« EelmineJätka »
question, Hammond, J., said: “It may be a test of one company is the property of the other. According the soundness of the judgment here rendered to con to the decision in Horne v. Boston & M. R. R., 18 Fed. sider whether, under its operation, it would be com Rep. 50, the fact that the injury complained of was petent for this consolidated corporation to iguore its suffered in Michigau is not material to the question of Kentucky existence, and describing itself as a corpor- jurisdiction. Cir. Ct., D. Iudiana, 1884. Burger v. ation under the laws of Louisiana, suo a citizen of Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. Opinion by Wouds, J. (22 Kentucky in this court (sitting in Kentucky), or Fed. Rep. 561.) whether a citizen of Kentucky, ignoring the Kentucky statutes, might sue it in this court as a Louisiana cor
PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT poration 'found' within this district; and if either be
ABSTRACT. admissible, why the same right to choose the capacity in which it shall conduct the litigation does not exist in favor of the right of removal when sued in the DAMAGES-LIQUIDATED OR PENALTY-PROFITS.-A. Stato courts." In other cases besides the Nashua & agreed to place in B.'s mill, within a stipulated time, L. Corp. v. Boston & L. Corp., already cited, it has certain machinos to make flour, which should have a been held that a corporation organized and consolida- | capacity not below 200 barrels of high grades of flour ted under the laws of two States, describing itself as a
daily, and further agreed that it should be no expericorporation of any one of them, and ignoring the stat- ment, and in proof thereof that in case the results utes of the other, may sue a citizen of the latter in the were not as promised the machines should be retained Federal court there sitting. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. without any price being paid. The machines when ('0. v. Indianapolis & St. L. R. ('0., 9 Biss. 11-1; Chicago furnished were found not to make a high grade of & N. W. R. Co. v. Chicago & P. R. (0., 6 id. 219. See flour, and not to be capable of producing the stipulaalso Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 271, 283, fol ted number of barrels per day. In an action by B. lowed and re-allirmed in Muller v. Dow8, 93 U. S. 411, against 4. to recover damages. Streeper v. Williams, 4:18. While at common law a corporation may not
12 Wr. 151; Shrevo v. Brereton, 1 P. F. S. 185. In migrato, but must dwell in the place of its creation,
Mathews v. Sharp, 3 Out. 564, Mr. Justice Trunkey and cannot be sued elsewhere, yet under the laws of said, referring to Streeper v. Williams, supra: "In an Congress and of the States it may exercise its author elaborate opinion it was ruled that to determine ity in a foreign territory upon such conditions as may
whether the sum named as a forfeiture for non-combe prescribed by the law of the place. “One of these pliance is intended as a penalty or as liquidated damconditions may be that it shall consent to be sued ages, it is necessary to look at the whole contract, its there. If it do business there it will be presumed to subject matter, the ease or difficulty in measuring the have assented, and will be bound accordingly. For breach in damages and the magnitude of the stipu. tbe purposes of Federal jurisdiction it is regarded as
lated sum, not only as compared with the value of the it it were : citizen of the State where it was created, subject of the contract, but in proportion to the proband no averment or proof as to the citizenship of its able consequences of the breach.” There are numermembers elsewhero will be permitted." Railroad Co
ous authorities on this subject, but probably their best v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65. In the caso last cited it is also expression is found in the foregoing citations. Held, said: “We see no reason why several States cannot,
that the clause in the agreement that the machines by competent legislation, unito in creating the same
might be retained was not a liquidation of damages, corporation, or in combining several pre-existing cor
but in the nature of a penalty. Ileld further, that the porations into a single one. The jurisdictional effect measure of damages was the amount paid upon the of the existence of such a corporation, as regards the machines, the loss by defects in the machinery, and Federal courts, is the same as that of a co-partnership the cost incurred in repairing the mill and putting it of individual citizens residing in different states."
into condition to produce 200 barrels daily of a high See also St. (lair v. ('ox, 106 l. S. 350; Ex parte Shol-grade of flour, less the value of that portion of the delenberger, 96 id. 369; Railroad ('o. v. Koontz, 101 id. 5; / rendant's machines retained and used in the repairing Life Ins. ('o. v. Wood worth, 111 id. 1:38; Railroad ('o). and refitting of the mill. The loss of possible profits, v. Railroad ('o., 10 Fed. Rep. 197; (Callahan v. Railroail which miglit havo been made if the mill had run propCo., 11 id. 136. In Railroad Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black, erly, was not a proper subject of damages, the plaint297, tho.Supremo Court at an earlier cate, speaking of iff being measurably in fault, and further because such a consolidated company, had said: “The president damages were too remoto and speculative. Hoy v. and directors of the Ohio & Vississippi Railroad ('om Gronoblo, 10 (as. 11; Adams Express Co. v. Egbert, pany is thereforo a distinct and separate corporate
1:2 id. 364. Pennypucker v. Jones. Opinion by Green, body in Indiana from the corporate body of the same
J. name in Ohio, and they cannot be joined in a suit as [Decided Oct. 6, 1881.] ono and the same plaintiff, nor maintain a suit, in that
RECORDING ACT-LEAVING WITH RECORDER-INDEX character against a citizen of Ohio or Indiana in a ('ir
NO PART OF RECORD).—Prior to the act of March 18, cuit ('ourt of the l'nitod States.” The statutes of In 1875, at least it was well settled that a deed was in condiana provide for suits against foreign corporations templation of law recorded, when it was left in the doing business in the State, and for service of process recorder's office, and put upon the entry book for that upon agents found in charge of such business. Rev.
purpose. The duty of tho recordor was to record it, siat. 1881, $$ 302:2, 3030. But in respect to consolidated and the responsibility rested upon him for any default bodies, having a chartered existence both in this and
in the proper discharge of that duty; the consequenin a foreign State or Suites, it seems quite doubtful
ces of his default could not be visited upon the owner, whether these statutes, which in terms embrace only who had done all that the law required in depositing “corporations not incorporated or organized in this the deed in the office for that purpose. A different State,” can be considered applicable. The conclusion doctrino was perhaps declared in Luch’s Apreal, 8 which I have reached is in some measure fortified per- Wright, 519, where it was hold that mortgages must be haps by the consideration that if judgment could bo
recorded in a mortgage book," and that they are not given in this action against the defendant
properly recorded in any other book, where they canMichigan corporation, it would be binding upon not be found by means of a “mortgago index," but the company in this Stato as well as in Michigan, and
that case was expressly overruled in Glading v. Frick, might bo enforced by execution issued directly against Nor. 160, where it was said by Paxson, J.: "We the property of the company here. The property of feel ourselves constrained to return to the rule laid
down by Chief Justice Gibson in McLanahau v. Ree- held liable only as a bailee for hire, and it was decided side, 9 Watts, 511." “It is indeed,” says the Chief that the bailor could not recover upon simple proof of Justice, “of no account that the conveyance and the the destruction of the goods by fire, he must go farther articles were not recorded in the book set aside for and show that the loss was caused by the negligence of mortgages; the keeping of such a book is an arrange the bailee. Lamb v. Camden & Amboy R. & Tr. Co., ment to promote the convenienco of tho officer, by 46 N. Y. 271; Farmham v. Camden & Amboy R. Co., contracting the surfaco over which he is to search for 55 Penn. St. 53. In the latter case it was said, “that a particular thing; he is bound to furnish precise in where a bailee accounts for a loss in a way not to imformation, get it as he may, of cvery registry in his plicato himself in a charge of negligence, this is a suffioffice, whether made in the right place or not.” Clader cient defense, unless tho plaintiff proves negligence.” v. Thomas, 8 Nor. 343, and Paigo v. Wheeler, 11 id. 282, Vat. Line Steamship Co. v. Smurt. Opinion by Trunare to tho same effect. Tho remark of Chief Justice | key, J. Woodward, in Speer v. Evans, 11 Wright, 111, that the in- [Decided Nov. 20, 1884.] dox is an indisputablo part of the record, is not to be regarded as an adjudication to that extent; that case turned upon the question of actual notice. Schell v.
CORRESPONDENCE. Stein, 25 P. F. S. 398. No duty rested upon a party to supervise the action of the recoider, to see that he
A SURREBUTTOR. made the record and indexed the conveyance. Brown and Wood’s Appeal, 3 Week. Notes, 33; Wyoming Edilor of the Albany Law Journal: Bank's Appeal, 11 id. 507. Stockwell v. McIlcnry. Opin
I rise to a question of privilege! I desire to know ion by Clark, J.
whether, in this degenerate age, tho members of the [Decided Oct. 20, 1884.]
legal profession havo any rights which courts of jus
tico are bound to respect. CARRIER-BAGGAGE
LIABILITY CEASES It appears to be a modern invention to dispose of leBURDEN OF PROOF.-(1) A passenger must be allowed gal controversy by ignoring tho merits of the caso a reasonable time after arrival of his baggage to call itself, and delivering an elaborate opinion upon the for and take it away, and during such time the carrier merits or demerits of the counsel by whom it is concontinues responsible according to the strict rule of ducted. It is undoubtedly much easier, in a majority law relating to common carriers. When the liability of cases, to dispose of the latter than the former, and as carrier ceases he holds the baggage under a modi therefore not especially remarkable that the practice fied liability. Ilis duty to exercise caro over the prop is rapidly increasing. The averago lawyer however is erty remaining in his handy grows out of the original not so avaricious or ambitious for personal distinction contract, and he is therefore bound to exerciso ordi as to feel specially flattered by repeated judicial annary caro in keeping and preserving it, the original nouncements that he is, professionally speaking, an contract, though modified in respect to the degree of ass, at the uniform expense of his clients, or to crave liability assumed from a reasonable time after tho ar their continuanco in cases where they are no less at rival of the goods, being understood to contemplato a his personal expense, by reason of the fact that they possiblo delay, and to cover the dolivery. Edwards on aro alike umwaranted and unjust. Bail. 90; Hutchinson on ('ar. 709, 71:2; Burnell v. New I am not an advocate of the practice of reviewing York Cont. R. Co., 15 N. Y. 184. Where the contract adverso decisions by “swearing at the court,” and do is to carry goods by sea from port to port, it is the do not design in the present instance to take any new duty of tho consignee to receive the goods out of the departure in that behalf, but after mature deliberaship or at the wharf. If they are not accepted by the tion I have reached the conclusion that the time has consignee the carrier should put them in a placo of arrived, when from a personal stand point, I should safety, and when he has so done he is no longer liable “have learo to kick for being kickedl," and bo peron his contract of affreightment. Richardson v. God mitted to enter a firm and vigorous protest against daril, 23 Ilow. 28. So a passenger should call as soon the more recent application of this modern invention as practicablo for his baggago, but if he does not, the in the disposition by the "court of last resort” of a carrier is bound to care for it or send it to a fit store causo professionally conducted by myself as counsel house. (2) A common carrier is regarded as an insurer for the unsuccessful litigant. of the safety of the goods against all losses except such I refer to the case of arnolil . Parmalec, 97 N. Y. as may be caused by the act of God or the public 65, which in the matter of inaccuracy of statement, enemy; and exceptions may arise from the fault of the novelty of doctrine, and manifest injustice to counsel owner, or from somo inherent defect in the goods, or and client, may be regarded as entirely sui generis, upon an express contract that the carrier shall not be even in this era of multitudinous and diversified adjudliable for loss from a specified cause. In all such cases ication. It also graphically illustrates with what tho burden is upon the carrier to establish the fact wonderful facility in modern practice a case of considwhich will bring his case within an exception to the erable intrinsic importance, pecuniarily and otherrulo. When tho carrier has shown that tho loss was wise, may be disposed of by a single stroke of the juoccasioned by a cause from tho liability of which he dicial guillotinc, simultaneously beheading both counis protected by law or by contract, it will not be pre- sel and client. sumed that his negligenco contributed to the loss, but I rest my defense solely upon tho record presented the presumption will be, in the absence of proof to es to the court, and a correct statement of the case as distablish his negligence, that the carrier has done his closed thereby. duty; and if it has been shown that tho loss resulted l'pon the plearings the plaintiff's cause of action from such cause, without also having shown that the stood admitted. Various aflirmative matters of alcarrier was negligent, the burden of proving his negli-leged defense were interposedl. ('ertain "questions of genco dovolves upon the plaintiff. This rulo seems to fact," pertaining or supposed to pertain to those debo supported by a decided preponderance of author lenses were settled to bo submitted to a jury, and ity. Hutchinson on Car. 765-767. It has been estab were thus tried at ('ircuit. The result of the answers lished in New York and Pennsylvania, and considered of the jury was such as to defeat the plaintiff's right as if applicable to the case of a bailee who receives to recover. Subsequently the cause came on for heargoods to store for a compensation. Where a carrier, ing at the Special Term. It is true that this court was by contract, was esoneratod from a loss by fire, he was held by a justice of the Supreme ('ourt other than tho
adversely to tho plaintiff, although in some respects day, May 8, 1985:
justice who presided on tho trial at Circuit, tho latter taken upon the trial before the jury to the admission having in the meantime ceased to be a member of the or exclusion of evidence, but none but what may be court. The practice adopted at the Special Term is properly disregarded as not affecting the merits, under not without precedent in similar reported cases in the section 1005, Code of Civil Procedure.” court of chancery, and inasmuch as it was entirely This statement would seem to indicate that the obsatisfactory to the court at Special Term, no questionjections were relied upon by counsel, and considered as to its regularity or propriety remained to perplex and passed upon by the trial court, and it is beneath any court of review in their subsequent cousideration the dignity of a “quibble” to contend that in thus of the case. As against the admitted cause of action passing upon them that court did not distinctly of tho plaintiff, the defendants interposed the findings rule and intend to rule upon all questions raised as to of the jury upon tho aforesaid questions of fact. There the admission or rejection of evidence, by an express upon the plaintiff's counsel presented to the court a adoption of the rulings of the Circuit judge and recaso, duly settled, containing a complete record of the affirmation of their correctness. evidence and proceedings on the trial of these ques In every tribunal to which the cause has been pretions of fact before the jury at Circuit, in connection sented—the Special and General Terms of the Supreme with nolice of motion for a new trial of those questions Court and the Court of Appeals—these rulings and exof fact, based upon such record of the evidence and ceptions have been the subject of discussion by counproceedings on the former trial. Had this motion sel without suggestion from any source that they were beon entertained and passed upon by the trial court, it not properly before the court for discussion, consideris conceded by the Court of Appeals, that it must have ation and determination. Indeod in tho last named resulted in favor of the plaintiff, the record disclosing court there was nothing elso in the case, the same Gencrrors of law which could not be ignored or succes: eral Term which had once set aside similar findings of fully defended in that tribunal.
the jury as quite too absurd to be approved or sancBut the court at Special Term, as it hal an unques tioned by any court having, as I assume, upon the tioned right to do, against any protest or objection theory that “two wrongs make a right," indorsed and from either party, decided to pursue a different course, approved the second edition of the same. and in the language of his final decision filed by the The patriarchal Job was not a not a practitioner in learnell justice, “to hear, try and determine the whole modern courts of justice, and was therefore happily cause and all questions of fact or lawr involved exempt from the additional affliction, consequent therein."
upon earnest and zealous, but futile efforts to secure Thore was not the semblance of a “question of law and preserve the rights of litigants in those tribunals. before the court, aside from those presented by the Otherwise his “record” would unquestionably bare case as arising upon exceptions taken to the rulings of presented tangible “ exceptions ” of an uumistakable tho Circuit judge in the admission or rejection of eri character. Whether any record of that description dence, and tho entiro case as presented to the trial however could ever be successfully brought to the atjudge consisted of the plaintiff's admitted cause of tention or within the comprehension of the court, is an action, the findings of the jury and the record of pro inquiry which may properly be left in repose among ceedings of the trial at ('ircuit. And upon this case in the other “glorious uncertainties of the law." its entirity, the cause was argued and submitted by
MYRON H. PECK. the counsel for the respective parties. The “trial BATAVIA, JUy 5, 1885. was necessarily limited to the aryument by counsel and decision by the court of the questions of fact and questions of law presented by this record. Ti wasthus
COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. considered by the trial court, and a decision rendered
HI E following decisions were handed down Frivariant from the findings of the jury upon matters of fact.
Judgment affirmed with costs-Joseph Lowery, inPrecisely here it is that the opinion adopted by the fant, respondent, v. Manhattan Ry. ("0., appellant; Court of Appeals attributes the plaintifl's loss of a Frank Potts, adm'r, respondent, v. William A. Ilart meritorious case to the stupid blundering or blunder and others, appellants; People, respondent, v. Knicking stupidity of his counsel. It is not suflicient griev crbocker Ico ('0., appellant; Frank L. Pineo, adm'r, ance, in the judgment of that distinguished tribunal, respondent, v. N. Y. (. & II. R. R. Co.; Horace K. that the plaintiff's counsel should have been prevented Thurber and others, appellants, v. William Hughes, from presenting his “questions of law' in clue and
respondent; George ('. Morris, appellants, V. Mayor, proper form, by means of his motion, but by (reson etc., respondent; Georgo Wadsworth, respondent, v. thereof he is to be solemnly adjudged to have abso Louisa R. Lyon, appellant; Jefferson Carley, appellutely eliminated from the case, prepared for the ex lant, v. ('aroline D. Potts, respondent; Jacob Loril. press purpose of bringing them before the court, every lard, respondent, v. William P. Clyde and another, adverse ruling and exception thereto contained therein appellants; (aroline Pope, respondent, v. George W. and indulged in the pleasant and profitable pastime of Vead, impleaded, appellant; Philip H. Rcad, appelfurnishing ammunition ior his adversary.
lant, v. Lewis R. Stegman, sheriff, etc., respondent. In the judgment of a lawyer of limited mental cali -Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to bre it woull seem to be quite impossible that the trial abide the event-Mary Marsh, respondent, v. William judge could thus adopt, for the purposes of a hearing R. McNair, appellant; Theodore Brinkerhoff and and determination of the cause, tho evidence and pro others, appellants, v. Ilenry Bostwick and others, receedings on the trial at ('ircuit, as set forth in the case, spondents.-Judgment of Common Pleas reversed, without taking them cum onere as to the rulings and that of Marine ('ourt affirmed, with costs, upon the exceptions constituting an integral portion thereof. 95 ground that no exceptions appear in the case-George N. Y. 25:2.
Lane et al., appellants, v. Thomas E. Arnold and But the assumption of the ('ourt of Appeals that others, respondents. these exceptions were not brought to the attention of Ordered, that this court take a recess from this date or passed upon by the trial court, is in direct contra to Monday, the first day of June, 1885, at ten o'clock diction of the record.
A. M., at the town hall, in tho village of Saratoga I quote from the concluding portion of the opinion Springs, then to proceed with the call of the calendar. of tho judge at Special Term. “Somo exceptions were Tuesday, June 2 and 16, will be motion days.
The Albany Law Journal.
ity, and is based upon superficial knowledge of insufficient facts.” “In this we heartily,” but not
“humbly agree.” These newspapers are hard to ALBANY, MAY 23, 1885.
We agree with George William Curtis who
says, in the “Easy Chair: " “The impression which CURRENT TOPICS.
the newspaper often leaves upon the observer is that
it has not a high respect for the public. It often UDGE VAN BRUNT has punished the juror, toadies and deprecates and flatters, indeed, but its
Munsell, in the Short case, by sentence to inn- extravagance betrays it. There is a certain tone of prisonment for thirty days, and a fine of $250. Ilis infallibility also, which is entertaining, and which offense consisted in taking a private view of the seems to spring from the same conviction which led premises in question. With their usual rashness, the older sinner to advise the younger, ‘My boy, the newspapers which abused the jury for the ac you will have to lie a good deal, but remember to quittal, now abuse the judge for punishing this lic steadily and consistently.'” juror. We labor under the disadvantage of not being so wise as the newspapers, whose writers pronounce these ex catheilrı opinions.
The newspapers do not confine their attacks to liv
It may be that Judge Van Brunt has exceeded the bounds of mod- ing judges, but they even defame the dead. “ John eration and discretion, but the juror was certainly Judge Folger, in reference to his opinion in the cele
Swinton's Paper" contains an infamous attack on guilty of a grave offense, and deserves a marked
brated case of Lange v. Benedict, 73 N. Y. 12, in an punishment. These superserviceable jurors, who
article entitled “The Befouled Bench," and some anare wiser than the courts and their fellows, stand in
onymous comments thereon, charging that by reason need of some rebuke. The jury box is not the
of this opinion “Folger wrote his name beside Beneplace for the display of enterprise in getting better posted " than the rest of the pancl, and in warp- | always believed that Judge Folger was wrong in
dict's on the list of infamous judges.” We have ing or wresting a verdict. We have seen no evidence that Munsell was corrupt, and it seems to us
that opinion. We said so at the time. But he bethat his comb) might have been sufficiently cut by
lieved he was right, and his character is too high to
be hurt by the libels of this graveyard Guiteau. His the imposition of a fine. But we see no warrant for opinion was unanimously concurred in, and has been condemning the judge's conduct as scandalous
elsewhere approved. It is hardly necessary for us to or “outrageous." We blamed him for his remarks
vindicate the dead judge against this loathsome upon the verdict
, for that was none of his business, aspersion. But it is well to speak of it to illustrate but a contempt of court like this in question the growing and reckless license of the press. deserves a condign punishment. The clever juror, Nothing is safe or sacred. Knowledge is unneceswho controls the verdict by dint of superior inforination or glibness of tongue, is a dangerous element
sary; reason is superfluous; truth is immaterial;
sensation is all that is required. in the administration of justice. It is right to teach such that they must rely on the evidence. Now let us leave the solution of this matter to the The Central Luuc Journal has been telling some courts. If Judge Van Brunt has done wrong it may truths about life insurance, although perhaps it puts be corrected. But do not let lawyers, imitating the things rather too strongly in saying that “American newspaper oracles, howl at the jury in one breath life insurance is a rank fraud." The Western Insurand at the court in the next, for a “l'ailure of ance Rerier hereupon says: “Now the Central Law justice,” which after all is not by any means clear. Journal people do not believe the above, but they The London Lo Times says, of the subject of are determined to be deemed checky and original sentences: “By habit and education the judges No other journal with a reputable prestige was ever are better fitted to form a correct conclusion as to reckless enough to say that American life insurance the requirements of justice in any given case thin is a rank fraud. Therefore we confess that the any other class of the community, while at the same statement is both original and cheeky, notwithtime the presiding judge at a criminal trial has opstanding the circumstance that the brilliant source portunity such as no one else can possess for ac of that pungent originality has been careful to cover quainting himself with every circumstance connected his valuable life with a wholesome amount of with the case.” And the same journal in speaking American life insurance. But then, as we have of Justice Stephen's essay, in the Vineteenth Century, intimated, the Central Lim Journal is not particular on “Variations in the Punishment of Crime," ob what it attacks - when it wants advertising. It is serves: “The learned judge begins with an attack liable to say almost any thing that is erratic, but it upon the critics who base their arguments upon means no real malice. Why, one of these days, ordinary newspaper reports, saying truly that noth when it feels peculiarly neglected, it will shoot off a ing can be more deceptive and incomplete than the dynamite petard to the effect that the American accounts of a trial which appear in the newspapers.' judiciary is a rank fraud." It is not for us to comIn this we heartily and humbly agree, well-know-pose such strises. But we do not tlıink that it is ing that three-quarters of the lay comment on the any argument against the Journal that its editor has subject comes from quarters which are of no author-liis lise insured. We have haul ours insured, and have
Vol. 31 – No. 21.
lost money by bogus companies, and every lawyer built, he should not do the work without reward, knows what a fraud much of American life insur- provided such is the understanding. If however ance is, and how scandalously our common law as the defendant here claimed, the architect volunhelps it along with its doctrine of warranty and the teered his services, with the chances of future emlike. And years ago we dwelt on the abuses of this ployment, it would be different. But it cannot be system.
held that in either case such preliminary work can
be measured by estimates of the costs of the archiLegislatures are bad enough, but Mr. W. H. Lyon, tect's projected building. No man in his senses of Dakota, has bit upon something worse. He calls
will determine on going forward with a factory it “The Dakota Plan," and to use his words, “The until he has ascertained, not only just what he leading idea of the plan is that all extraordinary wants, but what it will cost. It would always be appropriations and all laws of general interest to the for an architect's interest, in such a case as this, if public should be referred to the people themselves the plaintiffs are correct, to make the plan as exto pass upon at annual or perhaps biennial elec-pensive as possible, instead of bringing it within tions.”
Perhaps this would do in Dakota, where bounds. And until not only plans but specificaMr. Lyon assures us the “ citizens are the most
tions are drawn up showing the kind, quality, and intelligent of any State in the Union or any country amount of every class of materials to be used, it in the world,” but we fear it would not answer would be impossible to count the cost, or obtain the elsewhere. We commend this scheme to the con
intelligent views of builders and mechanics. From sideration of Mr. Sterne. It certainly has the merit plans alone the quality of the material could not be of novelty, and as its projector says, “should not got at. They would not show the kind or grade of be rejected because it is new.” But it would be a
brick, stone, wood, or iron work, which might be bonanza for the newspapers and the stump-orators. of expensive or cheap quality. Such plans as were
shown here would go but a little way in showing Judges are differently treated in different com
the character of the building in any respect, and munities, and by different classes. The venerable by themselves could be of no avail except as deterand learned judge Cooley is dropped at the caprice mining the appearance of the front, and the floor or passion of the electors the bar would have arrangements, neither of which have been settled kept him. On the other hand ex-Judge Erskine, of finally. These papers cannot be deemed to bave the Georgia Federal Circuits, is the recipient of a any intrinsic value, and they could not avail dedouble and perhaps unprecedented honor on his fendant in their unfinished condition. They only voluntary retirement. Appointed by President claim plaintiffs could have would be for such time Johnson, at a time when it was always a disgrace
as was actually spent in their work, with the fair for a southern citizen to accept Federal office, and understanding that they should be paid for so much almost a crime to be a Republican there, he, a Repub
as they did, or with such circumstances as would lican, acted so uprightly and impartially, and exhib-compel defendant to the duty of so understanding; ited such learning and industry, that the law- but no custom of architects can be received to fix it yers of the Northern District, without regard to on any such basis as is here set up. It is impossible politics, procured his portrait, for the Atlanta court in reason that it can be assumed as having such a room, on his resignation, and now a similar honor proportion of value to the complete plans and specis conferred by those of Savannah. Any true lawyer ifications and superintendence of a building durwould deem such a dual distinction worth the labor | ing erection. Such a custom, if it prevails, can of a life. We have spoken of Judge Erskine before. bind no one who is not made in some way aware of We need only now refer to his case as an exception and assenting to it. It is too unreasonable to stand to the rule of the prophet at home. As a poet in
alone. It would put every employer at the mercy known to fame says:
of an architect's extravagance in taste and license “Tis sweet to be beloved, I know,
of guessing at estimates which have nothing to But solemn, thus to be revered."
NOTES OF CASES.
In State v. Board of Education, Wisconsin Sup
reme Court, April 28, 1885, 23 N. W. Rep. 102, it N Scott v. Maier, Michigan Supreme Court, April was held that a regulation that cach scholar, when
returning to school after recess, shall bring into the an architect who volunteers his services with the school-room a stick of wood for the fire is not "needchances of future employment cannot recover for sul ” for the government, good order, and efficiency of preliminary sketches which are not accepted, on the the schools, and a scholar cannot be suspended for basis of a percentage on the probable cost of the a refusal to comply with such regulation. The court building. The court said: “There is some reason said : “One can but express surprise tbat
intelfor claiming that if a man is employed to make ligent teacher, or any intelligent board of education preliminary sketches to cnable a land-owner to de- should suffer such a case as this to reach the courts termine what sort of building he may profitabıly erect,
In contesting the sufficiency of this return, and in what style and of what material it should be the learned counsel for the relator insists that the rule