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cording to Aristotle, because a thing is, it must actually exist. This is evident from the eighth book of his Metaphysics, where he animadverts on the Megaric philosophers, as not admitting a possible existence distinct from the actual : from whence, faith he, it must follow, that there is nothing cold or hot or sweet or any sensible thing at all, where there is no perception. He adds, that in consequence of that Megaric doctrine, we can have no sense but while we actually exert it: we are blind when we do not fee, and therefore both blind and deaf several times in a day.
313. The evlenexhat wpãrar of the Peripatetics, that is, the sciences, arts, and habits, were by them distinguished from the acts or solenézetas dotepan, and supposed to exist in the mind, though not exerted or put into act. This seems to illustrate the manner in which Socrates, Plato, and their followers conceived innate (c) notions to be in the soul of man. In was the Platonic doctrine, that humane souls or minds descended from above, and were sowed in generation, that they were ftunned, stupified, and intoxicated by this descent and immersion into animal nature. And that the soul, in this óvéigwžis or slumber, forgets her
original notions, which are smothered and oppressed by many false tenets and prejudices of sense. Insomuch that Proclus compares the soul, in her descent invested with growing prejudices, to Glaucus diving to the bottom of the sea, and there contracting divers coats of fea-weed, coral, and shells, which stick close to him and conceal his true shape.
314. Hence, according to this philosophy, the mind of man is so restless to shake off that flumber, to disengage and emancipate herself from those prejudices and false opinions, that so straitly (6) 309.
beset and cling to her, to rub off those covers, that disguise her original form, and to regain her primæval state and first notions : Hence, that perpetual struggle to recover the loft region of light, that ardent thirst and endeavour after truth and intellectual ideas, which she would neither seek to attain, nor rejoice in, nor know when attained, excepe she had some prænotion or anticipation of them, and they had lain innate and dormant like habits and sciences in the mind, or things laid
up, which are called out and roused by recollection or reminiscence. So that learning feemeth in effect reminiscence.
315. The Peripatetics themselves distinguish between reminiscence and mere memory. Themistius observes that the best memories commonly go with the worst parts; but that reminiscence is most perfect in the most ingenious minds. And notwithstanding the tabula rasa (d) of Aristotle, yet some of his followers have undertaken to make him speak Plato's sense. Thus Plutarch the Peripatetic teacheth as agreeable to his master's doctrine, that learning is reminiscence, and that the všs xalo živ is in children. Simplicius also, in his commentary on the third book of Aristotle ali funcñs, speaketh of a certain interiour reason in the soul, acting of it self, and originally full of it's own proper notions, whýgus á Q' auls Tūr oixew guwsv.
316. And as the Platonic philosophy supposed intellectual notions to be originally inexistent or innate in the soul (e), so likewise it supposed fenfible qualities to exist (though not originally) in the soul, and there only. Socrates faith to Theætetus, You must not think the white colour that you see is in any thing without your eyes, or in your eyes,
(d) 308. (e) 309, 314.
or in any place at all. And in the Timæus Plato teacheth, that the figure and motion of the particles of fire dividing the parts of our bodies produce that painful sensation we call heat. And Plotinus, in the sixth book of his second Ennead, observes that heat and other qualities are not qualities in the things themselves, but acts: that heat is not a quality, but act, in the fire : that fire is not really what we perceive in the qualities light, heat, and colour. From all which it is plain, that whatever real things they supposed to exist independent of the soul, those were neither sensible things, nor cloathed with sensible qualities. 317.
Neither Plato nor Aristotle bý mattery ünn, understood corporeal substance, whatever the moderns may understand by that word. To them certainly it signified no positive actual being. Aristotle describes it as made up of negatives, having neither quantity nor quality nor effence. And not only the Platonists and Pythagoreans, but also the Peripatetics themselves declare it to be known neither by sense, nor by any direct and just reasoning, but only by some spurious or adulterine method, as hath been observed before. Simon Portius, a famous Peripatetic of the sixteenth cena tury; denies it to be any substance at all; for, faith he, nequit per se subäiftere, quia sequeretur, id quod non eft in actu effe in actu. If Jamblichus may be credited, the Ægyptians supposed matter so far from including ought of substance or effence, that, according to them, God produced it by a separation from all substance, essence or being, δο έσιότητG- Αποχιοθέισης υλότηG-. That matter is actually nothing, but potentially all things, is the doctrine of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and all the antient Peripatetics. 318. According to those philosophers, matter is U
only a pura potentia, a mere poffibility. But Anasimander, successor to Thales, is represented as having thought the supreme Deity to be infinice
Nevertheless though Plutarch calleth it matter, yet it was simply to dreigov, which means no more than infinite or indefinite. And although the moderns teach that space is real and infinitely extended ; yet if we consider that it is no intellectual notion, nor yet perceived by any of our senses, we shall perhaps be inclined to think with Plato in his Timæus, that this also is the result of dagsomos voto or fpurious reasoning, and a kind of waking dream. Plato obferves that we dreamı, as it were, when we think of place, and believe it neceffary, that whatever exists should exist in some place. Which place or space (f) he also obferves is μετ' αναθησίας απιον, εhat is to be felt as darkness is seen, or filence heard, being a mere privation.
319. If any one should think to infer the reality or actual being of matter from the modern tenet, that gravity is always proportionable to the quantity of matter, let him but narrowly scan the modern demonstration of that tenet, and he will find it to be a vain circle, concluding in truth no more than this, that gravity is proportionable to weight, that is to it felf. Since matter is conceived only as defect and mere possibility, and since God is absolute perfection and act; it follows there is the greatest distance and opposition imaginable between God and matter. Infomuch that a material God would be altogether inconsistent.
320. The force that produces, the intellect that orders, the goodness that perfects all things, is the supreme being. Evil, defect, negation, is not the object of God's creative power.
From (f) 250, 270
motion the Peripatetics trace out a first immoveable mover. The Platonics make God author of all good, author of no evil, and unchangeable. According to Anaxagoras there was a confused mass of all things in one chaos, but mind fupervening, én sabar, distinguished and divided them.' Anaxagoras, it seems, ascribed the motive faculty to mind, which mind some subsequent philosophers have accurately discriminated from foul and life,afcribing to it the sole faculty of intellection.
321. But still God was supposed the first agent, the source and original of all things, which he produceth, not occasionally or instrumentally but with actual and real efficacy. Thus, the treatise, De fecretiore parte divinæ sapientiæ secundum Ægyptios, in the tenth book, faith of God, that he is not only the first agent, but also that he it is who truly acts or creates, qui verè efficit.
322. Varro, Tully, and St. Augustin understand the soul to be vis, the power, or force that acts, moves, enlivens.
Now although, in our conception, vis, or spirit might be distinguished from mind, it would not thence follow, that it acts blindly or without mind, or that it is not closely connected with intellect. If Plutarch is to be trusted in his account of the opinions of philosophers, Thales held the mind of the world to be God : Democritus held the soul of the world to be an igniform deity (8): Pythagoras taught that God was the monad and the good, or 7" a'ya döv; Socrates also and Plato pronounced him to be the Tor (b), the single, self originate one, essentially good. Each of which appellations and forms of speech directly tends to, and determines in mind, is toy všv auf udes faith Plutarch, -323.Whence that author concludes, that in the senfe (8) 166, 168, 277