman, or marine, borne on the books of one of His Majesty's ships at sea, at morning service on board that ship.

ENCYCLOPÆDIA

OF

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

Revivor.-Under the former practice of the Court of Chancery, where a suit had become defective by the death, marriage, bankruptcy, or other transmission of interest of some or one of the parties, it was said to have abated, and in order to obtain the benefit of previous proceedings it was necessary to commence a fresh suit by filing what was termed a bill of revivor. This costly and dilatory procedure was considerably simplified by the provisions of the Chancery Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, under which, upon a suit becoming abated, an order to the effect of the usual order to revive, or of the usual supplemental decree was obtainable, of course, upon allegation of the facts rendering the application necessary (s. 52). The order under the section. was usually called "the common order."

In the Courts of common law the procedure was regulated by the provisions of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, under which, where it was necessary to revive a judgment by reason either of lapse of time, or of a change, by death or otherwise, of the parties entitled or liable to execution, the party alleging himself to be entitled to execution might either sue out a writ of revivor or apply to the Court or a judge for leave to enter a suggestion upon the roll, to the effect that it manifestly appeared to the Court that such party was entitled to have execution of the judgment and to issue execution thereon (ss. 129-131). The same statute (ss. 135-142) contained provisions as to the course to be followed in the case of death, marriage, or bankruptcy of any party to an action, pending proceedings.

The Rules under the Judicature Acts have greatly simplified the procedure in all the divisions of the Court.

By Order 17, r. 1, a cause or matter does not become abated by reason of the marriage, death, or bankruptcy of any of the parties, if the cause of action survives or continues, and does not become defective by the assignment, creation, or devolution of any estate or title pendente lite; and, whether the cause of action survives or not, there is no abatement by reason of the death of either party between the verdict or finding of the issues of fact and the judgment, but the judgment may in such case. be entered, notwithstanding the death.

The rule only applies where the cause of action survives or continues in some person who is before the Court (Jackson v. North-Eastern Rly. Co., 1877, 5 Ch. D. 844; Eldridge v. Burgess, 1878, 7 Ch. D. 411;

VOL. XIII.

1

In re Shephard, Atkins v. Shephard, 1889, 43 Ch. D. 131). And so, where a sole plaintiff or defendant dies, marries, or becomes bankrupt, the action becomes abated or defective (Eldridge v. Burgess, 1878, 7 Ch. D. 411). So, too, where one of several plaintiffs, each having a separate cause of action, dies (Arnison v. Smith, 1889, 40 Ch. D. 567). But where two of five defendants, jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff, had become bankrupt it was held that the action might proceed against the other three defendants, without bringing the trustees in bankruptcy of the two bankrupt defendants before the Court (Lloyd v. Dimmack, 1877, 7 Ch. D. 398).

As a rule actions of tort in respect of wrongs done to or by a deceased person in his lifetime, independent of contract, do not survive (Pulling v. Great Eastern Rly. Co., 1882, 9 Q. B. D. 110; Kirk v. Todd, 1882, 21 Ch. D. 484; In re Duncan, Terry and Sweeting, [1899] 1 Ch. 387; Hatchard v. Mège, 1887, 18 Q. B. D. 771; Finlay v. Chirney, 1887, 20 Q. B. D. 494; Phillips v. Homfray, 1883, 24 Ch. D. 439).

Where through a tort property of the plaintiff has been injuriously affected, the right of action survives (Twycross v. Grant, 1874, 4 C. P. D. 40; Hatchard v. Mège, 1887, 18 Q. B. D. 771; Oakey v. Dalton, 1887, 35 Ch. D. 700). And so, where the estate of a deceased tort-feasor has benefited by his wrong, an action can be continued against his representatives. See Phillips v. Homfray, 1883, 24 Ch. D. 439, where the rule was thus stated by Bowen, L.J.: "The only cases in which apart from questions of breach of contract, express or implied, a remedy for a wrongful act can be pursued against the estate of a deceased person who has done the act, appears to us to be those in which property or the proceeds or value of property belonging to another have been appropriated by the deceased person and added to his own estate or moneys. In such cases, whatever the original form of action, it is in substance brought to recover property or its proceeds or value, and by amendment could be made such in form as well as in substance. In such cases the action, though arising out of a wrongful act, does not die with the person.

Where the alleged cause of action arose out of a statutory duty to the deceased, it survives to his executors (Peebles v. Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council, [1896] 2 Q. B. 159). And the cause of action survives where the wrong committed by a deceased person amounted to a breach of contract (Batthyany v. Walford, 1887, 36 Ch. D. 269).

Order 17, r. 2, provides that in case of the marriage, death, or bankruptcy, or devolution of estate by operation of law, of any party to a cause or matter, the Court or a judge may, if it be deemed necessary for the complete settlement of all the questions involved, order that the husband, personal representative, trustee, or other successor in interest, if any, of such party be made a party, or be served with notice in such manner and form as by the rules prescribed, and on such terms as the Court or a judge shall think just, and shall make such order for the disposal of the cause or matter as may be just.

This rule only applies to cases where there is a transmissible interest. If the estate or title devolves on some one as representing the original party, the action may be revived, but there must be a devolution of the estate or title. Thus, where a husband who had obtained a decree nisi for dissolution of his marriage died before the time for making it absolute had arrived, it was held that the legal personal representative of the husband could not revive the suit for the purpose of applying