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carrying it into execution. The consequence is, that in the moral science of the law we never make an advance, because we never generalize, and have not persons who (as moral, political, or scientific men do in their peculiar line) interest and concern themselves in observing the effect of the law-whether the instrument we have destined for a certain duty is calculated to perform it well. This should be one of the great duties of the Minister of Justice. Let it be the duty of men, appointed by him for the purpose, to look through all the law, civil and criminal, and collect from the authentic records of past cases those practical conclusions which will serve to guide us in the improvement of the machinery of the law, and in the law itself, in order to fit it to the existing state of society. Then, with a proper division of labour, the result will be a great improvement in our criminal statutes, respecting which, since this subject was agitated, the Home Secretary has in some degree imitated the practice abroad, and from which most important conclusions have been drawn. But the same would take place in the civil branch of our law. In countries where these legal experiments are made, legal maxims and general principles have assumed a more expanded and distinct form-in other words, the form of a Code; and the experience thus acquired is applied to each particular article and subdivision of the code itself. The effect of such a course would be to show, that in a specified time there have been so many suitors, so many actions, so many questions, on this or that particular expressed rule; and from those we derive this conclusion, that there may be an ambiguity in such a particular expression, and that the rule ought to be expressed in such or such a manner, in order to cut off this source of litigation. Such would be the result if that parental care were applied by government to those moral rules (for laws are such) which it lays down for the guidance of its subjects. The government would endeavour to ascertain if those rules are easily understood; if they are capable of a quick, ready, and economical application; or if any improvement can be effected in the rule itself, or the machinery of its application. Now, would any one affect to say that what I have been here describing is not the

duty of a government, or that it might not be most easily and advantageously effected in a country like this? Is it not consistent with a very high degree of moral science, and a high degree of civilisation? The answer to each of those questions would be so obviously in the affirmative, that every man would naturally say, "Is it necessary to ask a question, the answer to which is so obvious?" But that question has been put to the government again and again, and the answer is simply nothing. Every thing is asked, nothing is responded. But there is a still more crying necessity for this in a country like ours than in other countries. We depend here, altogether, for the application and development of our principles of our laws-in other words, for our practical law-on the reports of decided cases; and yet we resolutely refuse to allow the results of these cases to be put into any abstract form. Many persons would agree with me in thinking that it is right they should be so embodied; but if for that form of expressing it you substitute the term "Codification," which only expresses shortly what the other expresses in a roundabout way, immediately there arises a prejudice, a reluctance, an indisposition to act, and certainly nothing will be done.

Many persons talk about codification without the least notion of the meaning or effect of the word. It is the characteristic and the merit of our law that it is always entangled with facts; but, on the other hand, it often happens that the law is overlaid by the facts of the case. The judges studiously avoid saying any thing more than the facts before them imperatively require; the result of which is, that the law and fact are mixed up in what are called "Precedents," the difficulty of extracting a rule from which is exceedingly great; and if you watch the proceeding of the courts you will see the great amount of judicial time consumed by this. An advocate knows that a certain rule has been enunciated, but is uncertain where to find it; he therefore cites A. v. B., C. v. D., and so on, to the end of the alphabet; and applies this laborious process to show that such and such is the rule. It is frequently extracted with great difficulty, and often with some uncertainty; for the opposite counsel says there were

some particular facts in the cases cited which are not in the case at the bar; the judges accede to the distinction suggested, and say the cases are different; and that dictum must be interpreted secundum subjectam materiam, so that the unfortunate rule is often maimed and mutilated in extracting it from the mass of rubbish in which it is involved. Why should not all this be submitted to men able to examine and comprehend the authorities, and embody the rule to be derived from them in one single abstract proposition, which should remain a neat, ready, and applicable instrument, fit to be used at all times? But this process, so simple and so natural, and the principle of which you are obliged to apply so constantly, is only codification. Now, one duty of the Minister of Justice would be, to take the decisions of the current year in connection with those of past times, and enunciate and express, in a compact form, those general rules for which, as the law stands, you are obliged to apply to authority whenever you want to deduce a rule to be applied to the case before you.

There is one circumstance which renders this more particularly requisite now than in former times. We have seen, in the last few years, new relations of society arise; new combinations of men, in forms never known before; and we have seen the law in a state of utter inability to meet them. The consequence is, that the law has, as it were, ebbed and flowed sometimes in one direction, then in the opposite; at one time flowing to the eastward, and overwhelming whole families in ruin; and then ebbing to the westward, admitting that it had been wrong in setting in the former direction. The reason of that was, that there was not in our constitution a body of men armed with authority to take the different cases as they arise, and see if, owing to peculiar circumstances, it has become requisite to lay down some new principle by authority, and with that view take some case to the highest tribunal, and there have it settled once for all. For, in England, although society has the greatest possible interest in the results of particular cases, yet, whether from those cases shall accrue benefit to society, depends entirely on the litigant parties to them. For example, a case is erroneously

decided by one of the ordinary Courts of Law, or one of the Vice-Chancellor's. A rule of great mischief is established by that decision, but it does not suit the litigant party who has been defeated to carry it farther; the consequence is, that it passes into a precedent, so that any judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction, before whom the same point is raised on some future occasion, says he is bound by that decision, and he accordingly acts upon it. Thus matters go until some remarkable case arises, when the mischief is remedied; but that consequence does not always follow, for oftentimes even a superior court is obliged to give continuance to an error, from the inconvenience that would arise from abandoning a long-settled rule. All this is mischievous in the highest degree; but all the mischief arises from the government not exercising the sort of control I have pointed out. As a remedy, I would arm the body of men of which I have spoken, with authority, whenever they find a decision such as I have described, with the power of stating a case in an abstract form, in order that matters of great importance to the community may be settled at once. But how stand matters at present? It has occurred to me again and again to bring cases to the House of Lords, with the view of settling a point on which there was a series of conflicting authorities; and I have found as much difference of opinion intra muros as extra muros, so that, after the appeal was heard, the law was in a worse condition than before. All this arises from the absence of a body armed with the superintending power I have described.

I have dwelt so long on this topic that I have hardly time to refer to the others to which I intended to allude. As connected with the previous subject, I must remark that the important function of preparing measures for the improvement of the law, ought not to be left to the imperfect struggles of gratuitous, and often dilettanti, amenders of the law; but that, in my judgment, the executive should assert its right and duty to assist parliament in the construction of statutes, and protect us from the disgraceful exhibitions of verbiage to be found in so many of them. You will not, however, wonder

at the present state of things, when I tell you that, while in the House of Commons, I have been compelled to draw up on the instant, and write on the back of my hat, clauses of proposed enactments which have afterwards been put on the statute book. Is that the way in which legislation ought to be conducted? And yet that is the way in which the greatest part of our legislation is compelled to be conducted! This, and the kindred subject of codification, are those to which I trust much of the attention of this Society will be directed. I trust that we shall compare our own legislation with the legislation of other countries, and learn from them what state of things might exist here; and, having obtained that knowledge, establish a body of men whose duty it should be to observe the law, generalize results from it, and give effect to conclusions which would be most important for the general benefit, and the peace and welfare of the empire at large.

But, while insisting on the necessity of what I have thus suggested, I cannot but feel sensible that the only mode of extending the knowledge of the judicial sciences in this country, and introducing into them a more enlarged, enlightened, and philosophical spirit, is that by which all reforms in other departments of the intellectual world must be soughtI mean the education of the future professors of those sciences; and, as that lies at the root of every thing that can be desired, I wish to direct the attention of the Society during the next year to this also. This is another of those things which, while they are acknowledged to be true in the abstract, are not followed up by any apparent desire to put them in exercise. You know how (until the last few years) students were brought up to the bar. I have known many of the finest intellects so disgusted at the profession in its origin, that they have turned from it in dislike, as unworthy the attention of a cultivated mind and high order of intellect. How could it be otherwise? A young man comes from the university, where, unfortunately, the duty of making ethical knowledge the introduction to jurisprudence has not been followed out; though one would think that one duty of the university is to train the student to see the connection

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