Page images
PDF
EPUB

272. All the foregoing notions of fate, as reprefented by Plutarch, plainly fhew that those antient philofophers did not mean by fate a blind, head-long, unintelligent principle, but an orderly fettled courfe of things conducted by a wife and provident mind. And as for the Ægyptian doctrine, it is indeed afferted in the Pimander, that all things are produced by fate. But Jamblichus, who drew his notions from Egypt, affirms, that the whole of things is not bound up in fate; but that there is a principle of the foul higher than nature, whereby we may be raifed to an union with the gods, and exempt our felves from fate. And in the Afclepian dialogue it is exprefly faid, that fate follows the decrees of God. And indeed, as all the motions in nature are evidently the product of reafon (c), it fhould feem there is no room for neceffity, in any other fenfe than that of a fteddy regular courfe.

273. Blind fate and blind chance are at bottom much the fame thing, and one no more intelligible than the other. Such is the mutual relation, connection, motion, and fympathy of the parts of this world, that they feem as it were animated and held together by one foul and fuch is their harmony, order, and regular courfe, as fheweth the foul to be governed and directed by a mind. It was an opinion of remote antiquity that the world was an animal (d). If we may truft the Hermaic writings, the Ægyptians thought all things did partake of life. This opinion was alfo fo general and current among the Greeks, that Plutarch afferts all others held the world to be an animal, and govern ed by providence, except Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. And although an animal, contain (d) 153, 172,

(c) 154.

R 2

ing

[ocr errors]

ing all bodies within it felf, could not be touched or fenfibly affected from without; yet it is plain they attributed to it an inward fenfe and feeling, as well as appetites and averfions; and that from all the various tones, actions, and paffions of the univerfe, they fuppofed one fymphony, one animal act and life to refult.

274. Jamblichus declares the world to be one animal, in which the parts however diftant each from other, are nevertheless related and connected by one common nature. And he teacheth, what is also a received notion of the Pythagoreans and Platonics that there is no chafm in nature, but a chain or scale of beings rifing by gentle uninterrupted gradations from the lowest to the higheft, each nature being informed and perfected by the participation of a higher. As air becomes igneous, fo the pureft fire becomes animal, and the animal foul becomes intellectual, which is to be understood not of the change of one nature into another, but of the connection of different natures, each lower nature being, according to thofe philofophers, as it were a receptable or fubject for the next above it to refide and act in.

275. It is alfo the doctrine of Platonic philofophers, that intellect is the very life of living things, the first principle and exemplar of all, from whence by different degrees are derived the inferior claffes of life; firft the rational, then the fenfitive, after that the vegetal, but fo as in the rational animal there is ftill fomewhat intellectual, again in the fenfitive there is fomewhat rational, and in the vegetal fomewhat fenfitive, and laftly in mixt bodies, as metals and mineral, fomewhat of vegetation: By which means the whole is thought to be more perfectly connected. Which doctrine

doctrine implies that all the faculties, instincts, and motions of inferior beings, in their feveral refpective fubordinations, are derived from, and depend upon mind and intellect.

276. Both Stoics and Platonics held the world to be alive, though fometimes it be mentioned as a fentient animal, fometimes as a plant or vegetable. But in this, notwithstanding what hath been furmised by fome learned men, there feems to be no atheism. For fo long as the world is fuppofed to be quickened by elementary fire or fpirit, which is it felf animated by foul, and directed by underftanding, it follows that all parts thereof originally depend upon, and may be reduced unto, the fame indivifible ftem or principle, to wit, a fupreme mind; which is the concurrent doctrine of Pythagoræans, Platonics, and Stoics.

277. There is according to thofe philofophers a life infufed throughout all things: the wug voegov, ug Texvxv, an intellectual and artificial fire (e), an inward principle, animal fpirit, or natural life producing and forming within as art doth without, regulating, moderating and reconciling the various motions, qualities and parts of this mundane fyftem. By virtue of this life the great maffes are held together in their orderly courfes, as well as the minuteft particles governed in their natural motions, according to the several laws of attraction, gravity, electricity, magnetism, and the reft. It is this gives inftincts, teaches the fpider her web, and the bee her honey. This it is that directs the roots of plants to draw forth juices from the earth, and the leaves and cortical veffels to separate and attract fuch particles of air, and elementary fire, as fuit their respective natures.

278. Nature feems to be not otherwise diftin(e) 166, 168, 174, 175, &c.

guished

1

guished from the anima mundi, than as life is from foul, and, upon the principles of the oldeft philofophers, may not improperly or incongruoufly be ftyled the life of the world. Some Platonics indeed, regard life as the act of nature, in like manner as intellection is of the mind or intellect. As the first intellect acts by understanding, fo nature according to them acts or generates by living. But life is the act of the foul, and feems to be very nature it felf, which is not the principle, but the refult of another, and higher principle, being a lite refulting from foul, as cogitation from intellect.

279. If nature be the life of the world, animated by one foul, compacted into one frame, and directed or governed in all parts by one mind: This system cannot be accused of atheifin; tho' perhaps it may of mistake or impropriety. And yet, as one prefiding mind gives unity to the infinite aggregate of things, by a mutual communion of actions and paffions, and an adjustment of parts, caufing all to concur in one view to one and the fame end, the ultimate and fupreme good of the whole, it should feem reasonable to fay, with Ocellus Lucanus the Pythagorean, that as life holds together the bodies of animals, the cause whereof is the foul; and as a city is held together by concord, the cause whereof is law; even fo the world is held together by harmony, the caufe whereof is God. And in this fenfe, the world or univerfe may be confidered either as one animal (f) or one city.

280. Aristotle difapproves the opinion of those who hold a foul to be diffused throughout the world; and for this reason, because the elements are not alive. Tho' perhaps it may not be easy to prove, that blood and animal spirit are more alive in iman, than water and fire in the world. That phi(f) 172, 277.

lofopher,

lofopher, in his books of the foul, remarks upon an opinion fet forth in the Orphics, of the foul's entering from the univerfe into living creatures being born by winds, that this cannot be true of plants or of certain animals which do not breath. But air veffels are by later experiments allowed to be found in all plants and animals. And air may in fome fort not improperly be faid, to be the carrier or vehicle of the foul, inafmuch as it is the vehicle of fire, which is the fpirit immediately moved and animated by the foul (g).

281. The living fire, the living omniform feminary of the world, and other expreffions of the like nature occurring in the ancient and Platonic philofophy, how can they be understood exclufive of light or elemental fire, the particles of which are known to be heterogeneous, and, for ought we know, may fome of them be organized, and, notwithstanding their wonderful minuteness, contain original feeds which, being formed and fown in a proper matrix, do gradually unfold and manifeft themselves, ftill growing to a juft proportion of the fpecies.

282. May not this æthereal feminary, confiftently with the notions of that philofophy, which afcribed much of generation to celeftial influence, be fuppofed to impregnate plants and animals with the first principles, the ftamina, or those animalcules which Piato, in his Timæus, faith are invifible for their smallness, but, being fown in a proper matrix, are therein gradually diftended and explicated by nourishment, and at length the animals brought forth to light. Which notion hath been revived and received of late years by many, who perhaps are not aware of it's antiquity, or that it was to be found in Plato. Timæus Locrenfis in

(g) 163, 171.

« EelmineJätka »