the Chancery Division is very considerable. In 1905 the number of sales was 309; in 1906 there were sales in 297 cases, the aggregate amounts realised being £859,069, 15s. 4d. and £1,068,219, 3s. 1d. respectively. In 1905 the sales took place in ten instances in the District Registries; in 1906 twelve sales were so conducted.

Sales by the Court may be effected either under its special statutory jurisdiction or under its general jurisdiction. Under the former head may be classed sales carried out under the powers conferred by the Settled Estates Act, 1877, 40 & 41 Vict. c. 18, and the Partition Acts, 1868, 31 & 32 Vict. c. 40, and 1876, 39 & 40 Vict. c. 17. Of the abovementioned statutes, the Settled Estates Act is now of comparatively slight importance, owing to the powers conferred on tenants for life by the Settled Land Acts. The subject of sales under the Partition Acts has been fully dealt with under the head of PARTITION, in Vol. X. of the present work.

For further information on the subject of sales under these statutes, the reader is referred to Dart on the Law of Vendors and Purchasers, 7th ed., ch. 18. This article will be confined to the subject of the sale of real estate by the Court under its general jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction vested in Chancery Division.-By the Judicature Act, 1873, s. 34 (3), all causes or matters for the purpose of the sale of real estates are assigned to the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice.

By Order 51, r. 1, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, it is provided that, if in any cause or matter relating to real estate it shall appear necessary or expedient that the real estate or any part thereof should be sold, the Court or a judge may order the same to be sold. This rule is in substitution for sec. 55 of the Chancery Procedure Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 86, which has been repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 49, s. 4. That section was confined to cases where a sale appeared to be necessary for the purposes of the suit, and gave power to the Court to direct a sale before the hearing in those cases only in which the Court could, under the old practice, have given such directions at the hearing (see Tulloch v. Tulloch, 1867, L. R. 3 Eq. 574; Mandeno v. Mandeno, 1853, Kay, App. ii.; 69 E. R. 311; Bell v. Turner, 1876, 2 Ch. D. 409; London and County Bank v. Dover, 1879, 11 Ch. D. 204). But though the rule is less restricted in its terms than the section, it does not give power to the Court to order a sale where it is not necessary for the purposes of the action, nor does it enable the Court to sell real estate in cases where before the rule it possessed no such power (In re Robinson, Pickard v. Wheater, 1885, 31 Ch. D. 247; see, too, Miles v. Jarvis, 1883, 50 L. T. 48). As to what is a cause or matter relating to the sale of real estate within the rule, see Staines v. Staines, 1886, 33 Ch. D. 172.

Jurisdiction in Foreclosure or Redemption Actions. In proceedings for foreclosure or redemption the power of the Court to order a sale of the mortgaged property has been extended by sec. 25 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41. Prior to that statute there was power under sec. 48 of the Chancery Procedure Act, 1852, to direct a sale at the hearing in a suit for foreclosure upon the request of the mortgagee, or of any subsequent incumbrancer, or of the mortgagor, or any person claiming under them respectively. There was, however, no jurisdiction to direct a sale on an interlocutory application before decree (London and County Banking Co. v. Dover, 1879, 11

Ch. D. 204); and by the express terms of the section, where the request for a sale was made by a subsequent incumbrancer or the mortgagor, the sale could not be directed without the consent of the mortgagee, unless a deposit was paid for the purpose of securing the performance of such terms as the Court might impose on the person making the request. By the Conveyancing Act, however (which repealed the prior enactment), the provisions for sale are extended to redemption actions, and any person entitled to redeem may have a judgment or order for sale instead of redemption (s. 25 (1)). Moreover, in any action, whether for foreclosure or for redemption, the Court may, on the request of the mortgagee, or of any person interested either in the mortgage money or in the equity of redemption, and notwithstanding the dissent of any other person, and notwithstanding that the mortgagee or any person so interested does not appear, and without allowing any time for redemption, or for payment of any mortgage money, direct a sale of the mortgaged property on such terms as it thinks fit, including deposit in Court of a reasonable sum fixed by the Court, to meet the expenses of sale, and to secure the performance of the terms (s. 25 (2)). In an action brought by a person interested in the right of redemption, and seeking a sale, the Court may, on the application of any defendant, direct the plaintiff to give such security for costs as the Court thinks fit, and may give the conduct of the sale to any defendant, and may give such directions as it thinks fit respecting the costs of the defendants or any of them (s. 25 (3)). The Court may direct a sale without previously determining the priorities of incumbrancers (s. 25 (4)).

Under the above section the Court can direct a sale at any stage of the action before foreclosure absolute (Union Bank of London v. Ingram, 1882, 20 Ch. D. 463; Woolley v. Colman, 1882, 21 Ch. D. 169; Weston v. Davidson, 1882, W. N. 28). As to the practice where the defendant does not appear, see Wade v. Wilson, 1882, 22 Ch. D. 235; South-Western District Bank v. Turner, 1882, 31 W. R. 113.

The discretion reposed in the Court by the section is to be exercised judicially (Merchant Banking Co. v. London and Hanseatic Bank, 1886, 55 L. J. Ch. 479; Provident Clerks Mutual Life Assurance Association v. Lewis, 1893, 67 L. T. 644; Brewer v. Square, [1892] 2 Ch. 111).

As to security for costs of the sale, see Woolley v. Colman, 1882, 21 Ch. D. 169; Weston v. Davidson, 1882, W. N. 28; Brewer v. Square, [1892] 2 Ch. 111; Cripps v. Wood, 1882, 51 L. J. Ch. 584. In Davies v. Wright, 1886, 32 Ch. D. 220, North, J., declined to order a mortgagor having conduct of the sale to give security for costs.

As to conduct of the sale, see Woolley v. Colman, 1882, 21 Ch. D. 169; Davies v. Wright, 1886, 32 Ch. D. 220; Brewer v. Square, [1892] 2.Ch. 111; Christy v. Van Tromp, 1886, W. N. 111; Norman v. Beaumont, 1893, W. N. 45.

Effect of Order for Sale.-An absolute order for sale properly made in an administration action operates as a conversion from the date of the order, and before the sale has actually taken place (Hyett v. Mekin, 1884, 25 Ch. D. 735); and so where the order is made in a partition action (In re Dodson, Yates v. Morton, 1908, 98 L. T. 395).

Mode of Sale.-In all cases where (inter alia) a sale is ordered, the Court or judge may with a view to avoiding expense or delay, or for other good reason, authorise the same to be carried out either by laying proposals before the judge at chambers for his sanction,

or by proceedings altogether out of Court, any money produced by the sale being paid into Court or to trustees or otherwise dealt with as the judge in chambers may direct. Before, however, proceedings altogether out of Court are sanctioned, the Court must be satisfied that all persons interested in the estate to be sold are before the Court, or are bound by the order for sale, and the order authorising the proceedings must be prefaced by a declaration that the judge is so satisfied, and a statement of the evidence on which such declaration is made (Order 51, r. 1A). As to the terms usually imposed where a sale is directed out of Court, see Pitt v. White, 1887, 57 L. T. 650; In re Stedman, Coombe v. Vincent, 1888, 58 L. T. 709. As a rule, however, a sale will not be directed to take place out of Court unless all parties are sui juris and consent. Experience has proved that, generally, better prices are obtained on a sale under the Court than on one by the parties out of Court (see observations of Chitty, J., in Strugnell v. Strugnell, 1884, 27 Ch. D. 258). In general directions will be given that the sale shall take place by public auction. There is, however, ample jurisdiction to dispose of the property in the method which appears most advantageous under the particular circumstances. Thus the Court will confirm a contract for sale to a private buyer if on the evidence it is satisfied that the price offered is as much as would be realised at a sale by auction. Where all parties interested are before the Court, and desire that method of sale, it may be directed to take place before the Master in chambers (Pemberton v. Barnes, 1872, L. R. 13 Eq. 349); or it may be effected by means of sealed tenders sent into chambers to be opened by the Master (Barlow v. Osborne, 1858, 6 H. L. 556; 10 E. R. 1412). Where the order for sale indicates a particular method of carrying it out, a fresh order is necessary before the property can be realised in any other manner (Berry v. Gibbons, Ex parte Lee, 1872, L. R. 15 Eq. 150). The sale may be ordered to take place in a district registry, but it is entirely within the discretion of the judge who tries the action to give directions on the subject, and his discretion will not be interfered with by the Court of Appeal (Macdonald v. Foster, 1877, 6 Ch. D. 193).

Sale in Actions by Debenture-Holders.-It is provided by Order 51, r. 1B, that in debenture-holders' actions, where the debenture-holders are entitled to a charge by virtue of the debentures, or of a trust-deed, or otherwise, and the plaintiff is suing on behalf of himself and other debenture-holders, and where the judge in person is of opinion that there must eventually be a sale, he may in his discretion direct a sale before judgment, and also after judgment, before all persons interested are ascertained, whether served or not.

The rule does not apply where the plaintiff is sole debenture-holder (Parkinson v. Wainwright, [1895] 64 L. J. Ch. 493).

A sale has been directed on motion for judgment, on admissions in the pleadings, on proof of insolvency, and jeopardy of the security; in such case an affidavit of the admitted allegations was required (In re Day and Night Advertising Co., [1900] 48 W. R. 362). But unless all the debenture-holders subsequent to the plaintiff are parties, the order will be for sale with the approbation of the judge, so that the absent debenture-holders may be brought in in chambers on the sale (In re Crigglestone Coal Co.; Stewart v. The Company, [1906] 1 Ch. 533). See further, DEBENTURE, Vol. IV.

Incumbrancers.-The common form of order for sale directs the

property to be sold free from the incumbrances of such of the incumbrancers as consent, and subject to the incumbrances of such as do not consent, and an inquiry is usually directed as to the incumbrancers and their priorities. An incumbrancer consenting to the sale will be paid his principal, interest, and costs out of the purchase-money of the property, subject to his charge in priority to the costs of the action (Hepworth v. Heslop, 1844, 3 Hare, 485; 67 E. R. 472; In re Mackinlay, Ward v. Mackinlay, 1864, 2 De G., J. & S. 358; 46 E. R. 414). He is entitled to interest for six months from the date of his consent, or up to the time of payment, if the sale takes place after the expiration of six months from such date (Day v. Day, 1862, 31 Beav. 270; 54 E. R. 1142). An incumbrancer who has consented to the sale is bound to facilitate it, and to produce the deeds of the property (Livesey v. Harding, 1839, 1 Beav. 343; 48 E. R. 972). See Daniell's Ch. Pr., p. 873. Under the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, in the case of the sale of land subject to any incumbrance, the Court may, on the application of any party to the sale, make provision for payment into Court of a sufficient sum to provide for the incumbrance, together with a sum not exceeding one-tenth of the amount to be paid in, to meet the contingency of further costs, expenses, and interest, and any other contingency, except depreciation of investments. Thereupon the Court may declare the land to be freed from the incumbrance, and make any order for conveyance, or vesting order proper to give effect to the sale, and give directions for the retention and investment of the money in Court (s. 5). See Patching v. Bull, 1882, 30 W. R. 244; Dickin v. Dickin, 1882, 30 W. R. 887; Milford Haven Rly. and Estate Co. v. Mowatt, 1884, 28 Ch. D. 402. The Court will not oblige a vendor to pay money under the section for the purpose of discharging an incumbrance, where to do so would inflict great hardship on him (In re Great Northern Rly. Co. and Sanderson, 1884, 25 Ch. D. 788).

Conduct of Sale.-In the case of a sale in an action for the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or for execution of the trusts of a written instrument, the conduct of the sale will be given to any executor, administrator, or trustee in whom the property is vested, unless the Court otherwise directs (Order 50, r. 10). In other cases it is ordinarily committed to the plaintiff or other party having carriage of the order (Knott v. Cottee, 1859, 27 Beav. 33; 54 E. R. 13); even though in a sale out of Court he would not be the proper person to conduct it (Dale v. Hamilton, 1853, 10 Hare, App. I. vii.; 68 E. R. 1116). In partition actions the conduct is almost invariably given to the plaintiff. But a party having leave to bid at the sale will not be intrusted with conduct of it (Domville v. Berrington, 1837, 2 Y. & C. 723; and see Sidny v. Ranger, 1841, 12 Sim. 118; 59 E. R. 1076). The Court has an absolute discretion in the matter, and will give the conduct to such one of the parties as in the interest of all it considers most suitable (Knott v. Cottee, 1859, 27 Beav. 33; 54 E. R. 13; Dixon v. Pyner, 1850, 7 Hare, 331; 68 E. R. 135). The Court of Appeal ought not to interfere with the discretion of the judge as to who is to have the conduct of a sale, unless there are some very extraordinary circumstances that require it to do so (per Cotton, L.J., In re Love, Hill v. Spurgeon, 1885, 29 Ch. D. p. 349). As to conduct of sale in actions for foreclosure or redemption, see Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 25 (2), (3); Woolley v. Colman, 1882, 21 Ch. D. 169; Davies v. Wright, 1886, 32 Ch. D. 220. In the event of all parties having liberty to bid,

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the Court will nominate some independent solicitor to conduct the sale, and in such case it is usual for the official solicitor to be appointed for the purpose (see OFFICIAL SOLICITOR). Where conduct is given to one party to the action, no other party is entitled to interfere in the sale without the leave of the Court (Dean v. Wilson, 1878, 10 Ch. D. 136). The solicitor of the party having conduct is, as between vendor and purchaser, considered agent for all parties to the action (Dalby v. Pullen, 1830, 1 Russ. & M. 296; 39 E. R. 114).

Particulars of Sale.-It is the duty of the solicitor for the party having conduct to prepare and bring into chambers the particulars of sale, showing the proposed method of lotting the property, and the incumbrances affecting each part thereof, and generally giving such information as is usual in the case of sales not under the direction of the Court. See PARTICULARS OF SALE.

Abstract of Title; Reference to Conveyancing Counsel.-Before any estate is put up for sale under a judgment or order an abstract of the title thereto must, unless otherwise directed, be laid before some conveyancing counsel approved by the Court or judge for his opinion thereon, to enable proper directions to be given respecting the conditions of sale, and other matters connected with the sale. A time for the delivery of the abstract to the purchaser or his solicitor is to be specified in the conditions of sale (Order 51, r. 2). As a rule, the abstract is directed to be submitted to one of the conveyancing counsel of the Court, as to whom, see Order 51, rr. 7-13, and see CONVEYANCING COUNSEL OF THE COURT. The rule (which is taken from sec. 56 of the Chancery Procedure Act, 1852) is not imperative but discretionary only (Gibson v. Woollard, 1854, 5 De G., M. & G. 835; 43 E. R. 1094). In addition to the ordinary conditions of sale (as to which see R. S. C., 1883, App. L, No. 15), the conveyancing counsel will prepare such special conditions as the state of the title renders necessary. He will see that the title is one which can be properly offered to a purchaser; for it is a rule with the Court that it will not knowingly pass off an absolutely bad title by the aid of special conditions (Hume v. Bentley, 1852, 5 De G. & Sm., p. 527; 64 E. R., p. 1228; Nunn v. Hancock, 1871, L. R. 6 Ch. 850; Else v. Else, 1871, L. R. 13 Eq. 196; Dart, p. 1164). "I think, where the sale is by the Court, the Court is bound to take more especial care, if possible, that there shall be nothing in the conditions or in the representations therein contained which by possibility can mislead a purchaser, because the purchaser has a right to assume that the Court will take very good care that there shall be nothing that can in any way mislead him as to the title he is getting (per Cotton, L.J., In re Banister, Broad v. Munton, 1879, 12 Ch. D. 150). In consequence of the rule above stated it is the practice, at any rate in some branches of the Court, upon an application to confirm a conditional contract not to do so absolutely in the first instance, but provisionally on the purchaser accepting the title, except where the contract has been settled by the conveyancing counsel, or the sale is under conditions which have been already approved and settled by him. This course has been found very convenient in practice, and avoids difficulties which might arise if it should turn out that a doubtful title is being forced on a purchaser. As between vendor and purchaser, the conveyancing counsel is treated as the agent of the vendor (In re Banister, Broad v. Munton, 1879, 12 Ch. D. 131). The conditions of sale having been prepared by the conveyancing counsel are finally settled by the Master, who will fix the time and place of sale, and direct what advertisements shall