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affect nor apply to any contract that shall be made the defendant has got at least some letters which between husband and wife.” Probably the prohibi- ought to have been treated as the letters of the tion extends only to property not belonging to the plaintiffs, and to have been sent on to them. Instead wife. But the matter is vague.

of doing that the defendant has opened them, and not until some time afterward has he given them to

the plaintiffs, or offered to them the money intended NOTES OF CASES.

for them which was in the letters. There is also a case where money was paid to the defendant for the

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442, where a defendant, formerly in the employ machine was returned, and he did not for some conof the plaintiffs, had been making statements to the siderable time send the money or the sewing machine plaintiffs' customers injurious to their business, and to the plaintiffs. The slefendant having so acted, trying to interfere with their customers making the case is in my opinion one in which it is the duty payments to them, and had notified the post-office of the court to interfere, and to see that he does not, to send any letters addressed to him there to anotlier by reason of his having been employed in the plaintaddress, held, that he should be enjoined from such iffs' house of business, obtain letters which are instatements and interference, and to withdraw such tended for them, and really belong to them, but notice, the plaintiffs undertaking not to open any which have come, under his directions given to the letter adressed to the defendant except at certain postmaster, to his own private address.” Bowen, L. fixed times, with liberty to the defendant to be pres- J., said: “There is a wrong done which is actionent: Cotton, L. J., said: “The court has of late able if it has been committed, and which naturally granted injunction in cases of libel, and why should would, if repeated or persisted in, affect injuriously it not also do so in cases of slander? It is clear that the property or trade of the plaintiff company. It slanderous statements, such as were made to old has been held since the Judicature Act that a plaintcustomers in this case, must have a tendency mate iff is entitled to the protection of the court against rially to injure the plaintiffs' business; they are a wrong of that sort which is contained in a written slanders therefore spoken against their trade. It is document; that is to say, the court will restrain the not necessary therefore in my opinion to show that publication of a libel which is immediately calculoss has actually been incurred in consequence of lated to injure the property and trade of the person them. If they are calculated to do injury to the against whom it is directed. Then can there be any trade, the plaintiffs may clearly come to the court. distinction in principle between a slander which is There is no doubt more difficulty in granting an in-contained in a written document and a slander which junction as regards spoken words than as regards is not? In the cases of Thorley's Cattle Fooil Company written statements, because it is difficult to ascer. v. Massam, and Thomas v. Williams, the court intain exactly what is said. But when the defendant teifered to restrain the slander which was placed is proved to have made certain definite statements upon paper, so that clearly in the case of such writsuch as are mentioned in the order, in my opinion ten slander as is naturally attended with injury to an injunction is properly granted to prevent his re property and business, the court has jurisdiction to peating them. Then the second part of the injunc- interfere, and it appears to me that the same princition, which is in part mandatory, restrains the ple must apply to spoken slander. Then I come to defendant from giving instructions to the postmaster the next question, about the notice to the postas to his letters, and orders him to withdraw a notice master. The defendant changes bis address from that he has already given to the postmaster. Objec- the plaintiff company's oflice to a private residence, tion is taken to that on the ground that it is a man and sends to the postmaster a notice that all letters datory injunction, and that the defendant had a addressed to him at the plaintiffs' office are to follow right to give directions to the postmaster to send him to his own residence. Now, a man has a right, his letters to bis actual address. I need hardly say when he changes his address, to tell the postmaster any thing about the mandatory injunction being to send his own letters after him; but it is obvious granted. This court, when it sees that a wrong is that he has no right to tell the postmaster to send committed, has a right at once to put an end to it, somebody else's letters after him. The question and has no hesitation in doing so by a mandatory here is whether the defendant has not done some injunction if it is necessary for the purpose. Then thing more than tell the postmaster to send his own as to the merits, undoubtedly a man when he changes letters after him — his letters relating to his own his address has a right to give directions to a post private business; and I think he has, because letters master to send on to him his letters, but that as addressed to an agent at the office of his principal sumes that they are his letters; and what we find are frequently addressed to him as a servant, though here, is that the defendant was formerly residing at there may of course be among them private letters the plaintiffs' office as a servant of the plaintiffs, which belong in law to him. There may be signs and a very large proportion of the letters addressed which would show whether the letters belong to the to him were undoubtedly letters relating to the servant or to his master for instance, words writbusiness of the company, though of course there ten on the envelope. But the servant has no right, might be some letters which would be marked merely because letters are addressed to him, to say * private.' By means of his notice to the postmaster that they are his own if there is nothing on the

envelopes to show that they are his own, and not his ing a good presentment of the necessary tableaux. employer's letters. Therefore his notice to the A good actress, moved by a proper spirit toward postmaster is clearly too large, because all the let ber manager, ought to have been ready and willing ters which are aildressed to him at his place of bus to do all in her power to contribute to the promotion iness do not belong to him.” Fry, L. J., said: “1 of that success upon which both so much depend. conceive that the court has plainly jurisdiction to So far the case has been considered upon the law grant injunctions against slander, as well as against applicable to contracts of hiring, without regard to libel At the same time I am not unconscious of the terms of the special contract in this case, which the inconvenience which would result from trying provided, that if upon fair trial, the defendant felt actions for slandler on motions to commit. I think satisfied that the plaintiff was incompetent to perthat requires careful consideration in any case in form the duties for which the defendant had conwhich the court is asked to grant injunction tracted, in good faith, the latter might annul the against slander. Then with regard to the notice contract on two weeks' notice. This clause made to the postmaster. It seeme to me, for the reasons the defendant the sole judge of the competency of given by Bowen, L. J., that the notice was too large, the plaintiff. In the case of Nelson v. Von Bonnhorst, and I come to that conclusion from the very simple 29 Penn. St. 352, it was held that a contract 'to fact that it has induced the postmaster to send to pay whenever in my opinion my circumstances will the defencl:int letters which belong to the plaintiffs. enable me to do so,' imposes no legal obligation Then the question as to who is to open letters is un which can be enforced by action, although the court doubtedly one of considerable difficulty, for this and jury should find that the party was of sufficient reason, that the court is averse from interfering with ability to pay the debt, as by the terms of the cona legal right except so far as is absolutely necessary, tract the clebtor is maile the sole judge of that fact, and in the present case the court would not desire Under the contract in this case, the only question to interfere with the legil right in the letters. But for the jury to determine was the good faith of the that right cannot be ascertained until they are defendant, and therefore the jury were instructed opened; they must be opened by somebody, and that if the defendant was satisfied in good faith that therefore the court has to determine who is to open the plaintiff was incompetent, the defendant had a them. There are many reasons which incluce me to right to dismiss the plaintiff, and in that case the think that the plaintiffs are the proper persons to verdict should be for the defendant, although the open them. In the first place, the letters are all- jury were of opinion that the plaintiff was compedressed to their place of business; and in the next tent to perform her parts. The defendant was not place, there appears to be it presumption prima facie liable for error in her judgment, if in good faith she that most of the letters actressed to the defendant exercised her judgment and acted

upon

it. Having coming there are letters which are addressed to the the power to give judgment, she is not liable for defendant on their business; and lastly, the defend error if she did not act maliciously, although she ant has certainly behaved, with regard to some of may have exercised her power arbitrarily. Doroning the letters, and with i gard to his other relations to v. JcFulien, 18 Penn. St. 331. No one is liable his former employers, in a manner which is not creil for a mistake in the exercise of a discretion conferred itable to him, and which, as between him and the

upon

him. Moore v. School Directors of Cleurjielil, 59 plaintiffs, renders it more expeclient that the open Penn. St. 232. The defendant testified that she was ing should be done by them in his presence than by satisfied that the plaintiff was incompetent, and dishim in their presence." On the latter point, see charged her for that season, as well as others; and Myers v. K’ulamazoo Buggy Co., 30 Alb. Law Jour. she very properly introduced evidence showing that

she has a basis for her judgment as evidence of her

good faith, and for the purpose of showing that she In Cassidy v. Janauschek, Pennsylvania Common

did uot set up her judgment as an afterthought and Pleas, December 13, 1881, it was held that a contract of hiring which provides that an actress may

subterfuge to avoid the consequences of her action, be discharged if the manager is satisfied in good

and she made so strong a presentment that it is not

free from doubt whether the jury ought not to have faith that the actress is incompetent, makes the

been directed to render a verdict for the defendant." manager the sole judge of the competency of the

As to contracts to satisfaction, see Gibson v. Cranage, actress, and if the manager discharged the actress

39 Mich. 19; S. C., 33 Am. Rep. 351, and note, 353; for that reason, he is not liable for error of judy

Wool Reaping and Mouing Muchine Co., 50 Mich. 565; ment exercised in good faith, although the jury s. C., 45 Am. Rep. 57; Werner v. Bergman, 28 should believe that the actress was competent. The

Kans. 60; S. C., 42 Am. Rep. 152, note, 153. particular reason for discharge was the plaintiff's refusal to go on the stage in disguise as a member of the mols in the tragedy of Marie Antoinette (she

INTER-STATE EXTRADITION. probably objected to wearing a mol) cap.) The

I. court said: “In a business which depends so much upon effect produced upon audienceas NE of play acting, it seems reasonable that all the

this country is that players should be subject to a call to assist in mak to inter-State extradition, The authors of the

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Federal Constitution, to prevent the deplorable evils V. Brown, 19 N. W. Rep. 429, and cases citer. which would have resulted from the failure to reg This case also settled another very important quesulate, by a comprehensive and uniform law binding tion, namely, that the demand for the fugitive upon all the States, a matter of such vital import must be made by an appeal to the executive auance to the administration of criminal law, incor- thority of the State, although the Constitution is porated into the Constitution the provisions of entirely silent on that subject. The court say at section 2 of article 4, a person charged in

any page 102: “ The clause in question, like the clause State with treason, felony or other crime who shall in the Confederation, authorizes the demand to be flee from justice and be found in another State, made by the executive authority of the State where shall on demand of the executive authority of the the crime was committed, but does not in so many State from which he had fled be delivered up to words specify the officer of the State upon whom be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the the demand is to be made, and whose duty it is to crime.” The first and all important question is have the fugitive delivered and removed to the whether the imperative language of this provision State having jurisdiction of the crime. But under imposes upon the several States a duty, the per the Confederation it is plain that the demand was formance of which may be enforced by any tribu to be made on the governor or executive authority nal, State or Federal; or whether the duty is one of the State, and could be made on no other deof imperfect legal obligation. That an absolute partment or officer, for the Confederation was only duty, involving no discretion whether the case is a league of separate sovereignties in which cach brought clearly within the language and spirit of State within its own limits held and exercises all this provision, was intended to be devolved upon the powers of sovereignty, and the Confederation the several States, cannot be seriously questioned. had no oflicer, either executive, judicial or ministeIndeed all the authorities support this view of the rial, through whom it could exercise an authority question. Work v. Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 64; S. C., within the limits of a State. In the present Con32 Am. Rep. 345; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. stitution however these powers to a limited extent 66. This duty however has been held by the have been conferred on the general gorernment United States Supreme Court to be a duty of im within the territories of the si veral States. But perfect legal obligation, for the reason that there is the part of the clause in relation to the mode of no constituted legal tribunal vested withi authority demanding and surrendering the fugitive is (with to enforce its performance. For the purpose of the exception of an unimportant word or two) a litthe discharge of this duty the States are independ-cral copy of the article of the Confederation, and ent sovereignties with respect to one another, re it is plain that the mode of the demand, and the sponsible to no superior, and not subject to the official authority by and to whom it was adiressed coercion of any tribunal. This duty is the same in under the Confederation, must have been in the its nature as those duties which are imposed by the minds of the members of the convention when this laws of nations upon the different sovereignties of article was introduced, and that in adopting the the civilized world in their intercourse one with same words they manifestly intended to sanction another. Such duties are of imperfect obligation, the mode of proceeding practiced under the because there exists no common tribunal to which Confederation — that is of demanding the fugitive nations can appeal for the settlement of their con from tne crecutire authority, and making it his troversies; no court of judicature vested with the duty to cause him to be delivereed up." authority to determine their conflicting clainis, and While the governor of a State has in every case with the power of carrying its judgment into exe the undoubted power to refuse to comply with the cution. The case of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 requisition and grant the warrant, yet it is neverHow. 66, settled the doctrine of the exemption of theless his duty to issue his warrant for the apprethe States and their executives from national or hension of an alleged fugitive from justice in every other control in all cases of inter-State extradition. case coming within the scope of the ('onstitution, In this case the governor of Kentucky moved the unless some special reasons exist justifying il reUnited States Supreme Court for a rule on the fusal. The courts have determined what some of governor of Ohio to show cause why a mandamus these special reasons are. It is important that they should not issue commanding him to cause one Wil should be referred to, not because they (in ever be lis Lago, a fugitive from justice, to be delivered up invoked in the courts to support the claim to immuto be removed to the State of Kentucky, having nity from arrest and surrender, but for the reason jurisdiction of the crime with which he was that it is always in the power of the alleged fugicharged. The motion was overruled, with the con tive to obtain a hearing before the governor of the currence of all the justices in the opinion of the State in which he has been or is to be arrested, court, delivered by Chief Justice Taney. The de either after or before the issue of the warrant by cision is summed up in its concluding sentence: such governor.

These rules which have been estab"But if the governor of Ohio refuses to discharge lished by the judiciary for the guidance of executhis duty, there is no power delegated to the gen tive discretion in such cases, though not obligatory eral government, either through the judicial de upon the executive, will ret undoubtedly be obpartment or any other department, to use any coer served and followed in all cases in which they may cive means to compel·him.” To same effect State be properly applied. It therefore becomes neces

sary to inquire what rules have been established his official capacity. The warrant is not process of justifying the governor of a State in refusing to the person holding the office of governor, but a wargrant the warrant in cases where he has undoubt rant issued by an officer. We all agree that Govedly the power to issue it. Iu the first place if the ernor Young had the same power to revoke a waralleged fugitive from justice is held for crime in rant issued by his predecessor that he had to revoke the State to which he has fled, and from which he one issued by himself.” The cases we have been is demanded, the governor has the right to refuse, considering are cases in which it has been held to and should refuse to issue the warrant.

Work v.

be the moral duty of the executive to revoke a Corrington, 34 Ohio St. 64; S. C., 32 Am. Rep. 345; warrant once issued. These rules should therefore Taylor v. Taintor, 16 Wall. 366, 370; Troutman's be invoked before the governor himself.

The fugicase, 4 Zabr. 634; In re Briscoe, 51 How. Pr. 422.

tive can

never avail himself of them upon habeas He may and should refuse to deliver the fugitive corpus. If the decision of the executive is against when he is satisfied that the sole object of the him in cases where the power to grant the warrant prosccution and extradition is to enforce collection { exists, the decision is final and subject to no reof a claim. Work v. Corrington, supra.

In this view. But suppose the executive revokes a warcase the court say on this point: “ The provision rant without any reason for so doing, will it be a was inserted in the articles of Confederation, and good answer to the revocation, on a writ of habeas subsequently in the Constitution, to subserve public corpus, that the governor should not have recalled and not private purposes. The object was to secure the warrant in the absence of any sufficient reason? the punishment of public offenders, and not to en In other words, is the power of the executive to reforce the payment of private claims, whether well voke the warrant circumscribed or unlimited? On or ill founded. To employ this extraordinary pro both principle and authority the power to revoke cess for public purposes tends to secure peace and the warrant must be considered to be as broad and good order, but to prostitute it to the advancement unlimited as the power originally to refuse the of private ends is to bring it into great disfavor. | granting of the warrant. The case of Work v. CorTrue, the theory is that the demanding State will rington, supru, is explicit on this point. The syllahold the offender for trial, even though he be bus clearly states the decision so far as this ques. brought into the State fraudulently or forcibly, and tion is concerned: "Where such warrant has been without process, but experience shows that where revoked by the governor no inquiry will be made the end sought is private the accused is rarely in a proceeding on habeas corpus on behalf of the brought to trial. No satisfactory reason is per- alleged fugitive as to the grounds of such revocaceived why a governor should issue or obcy a tion, although at the time of the revocation the requisition when he is satisfied that the sole object fugitive may have been in the custody of the agent of the party complaining is to enforce the payment of the demanding State." It is therefore the law of a private claim for money. Such an abuse of that the executive has the power not only arbiprocess is equivalent to a fraudulent use of it.” In trarily to refuse the granting of the warrant, but such a case a warrant which has been already also arbitrurily to revoke it after it has been propgranted may be revoked. This was the ground on erly issued. The moment it is revoked the agent which the warrant in the case of work v. Corrington, of the demanding State ceases to have any authorsupra, was revoked, and the court approved and ity to retain the fugitive in his custody, and the sustained the action of the governor in this respect, court on habeas corpus must discharge him. The and expressed its opinion in these most emphatic decision in this case of Work v. Corrington, that the words: “For reasons equally strong, a governor fugitive must be released on hubeis corpus, even from whom such warrant is obtained for the ad- though he was in the custody of the agent of the vancement of private ends fails to discharge his duty demanding State at the time of the revocation of if he neglects to revoke the provision discovering the warrant is unquestionably sound, for the reason the fraucl." The warrant may be revoked even af that while the fugitive remains within the territoter the sugitive has been apprehended and is in the rial limits of the State to which he has fled, he custody of the agent of the demanding State, pro cannot be subjected to the laws or control of the vided he is still within the territorial limits of the State in which he committed the crime. The agent State upon which the demand was made. This is who has him in his custody derives all his authority precisely what was done in the above case, and the to hold him and deprive him of his liberty from action of the governor was approved by the court. the warrant of the governor. The moment that Moreover the revocation need not be made by the warrant is revoked his authority is annulled, and governor who granted the warrant. It may be from that moment his detention of the fugitive is made by his successor in office.

In the above case unlawful. the warrant was issued by Governor Isayes, and While the conduct of the executive in refusing was revoked by his successor, Governor Young. to issue the warrant is subject to no judicial conThe reasoning of the court on this point is brief, trol, yet his decision in granting the warrant is al.. but convincing and unauswerable: “Further ob ways subject to the supervision of the courts, and jection is made that Governor Young had no au unless the case is brought clearly within the scope thority to revoke a warrant issued by Governor of the constitutional provision, and the act of ConHayes. But we have seen that the governor acts in gress passed in pursuance of that provision, the

66

detention of the fugitive will be illegal, and he ishable by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, will be discharged by the court on habeas corpus. was an offense for which the executive of a State In determining whether the governor had authority could issue his warrant to arrest and deliver a fugito issue the warrant it becomes necessary to ascer

tive from justice. tain first of all to what offenses the language of

GUY C. H. CORLISS. the Constitution refers. In other words for what violations of law has the executive the power to

CORPORATION-PURCILA SE OF CAPITAL STOCK surrender a fugitive on demand? This provision of

-REPLE'VIN. the Constitution is very comprehensive. It embraces the case of a person charged with treason,

WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT, SEPTEMBER 23, 1884. felony or other crime.” The question has frequently been before the courts of the different States and

BUTTON V. HOFFMAN.* the United States Supreme Court, and the rule One who by purchase or otherwise becomes the owner of all which has been enunciated by them all, without a

the capital stock of a private corporation does not thereby single dissent, is that the executive has authority to

become the legal owner of its property, and cannot inain

tain replevin therefor in his own name. arrest and surrender a fugitive from justice who

PPEAL from Circuit Court, Jackson county.
has been guilty of any offense which is punished
as criminal by the laws of the demanding State.

Carl C. Pope, for respondent.
In re Hooper, 52 Wis. 699; People v. Brady, 56
N. Y. 182; Brown's case, 112 Mass. 409; Clark's

C. F. Ainsworth and S. U.Pinney, for appellant. case, 9 Wend. 212; People v. Pinkerton, 17 Hun,

ORTON, J. This is an action of replevin in which the 199; State v. Stewart, 20 N. W. Rep. 429 ; Kentucky title of the plaintiff to the property was put in issue by

the answer. In his instructions to the jury the learned v. Dennison, 24 How. 66; In re Voorhis, 32 N. J.

judge of the Circuit Court said: “I think the testiL. 141; Fetter's case, 3 Zabr. 311; Leury's case, 6 mony is that the plaintiff had the title to the propAbb. N. C. 54; People v. Donohue, 84 N. Y. 411. erty." The evidence of the plaintiff's title was that As the question involves the construction of the the property belonged to a corporation known as “The Federal Constitution the judgment of the national Harden & Smith Manufacturing Company,” and that

he purchased and became the sole owner of all of the Supreme Court is of course final. In Kentucky v.

capital stock of said corporation. As the plaintiff in Dennison, supra, it was argued that the provision his testimony expressed it, “I bought all the stock. I was not designed to apply to cases of new offenses own all the stock now. I became the absolute owner created by statute since the adoption of the Consti- of the mill. It belonged at that time to the company, tution, especially where such offenses were not

and I am the company.” There was no other evi

dence of the condition of the corporation at the time. made crimes by the laws of the State upon which

Is this sufficient eridence of the plaintiff's title? We the demand was made. But the court repudiated think not. The learned counsel of the respondent in this palpably erroncous doctrine, and decided that his brief says: “The property had formerly belonged the constitutional framers had exhibited the delib to the Ilayden & Smith Manufacturing Company, but erate purpose to include every offense known to

the respondent had purchased and become the owner the law of the State from which the party charged sole owner.”

of all the stock of the company, and thus became its had fled.” In re Ilooper, supra, the court say: “The From the very nature of a private business corporalanguage of the Constitution of the United States tion, or indeed of any corporation, the stockholders is that the alleged fugitive from justice must be

are not the private and joint owners of its propcharged with treason, selony or other crime.' The erty. The corporation is the real, though artifi

cial, person substituted for the natural person who weight of judicial opinion is that these words em

procured its creation, and have pecuniary interests in bruce any act forbidden and made punishable by it, in which all its property is vested, and by which it the laws of the State making the demand.” In is controlled, managed, and disposed of. It must purPeople v. Brady, supra, the same doctrine is stated chase, hold, grant, sell, and convey the corporate in these words: “The word crime in the clause of property, and do business, sue and be sued, plead and

be impleaded, for corporate purposes, by its corporate the Constitution which has been quoted embraces

The corporation must do its business in every act forbidden and made punishable by the tain way, and by its regularly appointed oflicers and law of a State, and the right of a State to demand agents, whose acts are those of the corporation only as the surrender of a fugitive from justice extends to they are within the powers and purposes of the corall cases of the violation of its criminal law. Felo- poration. In an ordinary copartnership the members

of it act as natural personis and as agents for each nies and misdemeanors, offenses by statute and at

other, and with unlimited liability. But not so with common law, are alike within the constitutional

a corporation; its inembers, ils natural persons, are provision.” In People v. Donohue, supra, it is thus merged into the corporate identity. Ang. & A. Corp., expressed: “The language chosen is broad, and $$ 10, 10, 100, 591, 595. A share of the capital stock of a was plainly intended to embrace every criminal of corporation is defined to be a right to partake, :1ccordfense, and every act forbidden and made punishing to the amount subscribed of the surplus profits ob

tained from the use and disposal of the capital stock able by the law of the State where the crime was

of the company to those purposes for which the comcommitted, and whether such by common law or ex pany is constituted. II., $ 557. The corporation is the press legislative enactment.” In Morton v. Skinner, trustee for the management of the property, and the 48 Ind. 123, it was held that a misdemeanor, pun

*S. C., 20 N. W.Rep. 667.

name.

cer

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