his book of the foul of the world, fuppofeth even fouls to be derived from the celeftial luminaries, excepting only the rational or intellectual part. But what influence or influx is there from the celestial bodies, which hath not light for it's vehicle (a)?

283. What other nature there fhould be intermediate between the foul of the world (b) and this grofs corporeal fyftem, which might be the vehicle of life, or, to use the language of philofophers, might receive or be impreffed with the forms of things, is difficult to comprehend. It is a vulgar remark, that the works of art do not bear a nice microscopical infpection, but the more helps are used, and the more nicely you pry into natural productions, the more do you discover of the fine mechanifm of nature, which is endless or inexhaustible; new and other parts, more fubtile and delicate than the precedent, ftill continuing to offer themfelves to view. And thefe microscopical obfervations have confirmed the ancient theory concerning generation, delivered in the Timæus of Plato. But that theory or hypothefis, how agreeable foever to modern discoveries, is not alone fufficient to explain the phænomena, without the immediate action of a mind. And Ficinus, notwithstanding what himself and other Platonics fay of a plastic nature, is obliged to own, that with the mundane force or foul it is to be underftood there is joined an intelligence, upon which the feminal nature conftantly depends, and by which it is governed.

284. Alcinous, in his tract of the doctrine of Plato, faith that God hath given the world both mind and foul: others include both in the word foul, and fuppofe the foul of the world to be God. (b) 171.

(a) 43.

Philo appears to be of this opinion in feveral parts. of his writings. And Virgil, who was no stranger to the Pythagorean and Platonic tenets writes to the fame purpose.

Deum namque ire per omnes Terrafque tractufque maris coelumque profundum.

Hinc pecudes armenta, viros, genus omne fe

rarum,

Quemque fibi tenues nafcentem arceffere vitas. Thus much the fchools of Plato and Pythagoras feem agreed in, to wit, that the foul of the world (b) whether having a diftinct mind of its own, or directed by a fuperior mind (c) doth embrace all it's parts, connect them by an invifible and indiffoluble chain, and preferve them ever well adjufted, and in good order.

285. Naturalifts, whofe proper province it is to confider phænomena, experiments, mechanical organs and motions, principally regard the vi fible frame of things or corporeal world, fuppofing foul to be contained in body. And this hypothefis may be tolerated in phyfics, as it is not neceffary in the arts of dyalling or navigation to mention the true system or earth's motion. But thofe who, not content with fenfible appearances, would penetrate into the real and true caufes (the object of theology, metaphyfics, or the philofophia prima) will rectify this error, and fpeak of the world as contained by the foul, and not the foul by the world.

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286. Ariftotle hath obferved there were indeed fome who thought fo grofly, as to fuppofe the universe to be one only corporeal and extended nature but in the firft book of his Metaphy--`

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(6) 153, 172.

(c) 154, 279

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fics

fics he justly remarks they were guilty of a great mi ftake; forafmuch as they took into their account the elements of corporeal beings alone; whereas there are incorporeal beings alfo in the univerfe; and while they attempted to affign the causes of generation and corruption, and account for the nature of all things, they did at the fame time destroy the very cause of motion.

287. It is a doctrine among other speculations contained in the Hermaic writings, that all things are one. And it is not improbable that Orpheus, Parmenides, and others among the Greeks, might have derived their notion of To U, THE ONE, from Egypt. Tho' that fubtil metaphyfician Parmenides,, in his doctrine of visus, feems to have added fomething of his own. If we fuppofe, that one and the fame mind is the univerfal principle of order and harmony throughout the world, containing and connecting all it's parts, and giving unity to the fyftem, there feems to be nothing atheistical or impious in this fuppofition.

288. Number is no object of fense: it is an act of the mind. The fame thing in a different conception is one or many. Comprehending God and the creatures in one general notion, we may fay that all things together make one universe, or TÒ wav. But if we fhould fay, that all things make one God; this would, indeed, be an erroneous notion of God, but would not amount to atheism, fo long as mind or intellect was admitted to be the To nyeμovinov, the governing part. It is neverthelefs more refpectful, and confequently the truer notion of God, to fuppofe him neither made up of parts, nor to be himself a part of any whole whatfoever.

289. All thofe, who conceived the universe to be an animal, muft in confequence of that notion,

suppose

fuppofe all things to be one.

But to conceive God

to be the fentient foul of an animal, is altogether unworthy and abfurd. There is no fenfe, nor fenfory, nor any thing like a fense or sensory in God. Senfe implies an impreffion from fome other being, and denotes a dependence in the foul which hath it. Senfe is a paffion; and paffions imply imperfection. God knoweth all things, as pure mind or intellect, but nothing by fenfe, nor in nor through a fenfory. Therefore to fuppofe a fenfory of any kind, whether space or any other, in God would be very wrong, and lead us into falfe conceptions of his nature. The prefuming there was fuch a thing as real abfolute uncreated space, seems to have occafioned that modern mistake. But this prefumption was without grounds.

290. Body is oppofite to fpirit or mind. We have a notion of fpirit from thought and action. We have a notion of body from refiftance. So far forth as there is real power, there is fpirit. So far forth as there is refiftance, there is inability or want of power. That is, there is a negation of fpirit. We are embodied, that is, we are clogged by weight, and hindered by resistance. But in refpect of a perfect fpirit, there is nothing hard or impenetrable: there is no refiftance to the Deity: Nor hath he any body: nor is the fupreme being united to the world, as the foul of an animal is to it's body, which neceffarily implieth defect, both as an instrument, and as a conftant weight and impediment.

291. Thus much it confifts with piety to fay, that a divine agent doth by his virtue permeate and govern the elementary fire or light (d), which serves as an animal spirit to enliven and actuate the (d) 157, 172.

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whole

whole mafs, and all the members of this visible world. Nor is this doctrine lefs philofophical than pious. We fee all nature alive or in motion. We fee water turned into air, and air rarified and made elaftic (e) by the attraction of another medium, more pure indeed, more fubtil, and more volatile than air. But ftill, as this is a moveable extended, and, confequently, a corporeal being (f), it cannot be itself the principle of motion, but leads us naturally and neceffarily to an incorporeal spirit or agent. We are confcious that a fpirit can begin, alter, or determine motion, but nothing of this appears in body. Nay the contrary is evident, both to experiment and reflection.

292. Natural phænomena are only natural appearances. They are, therefore, fuch as we fee and perceive them. Their real and objective natures are, therefore, the fame; paffive without any thing active, fluent and changing without any thing permanent in them. However, as thefe make the first impreffions, and the mind takes her first flight and fpring, as it were, by refting her foot on thefe objects, they are not only firft confidered by all men, but moft confidered by moft men. They and the phantomes that refult from those appearances, the children of imagination grafted upon fenfe, fuch for example as pure space (i) are thought by many the very firft in existence and stability, and to embrace and comprehend all other beings.

293. Now although fuch phantomes as corporeal forces, abfolute motions, and real spaces, do pafs in phyfics for caufes and principles (g), yet are they in truth but hypothefes, nor can they be the objects of real fcience. They pafs nevertheless in phyfics converfant about things of fense, and con(e) 149, 152, 200. (f) 207. (i) 270. (g) 220,

249, 250.