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Partridgov. Messer, 14 Gray, 180. But the plaintiff was bound by it, and cannot set up his own illegality to relieve himself from its consequences. His debt has been discharged and extinguished, and the law leaves the parties in the position in which they have placed themselves, and will not furnish a remedy to either to undo what has been done. Mallalieu v. Hodgson, 16 Q. R. 689. Huckins v. Hunt. Opinion by Morton, ('. J. [Decided Jan., 1885.]
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT
we are clearly or opinion that the plaintiff has no claim to equitable relief. Wood v. Sutcliffe, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 166 ; 21 L. J. (N. S.) (h. 253. Gaunt v. Fynney, L. R., 8 Ch. 8. Perkins v. City of Lawrence. Opinion by Holmes, J. [Decided Jan., 1885.)
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION- ICY SIDEWALK EVIDESCE AS TO PRIOR CONDITION.- In an action for personal injuries occasioned by falling upon a defective sidewalk the court may, in its discretiou, reject evidence of the condition of the sidewalk as to ice a week before the accident happened, so far as offered to prove the condition at the time of the accident, even if under special circumstances, it would have been warranting in admitting it. Berrenberg v. Boston, 137 Mass. 231. The witness did not undertake to speak to the continuance of the same defect down to the moment of the accident from daily observation, and although the plaintiff's counsel stated that he expected to prove by this and other witnesses that the defect had existed in substantially the same way for right or ten days, yet in view of the plaintiff's own testimony, that the day before the accident snow fell to the depth of four or five inches, followed by rain and then by a thaw, we must take it that the intended proof was by way of inference from other testimony like that offered, which the court very properly considered too remote. The plaintiff argues that the evidence was admissible to prove notice. What we have said applies to this argument also, for the notice to be proved must be notice of the same defect. Furthermore the defense was not put on want of notice of the condition of the sidewalk, such as it was, but on a denial that the condition was defective. Il'oodstock v. City of Worcester. Opinion by Holmes, J. [Decided Jan., 1885.]
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT – ILLEGAL CONSIDERATIOX-PARI DELICTO-COMPOSITION:-Tho first count was upon promissory note for $217.50, made by the plaintiff to the defendant; the second was for a like annount, upon an account annexed for goods sold and delivered by the plaintiff to the defendant before the making of the note. The plaintiff does not contend that he is entitled to recover upon the note on which his first count is founded. The note was given in consideration, and upon the secret agreement, that the plaintiff should execute a deed of composition entered into between the defendant and his creditors, which purported to treat all the creditors equally. The decisions are numerous and uniform that such a note is void. Ilarvey v. Hunt, 119 Mass. 279, and cases cited. But he contends that he is entitled to recover the balance of his account for which the note was giveu, in the same manner as if he had not executed the composition deed. In other words, his claim is that the law will regard the rights of the parties as if the composition deed and the corrupt agreement by which it was accompanied had never been made. We do not understand this to be the law. If two persons make an illegal contract, being in pari delicto, so long as it remains executory, tho law will not aid either party to enforce it; but so far as it is executed, the law will not lend its aid to cither party to relieve him from the consequences of the illegal contract, or to rescind it. Myers v. Meinrath, 101 Mass. 366; Horton v. Buffinton, 105 id. 399; ('ranson v. Goss, 107 id. 439. In the caso at bar the plaintiff executed the composition decd and received the amount provided for therein in full satisfaction and payment of his account. This operated as an extinguishment of his debt. The agrocment with the defendant that he would pay the full amount of the debt in the futuro was illegal, and avoided the composition deed as to other creditors.
TowX-OXE OF FOUR OFFICERS CANNOT BIND TOWNALL MUST ACT.-A towuship having four supervisors was for the converience of such supervisors divided into four districts, over each of which one supervisor had charge. The supervisor in one of said districts engaged and contracted with a party to plow the road, and in answer to the party's objection, that his plow was too light, said: “I'll insure you it won't hurt it.” The plow being broken while employed in the work, and suit being brought against the township to recorer damages, held, that the alleged contract was not a ministerial act which could be entered into by one supervisor, so as to bind the township, but that in order to create such liability it should have been entered into by all the supervisors. Held therefore that the township was not liable. One supervisor cannot lery a tax to pay the debts contracted, nor the expenses incurred in the township. Cooper v. Lampeter Township, 8 Watts, 1:25. As a general rule, it may be deolared one cannot bind the township by a contract, the propriety of which requires deliberation and the exercise of judgment. Union Township v. Gibboney, 13 Norr. 534. He may bind it in matters purely ministerial. It is in the line of ministerial duty to open and repair a road. He can therefore employ laborers for that purpose. It was held in Dull v. Ridgway, 9 Barr, 272, that one might givo a valid due bill, which showed on its face that it was for work done thereon. The right of the laborer rested rather on the consideration mentioned thereiu than on the due bill itself. The township was not thereby deprived of any valid defense. The law has wisely intrusted to the supervisors as a body the transaction of all the public business imposed on them, which calls for the exercise of judgment and careful deliberation. The conclusion at which we have arrived does not conflict with ('ommonwealth v. Supervisors of Colley Township, 5 Casey, 121, in which it was held that the supervisors might enter into a valid arrangement that each should take charge of a certain portion of the township, and direct the working out of road taxes therein. Nor is the present case like Hopewell Township v. Putt, 2 Week. Notes, 46, in which a person was permitted to recover for money advanced to pay for work actually done in constructing the road. The attempt now is not to recover for work done, not for money advanced to pay for work done, but to pay damages not contemplated by the board of supervisors and not implied under any authority given by them. The alleged contract was therefore in excess of the power of one supervisor, and the towuship is not bound thereby. It cannot be said that such a coutract is a ministerial act. Somerset v. Parson. Opinion by Mercur, J. (See 20 Eng. Rep. 522.] [Decided (ct. 6, 1884.]
SUBROGATION-JUDGMENT-NOTE-LIEN.-Where one of two debtors on a joint judgment-note, which has been duly entered up, pays, under exeoution, the amount thereof, taking an assignment of record of the judg
ment to his use, he is entitled to be subrogated to the EXECUTOR ANI) ADMINISTRATOR-PI'RCHASE OF IXcreditor's rights against the estate of his deceased co
OF DECEASED IN PARTNERSHIP-VOIDABLE obligor, to the extent that he has paid his co-obligor's RATIFICATION - ESTOPPEL — MARRIED WOMAN — ADproportion of the debt. In McCormick v. Irwin, 11 VANCEMENT-INTEREST ON.-(1) The purchase of the Casey, lil, it was said by Mr. Justice Strong: “The uudivided interest of a deceased partner by the execudoctrine (subrogation) does not depend upon privity, tor of his estate, in his own behalf, is viewed with nor is it confined to cases of strict suretyship,” and in more suspicion; in such case the estate stands altoCottrell's Appeal, 11 Ilarr. 294, by Justice Woodward : gether unprotected; it is exposed to the greed or the “Subrogation is founded on principles of equity aud executor, with none to guard against it. The execubenevolence, and may be decreed when no contract or tor appears both as seller and buyer, and an indefeasiprivity of any kind exists between the parties. When ble title cannot thus be acquired. ('hronister v. ever one not a mere volunteer discharges the debt of Bushey, ở W. & S. 153; Canıpbell v. McLain, 51 Penn. another he is entitled to all the remedies which the St. 200. The rule extends to all having a fiduciary recreditor possessed against the debtor." And in Mosier's lation to the property, and the fairness and honesty of Appeal, 6 P. F.S. 76, where a junior judgment creditor, the transaction do not vary it. This principle is not believing the land would be sacrificed, after the exe founded on the assumption of actual fraud; it is a rule oution plaintiffs had refused to assign their judgments of public policy. Drysdale's Appeal, ? Harr. 536; to him ou paynient, paid the executions to the sheriff, Chorpenning's Appeal, 32 Penn. St. 315. Where the and satisfaction was entered; no other liens having transaction is accompanied by actual fraud it is absointervened, he was subrogated to the rights of the lute void, and is incapable of subsequent ratification; execution plaintiffs, and the satisfaction cancelled. but a purchase by a trustee at his own sale, bona fide While the ruling of these cases is perhaps broad enough and for a full price, is but a legal fraud; it is voidable to control the present one, we are not obliged to say so, only, and may be confirmed by the parties in interest as we have direct authority upon the point. In Gear upon full knowledge of all the circumstances after a hart v. Jordan, 1 Jones, 3:25, it was held that “the rule deliberato examination. What may be subsequently embraces purchases in common of an estate bound by ratified may of course be previously authorized, and a joint lien, ay between themselves, the purpart of an act done by such previous authority needs no subeach is liable to contribute only its proportion of the sequent ratification. (2) It is certainly true, as shown common burden, and beyond this is to be regarded in a long line of cases, that a contract, void under the simply the surety of the remaining purparts. In this disability of coverture, cannot be made good by estoprespect they are to be treated as the several estates of pel; neither a fraudulent denial of cuverture, payment joint debtors, one being surety of the other; and if of purchase-money nor silent acquiescenco in the makthe purpart of one is called upon to pay more than its ing of improvements, nor all of these together, can by due proportion, the tenant or his lien creditors, upon way of estoppel give validity to a contract void upon the principle settled in Fleming v. Beaver, ? Rawlo, this ground. Glidden v. Strupler, ? P. F. S. 100; Bisp128; Croft v. Moore, 9 Watts, 451; aud Neff v. Miller, 8 ham Eq. 293. The above principle applied in the presBarr, 347, is entitled to stand in the place of tho satis ent case where certain married women executed, withfiod creditor to the extent of the excess which ought out the joinder of their husbands, an instrument to have been paid out of the other shares.” Gearhart which virtually ratified a purchase by their father's v. Jordan was recognized in the late case of Watson's executor of decedent's interest in a partnership. In Appeal, 9 Norr. 426, where is was said by Mercur, J.: such caso the married women were held estopped from “As between two mortgagors of land held by them as subsequently objecting to said purchase. (3) A testatenants in common and third persons, each mortgagor tor by his will directed that the amounts due him by is liable for the whole sum secured by the mortgage; his sons-in-law should be taken as advancements by but as between themselves each is liable for one-half him to their several wires. Halil, that no interest only. As to the other half, each is surety for the could be charged on the indebtedness of the sons-inother." Ackerman's Appeal. Opinion by Pax law to the testator. (4) Where a testator, after pro
viding for certain annuities, leaves the residue of his [Decided April 14, 1884.)
estate to his widow during her life, she is entitled to
interest which has accrued upon a debt due the estate EQUITY_JOINT PURCHASE OF PROPERTY-REFUSAL between the date of testator's death and the date of OF SOME OF PURCHASERS TO PAY TIIEIR SHARE OF EX the collection of the debt. Grim's Ippeul. Opinion PENSES-EFFECT OF.-Several parties, who were owners by Clark, J. of bonds of a railroad company about to be sold under [Decided (ct. 6, 1881.] the mortgage, entered into an agreement to purchase the property and not to claim their share of the pro CORPORATION--STOCKHOLDER-LIABILITY OF, HOW ceeds of the sale, but to take in lieu thereof bonds, to ENFORCET). --A stockholder of a manufacturing corpo. be issued under a company to be subsequently organ- ration, against whom judgment is recovered for the ized. Nothing was said in the agreement as to wbich debts of the corporation, which judgment he pays, is of the parties should purchase the property but one of not entitled to contribution against the other stock. them, a corporation, undertook to do so, but the prop- holders except in the particular manner specified in erty was bid above their limit. Subsequently the pur- the acts. Corporation stockholders who have already chaser at the sale transferred the title to said corpora contributed their proportions to the capital stock are tion for advances made by them and for prior indebt not at the common law or in equity liable for the coredness to them. Said corporation began to reorgan- porate debts; statutes which impose this liability ize a company, and requested the other parties to join must therefore be strictly construed. This rule of law in the expenses, which was refused. Izold, that even is well settled. Mean's Appeal, 4 Norr. 78. The right should this purchase by the corporation inure to the of contribution among stockholders also exists by reabenetit of the other bondholders, the latter were de. son only of the obligation imposed by the statute. If barred by their refusal to sbare in the expenses from it were not for tbe statute there would esist no perclaiming any interest in the purchase. Yeager's Ap-sonal responsibility on the part of the holder of the peal, 4 (ut. 88. Lennig's Appeal. Opinion by Pas- stock, either to the corporate creditors or to each other son, J.
for the corporate debts. The right of the plaintiffs to [Decided April 14, 1881. ]
recover in this case therefore depends upon the con
struction of the act of April 7, 1849, and its supple der it useless.' A leasehold estate may include buildments of April 20, 1853 (Pamp. Laws, 6:37), and 27 ings, fixtures and machinery placed upon the real esMarch, 1851 (Pamp. Laws, 215). Hvard v. Wilcox, 11 tate by the tenant. Such a lien may attach to the Wright, 51; Mansfield Iron Works v. Willcox, 2 P. F. leasehold estate, including the buildings, fixtures and S. 378; Patterson v. Lane, 11 Casey, 275; Brinham v. machinery placed upon the real estate by the tenant, Wellersburg Coal Co., 11 Wright, 43. In the case of although the tenant may have the right and privilege Youghiogeny Shaft Co. v. Evans, 22 P. F. 8. 334, the of removing such buildings, fixtures and machinery case of Briuham v. Wellersburg Coal Co., supra, and from the leased premises. Hathaway V. Davis. Hoard v. Wilcox, supra, are cited with approval, and Opinion by Valentine, J. Agnew, J., there says: “The liability of the stockholders is secondary, and the proceeding to enforce it
CORRESPONDENCE. is statutory, not at common law; it was therefore held in sereral decisions that in such case the proceeding is PREFERENCES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS. wholly governed by the statute, and the rights and lia Editor of the Albany Law Journal: bilities of the parties must be ascertained by it."
The attention of the bar is being called to the necesO'Reilly v. Bard. Opinion by Clark, J.
sity of relieving in some mode the Court of Appeals; [Decided Oct. 6, 1884.]
and manydifferent views and suggestions have been pre.
sented. There is one matter however, while it will not KANSAS SUPREME COURT ABSTRA('T.*
tend to lessen the labors of the court, attention should
be called to; that is, the great and growing injustice PARTNERSIIIP-PROPERTY OF, PURCHASED BY P'ART caused by the statutes creating preferevces as a matter NER-EXEMPTION.-One partner may acquire title to of right. While criminal cases should be preferred, partnership property by purchaso from the copartner there is no reason why all other cases should not be ship, and if the purchase is not made with the intent to heard in their order, unless the court should deem it hinder, delay or defraud the creditors of the copartner proper to advance such cases if in its judgment public ship, and the property purchased is such as is exempt or private interests justify it. The first two hundred from levy and sale on execution under the statutes of cases on the present calendar are preferred under the the State, may hold it as against creditors of the co statutes, and it may be safely asserted that in not ten partnership. Burion v. Baum. Opinion by Hurd, J. per cent of them is there any reason for urgency, or CONTEMPT—WIAT CONSTITUTES-HABEAS CORPUS.
that making them take their turn with other causes --To constitute a direct contempt of court there must
would produce any hardship. In upward of one-balf be some disobedience to its order, judgment or pro
of the other causcs the returns were filed during 1883, cess, or some open and intended disrespect to the court
and none of them will probably be reached before the or its officers in the presence of the court, or such con
June session, about two years from the time the reduct in or near the court as to interrupt or interfere
turn is filed, and probably in most of them an early with its proceedings or with the administration of
hearing is as much deserved or necessary as in an justice. To constitute a constructive contempt of court
equal number of preferred causes. Making of a calensome act must be done, not in the presence of the
dar before the existing one is called through, operates court or judge, that tends to obstruct the administra
to further postpone the hearing of causes on the genetiou of justice, or bring the court or judge or admin
ral calendar. If the present calendar should remain istration of justice into disrespect. 1). executed his
until the causes thereon aro all called, and that should recognizance to appear in the District Court at a cer
be the rule hereafter adopted, it would materially al. tain term and submit to a trial on a criminal charge
ter the limitation; there would not be the yearly pushpending against him in such court. Ile did not ap
ing back of causes on the general calendar to make way pear at the term of the court at which he was recog
for cases where the appeals are taken long after other nized, but absented himself from the county where
cases. Should not this matter be called to the atten. the court was held. Proceedings wero taken against
tion of the court ?
ANTI-PREFERRED. him for contempt, and he was convicted and imprisoned. Ield, that the facts stated in the charge against him, on which he was convicted, do not constitute a
A CORRECTION. contempt for which he can be punished by fine or im Editor of the Albany Law Journal : prisonment. The judgment rendered was not war I note in your last week's journal you say, in column ranted by law, and the court was without jurisdiction of judicial salaries, that ('ircuit judges in this State to render it, and the imprisonment under it is illegal, (Missouri) get $1,500 per year. You are in error; they and the petitioner is entitled by proceedings in habeus get $2,000 per year, and pay their expenses from that corpus to be discharged from imprisonment. Hatter sum; and are the poorest paid and hardest worked of Dill. Opinion by IIurd, J.
servants of the people. MECIIANICS' LIEN-LEASEHOLD) ESTATE-EXTENT OF
WM. A. WOOD. LIEN.-A mechanics' lien, or lien for materials and la KINGSTON, Mo., Alarch 26, 1885. bor, may attach to a leasehold ostate. We think the word “owner in the statuto as it now exists is com
AN INTERESTING INQUIRY. prehensive enough to include an owner of a leasehold
Editor of the Albany Law Journal: estate as well as the owner of a greater estate. In the
I have been trying to compute the interest on a note case of Chouteau v. Thompson, ? Ohio St. 114, 1:23, the
from Oct. 25, also Oct. 29, also Oct. 31, 1884, to March Supreme Court of Ohio, in construing a similar stat
19, 1885. The question I want settled is: How long a ute, uses the following words, to wit: “The word
time has elapsed on which the interest must be comowner' in the first section of the act is not limited in
puted ? I want tho correct legal method of computing its meaning to an owner of the fee, but includes also
the time, but I cannot find any thing upon the suban owner of a loasehold estate. If the ownership is inject. I write this to ask if you will indicate in your foo, the lien is upon the fee; if it is of a less estate, the journal where I may go for authorities, even if you lien is upon such smaller estate. To hold that an
cannot answer my query yourself. I can obtain four owner in feo only is meant would be directly subyer different results for each note. What is the correct or sive of the policy of the act, and in a great degree ron
legal method ? An early reply will greatly oblige *Appearing in 3:2 Kansas Reports.
NEW YORK, March 30, 1885.
The Albany Law Journal.
fession and not a trade, and as it concerns the administration of justice, they ought to be better than
other men. We believe that the lawyers of MisALBANY, APRIL 18, 1885.
souri are, as a class, as good as those of Alabama, and we believe that many of them in gooil standing
in both States have been, and are, in the habit of CURRENT TOPICS.
prosecuting actions of ejectment and damage suits
upon agreements to receive an aliquot part of the THE Central Lain Journal seems to have some land or money recovered as a compensation for their
services. This makes them speculators in lawsuits, of the legal profession, and especially with regard degrades thein from the honorable position of counselto the “traffic in litigation.” The Journal once lors and advocates into that of secret parties, and sneered at our old-fashioned notions about the " con tempts them into practices which are incompatible tingent fee business.” Possibly its change of views with a faithful demeanor toward the courts. We may is attributable to a recent change of l's, Sucli err in this conclusion as to Alabama, and we do not a change sometimes works a difference of opinion. speak of the east, with which we are not much acRecently alluding to the conduct of the Pacific quainted; but we have reason to believe that this Coast Bar Association in a certain case, the Journal practice is more or less prevalent throughout the said: “The better members of the bar have been entire west and south. We have not yet seen or guilty of too many questionable practices to pro- heard of any attempt on the part of any bar associceed with alacrity toward purging their own ranks,
ation to rebuke or correct it.” In the main we agree and when they do proceed they find it an expen with these views. It is refreshing to see this cxsive and ungrateful task.” This having been criti-pression in so influential a journal, and it must have cized by a correspondent, the Journal justified it as weight, coming from one of the first legal authors follows: “The language above quotedl was delil) of our time, and an honored judge. In connection erately written. It embodies a profound convic with this, we call attention to a leading article in tion, the result of many years acquaintance with another column, in which it is shown that the atthe morals and practices of the legal profession. torney in this State, under the law of 1879, has a There are of course many honorable and high- lien on the client's cause of action, not to be afminded men in that profession. But the public fected by any settlement between the parties. This distrust of the profession is increasing every day, probably applies only to the attorney. It ought to and it is not an ignorant distrust, the result of low be extended to the counsel. This would do away prejudice, or the opinions of that class of people with the stock pretext for the necessity of the “conwhose misfortunes or crimes bring them in contact tingent fee business." But what with “traflicking with the lowest class of lawyers. The best members in litigation " and resisting the demand of the peoof the legal profession in Missouri have, since the ple for simple laws and cheap justice, the lawyers State existed, trafficked in litigation — bought it in the Legislature and out of it, or a good many of and sold it as though it were merchandise, and they them, seem letermined to ruin the profession. are still doing it. We ask our learner correspondent if it is not so in Alabama. U barrister could If the spirit of agnosticism continues to spread not remain a member of any of the English Inns of as it is now doing it will soon become necessary to Court who would do this. It is notorious that pro- modify our laws concerning juclicial oatls, or a fessional morals in the l'nited States are very lax, large anıl highly respectable part of the community and that lawyers in good standing can everywhere will be disqualified from testifying. Mr. Louis be found who have clone things that would disbar Claude Whiton discoursed on this topic in 29 ALB. them in England. This is an unpleasunt thing LAW JOUR. 344. Recently in Jassachusetts : bill, to say. It is especially an impleasant thing for al the effect of which was to allow “infidels," "athelawyer to say who loves his profession, and desires ists" and "agnostics" to testify in the courts of to promote its honor and extend its gooil name. A that State, was defeated in its Legislature. Acman does not start on il career of moral reform un coriling to newspaper reports the vote in the til he acquires a profound conviction of his own un Senate stool 22 against the bill to 10 in its favor. worthiness. The same law holds good in respect The Centrul Luin Journal says: "Some of the most of any number of men or any class of men. No pure, honest, upright and distinguished men in real reformation will begin in the ranks of the legal Massachusetts are absolutely denied the right to profession until that profession as a body begins to protect by their testimony their liberty, their propsbare in some measure in the popular conviction of erty and their lives in the courts of justice by the its own unworthiness. As long as the members of infamous rule which that vote perpetuated. the profession are content to rest in the idea that But when we think of the fate of the bill in the all its practices are honorable, no real movement Massachusetts Senate, just spoken of, we feel like toward reformation will commence.” And still saying, 'poor, olii, narrow-contracted, hide-bound, more recently the Journal thus responds to another bigoted, middle-aged, ante-cieluvian, crustacean, critic: “We agree that the lawyers as a class are superstitious, puritanical, praise-lioul-bare-bones, as good as other men; but as their calling is a pro-hew-Agag-hip-and-thigh, zeal-of-the-land-busy, I
Vol. 31 – No. 16.
am-better-than-thou, Massachusetts !'" This is ability;" but possibly he is afraid that the Code rather rough, but we are not sure that it is not would interfere with the sale of the ponderous deserved.
work on damages, originally written by another and
very distinguished Sedgwick, and recently edited Speaking of agnostics - at a meeting of the Nine- by the contemporary Sedgwick. But let us take teenth Century Club in New York, at which the courage, for “King Arthur” does not "rule this subject of discussion was, “Moral Evil, its Sources goodly land.” Then The Nation says Mr. G. L. Rives and Remedies,” Mr. D. G. Thompson, a well- has contributed to the same discussion a pamphlet on known New York lawyer, author of a work on “Torts under the Code,” in which he declares that Psychology, read an elaborate essay, in which he the provisions are in a remarkable degree incomundertook to show that the great source of moral plete, inaccurate and misleading. We do not evil is poverty, and that the remedy is to divide up know what warrant Mr. Rives has for setting up as property more equally. He was combated by an authority. It is our misfortune never to have Father McGlynn, Catholic, and Rev. Mr. Williams, heard of him as a jurist or legal writer, or in any Unitarian. The weak point of Mr. Thompson's ar other way; but to oppose the Code is a good way gument is in not recognizing the terrible prevalence for a young or old lawyer to become known, if not of sin among the rich. One suggestion made by him distinguished. The Nation observes: Codification, struck us forcibly that laws ought to recognize if we are to have it, ought to be the work of the best and provide for satisfying while regulating the in- legal minds. This "Civil Code'is radically bad nate passions of men, and we then thought of the and disgraceful. Mr. Sedgwick deserves hearty extreme folly, on which we have often commented, thanks for his exposure of it.” That puff ought to denying remarriage to parties divorced for their sell a good many copies of Mr. Sedgwick's great own infidelity. But what particularly strikes us just ancestor's great work on Damages, but we fear it now is that Mr. Thompson, with all his culture and will not, in California, at least. Now the question learning, and his unquestioned good character, is, who is the attorney who gives the Post and might not be a competent witness in Massachusetts, Nation their legal opinions, and what axe he has to against such a fellow as Sullivan, the prize-fighter, grind. We infer that any man who is so virulent because while Mr. Thompson does not deny, as to pronounce the Code “disgraceful” has an axe and hopes for the existence of a God and a to grind by defeating All these gentlemen future state of reward and punishment for earthly would better confess that they are opposed to any deeds, he “ does not know.' In the discussion by and all codification. the New York club Father McGlynn declared himself an ardent disciple of Henry George in respect
NOTES OF CASES. to land tenure, which will give joy to Mr. Clark, whose work Man's Birthright” we recently
Ulrich v. 'New York Cent., etc., R. Co., New found a little fault with, however much it may disagree with the practice of the Father's church.
1885, it was held that one riding on a railroad on a
free pass exempting the railroad company from There was a field-day in the lower house of our liability for negligence, may still recover if he was Legislature last week on the Code, in which Messrs. riding in a drawing-room car for hire. The court, Ives, Baker and others distinguished themselves by Van IIocsen, J., said: “The plaintiff was using their advocacy of the Code, while several others, this free ticket undoubtedly, but he was also using whose names we suppress out of charity, distin- another ticket, which he purchased and paid for. guished themselves, Erostratus-fashion, by their op- If he had been traveling on the free pass alone, the position. The measure commanded a support of stipulations that it contains would have been a bar sixty-three votes against thirty-five. This result to his recovery. The language of the stipulation will encourage both sides, we suppose. Now we means that if the person using the pass accepts free want to know what, if any thing, the opponents passage he shall relinquish his right to compensaof the Code propose to give us. This matter is more tion for injuries, and the law of this State holds important than capitols and parks. Are we to that a free passage is itself a full consideration for have any amelioration of our laws? And if a contract that will discharge a carrier of passenwhen and what?
gers from its common-law liability. The pass en
titled him to ride in one of the common cars of the In all the Code-literature there is nothing quite company, but the plaintiff wished accommodations so amusing as the comments of the Evening Post of a better kind, and therefore he applied for transand The Nation. These inform us that at the direc- portation in one of the drawing-room cars that tion of the New York Bar Association, Mr. Arthur form a part of the defendants' trains. He was acG. Sedgwick has published a review of the Code cepted as a passenger in the drawing-room car provisions in fifty-four sections on damages, and an called the Empire, and paid one dollar for transnounce that “of only three sections is Mr. Sedg- portation in that car to New York. If the free wick able to say unqualifiedly that they are cor- pass gave him the right to travel on the train it
This speaks poorly for Mr. Sedgwick's gave him no right to travel in that car, and it is
IN ., 9,