known as Havana when the casualty befell her, and that the risk under the homeward policy attached the moment she entered within the limits of the port in a state of sufficient seaworthiness. At the same time it was agreed that the outward policies had not expired, but they and the homeward policies were regarded as contracts entirely separate and independent, without influence on one another, without reference to one another. To prevent such an overlapping of policies, underwriters usually employ a clause making mention of the expiry of previous policies as a precedent in some way essential to the attaching of those meant to succeed. There are various forms of this clause ; the one which best expresses the intention is, "The risk not to attach before the expiry of previous policies."

In Haughton v. Empire Marine Insurance Company, 1866,1 the wide geographical range given to "Havana" shows that a considerable freedom is allowed in the interpretation of geographical terms. In documents of marine insurance geographical terms are taken to be intended in their ordinary mercantile sense, that in which business men trading in or with the places named use their names. This mercantile sense must in case of doubt be ascertained from mercantile evidence. As the result of such evidence it has been held (Uhde v. Walters, about 18112) that the Gulf of Finland is in the mercantile world considered to be part of the Baltic Sea, and (Robertson v. Clarke, 1824 3) that in commercial language Mauritius is included among the Indian Islands. In a more recent case (Royal Exchange v. Tod and others, 18924) it was decided by Mr. Justice Romer that goods loaded on board a steamer at a port on the Pacific Coast of Central America are not covered by a policy on goods "from the Pacific" by steamers, which so far as was known by underwriters at the place of insurance had not loaded at any port outside the limits of South America before the voyage on which the loss occurred. The judge was satisfied that

when the slip was signed neither party contemplated any risk except on vessels sailing from South American west coast ports. Similar difficulty may arise in the use of the apparently unambiguous words Europe, Continent (e.g. in the phrase "U.K. Cont."), United States (frequently in the language of some trades restricted to the Atlantic seaboard); in the inclusion of Aden under East Indian ports, of Algiers under French Mediterranean ports. The difficulty in these is to reconcile mercantile custom and geographical description.

As the geographical description of a port may be found, when tested by commercial usage, to be inadequate or too comprehensive, similarly the official description may fail. The port of Runcorn is for custom-house purposes within the limits of the port or custom-house district of Liverpool. Consequently, as far as revenue is concerned, a ship loading both at Runcorn and at Liverpool is loaded entirely in the port of Liverpool. But as regards marine insurance it has been decided (Brown v. Tayleur, 1835;1 Harrower v. Hutchinson, 1869 2) that a policy covering a vessel from “a port of loading in the U.K." does not cover a ship partly loaded at Liverpool and partly at Runcorn. Each of these

places is regarded as one port, separate and distinct from the other. It is only in a matter of official arrangement and convenience that they are regarded as one; by commercial usage they are not one place.

An insurance at and from a named port will not cover a vessel or cargo during a period of undue and unreasonable delay at that port. The transit between the termini is, for the ship, regarded as the aim and object of its existence, and the stay at one of the termini is only justifiable in so far as it is necessary for the undertaking of the passage. Consequently idle delay at the port of commencement of the voyage will discharge the underwriter (Tindal, C. J., in Mount v. Larkins, 1831). But if the delay is caused by genuine preparations for the voyage, such as necessary or desirable repairs, etc., the risk continues covered 2 L. R. 4 Q.B. 523 & 5 Q.B. 584. 38 Bing. 108.

1

4 A. & E. 241.

(Motteux v. London Assurance, 1739). Similarly, for goods, the object of loading them on the vessel being their conveyance to the other terminus of the voyage, the vessel must not be regarded as nothing more than a mere floating warehouse; she is not that, but a vehicle or transport whose essential function is to carry from one port to another. In Hamilton v. Shedden, 1837,2 where a vessel engaged in the palm oil trade, with permission to act as a tender to other vessels in the same employ, was detained over twelve months in the Benin River, the delay was held to be unreasonable. Thus, whenever delay is unreasonable in length, or is due to causes not connected with the completion of the voyage, it is held to alter the voyage in a way not in the contemplation of the underwriter; just as much as if after starting on the voyage the vessel turned aside, intending all the time to complete the voyage after doing something else; the delay and the turning aside are both classed as deviations.

Similarly, in the course of the whole voyage due diligence to complete the venture must be observed. Undue delay on the voyage, and more particularly at port of call and before discharge at port of discharge, will alter the character of the voyage as respects both ship and cargo.

A closer definition of the beginning and end of the venture as respects ship as well as goods occurs later in the policy and will be discussed in its proper place. Meanwhile there is no doubt that the policy was originally intended to cover only marine risks; all additions and adaptations intended to extend its operation to cover land risks are essentially modern, and do some sort of violence to the general sense of the document. But the reasonable wants of business have had to be met. An inland manufacturer's goods practically pass from his control when once they are loaded on the railway trucks at his siding; a merchant's, when they are passed over to the railway or other carrier. On the Continent of Europe where railway, canal, lake, and river transit form by far the most important part of the carrying done, the wants of the merchant have 23 M. & W. 49.

1

I Atk. 545.

been met by the institution of companies for the insurance of such risks as their goods are exposed to, or by the special authorisation of marine insurance companies to extend their operations to cover such risks. As a natural consequence special forms of policy have been devised for such business. In England, on the other hand, the smallness of the country and the nearness of the great producing districts to the seaports, reduce the inland risk to such comparative insignificance that it has hardly ever been thought worth while to define its extent and content with any exactness. Such uncertainty has sometimes been found awkward.

CHAPTER III

THE POLICY: PART I continued

Common English Policy continued, General Description of Subject Matter Insured, Duration of Risk on Goods and Ship, including Touch and Stay and Deviation Clauses.

Upon any kind of goods and merchandises, and also upon the body, tackle, apparel, ordnance, munition, artillery, boat and other furniture, of and in the good ship or vessel called the . .

The earliest form of marine policy seems to have been devised for the insurance of goods only, but the extension of protection to shipowners had become usual long before the date when the text of the ordinary English policy was fixed. That text was therefore so drawn as to be applicable both to goods and ship. The way in which this has been done is to make the standing printed text cover both, and to designate in writing at the foot the particular object intended to be covered by the policy.

(a) Goods and Merchandises.-If the written designation of cargo is not more explicit than these general words, or if either of these words is merely repeated at the foot, the underwriter is held to have willingly acquiesced in the loose description, and to have taken his chance of the nature of the cargo. There are only two points which he can open in such a case; he can demand satisfactory proof that the assured has an actual property in the interest insured, and he can insist that the goods or merchandises be carried in the place properly belonging to them, namely