forts of philofophers. The one placed body firft in the order of beings, and made the faculty of thinking depend thereupon, fuppofing that the principles of all things are corporeal: that body moft really or principally exifts, and all other things in a fecondary fenfe, and by virtue of that. Others, making all corporeal things to be dependent upon foul or mind, think this to exift in the first place and primary fenfe, and the being of bodies to be altogether derived from, and presuppose that of the mind. 264. Senfe and experience acquaint us, with the course and analogy of appearances or natural effects. Thought, reafon, intellect, introduce us into the knowledge of their caufes. Senfible appearances, though of a flowing, unftable, and uncertain nature, yet having first occupied the mind, they do by an early prevention, render the after task of thought more difficult and as they amufe the eyes and ears, and are more fuited to vulgar ufes and the mechanic arts of life, they easily obtain a preference, in the opinion of most men, to thofe fuperior principles, which are the later growth of the humane mind arrived to maturity and perfection, but, not affecting the corporeal fenfe, are thought to be fo far deficient in point of folidity and reality, fenfible and real to common apprehenfions being the same thing. Although it be certain, that the principles of fcience are neither objects of fenfe nor imagination; and that intellect and reafon are alone the fure guides to truth. 265. The successful curiofity of the prefent age, in arts and experiments and new fyftems, is apt to elate men, and make them overlook the ancients. But notwithstanding that the encouragement and purfe of princes, and the united endeavours of great focieties in these later ages, have extended experi mental mental and mechanical knowledge very far, yet it must be owned, that the ancients too were not ignorant of many things (e), as well in phyfics as metaphyfics, which perhaps are more generally, though not first known in thefe modern times. 266. The Pythagoreans and Platonifts had a notion of the true fyftem of the world. They allowed of mechanical principles, but actuated by foul or mind: they diftinguished the primary qualities in bodies from the fecondary, making the former to be phyfical causes, and they understood physical caufes in a right fenfe: they faw that a mind infinite in power, unextended, invifible, immortal, governed, connected and contained all things: they faw there was no fuch thing as real abfolute space: that mind, foul or fpirit, truly and really exists: that bodies exist only in a fecondary and dependent fenfe that the foul is the place of forms: that the fenfible qualities are to be regarded as acts only in the cause, and as paffions in us: they accurately confidered the differences of intellect, rational foul, and fenfitive foul, with their distinct acts of intellection, reasoning, and fenfation, points wherein the Cartefians and their followers, who confider fenfation as a mode of thinking, feem to have failed. They knew there was a fubtil æther pervading the whole mafs of corporeal beings, and which was felf actually moved and directed by a mind and that phyfical caufes were only inftruments, or rather marks and figns. 267. Thofe ancient philofophers understood the generation of animals to confift, in the unfolding and diftending of the minute imperceptible parts of pre-existing animalcules, which paffeth for a modern discovery: this they took for the work of nature, but (e) 166, 167, 168, 241, 242, s. nature nature animate and intelligent (f): they understood that all things were alive and in motion: they fuppofed a concord and difcord, union and difunion in particles, fome attracting, others repelling each other and that thofe attractions and repulfions, fo various, regular, and useful, could not be accounted for, but by an intelligence presiding and directing all particular motions, for the confervation and benefit of the whole. 268. The Egyptians, who imperfonated nature, had made her a diftinct principle, and even deified her under the name of Ifis. But Ofiris was underftood to be mind or reafon, chief and fovereign of all. Ofiris, if we may believe Plutarch, was the first, pure, unmixed and holy principle, not difcernible by the lower faculties; a glympfe whereof like lightening darting forth, irradiates the underftanding; with regard to which Plutarch adds, that Plato and Aristotle termed one part of philofophy iolaxov; to wit, when having foared above common mixed objects, and got beyond the precincts of fenfe and opinion, they arrive to contemplate the first and most fimple being, free from all matter and compofition. This is that soía Tws ra ἐσία ὄντως σα of Plato, which employeth mind alone; which alone governs the world, and the foul is that which. immediately informs and animates nature. 269. Although the Ægyptians did fymbolically represent the fupreme divinity fitting on a lotus, and that gefture has been interpreted to fignify the most holy and venerable being to be utterly at reft repofing within himfelf; yet, for any thing that appears, this gefture might denote dignity as well as repofe. And it cannot be denied,, that Jamblicus, fo knowing in the Ægyptian notions, taught there was an intellect that proceeded to ge neration, drawing forth the latent powers into light in the formation of things. Nor was this to be understood of an external world, fubfifting in real abfolute space: For it was a doctrine of thofe antient fages, that foul was the place of forms, as may be seen in the twelfth book of the arcane part of divine wisdom, according to the Ægyptians. This notion was embraced by divers philofophers of Greece, who may be fuppofed to have derived it from the fame fource from whence many of their other opinions were drawn. 270. The doctrine of real abfolute external fpace, induced fome modern philofophers to conclude it was a part or attribute of God, or that God himself was fpace; inafmuch as incommunicable attributes of the Deity appeared to agree thereto, such as infinity, immutability, indivifibility, incorporeity, being uncreated, impaffive, without beginning or ending; not confidering that all these negative properties may belong to nothing. For nothing hath no limits, cannot be moved or changed, or divided, is neither created nor destroyed. A different way of thinking appears in the Hermaic as well as other writings of the ancients. With regard to abfolute fpace, it is obferved in the Afclepian dialogue, that the word Space or Place hath by it felf no meaning; and again, that it is impoffible to understand what space alone or pure space is. And Plotinus acknowledgeth no place but foul or mind, exprefly affirming that the foul is not in the world, but the world in the foul. And farther, the place of the foul, faith he, is not body, but foul is in mind, and body in foul. See the third chapter of the fifth book of the fifth Ennead. 271. Concerning abfolute space, that phantome of the mechanic and geometrical philofophers (b), it may fuffice to obferve, that it is neither perceived by any fenfe, nor proved by any reafon, and was accordingly treated by the greatest of the ancients as a thing merely vifionary. From the notion of abfolute space fprings that of abfolute motion *; and in these are ultimately founded the notions of external exiftence, independence, neceffity, and fate. Which fate, the idol of many moderns, was by old philofophers differently underftood, and in fuch a fenfe, as not to destroy the αυτεξέσιον of God or man. Parmenides, who thought all things to be made by neceffity or fate, understood justice and providence to be the fame with fate; which, how fixed and cogent foever with refpect to man, may yet be voluntary with refpect to God. Empedocles declared fate to be a caufe ufing principles and elements. Heraclitus taught that fate was the general reason that runs through the whole nature of the univerfe; which nature he fuppofed to be an æthereal body, the feed of the generation of all things., Plato held fate to be the eternal reafon or law of nature. Chryfippus fuppofed that fate was a fpiritual power which difpofed the world in order; that it was the reafon and law of thofe things which are adminiftred by providence. (b) 250. Our judgment in these matters is not to be over-born by a prefumed evidence of mathematical notions and reafonings, fince it is plain, the mathematicians of this age embrace obfcure notions, and uncertain opinions, and are puzzled about them, contradicting each other and difputing like other men: witness their doctrine of fluxions, about which, within these ten years, I have feen published about twenty tracts and differtations, whose authors being utterly at variance, and inconfiftent with each other, inftruct by-ftanders what to think of their pretenfions to evidence. 272. All |