for whom he has an account open dies or becomes insolvent before the settling day (per Jessel, M.R., in Lacey v. Hill, 1874, L. R. 18 Eq., at 190; and Haas v. Durrant, [1900] 1 Ch. 209).

7. There is no reason for suggesting that a broker is a "del credere" agent, and, therefore, liable to his client on the default of the jobber (Gill v. Shepherd, 1902, 8 Com. Cas. 48).

[Authorities.-Stutfield's Rules and Usages of the Stock Exchange.]

Stock-in-trade.-This phrase would seem to include all chattels which a person has acquired for use in his trade, or for the purpose of sale or letting for hire. There appears to be no judicial definition of the term, but in Elliott v. Elliott, 1841, 9 Mee. & W. 23, an opinion was expressed by Parke, B., that a carriage in the testator's carriage factory, in process of being built to the order of a purchaser, fell within the term stock-in-trade; so in In re Richardson, Richardson v. Pilliner, 1881, 50 L. J. Ch. 488, it was decided that old barges accepted by a barge builder in part payment of new ones, and let out by him on hire, formed part of his stock-in-trade (see also Chapman v. Hayman, 1885, 1 T. L. R. 397).

Stolen Bill.-By the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 30 (2), every holder of a bill is prima facie deemed to be a holder in due course. If, however, the bill has been stolen, and that fact has been proved, then the onus is on the possessor to show that he gave value in good faith (Raphael v. Bank of England, 1855, 17 C. B. 161). So the person who has stolen a bill payable to the order of another is a wrongful possessor and not a holder within sec. 2 of the Act (Smith v. Union Bank, 1875, L. R. 10 Q. B. 295, 296). Such person has no rights and can create none (s. 24). If, therefore, the holder of a bill indorses it specially to another, but it is stolen before it reaches the other and is negotiated through a forged indorsement, the property in the bill remains in the holder (Arnold v. Cheque Bank, 1876, 1 C. P. D., at p. 584). To operate as a discharge, payment of a bill must be to the holder as defined by sec. 2, or to some person authorised on his behalf (s. 59); but see sec. 60 as to bankers paying cheques under forged indorsements. See also sec. 20 as to blank papers signed and delivered to be filled up by the deliveree. If a bill is left in its original form possibly a person taking bona fide for value and without notice may acquire a good title (Kinyon v. Wohlford, 1872, 10 Amer. R. 165; Ingham v. Primrose, 1859, 7 C. B. N. S. 82). But if a blank acceptance is stolen and then filled up as a bill, even a holder in due course cannot recover from the person from whom it was stolen (Baxendale v. Bennett, 1878, 3 Q. B. D. 525).

See also Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, [1905] 1 K. B. 677; Smith v. Prosser, [1907] 2 K. B. 735; Macbeth v. North and South Wales Bank, [1908] A. C. 137; and BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

Stolen Goods.-Where goods have been stolen, no property in them passes to the thief, and he cannot give to an innocent purchaser any title to such goods as against the original owner, except by a sale in MARKET OVERT (see 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 22).

As every larceny involves a trespass to goods, the appropriate action against the thief and his accessories was by action of trespass (see Wells v. Abrahams, 1872, L. R. 7 Q. B. 554). But inasmuch as the act was

felonious, it involved a forfeiture to the King of the felon's goods, which were taken as including those of which he became possessed by the felony (cp. 13 Edw. I. Stat. West. Sec. c. 34, as to goods stolen on elopement), and the true owner was punished if he recovered them by agreeing not to prosecute (see HUSH MONEY; THEFTBOTE). In 1538 (21 Hen. VIII. c. 11), to obviate this hardship on the original owner, it was provided that if he prosecuted to conviction, the property in his own goods should then revest in him, a provision which perfected his title not only against the thief, but against all the world, including purchasers in market overt. In 1861 the Larceny Act, c. 96, s. 100, extended the provision to property obtained, etc., by offences within that Act (including certain offences not amounting to larceny), but excepted offences by trustees, bankers, merchants, attorneys, factors, brokers, or other like agents intrusted with the possession of goods or documents of title to goods (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, ss. 77-84 as amended by the Larceny Act, 1901, 1 Edw. vII. c. 10; see R. v. Brockwell, 1905, 59 J. P. 376). This distinction is preserved by the terms of secs. 8, 9 of the Factors Act, 1889, and sec. 25 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893. In consequence of Bentley v. Vilmont, 1887, 12 App. Cas. 471, the law was restored to the position in which it stood in 1538 by sec. 24 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, which provides that where goods have been obtained by fraud or other wrongful means not amounting to larceny, the mere fact of conviction does not revest the property in the owner or his personal representative (R. v. Walker, 1907, 65 J. P. 729). But where goods obtained by fraud are in the possession of the offender on conviction, an order for their restitution may, it would seem, be made (R. v. George, 1905, 65 J. P. 729). The definition of goods in the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, is not so wide as that of property in the Larceny Act, 1861, and does not include money or "choses in action."

In most cases in which the property is obtained otherwise than by larceny, e.g. by forgery, false pretences, and the like, property as well as possession passes; and while the owner is in certain cases entitled to repudiate the contract and reclaim the goods, unless this has been effectually done before the resale, the person who obtained the property by fraud, and persons acquiring from him innocently, are protected against the original owner (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 23). In each case the questions arise, as whether the obtaining amounted to larceny by a trick or obtaining by fraud (see Oppenheimer v. Frazer, [1907] 2 K. B. 50), or whether the offender was a mercantile agent within the meaning of the Factors Act, 1889 (ibid.).

Where property revests on conviction, the Court of trial may award a writ of restitution, or an order for restitution in a summary manner of the goods, or the proceeds of sale (R. v. Central Criminal Court, 1886, 18 Q. B. D. 314; R. v. Mayor of London, 1869, L. R. 4 Q. B. 371), provided that the owner of the property, or his personal representative, has prosecuted, or where in the case of a public prosecution he has given reasonable assistance to the Crown (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 100; 42 & 43 Vict. c. 22, s. 7); the order is enforced by attachment (R. v. Wollez, 1860, 8 Cox C. C. 337); but it is not of absolute right (R. v. Ford, 1869, 11 Cox C. C. 320). But these writs or orders cannot be issued with reference to valuable securities where they have on good faith been paid or discharged without any reasonable cause to suspect that they had been obtained by crime (Chichester v. Hill, 1883, 52 L. J. Q. B. 160). The practice of stopping notices, etc., arises doubtless from this section; but

appears that a stopping notice cannot affect the title of a bond-fide holder of a negotiable instrument, even if it has been stolen. Under the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. vII. c. 23, s. 6, an appeal from a conviction suspends the operation of restitution order made, and the Appellate Court can vary the order. But this enactment does not give any right of appeal to the person against whom the order is made (R. v. Elliott, [1908] 2 K. B. 452). An order which gives restitution both of the goods stolen and of the price received for them by the thief would seem to be bad (R. v. London Justices, K. B. D., October 14, 1908).

Anciently, possession and property were easily confused; whence probably the rule as to revesting. The statute was in larceny cases unnecessary, except as an inducement to prosecute, as purchase in market overt alone could change the ownership of the stolen goods; and the rule applied, and applies, even in cases of larceny by a bailee (R. v. Macdonald, 1885, 15 Q. B. D. 323; Payne v. Wilson, [1895] 2 Q. B. 262), but not in cases of bailees under hire-purchase agreements where a contract, and not a mere option of sale, exists (Helby v. Matthews, [1895] A. C. 471); nor, it would seem, to bailees on sale or return where they have elected to purchase the goods by dealing with them in a manner precluding return (Kirkham v. Attenborough, [1897] 1 Q. B. 201).

A restitution order affects only the person possessed of the goods, whether as agent of the thief, or as purchaser or pledgee from him. It absolutely overrides any inchoate or possessory title in such persons; but, independently of its use as a summary means of restitution, it is unnecessary so far as common-law larceny is concerned, for the original owner's title to the goods is complete without it, and without the aid of the revesting provision (sec. 24 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893). Under the old system of pleading, and prior to 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23), the owner was, in the interest of public justice, precluded from suing to judgment before prosecution and conviction of the thief (Burn, Justice, 30th ed., vol. iii. p. 285). But this rule is now disregarded (see Wells v. Abrahams, 1872, L. R. 7 Q. B. 554; Osborn v. Gillett, 1873, L. R. 8 Ex. 88; A. v. B., 1889, 24 L. R. Ir. 235; Hargreave v. Spink, [1892] 1 Q. B. 25 ; Roscoe, Nisi Prius, 18th ed.), and the grounds on which it is rested are unsubstantial (see Pollock, Torts, 7th ed.).

Next must be considered what the exact position of the true owner is before conviction of the thief, with respect to innocent purchasers from the thief. According to Lord Watson (Bentley v. Vilmont, 1887, 12 App. Cas., at 479), it is a legal wrong to retake brevi manu before conviction from a person holding the goods under the thief; and Horwood v. Smith, 1788, 2 T. R. 750, there accepted as good law, is to the effect that a mesne possessor acquiring the goods innocently from the thief, and reselling before conviction, is under no liability in trover to the original owner.

The property revesting on conviction, no writ of restitution is necessary, and the owner can at once sue in trover any person who has them at the date of conviction, whether he bought in market overt or not (Golightly v. Reynolds, 1772, Lofft, 88; Scattergood v. Silvester, 1850, 15 Q. B. 506), to which the possessor has no defence whatever, and no counterclaim for any expense incurred by him with respect to the stolen property (Walker v. Matthews, 1882, 8 Q. B. D. 109).

But having regard to the common law, it is hard to see why the owner is not entitled to sue before conviction, to recover his goods from

any person in possession of them (except a purchaser in market overt); now that the obstacle created by "felony unprosecuted" is removed, and if the law is as held in Horwood v. Smith, supra, Hargreave v. Spink, supra, must be regarded as having been argued and decided on a wholly false basis.

What has been above said relates to Courts of Record with criminal jurisdiction. Courts of Summary Jurisdiction can exercise the powers given by sec. 100 of the Larceny Act, 1861, as to offences under that Act triable summarily either under that Act or by virtue of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 27 (3). And in cases of summary conviction (a) for knowingly pawning the property of another without his authority, or (b) for stealing or fraudulently taking goods afterwards pawned-the Court may order the pawnbroker to deliver them up to the owner, with or without requiring him to pay the sum lent according to the circumstances. This only applies where the pawning is for less than £10 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 93, ss. 10, 24, 30). In the Metropolitan Police District there is a similar provision without reference to value (2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, ss. 27, 28), which does not preclude resort to the enactments already referred to.

Where property has come into the possession of the police on a criminal charge, a Court of Summary Jurisdiction may order its delivery to the owner if ascertained (60 & 61 Vict. c. 30, s. 1); or its return to the accused person on whom it was found, if it be in the interests of justice (42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 44).

On conviction of an offence which involves larceny, the Court, if the accused has sold the property to an innocent purchaser, on restitution of the property to the owner, may order the price paid by the purchaser to be repaid to him out of any money found on the convict when arrested (30 & 31 Vict. c. 35, s. 9). This provision is in addition to that allowing compensation to a person injured by a felony (33 & 34 Vict. c. 23, 8. 4).

The provisions above dealt with include cases where the conviction is only for receiving stolen goods, or for embezzlement or larceny, etc., by parties and joint-owners.

Under the Metropolitan Police Courts Act, 1839, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 71, ss. 24-26, and the Larceny Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, ss. 14, 22, 35, 65, 66, 97, and 103, provision is made for examining people by whom property alleged to have been stolen has been received from the person accused, and for dealing with persons suspected of having or conveying stolen goods. As to search for such goods, see SEARCH WARRANT.

Advertising rewards for stolen goods on terms of not prosecuting is unlawful (see ADVERTISEMENTS FOR STOLEN PROPERTY; HUSH MONEY).

Stone.-Cut blocks of stone prepared for use as railway sleepers, although worth considerably more than unwrought stone of the same weight, were treated as "stone," and not as "merchandise," for the purposes of tollage in an Act which imposed tolls at different rates on stone and merchandise (Fisher v. Lee, 1840, 12 Ad. & E. 622; see also Dant v. Moore, 1863, 9 L. T. 381). In a legal document the word "minerals' prima facie includes every kind of stone (Macswinney, Mines, 3rd ed., p. 9).

Stop Orders.-Definition.-Where a party having an interest in a fund in Court has assigned or charged such interest, the assignee

or mortgagee can obtain an order preventing the fund being dealt with without notice to himself. Such an order is technically termed a stop order.

How obtained.-An application for a stop order was formerly made by petition, but for many years past it has been the practice to apply by summons at chambers (Wrench v. Wynne, 1869, 17 W. R. 198; Walsh v. Wason, 1874, 22 W. R. 676). Where, however, a fund exceeding £1000 has been paid into Court under the Trustee Relief Acts, or the Trustee Act, 1893, and it is desired to place a stop order on such fund, then, unless there has been some prior application to the Court with regard to it, a petition is still necessary for the purpose (In re Toogood's Trusts, 1887, 56 L. T. 703, following In re Day's Trusts, 1883, 49 L. T. 499). For forms of application, see Daniell's Chancery Forms, p. 840.

Service.-A person presenting a petition or issuing a summons for a stop order is not required to serve such petition or summons upon the parties to the cause or upon the persons interested in such parts of the fund as are not sought to be affected by the order (R. S. C., 1883, Order 46, r. 13, taken from Order 26, r. 3, of the Chancery Consolidated Orders).

Notwithstanding the terms of the above rule, the assignor, even though a party to the cause, must be served with the summons or petition (Parsons v. Groome, 1842, 4 Beav. 521; 49 E. R. 440). In practice, however, the assignor very constantly is a co-applicant. If unnecessary parties are served, the applicant may be ordered to pay their costs (Glazbrook v. Gillatt, 1846, 9 Beav. 611; 50 E. R. 480). All persons having already obtained stop orders on the fund must be served (Hulkes v. Day, 1840, 10 Sim. 41; 59 E. R. 527).

Evidence. The evidence in support of the application should show the title of the assignor, though it is not absolutely necessary to show the particular share of the fund to which he is entitled. The assignment must also be proved, unless the assignor appears and admits the execution of it (Wood v. Vincent, 1841, 4 Beav. 419; 49 E. R. 401; Quarman v. Williams, 1842, 5 Beav. 133; 49 E. R. 527; 59 R. R. 435).

Effect of Stop Order.-A stop order does not affect any right; and it is therefore unnecessary to specify that it is made without prejudice. All that is done is to prevent payment out of Court without notice to the party (Lucas v. Peacock, 1845, 9 Beav. 177; 50 E. R. 311). An order has been made even where the title to the fund was in dispute (Hawkesley v. Gowan, 1864, 12 W. R. 1100).

A stop order, however general in its terms, is confined in its operation to the specific portion of the fund in respect of a dealing with which it is made (Macleod v. Buchanan, 1864, 4 De G., J. & S. 265; 46 E. R. 921).

Where there are no funds in Court, and no order for bringing any funds into Court, an application for a stop order will not be entertained (Wellesley v. Mornington, 1862, 11 W. R. 17). But an order may be made in respect of a specified amount not actually paid into Court, but as to which an order has been made that it be paid in (Shaw v. Hudson, 1879, 48 L. J. Ch. 689).

It is no longer necessary, as a preliminary to obtaining a stop order on a fund in Court by a person who has a judgment in another Division of the High Court, that he should obtain a charging order in that Division (Hopewell v. Barnes, 1876, 1 Ch. D. 630; Shaw v. Hudson, 1879, 48 L. J. Ch. 689).