formation be expressly required to be in writing, it need not be so taken; and this Act is silent upon the subject; also, by sect. 8, it is expressly enacted that it shall not be necessary that the complaint shall be in writing unless required to be so by the particular statute on which it shall be framed; and from these data, the gentleman jumps to the conclusion that "therefore it will be advisable" that both information and complaint shall be in writing. But this is not all; he gives as a reason for this advice, that the statute gives a form of complaint, whereas there is no such form in the statute or its schedule. From this specimen of his practical notes, and from his groundless criticisms, the profession and the magistracy may judge for themselves how far they can trust to this gentleman's guidance in the construction they should give to these Acts, or the manner in which they should perform those of their duties which are to be regulated by them.

There are some subjects, which have been discussed in our legal periodicals, relative principally to the applicability of the second of these Acts to certain cases within the jurisdiction of Justices of the peace. I have ventured humbly to offer my opinion on these subjects in a note at page 136, taking care to state my reasons for the opinion I entertain and express, so that my readers may judge whether or not I am correct.

It will be remarked that in the two first of these Acts, the defendant is in all cases designated by the word person," including of course females as well as males, but is afterwards referred to by the pronoun "he" or "him,"

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throughout the section. The masculine pronoun here, however, does not control the meaning of the word "person," or restrict it to the masculine gender; but the two first of these Acts must be deemed to apply to female as well as male persons indiscriminately. This is particularly provided for by stat. 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 28, s. 14; and, indeed, in this instance, would be so at common law.

In conclusion, I beg to say that I have attended carefully to this edition as it has passed through the press, in order to ensure its correctness, and to make it worthy of the extraordinary favour with which the last edition has been received by the profession, the magistracy, and the public.

J. F. A.

TEMPLE.

PREFACE

TO THE

FIRST EDITION.

HER Majesty's present Attorney-General has, by these Acts done more for the due administration of criminal justice throughout England, than has ever yet been done by any person, with the single exception perhaps of Sir Robert Peel. Even the statutes called Peel's Acts, although well designed, well executed, must yield the palm of real downright utility to these Acts: Peel's Acts gave with certainty the definitions of the different offences in the nature of larceny and malicious mischief; Lord Lansdowne's Acts, those relating to offences against the person; but these Acts create a whole code of practice for Justices of peace out of session, both with relation to indictable offences generally, and to summary convictions and orders, and provide for the fair and reasonable indemnity of these same Justices in the execution of their several duties. And when we consider that more than half of the criminal law of England is administered by Justices of the peace out of sessions, we may learn to estimate and appreciate the importance of these Acts, which give the greatest facility to the Justices in the execution of their very onerous duties, enable them to execute them with certainty and correctness, create a uniformity of practice in this respect throughout the kingdom, and give a fair and reasonable protection, and consequent confidence, to Justices in their administration of the law. Nothing has hitherto been attempted, which is likely to have so beneficial an effect on the administration of the criminal law of the country, as these three Acts. They

insure the administration of it in the true English spirit of fairness towards the accused, at the same time that they repress and punish the crime with certainty, and give every fair and necessary security and protection to those to whom the duty of doing this is intrusted.

The first of these Acts relates wholly to the duties of Justices of the peace out of quarter sessions, with respect to indictable offences :-the information, the summons or warrant to apprehend, the examination of the prosecutor and witnesses, the binding of them over to prosecute or give evidence, and the bailing or commitment of the accused. The first five sections treat principally of the jurisdiction of Justices of the peace out of sessions, in relation to indictable offences. Formerly they had jurisdiction of treason, felony, and misdemeanors against the peace, or tending to a breach of it, but not of misdemeanors which were not against the peace, such as perjury, &c.; but now by this Act they have jurisdiction of all indictable offences whatsoever, whether against the peace or not. Formerly they had jurisdiction only of offences committed within their own county or other jurisdiction; now they have jurisdiction of them, if committed any where within England or Wales :-of offences within their own county, &c., they have jurisdiction, no matter where the offender may happen to be; and of offences committed elsewhere, they may take cognizance, if the offender be, or be supposed or suspected to be, within their jurisdiction. And where an offender is thus brought before a Justice of peace, charged with an offence committed out of the Justice's jurisdiction, the Justice takes the examination of any witnesses who may happen to be within his jurisdiction, and binds them over to give evidence at the trial; and if their evidence be sufficient, he at once commits the offender for trial to the gaol of the county, &c. where the offence is alleged to have been committed, and sends the depositions to the clerk of the peace or other proper officer; but if there