after the 24th June, except when the spring assizes would interfere with the sessions, in which case the sessions are to be appointed to be held on some day not earlier than the 7th March nor later than the 22nd of April (4 & 5 Wm. 4, c. 47). In boroughs, under the Municipal Corporations Act (5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 76, s. 105), in which there is a grant of quarter sessions, such sessions are directed to be holden before the Recorder once in every quarter of a year, or at such other and more frequent times as he may think fit, or as the Queen shall direct. Although such sessions are directed to be held at the times mentioned, and must be so held, there is nothing to prevent their being adjourned from time to time and from place to place, as the justices in their discretion, having reference to the business of the county, may think desirable. And it may be observed that such adjournments, or intermediate sessions, are most usually adopted in large and populous counties.

General sessions are holden before the general body of the justices, under the authority which they derive from their commission, and may be holden as often as the justices deem necessary. Except, however, in the county of Middlesex (where they are still held under the express authority of the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 71) they have fallen into complete disuse, the quarter sessions with their occasional adjournments being found to be more convenient and quite equal to all the requirements of the counties.

It may here be observed that the term "magistrate” is often applied to a justice of the peace. In such case it has no distinguishing meaning, though it is more frequently used as descriptive of those justices who exercise their authority under charter, as in cities and boroughs. When, however, the term is used in the following pages, it will be understood as applying generally to justices of the peace.

CHAPTER II.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURTS OF PETTY SESSIONS.

SUMMARY CONVICTIONS AND ORDERS.

THE practice in the Courts of Petty Sessions will be best described by treating, in their order of succession, the various steps necessary to be taken to perfect a charge to be dealt with upon summary conviction; and in dealing with the subject in this way, it will be convenient to consider convictions and orders as identical in their natures, distinguishing the practice in respect of each in such cases only as their slightly varied natures may at times require. It may here be observed, that although the legislature has in many instances directed that the decision of justices is to be recorded in the form of an order, and although a different rule of interpretation applies to orders than to convictions, the principle which dictates the adoption of the one kind of record rather than the other, is not very intelligible. It has, indeed, been said, that the practical distinction consists in this-that a conviction is the record of an affirmative adjudication upon an information for an offence or act punishable either by a penalty or imprisonment; and that an order is a record of a like adjudication upon a complaint for nonpayment of a sum of money, or for the doing of some other thing. The distinction, however, in principle is very immaterial, since every act of Parliament which is to be enforced by either the one or the other of these judgments directs which of the two is to be used; and the practice

to obtain either the one or the other is for the most part the same.

The choice of remedy.]-Assuming that an offence has been committed, in respect of which justices have jurisdiction, it may be prudent to consider whether or not they have exclusive jurisdiction, since it may occur that the party aggrieved has an option of remedies, and is not bound to seek for redress at the hands of the magistrates, or even that, should he go before them, he has a choice of proceedings. Thus, in the case of an assault and battery, the injured party may bring his action to recover damages, or he may indict his assailant, or he may choose to proceed summarily against him before justices at petty sessions; or should the assault be attended with threats of future violence, he may present articles of the peace. The various considerations which will determine the preference of any one of these proceedings need not here be discussed; suffice it to say, that in such a case, and many others, a choice actually exists, and that in the particular case of an assault, where the complainant merely desires the justices to bind over the defendant, they have no functions to deal summarily with the assault itself, it being the complainant's right to select his own remedy, and if he desire to prefer only articles of the peace, the jurisdiction, in such case of the justices being limited to that proceeding: (Reg. v. Deny, 20 L. J. 189, M. C.)

Before whom, when, and where complaint to be made.] -Supposing the nature of the grievance to be such that the only remedy is by summary conviction, or that this mode is deemed preferable to any other, it will be of importance, before initiating any proceedings, to consider before whom, within what time, or in what locality the complaint or information should be laid. In most cases, the act of Parliament which confers the summary jurisdiction, points out the restrictions as to person, time, and locality; but if no limits are defined, the information may be laid before any justice acting in and

for the county in which the parties may be living, or the offence committed, and this at any period from the commission of the grievance.

Many modern acts of Parliament have directed that the summary proceedings, in given cases, shall take place in the petty-sessional division in which the subjectmatter of the information or complaint has arisen, or in which one of the parties resides; thus, under the Bastardy Act (7 & 8 Vict. c. 101), the application for a summons against the putative father is to be made to a justice acting for the petty-sessional division in which the woman resides; and also under the various licensing acts, and the Highway Act, justices of certain divisions alone have jurisdiction. So, too, the limitations with regard to time within which these proceedings are to be adopted or finally terminated, are frequently provided for by the several acts of Parliament applicable to them; but by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 11, it is enacted, "That in all cases where no time is already or shall hereafter be specially limited for making any such complaint or laying any such information in the act or acts of Parliament relating to each particular case, such complaint shall be made, and such information shall be laid, within six calendar months from the time when the matter of such complaint or information respectively arose." As, however, no complaint should be made or information laid without a careful perusal of the statute upon the subject, and as the question of jurisdiction is one to which the justices will, for their own security, themselves attend, little more need be added in this place.

Practice under the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43-Exceptions.] -The practice at petty sessions upon summary proceedings is now chiefly regulated by the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, entitled, "An Act to facilitate the performance of the duties of Justices of the Peace out of Sessions within England and Wales with respect to Summary Convictions and Orders." This statute, however, by section 35, is declared not to be applicable

1. To any warrant or order for the removal of any poor person chargeable to any parish, &c.

2. Nor to any complaints or orders with respect to lunatics or their expenses, &c.

3. Nor to any information, &c,, under or by virtue of the statutes relating to the excise, customs, stamps, taxes, or post-office.

4. Nor to any complaints, warrants, or orders in bastardy, except as relates to the backing of warrants for compelling the appearance of the putative father, or warrants of distress, or the levying of sums ordered to be paid, or to the imprisonment of the defendant for nonpayment of the same.

5. Nor to any proceedings under the acts regulating or relating to the labour of children and young persons in mills and factories.

From these exceptions it will be seen that a very numerous body of offences is excluded, amongst which may be named those under the acts relating to bastardy (in respect of which, by the 8 Vict. c. 10, a complete body of forms is supplied), beerhouses, customs and excise generally, factories, game, hawkers and pedlars, lunatics, poor, postmasters, post-office, smuggling, wreck, and salvage. Whenever, therefore, an information is to be laid in respect of an offence under any one of these acts, the proceedings under the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43 will be no guide, and the practice will be that which is provided for by the particular acts themselves, or by the old rules of practice as they obtained before the foregoing statute of Victoria.

The practice, therefore, with reference to matters contained in acts passed prior to the foregoing is henceforth to be regulated by such act; statutes subsequently passed, also, where no special directions are given as to proceedings, will be governed in this particular by the same enactment. Care, however, must be taken to ascertain whether or not such subsequent enactment does contain any special directions; since, notwithstanding the ample code of practice contained in the statute