Justices for

adjoining counties, boroughs,

&c. may act in the one

2 J. P. 31.

It is objected (S.) to this section, that it does not provide that a warrant granted on a Sunday may be executed on a Sunday. "Oddly enough," (as the gentleman himself says), he seems to forget that this statute was framed for the purpose of defining the duties of justices only, and not those of constables. The duty of a constable, as to apprehending a party under a warrant on a Sunday, is already sufficiently defined and provided for by statute 21 Car. 2, c. 7, s. 6, above mentioned, and the cases decided upon it.

V. And be it enacted, that in cases where a justice of the peace for any county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place, shall be also justice of the peace for a county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place for the other. next adjoining thereto or surrounded thereby, it shall and may be lawful for such justice of the peace to act as such justice for the one county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or other place, whilst he is residing or happens to be in the other such county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or other place, in all matters and things herein before or hereafter in this Act mentioned; and that all such acts of such justice, and the acts of any constable or other officer in obedience thereto, shall be as valid, good, and effectual in the law to all intents and purposes, as if such justice at the time he shall so act as aforesaid were in the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or other place for which he shall so act; and all constables and other officers for the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place for which such justice shall so act as aforesaid, are hereby authorized and required to obey the warrants, orders, directions, act or acts of such justice which in that behalf shall be granted, given, or done, and to do and perform their several offices and duties in respect thereof, under the pains and penalties to which any constable or other officer may be liable for a neglect of duty; and such constable or other peace officer, or any other person apprehending or taking into custody any person offending against law, and whom he lawfully may and ought to apprehend or take into custody, by virtue of his office or such justice otherwise, in any such county, riding, division, liberty,

Constables,

&c. apprehending

offenders in

one such county, &c. may take

them before

any

county, &c.

justice of

city, borough, or place, may lawfully take and convey in the adsuch person so apprehended and taken as aforesaid to and Joining before any such justice of the peace for such county, riding, if he be a division, liberty, city, borough, or place, whilst such jus- both. tice shall be in such adjoining county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place as aforesaid; and the said constables and other peace officers, and all such other persons as aforesaid, are hereby authorized and required, in all such cases, so to act in all things as if the said justice of the peace were within the said county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place for which he shall so act.

NOTE.

The law upon this subject, before this statute, was imperfect. By stat. 28 Geo. 3, c. 49, s. 1, where a justice of the peace was a justice for two or more adjoining "counties," he might act in one for the other. But this was, by the terms of the Act, confined to counties, and did not extend to ridings or divisions of counties, liberties, cities, boroughs, or other places having a separate commission of the peace; so that a magistrate for a riding in Yorkshire, who was also a justice of the peace for an adjoining county, could not in strictness act in one for the other; and the same as to cities, boroughs, &c. this section, the defect is fully remedied; and every person who is a justice of the peace for two districts adjoining to each other, or the one surrounded by the other, no matter whether such districts respectively be counties, ridings (meaning the ridings of the county of York), divisions (meaning the divisions of the county of Lincoln), liberties, cities, boroughs, or any other place having a separate commission of the peace,-may act in one of these districts for the other.

But by

may act for

or place of

VI. And be it enacted, that it shall be lawful for any Justices for justice or justices of the peace acting for any county at a county, &c. large, or for any riding or division of such county, to it in an adact as such at any place within any city, town, or other joining city precinct, being a county of itself, or otherwise having exclusive exclusive jurisdiction, and situated within, surrounded 2 J. P. 31. by, or adjoining to any such county, riding, or division respectively; and that all and every such act and acts, matters and things, to be so done by such justice or justices within such city, town, or precinct, as justice or justices

jurisdiction.

Proviso.

for such county, riding, or division respectively, shall be as valid and effectual in law, as if the same had been done within such county, riding, or division respectively, to all intents and purposes whatsoever: provided always, that nothing in this Act contained shall extend to give power to the justices of the peace for any county, riding, or division, not being also justices for such city, town, or other precinct, or not having authority as justices of the peace therein, or any constable or other officer acting under them, to act or intermeddle in any matters or things arising within any such city, town, or precinct, in any manner whatsoever.

NOTE.

The law upon this subject, also, was imperfect, before the passing of this statute. By stat. 28 Geo. 3, c. 49, s. 4, a justice of the peace acting for a county at large, might act as such at any place within a city, town or other precinct, being a county of itself, and situated within, surrounded by, or adjoining to any such county at large. This being confined to cities, towns and precincts which were counties of themselves, it was thought necessary afterwards, by stat 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 63, to enact, that any justice of the peace acting for any county at large, or for any riding or division of a county in which there are several and distinct commissions of the peace, might act as a justice for such county, riding or division, in sessions or otherwise, at any place within any city, town or other precinct, having exclusive jurisdiction, but not being a county of itself, and situated within, surrounded by, or adjoining to, any such county, riding or division. So that a magistrate for a county might act for it in any city, town or place having exclusive jurisdiction, whether such city, town or place were a county of itself or not; but a magistrate for a riding or division of a county could not act for it in such city, town or place, if such city, town or place were a county of itself. This was evidently not intended; and therefore in the present section the defect is remedied, by enabling justices for any county, riding or division, to act for it in any city, town or other precinct within it, or adjoining to it, having exclusive jurisdiction, whether such city, &c. be a county of itself or not.

The proviso at the end of this section, is the same as one contained in the statute above-mentioned, 28 Geo. 3, c. 49, s. 4, and 1 & 2 Geo. 4, c. 63..

detached

counties.

VII. And whereas doubts have arisen whether the Authority of powers given to justices by an Act passed in the session justices in of parliament held in the second and third years of the parts of reign of her present Majesty, intituled "An Act for the better administration of justice in detached parts of counties," are applicable to cases of summary jurisdiction and to acts merely ministerial: be it hereby declared and enacted, that all the acts of any justice or justices, and of any constable or officer in obedience thereto, shall be as good in relation to any detached part of any county which is surrounded in whole or in part by the county for which such justice or justices acts or act, as if the same were to all intents and purposes part of the said county; and all constables and other officers of such detached part, are hereby required to obey the warrants, orders, and acts of such justice or justices, and to perform their several duties in respect thereof, under the pains and penalties to which any constable or other officer may be liable for a neglect of duty.

NOTE.

This section was introduced in the House of Lords. The stat. 2 & 3 Vict. c. 82, on which the doubt above-mentioned has arisen, enacts (s. 1) that it shall be lawful for any justice or justices of the peace, acting for any county, to act as a justice or justices of the peace in all things whatsoever concerning or in anywise relating to any detached part of any other county, which is surrounded in whole or in part by the county for which such justice or justices acts or act; and that all acts of such justice or justices of the peace, and of any constable or other officer in obedience thereto, shall be as good, and all offenders in such detached part may be committed for trial, tried, convicted, and sentenced, and judgment and execution may be had upon them, in like manner as if such detached part were to all intents and purposes part of the county for which such justice or justices acts or act; and all constables and other officers of such detached part are hereby required to obey the warrants, orders, and acts of such justice or justices, and to perform their several duties in respect thereof, under the pains and penalties to which any constable or other officer may be liable for a neglect of duty. The doubt

seemingly arising upon this Act was, that it extended only to indictable offences, and did not extend generally to the acts and duties of magistrates, such as their summary jurisdiction, and their acts which are merely ministerial.

There is another and subsequent Act, not mentioned here, namely, stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 61, which, after reciting that there exist in England and Wales parts of counties detached from the main body of the county, and that delay and hinderance to the administration of justice ensue, and inconvenience in other respects, and that it was desirable to remedy the said evil,enacts, by sect. 1, that from and after the 20th October then next, every part of any county in England or Wales, which is detached from the main body of such county, shall be considered, for all purposes, as forming part of that county of which it is considered a part for the purposes of the election of members to serve in parliament as knights of the shire, under the provisions of stat. 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 64. The doubt here is as to the meaning of the word "detached"; if it mean a part of a county, wholly detached and separated from the county to which it actually belongs, away and apart from it altogether, and surrounded by some other county or counties, such as the district of Islandshire, including the Farne islands and Monkhouse, which is part of the county of Durham, but is locally situated in Northumberland,-such as Bedlingtonshire, which is also part of Durham, but situate in Northumberland, such also as Craikshire, part of Durham, which is situate in the North Riding of the county of York,―and very many other places which might be mentioned, then it would appear that there was no occasion for this section, the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 61, s. 1, having already provided for the doubt recited in it. Now, on consulting the 2 & 3 W. 4, c. 64, s. 26, above referred to, we find it enacted, that the isolated parts of counties in England and Wales, described in schedule M, shall be considered as forming parts of the counties respectively mentioned in the fourth column of schedule M; and that every part of any county in England and Wales, which is detached from the main body of such county, but for which no special provision is hereby made," shall be considered as forming part of that county, whereby such detached part shall be surrounded," or, if surrounded by two or more counties, then as forming part of that county with which it has the longest boundary. Therefore it appears that, construing the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 61, s. 1, and 2 & 3 W. 4, c, 64, s. 26, as one Act, the stat. 7 & 8 Vict. c. 61, s. 1, really provided for the doubt expressed in the recital of the above section. However there can be no harm in the above enactment; it merely renders that which was certain doubly sure. The clause was introduced in the Lords by a noble peer of great talent, and a most active member of that house, who is

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