A SPLENDID PARADOX.

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enforced. On the morning of the 17th Sheridan arrived in Washington. The same day at noon he started on his return via Martinsburg, reaching Winchester on the evening of the 18th.

Early had made a reconnoissance quite near to the Union position on the 13th, and at the same time a small force of Union troops was reconnoitring. A collision ensued, with some smart Rebel battery practice, when a division of our army moved out; but the Rebels rather got the best of it, and our force was withdrawn. There was a smart fight on hand for a while, with the strong prospect of a general engagement.

BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK.

We now approach one of the most singular events of the whole war, the most remarkable struggle of modern times. In numerous other cases battles have apparently been lost, yet eventually won; but where is there a parallel to Cedar Creek, or Belle Grove as Early terms it? An army surprised in the night, beaten, routed, driven from the field, losing most of its cannon and all of its camp paraphernalia, many of its frightened fragments fleeing more than a dozen miles: yet on the same day, with a re-enforcement of only one man, fighting against more troops than whipped them in the morning, engaging in a stubborn contest, setting back the current of defeat, driving the victims pell-mell from the conquered field, turning their defeat into flight and an exultant Rebel host into a humiliated, uncontrollable herd of uniformed fugitives; capturing all the enemy's guns, besides recapturing every gun of their own; camping in the old lines at night; finally scourging with the last terrible and irresistible besom of war the armies of rebellion forever from the fair Valley of the Shenandoah?

Such was the battle of Cedar Creek, in which our gallant Phil Sheridan won imperishable renown, and the Fourteenth Regiment bore a conspicuous and honorable part. And this is the way in which it happened:

Wright had posted all the cavalry on the right of the army,

and there Sheridan did not much fear an attack. About the 16th Early secured an accurate sketch of the Union camps, and also re-established his observation and signal station on the end of Massanutten Mountain, overlooking the Union lines. According to Early's account, he was forced by lack of subsistence to fight, or fall back, the work of destruction was telling on the situation; and so he determined to surprise Sheridan. He pretends to utter ignorance of Sheridan's absence, and that he gave orders on the morning of the attack to capture him if possible. The fact was, that the wily general knew exactly when Sheridan left for Winchester, but doubtless did not know exactly when he was to return. Probably he has, for eighteen years, wished that he had never come into possession of the latter bit of knowledge.

Early started a surprise-party which has furnished him food for astonishing reflections ever since. As soon as Sheridan left camp, the Rebel commander began his preparations; and it was a splendid piece of strategy, whoever originated it. The writer has been recently informed by ex-Rebel officers that the credit was not due to Early. Be that as it may, the strategy and the tactics were of a character which deserved success; and, had they triumphed, they would have formed, perhaps, the most brilliant achievement of the war.

Many reasons have been assigned for the failure of ultimate triumph by the Rebel army; while the most important factor, next to the arrival of Sheridan, has been overlooked.

The enemy left his trenches during the night of the 18th, advancing in four columns: Gordon, on the enemy's right, to attack in rear of our left; Kershaw, to attack Crook in front; Wharton, to form on Hupp's Hill for a front attack of the Nineteenth Corps; Rosser, to proceed by the back road, and attack the cavalry on our right. The impression that the Rebel surprise and attack was wholly made in rear of our left is erroneous. The first surprise was in front-of Crook's position. A second surprise followed when Gordon appeared in rear of the Union left.

It must be conceded that Early "took time by the forelock;".

A FEW DISTANCES.

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but precisely what hold he had of "time" just before he let go entirely, twenty hours later, he has never informed us.

When

An intelligent study of the battle requires an appreciation of the distances involved in this remarkable piece of strategy. The distance from Sheridan's position on Cedar Creek to Early's on Fisher's Hill was five and one-third miles. The Union line. from Crook on the left to Averill on the right extended three and three-fifths miles. From the breastworks of the Nineteenth Corps to the bridge where the pike crosses Cedar Creek was one thousand yards. Crook was one and one-sixth miles in advance of the left of the Nineteenth Corps, across the pike and extending almost a mile to the left of it; his second division being more than half a mile to the rear of this position, the first division only occupying the breast works. Gordon marched nearly eight miles in reaching his position in our rear. he was formed for the attack, he was one and one-sixth miles in the rear of the Nineteenth Corps and fifteen hundred yards to the left of the pike. Kershaw formed on this side of Cedar Creek, just above its mouth, eight hundred and forty yards in front of Crook's breastworks. Hupp's Hill, where Wharton began the attack with artillery upon the Nineteenth Corps, was across the deep ravine through which flowed Cedar Creek, a little over nine hundred yards distant. The Fourteenth, which was on the right of the Nineteenth Corps in the front line occupying the breast works, was nine hundred yards to the right of the pike, and one thousand yards from the pike in the left rear where Gordon swept across it in his early onset. Just in the rear of the second division was the first division of the Nineteenth Corps, forming a second line but with no intrenchments. The right of the Nineteenth Corps extended nearly to the ravine through which ran Meadow Brook, six hundred yards to the right of the Fourteenth's position. Across that ravine, nine hundred yards distant, was the left of the Sixth Corps. In the Belle Grove Mansion, six hundred and seventy-five yards to the right rear of the Fourteenth Regiment's position, were the headquarters of Sheridan. Middletown was a little less than two miles from the position of the Nineteenth Corps.

Probably no army turned into its blankets with a more perfect feeling of security than that which possessed Sheridan's troops on the night of October 18. There was the perfect confidence that Early had been so gloriously whipped that he would never dare attack the Union force then in the Valley, and that his only purpose was to maintain a strong defensive.

It must be admitted that he "played it on the Yanks" that morning; but we always remember in that connection that "he laughs loudest who laughs last."

Let us now steal into the hostile camp, and follow their movements. The following is Early's account of the surprise, and, in the essential particulars, is perhaps as near accurate and truthful as Early was capable of being when writing the history of his defeats:

"Gordon was directed to cross over into the bend of the river immediately after dark, and move to the foot of the mountain, where he would rest his troops, and move from there in time to cross the river again, and get in position at Cooley's house, in the enemy's rear, so as to make the attack at the designated hour; and he was instructed, in advancing to the attack, to move for a house on the west side of the valley pike called the Belle Grove House,' at which it was known that Sheridan's headquarters were located. Rosser was ordered to move before day, in time to attack at five o'clock next morning, and to endeavor to surprise the enemy's cavalry in camp. Kershaw and Wharton were ordered to move at one o'clock in the morning towards Strasburg, under my personal superintendence; and the artillery was ordered to concentrate where the pike passed through the lines at Fisher's Hill, and, at the hour appointed for the attack, to move at a gallop to Hupp's Hill, - the movement of the artillery being thus delayed for fear of attracting the attention of the enemy by the rumbling of the wheels over the macadamized road. Swords and canteens were directed to be left in camp, so as to make as little noise as possible. The division commanders were particularly admonished as to the necessity for promptness and energy in all their movements; and they were instructed to press the enemy with vigor after he was encountered, and to allow him no time to form, but to continue the pursuit until his forces should be completely routed. They were also admonished of the danger to be apprehended from a disposition to plunder the enemy's camps by their men, and they were enjoined to take every possible precaution against it . . .

"At one o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Kershaw and Wharton moved, and I accompanied them. At Strasburg, Kershaw moved to the right on the road to Bowman's mill; and Wharton moved along the pike