tors of Bletchingley, to grant him voices, was for that and other offences sent to the Tower, and was declared incapable of being elected for the borough for the vacancy. That the crown, which often resorted to violence and underhand practices with returning officers, also sometimes interfered by corrupt practices when it had peculiar objects to accomplish, appears from the instance related by bishop Burnet, in his "History of the Reformation," that Gardiner, bishop of Winchester, in the time of queen Mary, sent to the emperor, to inform him that, unless great sums of money were sent over for carrying the elections of the second parliament of queen Mary, the opposition would be such that the queen must lay down all thoughts of marrying his son. It accordingly appears that the emperor raised and transmitted the sum of 1,200,000 crowns for this purpose, a sum almost incredible, amounting to £400,000 of our money, and probably equivalent in influence to four times the amount in the present day. These instances are, however, rare; the absence of any definition of, or allusion to, the offence in our earlier text writers, and above all, the silence of our statute book until after the revolution, show that corruption, although, as lord Mansfield says, always a misdemeanour at the common law, was then comparatively exceptional.

It was when commercial wealth had raised a class to influence unknown before, and political power became an object of ambition, that legislation on the subject took place. A practice of throwing the expense of contested elections on the candidates had crept in, and had become so recognised an usage that we find, as early as the year 1681, the thanks of the House given to constituencies which had returned their members free from charge in these terms:-"It being represented to the House by several members that many counties, cities, and boroughs, have freely, without charge, elected many of the members in this present parliament, according to the ancient constitution, wherefore the House doth give them thanks for such election." Members had first released their constituents from the charge of paying their wages, secured to them by a long series of statutes, which, often pro

posed to be repealed, soon after fell into desuetude. In the debate on the treating resolutions in 1677, the changed state of affairs was well described by Mr. Walter, who, in reference to the complaint of the mover, "that the expenses of elections are grown so vast that it goes beyond all bounds," considered the changes in the country, and then said: "Times are much changed now. Formerly the neighbourhood desired him (the member) to serve, there was a dinner, and so an end; but now it is a kind of empire. Some hundred years ago some boroughs sent not, they could get none to serve, but now it is in fashion, and a fine thing they are revived;" and ends his speech with a statement which is, one would think, applicable to the present time: "there is no appeal from us, we judge elections with impunity, and what we should take most care of we take least." It is clear then that, previous to any statutory legislation on the subject, the views of the relation of the member to his constituents were much changed. Instead of being paid, he was expected at least to forego his wages; instead of being returned free of expense, expenditure on his part was, if not sanctioned, at least connived at; and the treating resolutions, the basis of the subsequent legislation, aimed rather at the limitation than the suppression of expenditure. It is unnecessary to dilate on the effect of those resolutions, or of the treating act which followed; suffice it to say that the interpretation given to that enactment, the limitation of its application to entertainment provided for voters after the vacancy, and the tacit permission accorded to the expenditure of large sums in the entertainment of those who, having no voices at the election, yet had influence over the possessors of the franchise, rendered it nugatory to prevent practices which Serjeant Maynard had early designated as lay simony.

To advert at length to the legislation on the subject of bribery would be superfluous. Its defects are traceable to its narrow definitions, to the tenderness shown to the briber, and the severity manifested to the recipient--a course of dealing which has rendered public opinion hostile to enforcing the law. The statute of 2 Geo. III., cap. 24, passed with the

same views as the treating act, though containing some salutary changes in the definition of bribery, left many practical evils unprovided for.

Thus it was a crime in a voter to ask for a bribe, but it was decided that an offer unaccepted did not bring the offence within the provisions of the statute. It was forbidden to the voter to ask for or to accept a loan, office, or employment, but not for the candidate to proffer them, no offence being created under the statute unless the offer were accepted, though the solicitation to commit a misdemeanour is a common-law offence. Gifts made after the election, unless a previous contract could be proved, were protected, and thus an open and avowed system of giving head-money prevailed -a practice only rendered bribery by later legislation; and, no means being provided that proceedings should be instituted at the cost of the state, the statute entirely failed to effect the objects for which it was passed.

Some of the more glaring defects were remedied by the subsequent statute of 49 Geo. III., but within twenty years after the passing of the statute of the 2nd Geo. II., Tindal complains that "in the election of 1747, from the increase of wealth and the riches amassed by contractors and others during the war, corruption was more rife than ever, and the statute had signally failed to accomplish its objects." In fact, the legislature had only attempted palliatives, and not struck at the root of the evil; the law, as administered by the House, varied with the political exigencies of the moment, and elections were maintained or avoided in conformity with the views of the minister, and rarely with reference to the law or facts of the case. The act, while it professed to punish the briber and the bribed, left untouched the question of what was a legal expenditure, and, under colour of the doubt, bribery remained unquestioned and unassailed; and whilst it has proved most difficult, except in glaring cases, to distinguish between legal and illegal payments, corruption seems to have thriven the more the legislature attempted to arrest it.

It is true that most of the defects of previous legislation, in

the way of definition of corrupt practices, have been cured. by the Corrupt Practices Act, and a better system of penalties and disqualifications provided, but the grave evil remains of legalising an outlay under cover of which corruption is easily resorted to. Many other defects remain. The repeal of the provision of 7 & 8 Geo. IV., invalidating the vote of a person employed at an election, has enhanced the practice of such employment, and rendered the detection of a colourable engagement more difficult; and has not only increased expense, but given the voters a pecuniary interest in having a contest, while the provision throwing the cost of an unsuccessful prosecution on the prosecutor, and preventing his recovery of his expenses unless he enters into a recognisance to pay the costs of the defendant in cases of acquittal, has effectually discouraged all attempts to bring offenders to justice. It has also had the effect of throwing doubt on the desire of the legislature to punish such offences, no good reason being assigned for the distinction in this respect between this and other misdemeanours.

Under the system as at present established, the candidate is called on to pay the expenses necessarily incident to an election, including the hustings and poll clerks, and, by usage, fees to the returning officer for the discharge of his duty; he is permitted, by express legislation, to contribute to the expenses of registration, and of the charitable institutions of his constituents. He may expend any sum he pleases in retaining agents whose position gives them influence over the voters; may engage and pay voters; and may distribute large sums in providing conveyances for them to the poll; and by a large outlay, apparently innocent, but really influencing large classes of electors, may obtain an ascendency due to his means, or inclination for expenditure, but which is really often as efficacious as the direct purchase of votes. It is true that the legislature has interposed some slight checks to this outlay. The candidate may not provide ribbons and cockades, under a penalty of 40s. He may not pay into the voter's hands the expenses of his conveyance to the poll, but he may provide such conveyance: and he must pay all expenses

through a public officer, who is to publish an account of all moneys so expended. There is no doubt that under this system great facilities exist for corrupt payments. It is worthy of consideration whether, as suggested by the late attorney-general, the expenses legally payable should not be strictly defined; whether expense of any kind should be incurred without the concurrence of some public officer, who should be charged with seeing that the law is strictly enforced; whether the engagement of more than a limited number of agents in proportion to the size of the constituency, should not be forbidden; whether under any circumstances the expense of voters resorting to the poll should be defrayed by the candidate ; whether the violation of any of these provisions should not, without reference to intention, be visited with the loss of the seat. It would be impossible, in the present state of public opinion, to throw the necessary expenses of the election on the constituency, as appears to have been the ancient practice, a course which might be attended with grave inconvenience, as tending to augment contests where no doubt existed as to the feelings of the electors; but a rigorous limitation of the expenditure seems the only feasible mode of preventing an outlay which, apparently legitimate, is frequently used for the purposes of corruption.

Under the present system the cost is enormous, and is evidenced by the printed returns of the expenses incurred in late elections, reaching, in contests for large boroughs, frequently to 4000l. or 5000l. for each candidate.

It has been suggested that a further mode of prevention will be found in compelling each candidate at an election to declare on oath that he would not resort, and each member, upon taking his seat, that he had not resorted, to corrupt practices to secure his election. Without entering into the discussion of the efficacy of such a proposal, it is sufficient to say that as the bribery oath formerly administered to the voter was repealed, on grave consideration, by the Corrupt Practices Act, as not only inefficacious for the object, but as tempting him to add the crime of perjury to that of corruption, it would be unadvisable to add to the number of promissory oaths.